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ABSTRACT 
This research aims to answer the following questions: How does religion 
(in particular Judaism) affect the quality of democracy in Israel? Why, 
historically, religion assumed this role? How the correlation between religion 
and democracy affects the life of the so called "dominant" Jewish group?  
Using the TODEM method for democratic deepening, the procedural 
dimensions are investigated. The dimensions are: rule of law, electoral 
and inter-institutional accountability, participation and competition. 
After analyzing of all of them, a strong influence of religion is found in 
rule of law, participation and competition. This influence is evident at 
the institutional as well as at the social level and deeply affects the 
quality of democracy. Although the research does not question the 
belonging of Israel to the democratic group, a label is created to 
underline the shaping influence of religion: Orthodemocracy. This term 
refers both to the institutional role of religion (all recognized religions 
in Israel are given this role) and, in a more specific acceptation, to the 
role of Orthodox Judaism. The legal validity of religious norms in 
Orthodemocracy creates paths of discrimination and inequality that 
greatly impact on the daily life of the citizens. Jewish citizens, that a 
popular ethnic approach portrays as dominant in the Israeli society are 
all but exempted from the discriminatory effects.  
The strong influence that religion plays has historical reasons: this 
research argues that the source of power, since the diffusion of the 
nationalistic ideology, was the need for the state-enterprise to be agreed 
upon among all Jews. Religious legitimization, especially at the 
international level, was an absolute necessity for the Zionist project. 
Benefiting from this very political need, the religious minority 
managed to achieve astounding victories in terms of autonomy and 
influence in the society. After the dominance of the Zionists political 
leadership extinguished, the power was maintained through a new 
political role that the religious parties acquired in the fragmented 
Israeli society: that of Kingmakers. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The relation between religion and democracy in Israel, where religion is 
intertwined in an inextricable way to ethnicity, is a much debated issue. 
Many scholars addressed the topic of the secularity of the State, talked 
about citizenship, social conflict and exclusion. The definition of Israel 
as a Jewish and democratic State has been raising doubts and criticisms. 
In some cases it has also been defined as an oxymoron.  
Many of the theories elaborated on the topic tend to focus on the 
repercussions that this regime has on the status of the Arab population 
of Israel, emphasizing the ethnic cleavage existing in the society. While 
doing so, a dominant position is attributed to the Jewish population. 
This group is depicted in its entireness, as a body that enjoys the 
benefits provided by an ad hoc regime. I considered this approach non 
satisfactory since it lacks the ability to fully picture the Israeli society. In 
my review, I enlightened how the concepts of ethnic democracy, 
majoritarian democracy and in general the approaches based on the 
ethnic cleavage only partially describe rooted mechanisms of 
discrimination and State malfunctioning whose consequences affect the 
life of the Jewish population. 
As a consequence, I found a greater scientific interest in investigating 
the religious issue and trying answering the following questions:  
How does religion (in particular Judaism) affect the quality of democracy in 
Israel? Why, historically, religion assumed this role? How the correlation 
between religion and democracy affects the life of the so called "dominant" 
Jewish group?  
Questions concerning the relation between religion and democracy in 
Israel have been addressed before and answered according to different 
disciplinary approaches (legal, political, sociological, historical etc.). In 
the first chapter the main approaches were reviewed. An extensive 
theoretical investigation was made on the concept of democracy and its 
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definition. The focus was directed to the concept of liberal democracy, 
considered a model to tend to in many of the ethnic-oriented studies. 
Indeed, liberal democracy is one of the most common and praised 
models of democracy. I discussed its structural features and its 
implementation and I reported views on its inadequacy in defending 
its citizens or to promote reciprocal acceptation and harmony.. A liberal 
democratic regime would not necessarily guarantee a high democratic 
quality: structural elements need to be accompanied by a democratic 
culture in order to be effective and not to lead to distortions. The 
existence of a democratic culture both in the pre-State Jewish 
community and in the State era was questioned. Many scholars answer 
negatively to this question. In the last part of my literature review, I 
acknowledged the necessity to conduct a deep analysis of the Israeli 
democracy and I reviewed some of the main approaches that suggest 
an investigation on the actual functioning of democracy as one of the 
fundamental indicator of its quality. In this context, I introduced the 
methodological tool that I chose for my investigation: the TODEM 
method for democratic deepening.  
This method begins the epistemological activity with the exploration of 
the concept of quality and traces three semantic paths (quality as a 
procedure, quality as content and quality as a result). These 
acceptations are then translated in dimensions according to which 
democracy is analyzed. The procedural, substantial and result 
dimensions are further divided in sub-dimensions and then in 
indicators on which is possible to operate a qualitative and quantitative 
investigation. I decided to focus  on the procedural dimensions (that 
are rule of law, electoral and inter-institutional accountability, 
participation and competition), in order to examine the provisions that 
govern the functioning of the Israeli democracy. I investigated deeply 
the aspect of the rule of law since a great relevance is generally 
recognized to this aspect; additionally, it was mentioned in the original 
form of the TODEM model as the basic one. The deepening on the 
procedural dimension did not exclude the other dimensions that 
actually emerged during the dissertation, proving the essential 
interconnection among the dimensions. The provisions and settings 
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linkable to specific aspect of religion were of course enlightened to be 
later collected and further elaborated in my third chapter.  
In the third chapter I noted how religion affects democracy in the 
administration of justice both standing as an alternative pole of legal 
authority and actually discussing the very nature of the law. I pointed 
out the role of the religious parties in the formation of Governments: 
their blackmail power as well as their ability to influence the 
governmental agenda and the allocation of public funds. Further, I 
noticed a double path in the connection between religion and 
participation. From one hand, the level of religiosity is linked to 
segregationist tendencies and refusal of participating. On the other 
hand, some successful experiments of integration and social approval 
have been autonomously started by the segregationist communities. 
The implemented projects are benefic activities that are promoted since 
they are seen as the implementation of religious values and deeds.  
After contextualizing these findings in a historical framework, I drafted 
my conclusions:  
The above mentioned impact of religion in the Israeli democracy 
discards the view of a society that is strictly divided along the ethnic 
line Jewish VS Arab population. Segments of the so called “dominant 
group” are themselves object of some kind of unequal treatment and 
discrimination. In particular, the outcomes of my research enabled me 
to elaborate the new label of Orthodemocracy, a compromise between 
democracy and Jewish Orthodoxy that seems to cut the Israeli society 
(especially referring to the Jewish population) along the confessional 
line more that along the ethnic one. For some aspects, it is not wrong to 
say that Israeli democracy treats the inhabitants of the State first as 
members of religious groups, then as members of ethnic groups and 
only in the end citizens of the state. 
Through the historical consideration, the role of the Status Quo 
emerged as the proof of the political power that the religious 
component of the Jewish community acquired since the moment in 
which the State started to be ideated. I claim this power to be a 
symbolic one, given the relatively numeric minority that the religious 
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component represented at the time. The power that the religious faction 
had was the power of legitimizing the State-project (and then the State) 
that the secular Zionist elite was in need for. An agreement on the basic 
features of the State led to the recognition of the state project by the 
religious community (both Zionist and not Zionist), providing Israel 
with legitimization also in the international panorama.  
The following developments, both in the legal system and in the 
society, are the result of a continuous negotiation on the meaning of 
Israel as a political and a symbolic entity and on the unsolvable diatribe 
about the Jewish identity. A consociational inclusive approach was the 
political answer to the dilemma. When the political power of the 
Zionist leadership came to an end and new political dynamics took 
force, consociational approach left the pace to a more "real" 
competition. By that moment, however, religious parties were 
consolidated and able to benefit from their new role of kingmakers. In 
the meanwhile the social fracture between secular and religious 
deepened due to a radicalization of the religious agenda and an 
extension of their requests but also due to the massive secularization 
that the majority of the Israeli society underwent. Till today politics 
seems to be unable to offer solutions to this consuming "identity 
debate" that now has been going on for decades. On the contrary it 
appears short-sighted and immersed itself in the dilemma.  
On the light of the findings of this research a glimmer is seen in the 
positive role that basic religious values can have as incentive to 
participate and contribute. Looking at the minority but successful 
experiments of religious participation it seems that this path can be 
useful to harmonize social acceptation and valorization of one's value. 
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CHAPTER 1 
How Israeli democracy is assessed: a critical review of the 
literature 
 
 
1.1 ETHNIC CLEAVAGE AND DEMOCRACY 
The ethnic cleavage is largely applied when studying Israeli society 
since it has always been extremely relevant in shaping the history and 
political-social situation of the area. 
During the Ottoman Empire, well before the creation of the state and 
even before the Mandate period, the area was populated by many 
different ethnic groups; each with its own religion, culture and ad hoc 
legal system. After the decline of the multicultural and multinational 
Ottoman Empire, the Mandate period saw an intensifying tension 
among the groups in Palestine. This was due to an alteration in the 
numerical proportions of the Jewish population and also to the 
declared nationalist aspirations that were slowly beginning to take 
form. 
The creation of the State and its aftermath all but ameliorated the 
existing inter-ethnic relationships in any aspect while some sub-ethnic 
challenges were posed by new waves of immigration, especially within 
the Jewish population. 
In modern times the ethnic divisions are still one of the key elements in 
Israel. Its origin stems from historical events but also affects present 
and possible future outcomes. Many scholars focus on this aspect, often 
extending the perspective to include the broader Middle Eastern 
geographical area. 
Nonetheless, in the specific analysis of the Israeli case, too much focus 
is placed on this issue, risking underestimation of other issues that are 
equally important. The main weaknesses of this approach that will be 
explained in this critical review are:  
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 When assessing democratic functioning and quality of democracy in 
general, the Jewish population of Israel tends to be considered as a 
unitarian actor whose main feature is the dominance of the system. 
 The adoption of the ethnic criterion as the only discriminant in 
assessing the inclusiveness and the equality of the democratic system 
leaves some cases uncovered. In this way, equally consistent areas of 
inequality and discrimination are not reported or included in the 
model. The chosen classification criterion therefore is not fully able to 
“picture the reality". 
 The analysis of the Jewish population of Israel based on the same 
ethnic criterion portrays a quasi-stereotypical situation. Intra-subgroup 
lines of differentiation and the historical developments are not taken 
into account. The contradiction is evident when analyzing the 
discontent of the Ashkenazi secular group (seen as the dominant 
subgroup) toward the democratic system.  
In light of my stance, the literature review will start with an analysis of 
the concept of ethnic democracy, coined by Smooha and attributed to 
Israel. Smooha1 compares Israel to other Western democracies and 
argues that neither the liberal democratic model nor the consociational 
one can be assimilated into the Israeli model since Israel would not 
possess the main features that these definitions require.  
In a liberal democracy, the individual is at the center of the interest of 
the State with disregard to his national or ethic belonging. The 
neutrality of the State is accompanied by an attempt to create a civic 
identity to which all citizens can develop a sense of belonging.  In a 
consociational State, collective rights would be granted along with the 
civic one. In order to preserve the existence and identity of both groups, 
separate institutions for both groups would be maintained2 Other types 
                                                 
1 Smooha, S. (2003).  The Nation before the State in J. E. David (ed.) The State of Israel: 
Between Judaism and Democracy, Jerusalem: IDI, pp. 371- 377. 
2 On consociational democracy see also Lijphart A., (1968). The Politics of 
Accommodation. Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands, Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
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of democracy such as the multicultural democratic model are also 
excluded, mainly because they lack a civic approach to ruling and have 
a strong tendency toward unequal treatment of their citizens (according 
to their ethnic belonging). 
The model of ethnic democracy3 describes a hybrid regime. An ethnic 
democracy meets the minimum definition of democracy; it grants civil 
liberties, political, social and human rights for all permanent residents. 
Some collective rights are also granted to minority groups (for example 
autonomy in language, religious institutions, schools and cultural 
organizations) but a consistent part of them is denied. For example, the 
recognition of civil equality and the free expression of national 
belonging are not the State’s priority. On the contrary, they are seen as 
a potential threat. Minority groups are allowed to struggle for equal 
rights both publicly and institutionally as well as through their 
representative in elective bodies, to whom they have free access.  
In an ethnic democracy, the State supports an ethno-nationalistic 
ideology. The State is considered a prerogative of the dominant ethnic 
group whose components, with exception of a few cases, are 
determined by lineage. The symbols of the State (language, religion, 
institutions, flags and anthems, name of places etc.) are affected by the 
dominant culture. Also laws and policies, especially those regulating 
naturalization, immigration and ownership of land and businesses, are 
biased in favor of the core ethnic nation. 
In a lighter and more subtle way than the Herrenvolk democracy4, the 
ethnic democracy defines a privileged group of citizens on the basis of 
ethnic belonging. The minority group is marginalized with open 
discrimination and stigmatization as a threat to the survival and 
                                                 
3 Smooha S., (2001). Ethnic Democracy a model. Working paper n. 13, European Centre 
for Minority Issues  
4 The term "Herrenvolk democracy" was used by  Pierre van den Berghe to describe 
South African regime during the apartheid period. This term refers to a democracy that is 
officially limited to the dominant group only. Other scholars like Yfitachel took into 
consideration this definition for Israel, refusing it since the state of Israel grants important 
civil and political right to the non-dominant groups. See Yfitachel O. (1999), Ethnocracy: 
The Politics of Judaizing Israel-Palestine in Constellations, 6, 364-391 
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integrity of the ethnic nation. This discourages and prevents the 
minority group from taking an effective part in the decisional making 
process and becoming an accredited actor in the political arena.   
The concept of Ethnic Democracy is largely used and its validity is 
recognized by a substantial number of scholars and analysts. Some 
other scholars go as far as to explain how the tyranny of the majority 
makes Israel into a "majoritarian state" and not a democracy.5  
Nevertheless the ability of this theory to effectively describe the Israeli 
quality of democracy seems to be somehow limited. This model was 
developed during a study about the Jewish Arab relations but 
developed from there into a more independent and organic framework. 
The whole model suffers from the original approach, which focuses on 
the ethnic division and underestimates the multidimensional political 
and social conflict in Israel. This prevents it from offering an accurate 
representation of the current Israeli democracy.  
According to the definition of Smooha, “inequality and dominance 
prevail not only in practice but also in theory6” and the State ends up a 
tool in the hands of the majority (in this case, the Jewish group) who 
protect only their interests and work towards the enhancement of their 
own life-conditions as their main purpose. The examples that he gives 
are numerous and mostly fitting his  theory however,  as it is a model 
for a regime and not a model for studying the relationships among 
different ethnic groups in a State, it should be noted that inequality and 
discrimination in Israel might be perpetrated not only through ethnic 
lines.  
Ethnic democracy is defined as a diminished democracy. In the case of 
Israel, the Arab minority is stated to be the victim of this spoiled regime 
however its members are granted individual and collective rights: 
human, social, civil and political as well as the rights of a recognized 
minority (language, schools, media, cultural and religious institutions.) 
                                                 
5 Navot D., (2002) Is the State of Israel Democratic? The Question of Israel’s Democratic 
State  in the wake of October Events, Tel Aviv University (Hebrew)  
6 Smooha, S. (2003) The Nation before the State in J. E. David (ed.) The State of Israel: 
Between Judaism and Democracy, Jerusalem: IDI pp. 371- 377. 
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It is worth noting that a significant portion of individual and collective 
rights are negated to some Jewish Israeli citizens while others are 
negated to all Israeli citizens on the basis of a survival of religious 
dominance on these spheres.7 Cases of unequal treatment toward the 
Jewish population of Israel have been a leading political debate for 
years now (public funds to religious communities, non-recognition of 
the non-Orthodox rabbinical authority, exemption from military service 
for the Ultraorthodox,8 etc.) 
Also the definition of “majority group” could be problematic. Smooha 
educated himself in some of his studies on the cultural and value 
heterogeneity of Jewish Israeli population (see below the positions of 
the critical approach.) For many years their sub-ethnic origin put them 
in a different position in Israeli society and exposed them to an unequal 
treatment by the state that, according to many researchers would have 
deeply harmed the development of an egalitarian democracy in Israel. 
This effect would still be in action today.  
Even the Jewishness of the State, unquestioningly considered as a 
major feature of Israel (part of the ideology that is mirrored in the social 
dynamics of the State) is a debated definition. There are different 
meanings attributed to this. The debate is not devoid of ideological 
connotation and the division reflects on both the theoretical meaning 
and on the practical effects of the relations with the non-Jewish 
minorities. The divisions created in trying to define the concept of 
“Jewishness” are proved to be associated with levels of religiosity, both 
in public opinion and in the political implementation of policies. 
In the model, the dominance of the majority is evident also in the 
symbolic system of the State. The core group imposes its cultural, 
religious and historical background as the source for symbolic 
institutional production. This would prevent the sense of belonging for 
the minority, a clear discriminatory attitude. Israel’s calendar, 
                                                 
7 Freedom of religious expression for example is often denied to non -Orthodox streams 
of Judaism. Freedom of marriage is negated to all citizens in the country. 
8 The exemption issue has been recently reconsidered and the Supreme Court has stated 
the illegitimacy of this provision. However, a new norm has not been implemented and, 
for the moment, a sort of legislative vacuum have not lead to any solution.  
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festivities, sites of commemoration, heroes, flag, emblem, national 
anthem, names of places and the very name of the state belong to the 
Jewish semiotic sphere. However, many have noticed how this element 
is not exceptional if compared with most of the Western democracies9. 
It is also important to recognize that the creation of the State of Israel is 
the result of a deep conflict both with the indigenous Arab population 
and with other Arab countries. This creates a deep sense of hostility in 
the Jewish collective memory and the accepting of mixed symbols 
might have been utopic at that time. The formation and the change of 
collective memory is quite a long process and the relationship between 
the two groups has remained tense. For this reason, it is problematic to 
hypothesize any change in this sense.  
On the other hand, Israel does not impose to non-Jewish citizens a strict 
adherence to the symbolic apparatus. By the law, non-Jews are entitled 
to their day of rest. In non-Jewish communities, institutions and 
services work regularly during the Jewish festivities offering a very 
important occasion of cultural contact and alternative to those Jewish 
citizens that do not want to comply with the duties and restrictions of 
the Jewish calendar that entails religious prescriptions. Cultural 
expression is not forbidden to non-Jewish minorities.10 The problem is 
that due to the aforementioned historical reasons, the collective 
memories and symbols of the State of Israel are often conflicting and 
                                                 
9 For example, the French version of the Canadian anthem sings: "As is thy arm ready to 
wield the sword, so also is it ready to carry the cross" and the English flag has the cross of 
St. George on it. In Europe as well as in America, an uncountable number of places' name 
begins with "Saint".  On the cognition of the diffuse use of "partisan" symbols as state 
symbols all over the world see, Yakobson, A., Rubinstein, A., (2008). Israel and the family 
of nations: The Jewish state and human rights. London: Routledge. 
10 To this statement a quite crucial exception needs to be made: the so called Naqba Law, 
passed by the Knesset in 2011, ruled the curtailment of funds to organizations that are 
active in the commemoration of the Naqba Day, in which Arab citizens recall the 
establishment of the State of Israel as the cause of the deportation of many Arabs outside 
Israel and the deprivation of their lands. This is a too complex issue to be treated in a 
footnote but contrasting positions have been expressed: the supporters claiming that a 
State cannot fund events that regard its establishment like a tragedy; the detractors 
pointing at the law as a deprivation of the freedom of expression and the attempt to 
suffocate minorities' narrative. 
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this creates tension and reciprocal refusal. In this aspect, a process of 
reconciliation may be necessary. 
In the attempt to prove the Jewish ethno-national political dominance, 
it is often pointed out how the various Jewish political parties 
cooperate, especially through parliamentary coalitions, while the Arab 
parties are never taken into account as viable allies. This review does 
not attempt to minimize the commitment on the part of the Jewish 
political elite to exclude the Arab parties and representatives from 
official entrance in the majority coalition, however it may be more 
appropriate to focus for a moment on precisely how the political 
spectrum has become so sharply divided between religious and secular 
parties. (The Arab parties are not included when referring to the 
“dominant group.”) It is a symptom of another deep divide that cannot 
be left behind when dealing with the quality of Israeli democracy and 
its party system. The customary coalition between religious and secular 
parties in the Government is reported as proof of a solid axis of Jewish 
parties against the Arab parties, with discriminatory intents. These 
alliances are notoriously considered to be one of the biggest causes of 
political immobility and instability in the country.11 Historically, 
however, it is possible to register moments of external collaboration 
with Arab parties. During Yitzhak Rabin's government in the early 
1990s, the government survived thanks to the support of some 
members of Arab parties.12 The external support offered by the Arab 
parties to certain coalition governments led by the Labor party is 
described as another vexatious and exploiting measure perpetrated by 
the Jewish political class. On the contrary, it reveals a vivid and open 
political debate within the party system and opens future possibilities 
for further political agreement and inclusion.  
                                                 
11 In the attempt to solve this chronic instability, the electoral system has been reformed 
in 1992. This proved to be totally ineffective as a solution and after few years the old 
method was restored. 
12 This case is recalled by Peled as the less discriminatory period of Israeli history. See 
Peled Y., (2005) Ethnic democracy revisited in Israel Studies Forum, 20:1, 2005, pp. 3-27. 
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The prevailing “primordial solidarity”13 among the Jewish political 
actors in Israel is certainly consequence of the Zionist political culture 
and of the historical conflicting situation among Jews and Arabs (both 
within the Mandate Palestine and more generally in the Middle Eastern 
region) but even if it deeply affects levels of inclusiveness and power 
sharing, it cannot be considered a reason to define a regime as 
discriminatory. There is no legal provision against Arab involvement in 
a ruling coalition or as members of government. On the other hand, an 
amendment to the Basic Law: the Knesset,14 restricts the participation 
and election of political parties that contain within their programs the 
denial of Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people and the 
elaboration of parliamentary motions with the same content. This 
constraint, however, extends both to Jewish and Arab parties and 
concurrently forbids any incitement of racism as well as the denial of 
Israel as a democracy. This rule , moreover, has been not been 
restrictively applied by the Supreme Court which has generally 
allowed the presentation of every party, disregarding possible 
“problematic platforms” or the enunciation of “forbidden 
statements.”15 
The same ethnic criterion of analysis is applied when criticizing the 
immigration policy of the State of Israel and in particular the Law of 
Return. This is considered as one of the clearest examples of the “ethnic 
ascendancy criterion”. Jews and their descendants (including those not 
halachically16 Jewish) are extended automatic citizenship and their 
immigration is welcomed and favored. A blatant difference is noted 
between the possibility of Jewish people to easily immigrate as 
                                                 
13 On the concept of primordial solidarity see Gutmann E. (1981), "Religion and its Role in 
National Integration in Israel," in Michael Curtis (ed.), Religion and Politics in the Middle 
East Boulder, CO: Westview Press 
14 Basic Law the Knesset, amendment 7a. For the full text see: 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic2_eng.htm 
15 Emblematic is the decision that the Supreme Court took in 2009, overturning the 
Central Elections Committee's decision and admitting to elections the United Arab List-
Ta'al and Balad. The accusation that was moved to these parties was the non-recognition 
of the state of Israel and the incitation to fight against it. 
16 Lit. "According to the Halacha". Halacha is the Jewish religious law and it comprehends 
direct prescription from the Bible and rules of rabbinical creation.  
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“returnees” and the impossibility of Arab “returnees” to come back to 
their pre-State period land. In reality, the “restrictive interpretation” of 
this law, which in many cases required the intervention of the Supreme 
Court, demonstrates that members of the Jewish group also undergo 
some unequal treatment. Non-Orthodox Jews were initially negated the 
right of aliyah,17 as it was then recognized by the Supreme Court, while 
converted non-Orthodox Jews are still not entitled to receive all the 
benefits of citizens even after having immigrated and acquired 
citizenship under the Law of Return. These Jews cannot marry, divorce 
or receive funeral services, including burial, within the State of Israel. 
Their descendants are also ineligible for these services unless they 
undergo a recognized conversion process. This policy requires serious 
reflection on the internal dynamics that rule the membership to the 
“dominant group,” displaying some weakness in the ethnic approach 
while corroborating the importance of the religious aspect. This concept 
is partially contained in Smooha's theory when he states that belonging 
to the core ethnic nation is defined as innate, but it is also possible to 
acquire if the requirements are met. Which ethnic status is possible to 
acquire beyond the one that a person is born with? 
Smooha makes a very wise consideration when he reports that Jewish 
religious identity and Arab Islamic religious identity are the prominent 
identities rather than a shared Israeli civic identity. Here is the 
conundrum: the religious identity is the one that critically shapes the 
Israeli society and the ethnic identity is not enough to fully portrait the 
situation. The Arab world is much more variegated than this model 
depicts and the differences of faith among the Arabs are very 
discriminant when analyzing the relationship with the Jewish majority 
as per their status within the society. Druses, for example, have a much 
higher status in the Israeli society in regards social integration. They 
regularly serve in the armed forces and their relationship with the 
                                                 
17 Aliyah is the right of immigrate to Israel as an act of return to the ancient land of the 
Jews. This process is regulated by the Law of return. It grants an easier bureaucratic iter 
of naturalization, a mostly free process of assimilation (language, culture and 
socialization) and, especially in the past, gave access to some preferential (and public 
funded) forms of help for housing and employment.  
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Jewish population is not as tense. Christian Arabs also enjoy more 
integration and are less pressured by security control or public distrust.  
In ethnic democracy there is a contradiction between democracy and 
ethnic ascendancy: the reality in Israel is a more complex contradiction 
that includes in the picture the issue of religious faith as a central 
element18. 
Those who support the idea of an ethnic dominance in Israel, argue 
that Israel cannot be labeled as a liberal democracy because the state 
focuses on ethnic groups, not just individuals. The hypothesis that will 
be examined in this analysis, however, is that the Israeli democracy 
treats the inhabitants of the State first as members of religious groups, 
then as members of ethnic groups and only at the end, as citizens of the 
State. One could ask why, in Israel, the ethnic criterion is so deeply 
intertwined with the religious one. Perhaps because Israel, as a Jewish 
State, aims to mirror the overlapping dynamic of ethnicity and 
religious belonging that is present in Judaism?  Since the insistent 
complain of the secular Jewish group, can we define this dynamic 
something agreed upon at least by the "dominant group"? Why then, 
did the State adopt it and build an institutional system around it? 
 
 
Ethnic criterion in the analysis of the Israeli Jewish group 
The ethnic criteria is largely used both for the creation of a model of 
democracy and in the study of Israeli Jewish society. Many scholars 
based their theory on this element in order to prove an internal path of 
discrimination within the Jewish group. The most popular voices in 
this sense are: Kimmerling, Yiftachel, Smooha, Rouhana and other 
scholars of the school of social critic and the critical social science. This 
approach to the analysis of the Israeli democracy and society might 
                                                 
18 For the role of religion as a crucial factor in the preservation of ethno-nationalism see 
Don-Yehiya E.& Susser B. (1999) Israel and the Decline of the Nation State in the West in 
Modern Judaism, May 187-202. They also define Israel as an “exceptional” liberal 
democracy because it did not manage to create a proper multicultural society. 
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lead to the same distorted results reached by the assimilationist 
approach that these scholars try to disenfranchise from. 
As Kimmerling19 summarizes perfectly, historiography and sociology 
in Israel followed a path of development that went toward the 
progressive recognition of cultural and social heterogeneity in Israel. 
The assimilationist approach, guided both early Israeli historiography 
and sociology. Its main representative and founding father, 
Eisenstadt,20 described Israeli society as a whole, righteously and 
successfully oriented toward the absorption of immigrants from 
different countries in the spirit of Zionist “ingathering of exiles.” 
According to this approach, the ethnic rift within the Jewish group 
would have been overcome thanks to the emergence of a common 
Israeli culture, materialized in a universal use of Hebrew, a high rate of 
intermarriage, social mobility and lack of ethnic conflict. This would 
have been favored by the common ethnic descent, a common religion, 
history and homeland. As Smooha maintains,21 this original group of 
assimilationist scholars and those who are defined as “new 
assimilationist” define the ethnic divide in Israel as mainly symbolic 
with neither practical consequences society's dynamics nor quality of 
democracy. Israel would have become increasingly tolerant toward 
these kinds of symbolic manifestations, favoring the insurgence of a 
multicultural society.  
The main criticisms to this approach regard the delegitimization of 
ethnic differences and the assumption of uniformity as a premise for 
national unity. Jewish ethnic heterogeneity is depicted as real and not 
just symbolic and the different ethnic identities of Jewish Israelis are 
recognized as well defined. The most radical voices put the democratic 
nature of the regime under question, seeing it as deeply vexatious not 
only toward the Arab minority but also toward some Jewish ethnic 
groups (in particular Mizrachim, Russians and Ethiopians) who would 
                                                 
19 Kimmerling B., (2001). The invention and decline of Israeliness, Los Angeles and 
Berkeley UC Press   
20 Eisenstadt S., (1967) Israeli Society , New York: Basic Books 
21Smooha S., (2004). Jewish Ethnicity in Israel, symbolic or real? Jews in Uzi Rebhun (ed.) 
Israel: Contemporary Social and Cultural Patterns, Hannover: Brandeis University Press. 
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have faced an unequal treatment in the integration process. Its 
consequences and traces would persist into the current day in terms of 
economic and social realization. The Israeli democracy would therefore 
suffer from the distortions of an ethnic stratification that was created in 
the first years of the State and which has continued to shape the Israeli 
society. The critical approach, which aims to give a more detailed and 
authentic picture of Israeli society while emphasizing a number of 
critical points in the Israeli democracy, operates in the same 
“assimilationist way” of the assimilationist approach. It considers the 
ethnic feature as the only/main line along which identification is 
created. Ethnic identity is progressively losing relevance in shaping the 
political and social conflict while other fractures persist in their divisive 
power.22 Some research23 showed the lack of an a priori exclusion based 
on ethnic criteria but rather an inclusion, albeit with a certain inequality 
of opportunities. The inclusion was dependent on the acceptation of a 
“modern, westernized standard” which seems to be more due to an 
ideological credo.  The same critical scholars recognize that a growing 
number of Israelis (born from mixed marriages for example) do not 
recognize themselves as belonging to a specific ethnic group. Might it 
be the result of a successful (or terribly effective) strategy of 
assimilation? Might it be attributed to the identification with a higher 
status group24 or to other causes? Nonetheless, it lacks a complete 
explanatory power.  
Another doubt is in regards to some considerations on the “sub-ethnic 
hegemony” of the Ashkenazi group and its distortion power. Before the 
State was created, a solid community in the Yshuv took form. Its 
members were of mainly Eastern European origin and had moved to 
Palestine partly for ideological reasons and partly looking for new life-
opportunities. From this community, a collective identity originated, 
                                                 
22 Peres Y., Ben Rafael E., Fishler A., (2001) The inter-ethnic cleavage in Israel, a research 
report. Tel Aviv: Rabin Center for Israel Studies 
23 Khazzoom A., (2003). The Great Chain of Orientalism: Jewish Identity, Stigma 
Management, and Ethnic Exclusion in Israel, in American Sociological Review, 68, Aug.  
481–510. 
24 Klor, E. F. & Shayo M., (2007), Social Identity and Preferences Over Redistribution 
Discussion Paper No. DP6406, CEPR. 
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mainly based on Zionist values. Among them was physical force, 
masculine resistance to the concrete difficulties and sacrifice for the 
community. Palestine was progressively populated by new waves of 
Jewish immigrants, both coming from Eastern Europe and from Arab 
countries (Middle East and North Africa). After the political and 
historical developments that led to the formation of the State, the Yshuv 
veteran members established as leading political and intellectual class 
discriminated the new immigrants, orientalizing25 them and preventing 
them from socio-economic development as well as preventing them 
from influencing the society with their background. The new citizens 
were therefore considered a potential destructive element that was to 
be neutralized in a definitive way. Their Diasporic identity was seen as 
dangerous to the Western aspirations of the European Zionist leading 
class. Those following this critical approach remark on the persistence 
of the sub-ethnic dominance (perpetuated by the Ashkenazim not only 
with the wave of immigration of the Mizrachim, but also with the 
Russians and the Ethiopians) as deeply affecting Israeli democracy. 
This view has been popular for a long time, even though a certain 
improvement in the arena of inter-ethnic relations was later noticed. 
These critic researchers state the absolute dominance of the “secular 
successful Ashkenazi,”26 fully embodying the Israeli man and enjoying 
a society that was built around his needs and culture. This definition 
claims to point out the ethnic criterion but misses partially the point for 
two reasons. First, it adds two elements to the ethnic connotation: the 
economic/professional realization (“successful”) and the religious 
component (“secular”). The ethnic connotation therefore, seems to be 
inadequate to define satisfactory the current Israeli society and or to 
make precise assessments on the quality of Israeli democracy.  Second, 
it should cause us to reflect on the fact that the “dominant prototype of 
Israeli” that has been portrayed could have been the one that feels more 
discriminated by the legal and institutional system as well as by the 
policies applied by the Governments. That gives religion an important 
role in defining the life of all its citizens. The dissatisfaction of this 
                                                 
25 For the concept of Orientalization see above Khazzoom A. (2003) 
26 Smooha S. (1993) Jewish ethnicity in Israel, in Kyle K. & Peters J. (eds.) Whither Israel? 
The Domestic Challenges London and New York: I.B. Tauris and Co. Ltd.  
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Ashkenazi success citizen may also be shared by many non-Ashkenazi 
citizens according to their approach toward religion. This would open a 
more inter-ethnic and general approach to the interpretation of Israeli 
democracy. 
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1.2 LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: FORMAL ASPECTS AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 
In the previous section, the concept of liberal democracy was 
mentioned as a crucial term of comparison, being one of the most 
widespread models in Western world. Sometimes it is considered a 
synonym for the concept of democracy tout court and for this reason it 
deserves a special attention. As always, when trying to define macro-
concepts in political science, the definition is one of the most 
controversial parts. Democracy is considered to be a continuum and the 
semantic borders of this concept are variable in several directions. 
Further considerations in this regard will be explained in the next 
chapter: specific definitions of democracy will be mentioned and the 
features and explicative power of the TODEM method of analysis will 
be illustrated. The TODEM method in fact has been chosen as 
methodological tool to assess the quality of democracy in Israel. The 
concept of liberal democracy also suffers from these uncertainties of 
definition; however it is possible to find some basic features on which 
the scientific consensus is widespread: 
a) The role of the individual 
The commitment to guarantee a greater level of liberty is implicit in the 
label of Liberal Democracy. Freedom and the ability to shape one's own 
fate are the philosophical ideas that guide liberalism. The same 
individualistic view is applied to society and citizenship. Society is 
meant to be a gathering of individuals potentially able to self-regulate 
and reach prosperity. The relationship between the State and its 
citizens therefore is dual: the State grants citizens with rights provided 
they fulfill duties. Due to the optimistic view of the individual's ability 
of realization, citizens in a liberal democracy are perceived to be 
autonomous and free. The intervention of the State is limited to prevent 
the violations of other individuals' freedom or of universal norms.  
b) Separation of private and public sphere 
 Liberal regimes might be considered as the righteous subversion of the 
ancient principle of cuius regio eius religio. The authority of the king, at 
that time, had to be so pervasive and complete that those who lived in 
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his kingdom were totally subject to his choices in any sense, even if this 
meant the sudden and total assimilation to a different set of values. The 
State's minimum intervention in liberal democracies only provides the 
basics for the survival of the regime itself. The voluntary adhesion to 
the State,27 a voluntary cession of the minimum personal sovereignty 
necessary for a collective cohabitation, does not prevent total 
independence in those aspect of life that are not essential to the 
functioning of the State.  
A large portion of citizens' life is private, meaning it is inaccessible to 
the State's control and laws. Religion, personal values, ethnicity, 
sexuality and political views are included in the private sphere. These 
elements are not subject to any legislation and the complete 
disengagement of the State from these issues make them formally 
irrelevant to the status of the individual before the law. Groups or 
associations formed around these issues, both legally and economically, 
are totally ignored by the State. Their formation, however, is permitted. 
The participation or belonging to one of these groups does not 
prejudice the condition of the citizen nor does it constitute a title of 
merit: while individual rights are granted and maintained, collective 
rights are basically nonexistent. 
c) Neutrality of the State 
The State is considered to be an aggregation of individuals that 
voluntarily join the collective on the basis of self-interest. A liberal 
democratic regime, therefore, should ideally be the optimum between 
freedom and security. An opportunistic rationale neither dictated by 
blood affiliation nor by cultural or religious affiliation, presupposes the 
sense of belonging. There is no formal value apparatus beside the 
                                                 
27 The voluntary consent to an organized form of collective life from which state would 
derive its authority is expressed by Locke. Locke defines this moment as crucial for the 
passage from state of nature to state of right. These theories and its ideas on liberal 
democracy are exposed in “Letter concerning toleration”, Quadridge 1689 and  “Second 
Treatise of Government”, 1690 in electronic form at 
http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/7370 
21 
agreed upon concept of liberty and few others that are fundamental to 
maintain the regime.28 
A liberal state refrains from dictating a virtuous path along which 
citizens should walk, not possessing the role and the right to impose a 
moral code on its citizens. Contrary to the classical vision of the state 
(with Plato and Aristotle cited as the most famous examples), in liberal 
states there is neither an ideal citizen nor an educational aspiration. A 
philosophical explanation might be found in Hume29. In addition to the 
agreed upon utilitarian view of the state authority, Hume adds a 
speculation about human inaccessibility to the moral truth. From this, it 
can be derived that no state can be in the position to impose any moral 
code on its citizens, having shown the impossibility to choose with 
certainty among many.  
Even though there is an official language and there might be some 
cultural practices that citizens are minimally required to adapt to, such 
as a day of closure of the public offices, every citizen is free as to 
whether or not to express a sense of belonging to a particular 
community, cultural, linguistic or ethnic group. The requirements for 
inclusion in the State are therefore non-ethnic, non-religious and non-
ascriptive.  
 
 
Is liberal democracy a realistic model? 
This issue is not a minor one. When analyzing regimes, we should keep 
in mind the idealistic nature of the different types we are referring to in 
order to realistically assess the quality of each analyzed regime. A 
normative model indicates some general features that, de facto, are 
rarely completely possessed by a political system. Moreover, States 
have not been created by scientists. Historical facts, social contingencies 
                                                 
28 The elements that are recalled as total concern of the state are the so called “civil 
interests” in which life, liberty, property, and survival are included. See Locke, 1980 
29 Hume D., (1985) The Origin of Government, in Essays: Moral, Political and Literary, 
Miller E. F. (ed.), Indianapolis: Liberty Classics  
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(features of the population, formation of social cleavages and struggles) 
and political events (both internal and external) shape regimes and 
their features more than any ideology that might have been dominant 
in the State-formation period. This could add other factors of risk to the 
preservation of a potential model-based regime. 
The neutrality of the State and the non-affiliation/promotion of a 
preferred set of values, (culture, religion etc.) is a crucial element for a 
liberal democracy. These matters must be relegated to the private 
sphere where the State does not intervene. This definition, however, 
does not fit any State in the world. In fact, “no State exists in a 
demographic or cultural vacuum.”30 Being that the State is a human 
construct, it always reflects the human reality from which it has 
originated. This holds true beyond those aspects that have been 
intentionally set, for example, as a result of a political negotiation. 
Western democracies, main example of liberal democracy, developed 
historically as nation States. They were dominated by and identified 
with a conspicuous national majority. The creation of the political and 
social system was based on a precise background and has never taken 
place ex novo. Usually it implied a radical transformation as compared 
to the previous regime. The development of liberal democracy 
therefore took place through the formal establishment/strengthening of 
a dominant culture, collective memory and language. Zionism, as part 
of the European nationalism, did not act differently from the other 
European movements. As it will be elaborated in the continuation of 
the research, Zionist ideology too was based on a specific cultural and 
historical background. Zionists rejected it on one hand but, on the other 
hand, they used it as a cornerstone for the construction of the new 
ideology. If on the formal side liberal democracies are ethnically 
inclusive and not discriminatory on the basis of religious or ethnic 
belonging, on the other side they offer an undisputable mainstream to 
which everybody is asked to assimilate, without any interim possibility 
of change. The adopted values, language and culture become an 
essential part of the State, which have to remain unquestioned in a sort 
                                                 
30 Dowty, A. (1998) The Jewish State: A Century Later, Updated With a New Preface. 
Berkeley: University of California Press.  
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of “civil religion.”31 Formal homogeneity is obtained and the State can 
afford to ignore the residual differences among citizens of different 
groups. Multiculturalists32 stress how the pressure on minority ethno-
cultural groups (as well as minority groups with a different life 
conduct, sexual orientation, etc.) would force them to abandon and 
compromise their distinct heritage or lifestyle. Their dilemma in fact is 
whether to assimilate or being subjected to gross permanent 
discrimination. The difficult implementation of State neutrality is well 
represented by France, one of the most cited examples of a liberal 
democracy. The dominant cultural substratum is clear if simply looking 
at the calendar: beyond the secular festivities that coincide with specific 
moments of the State's history, Christian main festivities are celebrated 
with the closure of public offices and the reduction of public services. A 
similar deduction can be obtained by looking at law number 228 which 
was approved in 2004 by the French Assemblée National regarding the 
laity of the State. This law’s main provision is a ban from wearing 
dresses or showing symbols that ostensibly reveal a religious 
belonging. An interesting analysis of the norm and its meaning comes 
from Acanfora. Acanfora reflects on the laicitè de combat that France 
seems to strengthen as an absolute value even at the price of 
discriminating against the freedom of expression of its own citizens.33 
The point that should be enlightened is connected to this analysis but of 
a slightly different approach. It is interesting to reflect on the concept of 
"ostensibility" that is mentioned in the text. The "ostensibility" of a 
symbol is undoubtedly difficult to determine with certainty and leaves 
much room for interpretation to the legislator. This might create a basis 
for discriminatory conduct by the public authority and intensify 
discrimination against religions. How to decide when a symbol can be 
sanctioned? What is the discriminant? Public order seems to be the 
answer; but then, what are the borders of the law? If there is no equal 
                                                 
31 For an interesting analysis on the ineffective laity of liberal democracy see Acanfora V., 
Religione e Stato di diritto. Il Caso Francese in OLIR, 
http://www.olir.it/areetematiche/74/documents/Acanfora_Francia.pdf 
32 See for example Parekh B., (2000) Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and 
Political Theory, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press 
33 Acanfora V., Religione e Stato di diritto. Il Caso Francese in OLIR, 
http://www.olir.it/areetematiche/74/documents/Acanfora_Francia.pdf 
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limit for every citizen, where is the neutrality? Why should the symbol 
be an obstacle to the realization of a laic society? Where are the 
centrality of the individual and the protection of his freedom? The idea 
that liberal democracy is an open system in which citizens are not 
discriminated on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender or religion and are 
entitled to participate in determining, shaping and altering the societal 
goals and features clashes inexorably with the required assimilation 
and the “sacrifice” requested for the preservation of the system. 
Standardization seems to prevent the possibility of any change and 
perpetuates the privileged position of the dominant group. 
Always pointing out the openness of liberal democracy, Smooha agrees 
with Oldfield34 that in liberal democracy, citizens are stratified on the 
basis of their contribution to a common good. The common goals 
should be the elements that define the “good citizen” inasmuch as 
individuals are able to accomplish them. This point is interesting 
mainly because it reveals that the “minimum intervention,” which is 
recognized as a basic feature of liberal democracy, is in reality only an 
ideal and maybe a Utopia. The definition of what is common good 
means that a path has been recognized as the official one. This implies 
the adoption a specific set of values to the detriment of others. The 
dominant group would be, of course, in a favored position as per the 
definition of the “common good,” being favored also in the conquest of 
a superior role in society.  In a very short but meaningful sentence, 
Herzl, speaking about the situation of Jews in the Diaspora, said that 
the “majority may decide who the strangers are.”35 This concept is very 
realistic and is particularly meaningful in this context. In caustic and 
clear language, Western States are defined as very inhospitable 
environments for minorities since they are unable to provide protection 
from the caprice of the dominant group: “might precedes right.”36 
 
                                                 
34 Oldfield A., (1990), Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the Modern 
World, London: Rutledge 
35 Herzl T., (1896), The Jewish State. Electronic version at 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Zionism/herzl2.html 
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Is liberal democracy a good model? 
Till this point, the most salient features of liberal democracy have been 
pointed out. Liberal democracy indeed is one of the main points of 
reference in the analysis of Israeli democracy and it is often considered 
to be a positive model to which Israeli democracy should strive for. It 
has also been enlightened the difficulties of translating this model into 
practice. Also the criticisms that have been moved to this regime are 
now worthy of mention. A number of scholars and scholastic 
conglomerates have outlined the inherent weaknesses in this 
perception of liberal democracy. 
One of the most lucid analyses of liberal democracy comes from Leo 
Strauss. According to his non-egalitarian vision of humankind and 
government, a reference is made to the concept of aristocracy, as defined 
by Aristotle.37 Strauss outlines the difference between individuals, their 
different attitudes, capacities and consciousness. The attitude of 
“minimum intervention” in a liberal democracy when combined with 
the egalitarian principle (as the fundamental feature of democracy) 
creates a premises for a government that is not able to actualize the 
common good. This allows irresponsible people rule the community 
and heavily influence decisions. 
The very nature of liberal democracy as a covenantal entity based on 
voluntary adhesion of individuals enables citizens to stress the 
utilitarian aspect of their belonging and entitles them to seek out their 
personal interests. It also allows them to express their opinions about 
political and social issues, such as the right to vote. The positivist 
approach to society of liberalism also encourages this egoistic attitude 
as the engine of a virtuous mechanism allowing each and every 
individual to improve his/her life conditions. The individualistic 
society that liberal democracy has set would cause the progressive loss 
of the concept of natural right; thus disgracing the moral bases on 
which liberal democratic regimes have been built.  
                                                 
37 For a comprehensive analysis of the political thought of Aristotle and its idea of 
aristocracy see http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-politics/ 
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The neutrality of the State would worsen the situation.  As previously 
stated, liberal democratic regimes profess themselves neutral, 
(Machiavelli would say amorali, separated from the morals,) meaning 
that there is no moral momentum to drive its actions and that it is not 
interested in diffuse among its citizens. According to Strauss, the 
positivist and optimistic attitude supporting liberal democratic regimes 
adopted scientific neutrality when implementing political regimes, 
replacing morals with dogmatic relativism. As a consequence of this, 
the positivistic idea of neutrality would drive the public authority to 
completely suspend judgment. Since the State refrains from enhancing 
any set of values aside from freedom, an intellectual moral vacuum 
would inexorably occur in people’s conscience to which point there 
would be no values toward which to orient their behavior. They would 
no longer be able to discern right from wrong. The consequences could 
be disastrous in terms of relationship among citizens and social order. 
The ideas of tolerance and freedom could be so distorted that the inner 
rationale of liberal democracy is ultimately betrayed. A strict separation 
between public and private sphere is another ingredient in the recipe 
for disaster. In the definition of Strauss: “liberal democracy [...] means 
limited government, the distinction between the public and the private. 
Not only must the private sphere be protected by the law but it must 
also be understood to be impervious to the law.”38 
Liberal democracy is the champion of private freedom. It stems from 
the idea that communal life should not totally renounce the freedom of 
its citizens. The natural condition of man is to be free and rationally 
self-oriented. Therefore, communal authority can be exercised only in a 
limited way because it originates from the agreement of citizens and is 
not set above them as a natural supremacy. However, if the private 
sphere is protected from public interference, the fundamental change 
compared to the ancient illiberal regimes, there is also another aspect to 
be taken into account. Since the private sphere is inaccessible to public 
authority and its citizens are free to live their private lives according to 
the values that they prefer, the private sphere is also not regulated by 
                                                 
38 Deutsch K. L. & Nicgorski W. (ed.) (1994), Leo Strauss Political Philosopher and Jewish 
Thinker, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield  
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the political authority and is defenseless against degeneration. The 
circle closes therefore with a fostered private freedom that is not 
parallel to the virtues of citizens (or to the education to virtue); in this 
condition the inner principle of liberal democracy is endangered since 
the protection of individuals might not be reached. This will lead to the 
contrary establishment of a “tyranny of the majority”. 
A comprehensive example of critical interpretation of liberal 
democracy from Strauss is worthy of mention. Leo Strauss held a very 
interesting lecture on this topic on the 4 February 1962 at the University 
of Chicago. The title of the conference was “Why we remain Jews: can 
Jewish faith and history still speak to us?” In this speech, Strauss39 
analyzed the situation of the Jewish Diaspora in modern times. He 
conferred a symbolic meaning to it, as a case of discrimination and hate 
experienced by numerous groups in different countries. Jewish 
question is emblematic of the political-theological problem40 and 
degeneration in liberal democratic times. Liberal Enlightenment 
attempted to overcome any particularism, as well as different faiths 
and national cultures, trying to create a sort of egalitarianism and 
unification. This attempt was unsuccessful. It endangered Jewish self-
identity and more generally the Jewish people as a whole (always as an 
example of a minority group). Strauss underlined that discrimination 
and persecution against Jews has ancient roots and involves many of 
the main civilizations in history. It is well known that Jewish history is 
marked their defense of their identity and beliefs. This can be 
considered a noble cause for which entire generations dedicated 
themselves; something higher than the individual life that, on the 
contrary, has been often sacrificed. In modern times, the Enlightenment 
proved the necessity of building a State not based on religious power 
and popular submission to laws (possibly influenced by the orthodoxy 
commandments) but on rational principles and popular consensus. The 
neutrality of the State on religious issues formally represented a great 
opportunity of emancipation for the Jews. Since religion relegated to 
                                                 
39 Strauss L. (1994) See above. 
40 Strauss was committed in most of his academic life in investigating the so called 
theological political problem, which is whether the law should stem from religion or 
human authority. 
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the private sphere, in liberal democracies, the State guarantees an equal 
treatment of every citizen before the law and leaves everybody free to 
profess their own religious beliefs. However, legal equality does not 
solve the Jewish conundrum. Similarly, it does not eliminate hate and 
discrimination of minorities. Strauss denounced the existence of an 
extralegal racial hierarchy in almost every liberal democracy. This 
symbolizes how weak the instrument of legal equality is. Jews and 
“Negroes” occupy the last two places in the hierarchy and the legal 
protection of their rights does not prevent them from being 
discriminated on a daily basis by private citizens that are themselves 
protected even in their racist “preferences” or private behaviors. This 
problem is naturally inherent to liberal democracy's structure and its 
removal would transform the regime into a communist one. This has 
been historically proven to be one of the most Anti-Jewish regimes. 
Actually the only effective measure to avoid cases of private 
discrimination would be the removal of the private sphere and the 
creation of an omni-pervasive state's control on individuals. That, as 
the experience of communist USSR proves according to Strauss, would 
undermine the basis of liberal democracy fostering the insurgence of a 
dictatorial regime without solving the problem. Secularism and 
separation between the public and private spheres is therefore, “a 
blessing and a curse” because it grants equality before the law but 
condemns Jews to a subtler but equally ferocious private 
discrimination. 
Both from theoretical considerations and from the analysis of specific 
cases, structural elements seem insufficient (but necessary) to actualize 
a regime that would guarantee a good democratic quality. A 
democratic culture, committed to equality and the guaranty of rights is 
a crucial ingredient, even though it is acknowledged that ideal model, 
in practice and implementation, are usually quite different. The 
analysis of Israeli democracy suffers from underestimating the 
importance of this issue. Among those who explicitly recognize the 
relevance of this element in obstructing improvement in the quality of 
Israeli democracy, Neuberger and Dowty41 maintain interesting views. 
                                                 
41 Dowty, A. (1998) See above  
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Neuberger's main claim is that quality of democracy in Israel is not 
different from other liberal democracies but for four elements that 
weaken it considerably. These elements are the lack of a written 
constitution, the relationship between religion and State, the status of 
the Arab citizens of Israel and the ambiguous status of the occupied 
territories and their inhabitants.42The first two elements will be broadly 
analyzed in the research while the second two will occupy a more 
marginal position, due to the topic of the research. 
Neuberger deals also with another important aspect: the role of 
education in the creation of a democratic culture for the amelioration of 
democracy.43 This aspect is a very important one since it deals directly 
with the effective implementation and practice of formally democratic 
rules. When analyzing the quality of democracy, it is convenient to look 
for the existence of formal tools and to the effective use of them. In this 
respect, Leo Strauss elaborated on a general and very useful framework 
when he questioned the validity of the liberal democratic model 
because of the discrepancy between ideal of the model and its practical 
results. 
Neuberger's findings on the lack of a widespread democratic culture in 
Israel would explain certain features more effectively than the ethnic 
criterion that has been pointed out in the previous pages. His theories 
give a more complete overview, including the cases that the ethnic 
cleavage theories leave uncovered. One of the clearest examples is the 
legal provision on personal status that, as Neuberger states, denies the 
right of “freedom from religion,”44 which delegates exclusive 
competence to religious authorities and creates a “cross-ethnic” 
problem. According to Neuberger, a lack of democratic education is 
noticeable in Israel. He lists nine major constraints for the 
implementation of an effective democratic education: the non-
                                                 
42 Neuberger B. Religion and Democracy in Israel, (1997), Jerusalem: The Floersheimer 
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43 Neuberger B. (2007), Education for democracy in Israel: Structural impediments and 
basic dilemmas in International in Journal of Educational Development 27: 292–305 
44 Neuberger B., (2003) “Israel - A Liberal Democracy with Four Flaws” in Y. David (ed.), 
The State of Israel: Between Judaism and Democracy Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy 
Institute, pp. 361-370. 
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democratic countries (the origin of the vast majority of Israel’s Jewish 
and Arab population from Eastern Europe and the Arab Middle East); 
the partially non-democratic political traditions of the main political 
wings (the Left, the Right and the Orthodox); the lack of a liberal-
democratic written constitution as an educational tool; the absence of a 
national consensus, especially among the political elites on the 
fundamental polities of the State; the problems posed by occupied 
territories under military government; the salience of the security issues 
which leads teachers and parents to perceive democracy and human 
rights as a luxury in the context of war and terror; the lack of equality 
between Jewish and Arab population; the lack of separation between 
religion and State, including the attitude of Israel’s Orthodox and ultra-
Orthodox that in a Jewish–democratic state, Jewish should come first 
and democratic second; and finally, examples of non-democratic 
behavior on the part of the political leadership. Apart from the fact that 
some of these elements appear to be an effect of a strongly rooted lack 
of education to democracy more than a cause, they are thus an effective 
progress in the mass acquisition of a democratic culture. Some of these 
elements will be taken into account during the investigation and will 
enrich the perspective in the analysis. Doing so, the analysis will not be 
penalized from its focus on the procedural dimensions. These elements 
might be interestingly intertwined with others mentioned by Dowty. 
Dowty mentions the continuous mobilization and militarization of the 
society as a possible obstacle to the development of a liberal culture. 
Other scholars attribute the Jewish tradition itself as a main actor in the 
insurgence of a democratic culture. As far as the sources of Jewish law 
are concerned, a considerable debate originates. Some stresses include: 
the voluntary nature of the Covenant, the requirements in Talmudic 
law regarding public consensus to appointments and regulations and 
the traditional resistance to centralized authority. Shmuel Eisenstadt 
refers to “the basic ‘democratic’ or rather egalitarian premises of the 
Jewish tradition, premises of basic equality and of equal participation 
and access of all Jews to the centers of the sacred realm....” 45 Others 
                                                 
45 Eisenstadt S., (1985) The Transformation of Israeli Society Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press p. 46. 
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argue that traditional Jewish concepts put religious individualism 
above man-made legislation and cannot be made to encompass 
universalistic Western liberal versions of democracy and human rights. 
While the religious mandate of a “higher law” has the virtue of 
denying the legitimacy of arbitrary authority, it also is “contrary to the 
people’s political sovereignty upon which every liberal democracy is 
based.”46 
Reflecting on the main contributors to the formation of the State, we 
should consider that the strongest Zionist ideologists and politicians 
developed their thinking far from a non-religious environment. They 
were much more educated and, in light of the assimilationist model, 
influenced by the nationalist wave all over Europe. They were actually 
revolting against the common model of the Religious Segregated Jew. 
Despite the concrete realization of the secular aspiration of the Zionist 
secular idea (and the influence that was exercised by the religious 
component of this variegated movement) we should acknowledge that 
modern Zionism actually originates from the implicit recognition of the 
failure of “modern states” to guarantee equality and freedom and to 
basically accomplish major tasks of a real democratic State.  
Herzl, among the others, proposed a secular model of State and 
depicted the Alteneuland on the model of Western liberal democracies. 
The new State would have relied on the productive capabilities of its 
citizens, technologically advanced, lay and pluralist; nonetheless, his 
ideological corpus had the failures of liberal democratic system in the 
solution of the Jewish question as a starting point. This was especially 
true because of the ineffectiveness of the law nullifying the theoretical 
aspiration of granting freedom and protecting minorities. 
Keeping this in mind as well as trying to maintain a certain balance in 
our analysis, we should question whether the implementation of the 
pure secular European model would have guaranteed a higher 
standard of democracy. Many other considerations about the scarcity of 
a democratic culture in Israel, the causes and the possible evidences, 
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have been under a strict analysis by some scholars. Some focus on the 
analysis of legal features that in my opinion would be ascribable to a 
lack of democratic culture and mostly to a political contingency. 
Rubinstein and Agassi reflect on the lack of a written Constitution in 
Israel and on the power of the Rule of Arrangement. Rubinstein points 
out that extra-legal arrangement happened to be quite usual and very 
productive in terms of shaping important aspects of public life and the 
institutional framework.47 Among the examples: the absence of public 
transportation on Saturdays throughout most of the country and the 
reluctance to recognize the institutional rights of non-Orthodox Jewish 
congregations. According to the scholar, who takes into account the 
legal-historical framework in which the relationship between religion 
and State evolved, the Declaration of Independence is actually the only 
core document containing the fundamental values upon which the 
State has been built. He theorizes that this document could stand as a 
guide for further legal development. Even though it might have a high 
symbolic importance, it has no constitutional authority or binding 
power whatsoever. In fact, Rubinstein argues that in modern times, 
most of the legal provisions that are in force might be considered 
contrary to the ideas expressed in the Declaration of Independence.  
The lack of a written Constitution and the broad power of the Knesset 
resulted in a lack of homogeneity in terms of legislation and a general 
legal scheme that is not easy to recognize. A very tough statement is 
made by Rubinstein when referring to religion and law in Israel: 
“History, political expediency, party politics and, even more, chance 
are responsible for an amorphous body of laws which baffles outsiders 
as well as some Israelis dissatisfied with the present state of the law in 
this field.”48  
A similar issue is raised by Agassi49 brings to the table the concept of 
“rule of arrangement” set beside the concept of “rule of law.” The rule 
of arrangement consists in an ambiguous interpretation of the law 
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49 Agassi, J., (2003) Rule of law, Rule of Arrangement, in J. E. David (ed.) The State of 
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especially from administrative authorities and state official in the sense 
that the role of the legislator gets undermined or even nullified. When 
this happens, the political actors and public bodies who are involved 
position themselves above the law. According to Agassi, the gravity of 
the problem consists of the non-recognition of the supreme rule of law, 
one of the basics of democracy. The issue assumes cultural features 
because the conundrum is not a technical but conceptual. The cases 
studied by Agassi point out how a scarce separation between religion 
and State is the main source of a political culture that deeply 
undermines the quality of democracy and the supremacy of the rule of 
law. On the contrary underlying arrangements would reveal 
themselves more and more powerful in shaping society and the legal 
framework. 
This kind of remarks not only confirms the dichotomy existing between 
the formal and practical realization of a democratic regime and the role 
that religion has in it. The absolute necessity of a methodical analysis of 
Israeli democracy is confirmed. 
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1.3 THE NOTION OF STATUS QUO AND HOW IT AFFECTS 
DEMOCRACY 
Status quo can certainly be included in what Agassi calls Rule of 
Arrangement. From the structural point of view, it is not an organized 
and coherent set of principles. Most of the provisions that originated 
from there still lack legal entrenchment and sometimes they do not 
possess any legal status. Either they are informal or they provide a 
general framework that leaves the definition of details and the 
implementation to further development (so often leaving room for the 
interpretation and the discretion of the administrative bodies). 
According to Agassi, this is soundly conflicting with the good practice 
of a democratic state thus with the establishment of a true democratic 
setting. 
As Karyanni50 summarizes effectively, the secular-religious social 
cleavage within the Jewish community in Israel generated and 
nurtured an intense debate in the public opinion (media, organizations 
and informal circles of interaction), in the political arena and in the 
academia.  Even though expressed with different intensity according to 
the periods and the subjects, the claims coming from the secular group 
regarded the coercive nature of the religious norms, especially in 
matters pertaining to marriage and divorce. With increasing frequency 
they asked vehemently for limiting public funding for Jewish religious 
institutions together with a more equal form of participation in the 
society especially by the Ultra-Orthodox sector. From the religious side, 
the requests and the appeals regard a tolerant and respectful attitude 
toward religious norms and institutions; this would be necessary in 
order preserve the authentic Jewish heritage, prerequisite for Jewish 
people unity. The unofficial agreement that was stipulated between the 
leaders of both camps was supposed to reach some kind of balance in 
the relationship among the factions. A clear and unambiguous scope 
was not defined nor was a temporal framework set for the validity of 
the agreement: the Status Quo had to face the events and the many 
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changes that the Israeli society went through and it adapted itself with 
alternate fortune.  
Materially the Status Quo is constituted by a short series of letters that 
David Ben Gurion, the future Prime Minister of the State, sent in 1947 
to the spiritual leaders of Agudat Ysrael that was the strongest ultra-
orthodox Haredi faction. On the eve of the visit of the UN committee to 
Palestine, this correspondence had the aim to reassure the religious 
representatives that a general commitment to maintain the pre-state 
arrangement was guaranteed in a way that the individual and the 
communal life of the religious people would not go through major 
changes. A certain utilitarian approach is unanimously recognized, 
being a certain degree of shared consensus necessary upon the visit of 
the international organization; but also Ben Gurion’s respect for 
religion and the importance he attributed to Jewish cohesion and 
unanimity are told to have played an important role. 
Thanks to the Status Quo arrangement, Rabbinical Orthodox Jewish 
institutes were granted a specific role gaining a formal authority in 
matter of personal status and in representing the Jewish confession 
within the state. In this agreement therefore the exclusive management 
of all matters of marriage and divorce was attributed to religious 
rabbinical courts that became an integral part of the state's judicial 
system. They received total economic support from the state and 
gained a monopoly in state funded religious services (thanks to the 
official recognition of a Chief Rabbinate, of a Rabbinical Council and of 
a capillary net of local religious councils under the control of Ministry 
for Religious Affairs).  
Members of the Ultra-Orthodox communities were given some special 
concessions in order their lifestyle and their beliefs not to be hurt by the 
new state settings. A differentiated education systems was conceived 
granting to both Orthodox and Haredi Jews a high level of 
independence from the state regulation; public and private schools, 
were they religious or secular were provided with the same amount of 
public funds. Moreover being the continuous education and formation 
on the light of the Sacred Scriptures a duty for Haredi men, they were 
allowed to “postpone indefinitely” their service the army (compulsory 
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in Israel for men and women) in order not be distracted in their pious 
activity and to keep studying in the public financed Yeshivot. The 
exemption was legally guaranteed also to Orthodox religious women in 
the aftermath of a vivid political battle that resulted with the in Civil 
Defense Law in 194951. Other issues that were tackled in this agreement 
were the observance of Kasherut in public services (extending this rule 
also to the production of “forbidden” meat in the country and to the 
availability of leavened food during Passover period) and the limitation 
of the public service during Sabbath and Jewish holidays (which 
resulted in a massive ban on public transportation and business almost 
in every city in Israel).   
From an ideal point of view, the Status Quo is not only a set of legal (or 
non legal) provisions that have been enforced in Israel and influenced 
the public and political life of all the citizens. The Status Quo is a the 
very center of any discussion about the nature of the state (secular/non 
secular) and it is one of the main topics when dealing with the much 
debated question whether Israel can genuinely be Jewish and 
democratic at the same time.  
Reviewing some of the many contributions that the scientific 
community gave on this topic I will try to enlighten how the situation 
of the political elite by whom the State of Israel as a political entity was 
created is sometimes underestimated. The same argument holds when 
analyzing the premises upon which the State of Israel was conceived 
(and still considered to be valid). Not less important I will argue that 
the Status Quo, as most of the provisions, formal or informal that shape 
the institutional setting of any society are the consequence of an 
existent situation and their power of perpetuating it or exacerbating  it 
is much less powerful that what we think. Therefore, I would consider 
the Status Quo as a result of a peculiar social and political scenario 
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instead of (and before of) seeing it as the cause of divisions and social 
frictions.  
Sapir52 defines it as an informal “gag rule”53. The idea of gag rule is 
based on the principle that there are some sensitive issues in a society 
that is better not to discuss about. Framing the topic of religion and 
state into a main general agreement from which several informal but 
effective provision originated (in terms of practical implementation), 
would avoid, according to the scholar, destructive conflicts that would 
threat stability of the society. Gag rules would be useful to the 
democratic process and since they would grant cohesion and 
cooperation among different groups that otherwise would not be able 
to coexist pacifically.  
None of the arrangements that derived from the Status Quo received 
constitutional status and some of them were not even established in 
regular legislation and this is why Sapir defines it informal. The 
awareness from both sides (religious and secular side) that this 
agreement safeguarded a mutual interest guaranteed the survival of it 
for more than sixty years.  
As a precondition for a gag rule to maintain its effectiveness, the 
mutual interest has to be permanent and the equilibrium must remain 
unaltered, especially as far as it concerns the capacity of external actors 
to intervene. The doubts of Sapir focus on the permanence of these two 
conditions; the changes, through which the Israeli society and the 
judicial power passed, would undermine the stability of the Status Quo.  
The Status Quo would have turned to be an ineffective instrument for 
preventing frictions among the groups and only a Constitution, would 
be able to serve the purpose more effectively, framing in a more 
detailed and rigid way the issue and limiting the critical intervention of 
other subjects.  
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Even though not very familiar with the concept of gag rule and with 
the whole scientific debate about it, it seems to me that in this case the 
adoption of this model would not be effective because of two reasons: 
the perception of the fracture between religious and secular groups is 
greatly affected by time and especially from the secular side, the 
evolution of reality from the moment in which the agreement was born 
made new needs and new issues emerge. Framing in a stricter and 
more detailed way the situation (even starting from a serious 
reconsideration that would bring on the table demands and ideas up to 
date) it might lay the foundations for future inadequacy. Moreover, in 
my opinion any reconsideration of this matter should start with a 
reciprocal understanding and recognition of the contribution that the 
different groups gave to the state enterprise and the meaning that they 
attributed to it. Only on the light of this, a franker reconsideration of 
the needs of the two parts would be possible and eventually open to 
further developments.  
Another rationale is followed by Karayanni54. While theorizing his 
“regime of separateness” in matter of religion and state he makes a 
differentiation between the religious accommodations for the 
Palestinian-Arab minority in Israel and those of the Jewish population. 
Before the creation of the state, the millet system granted certain 
autonomy to the various religious groups empowering their leaders 
with jurisdictional power over their members. Nowadays recognized 
minority groups in Israel are a granted with the same freedom of 
judging their members according to their mores (at least for certain 
specific issues). This treatment is in continuation with the pre-state 
situation. But the idea of the Status Quo and its binding power to all the 
population55 (and in particular referring to the Jewish group) has its 
rationale in the conception of the state of Israel as a Jewish State. After 
the establishment of the state of Israel as a Jewish state it can no longer 
be said that the Jewish community in Israel is just another millet. On 
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the contrary it is the majority group in a state that defines itself as the 
homeland of this group (whose ethnicity displays certain promiscuity 
of the concepts of nation and religion). The Status Quo agreements thus 
can be considered as a consequence of the definition of the state whose 
creation requested the transformation of the public sphere in something 
coherent with the character of the state as well as requested the 
nationalization of religious institutions and norms. This theory is in my 
opinion very challenging and it opens interesting perspectives for 
interpreting the status quo as a specific political instrument to 
legitimize a crucial feature of the state. Taking it into account would 
immediately create room for consideration of the concept of Jewishness 
as conceived by the political elite at that time.  
A further opinion on the Status Quo and the socio-political meaning of 
it comes from Justice Haim Cohn56. He maintains that Status quo should 
be seen as a shameful agreement both in the eyes of a democracy 
supporter and according to the principles of a religious Jew. It 
contradicts the fundamental religious principle of free will and 
adhesion to religious rules and it binds the legislator and the law to an 
immutable situation that does not take into account further changes or 
developments of the will of people. Erroneously conceived to be an 
effective measure to achieve domestic peace within the Jewish 
population of Israel and in particular between secular and religious 
Jews, actually, he defines the Status Quo like the “citadel of the religious 
parties' battalion”57. According to Justice Chaim this has been a 
fundamental tool in the hands of the religious parties that increased in 
power year after year. Status Quo is described as an instrument for 
political groups like Shas58, to mobilize its voters and to exercise 
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pressure on the governments in order to achieve their coercive aims. 
Moreover, this landmark for fierce internal battles cannot drive to any 
peaceful end: every implementation of further extension of the Status 
Quo principles creates a sense of frustration and discontent in the 
secular population of Israel and in those who aim to a State free from 
religious interference. On the other hand, the religious counterpart 
cannot be satisfied with any kind of conquest since their totalizing idea 
over the society. Therefore the main faults imputable to the Status Quo 
would be that it did not manage to mitigate or prevent any dispute or 
friction among Jews with a different perception of the relationship 
between state and religion but on the contrary it deepened the fracture 
between secular and religious society, exacerbating this way the 
political debate and the social conflict. Rather than nurturing unity, the 
Status Quo heavily undermined social cohesion. Only the absence of a 
law with the necessary legal authority to disprove it, explains its 
survival. This interpretation seems to me to attach to the Status Quo a 
causative meaning that is not totally appropriate. I would rather look at 
it as an effect of a certain social conformation. In order to do this I 
would follow the same approach that Rokkan and Lipset59 followed in 
defining their social cleavage theory.  
Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan developed their theory of 
social cleavages in the 1960s analyzing political behavior in different 
countries in Western Europe. They emphasized how political trends 
and the dynamics of party support are a consequence of social divides. 
Social identities were found to be the platform on which party support 
was built. This finding held quite strong till some fundamental 
socioeconomic or demographic divides remained powerful in Western 
Europe. But the major changes that took over from the Seventies led to 
a review of the social cleavage theory: the attention shifted from 
political behavior and party support to social conflicts and sensitive 
issues, relevant for the public debate. 
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The divide between secular and religious in Israel can be considered to 
be a social cleavage according to the condition that were identified as 
necessary: it is based on a social division; there is quite a strong 
awareness of the characteristics that bond the members of the parts in 
conflict (stronger probably on the religious side) and commitment to 
promote the groups' interest; there are institutional actors that can 
serve the cause of the groups and provide them with organizational 
support. The religious division was already part of the original set of 
cleavages discovered in the original study of Rokkan and Lipset. Even 
though it was not meant to regard Israel, nonetheless the main features 
that were detected appears quite fitting for our case study also: the 
debate would in fact be focused on a conservative view of life versus a 
more liberal one, including marriage, family and the role of women.  
On the same spirit of the social cleavage theory is the analysis of the 
cultural value in the Modernization theory that was revised among the 
Sixties and the Seventies by Seymour Martin Lipset, Daniel Lerner, 
Walt Rostow, and Karl Deutsch60 These scholars emphasized the 
importance of developments in the nature of mass societies. In this 
view basic social identities of class, religion, gender and ethnicity 
cannot be created or manipulated by parties or other systemic actors. 
On the contrary, society and its features deeply shape the political 
structure and institutions and they result to be only a consequence of 
the feature of the society in which they operate. Changes and 
progressive evolution in a society therefore can deeply affect not only 
the political behavior but also the nature of institutional settings. While 
a general trend is recognizable as it regards the more classic cleavages 
(class, religion, ethnicity etc.), the changes occurred with development 
and modernization (due to economic development, widespread 
individualism, post-materialism etc.) are not unequivocally predictable: 
the persistence of a cleavage and its persistent strength in shaping the 
public debate and the reality varies from country to country according 
to peculiar historic events and background.  
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As said before, religion proved to be one of the most powerful issues at 
the time in which Lipset and Rokkan conducted their studies. Even 
though the process of secularization deeply affected its strength, 
Norris61 confirmed that it remained extremely relevant in traditional 
societies as well as in those countries in which it historically 
represented a point of division among citizenship (like Israel). 
Following the just mentioned approach and translating it into the 
Israeli case, it seems much more natural to me to conceive the Status 
Quo as a result of the fracture between religious and secular Jews in 
Israel. The conflicting relationship that these two groups have been 
experiencing since the origin of the state is only marginally imputable 
to the formal defects of the arrangements and it is most likely to be an 
endogenous factor that affected the Status Quo more than being affected 
by that. The points of friction are many and kept occupying the public 
and political agenda independently from the flexibility with which the 
instrument to heal them were used. Status Quo cannot be blamed for its 
incapacity of pacifying such a major conflict and we should consider 
(and I will try to do it in the next chapters) whether that was the real 
purpose of it or other political considerations were made in stipulating 
this agreement. 
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1.4 THEORETIC APPROACH TO THE ANALYSIS OF THE 
QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY 
In the last paragraph, the concept of democracy was largely debated 
and many views, coming from sociologists, political scientists and other 
scholars were reported. They commented on the actual condition of 
Israeli democracy and whether this definition is appropriate to the 
specific case in study. Other studies were mentioned which are more 
philosophically oriented in the assessment of democracy and whether it 
is a good and effective method of governing.  
Deepening this literature review does not fail to enlighten the need for 
a comprehensive and thorough analysis of the Israeli democracy. On 
the contrary, it makes it even more evident how a systematic and 
specific analysis would clarify questions and crucial doubts pertaining 
to a broader spectrum. 
This paragraph therefore is a very crucial one because it links a piece 
that is more theoretical to one that is more operational. It explains the 
conceptual basis and the motivation for choosing the TODEM method 
for the analysis of democratic qualities.   
The concept of democracy is a very complex and debated one. For 
centuries the interest in this form of government has spurred the 
writing of many books and essays which contributed to the current 
understanding of what democracy is as an ideal. It also fostered an 
uninterrupted quest for how to improve the quality of government 
under this kind of regime. As it will be explained below, the questions 
and answer given were the result of the historical moment and of the 
State of development in these societies. The definitions have been 
various, defining a wide range of regimes; the idea of democracy itself 
has always been subject to controversy in regards to its feasibility and 
the assessment of its validity. 
In modern times, with democracy having been acknowledged almost 
unanimously as the best form of government invented, the main 
interest shifted toward the amelioration of this regime and the 
realization of a fully beneficial effect on those governed under it. The 
task did not become easier or less controversial: the specific literature 
44 
on this topic includes different assumptions (especially in regards to 
the definition of democracy) and covers different purposes. It thus 
relies upon different methods of investigation. 
Andrew Roberts' provides a very interesting contribution is that is 
based on a very basic and essential definition of democracy.  In his 
study about quality of democracy on Eastern Europe, he follows the 
procedural definition of democracy which is founded on two main 
concepts: free, fair and regular elections in which all adult citizens are 
allowed to participate without exception as both voters and candidates; 
and the possibility of all citizens to effectively take part in the process 
of selection (passive and active) through the enjoyment of a set of civil 
rights. Appealing to this concept of democracy and concluding that the 
essence of democracy resides in people's ability to decide, Roberts 
criticizes those scholars who focus on "non-essential dimensions" in 
measuring quality of democracy." Dimensions like corruption, legal 
and human development can affect the functioning of democracy (or 
any other regime,) but are analytically distinct from democracy itself; 
they affect democratic quality but are not democratic quality, so they 
should not be taken into account when evaluating the quality of 
democracy in a country. The concept of democratic quality should be 
centered instead on those aspects of politics that are essentially related 
to democracy itself. What should be crucial to assess is whether citizen 
rule exists and to what extent. According to Roberts, the fundamental 
question to be answered is about the strength of linkages between 
governed and ruling classes, especially regarding the power of control 
of the former to the latter through the functioning of institutions that 
should guarantee this. On the other side, though in the same field of 
studies about democratization, O'Donnell is a scholar who starts from 
Dahl definition of poliarchy as a base for his theories. There are many 
scholars that also use this definition. They warn about the need to look 
behind the façade of established institutions questions about the 
content and actual working of those institutions. With an extensive 
analysis of Latin American countries and also some in Asian and 
Eastern Europe, O'Donnell traces in these Governments the features of 
Dahl's paradigm. On the other side he reports some distortive elements 
that are ascribable to the social and economic crisis that most of these 
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countries inherited from previous authoritarian Governments. Taking 
this into account, O'Donnell elaborates upon the concept of delegative 
democracy by depicting formal polyarchic regimes that do not truly 
match or approach the normative standards of a representative 
democracy. Dimensions like participation and level of corruption 
(recognized as such or not) are considered to be crucial in assessing the 
quality of democracy in these countries.  
Easily understandable, O'Donnell's theory represents a broader and in 
some ways, contrary model from Roberts and offers an example of 
contrasting voices in the academic panorama of research on quality of 
democracy. The same commitment to underline the importance of the 
effective functioning of democracy and the recognition of it as a 
fundamental indicator of quality is shared by the scholars of the 
democratic auditing. Two of the founding fathers of this approach, 
Weir and Beetham, focused mainly on British democracy but the 
methodological tool that they created is a framework for the quality 
analysis of any country. Underlining how also in "mature democracies" 
it is possible to find major defects even in regards the basics of 
democratic government, they used the notion of audit, that is "a 
systematic assessment of institutional performance against agreed 
criteria and standards, so as to provide a reasonably authoritative 
judgment as to how satisfactory the procedures and arrangements of 
the given institution are." Besides outlining the popular rule as the 
essence of democracy, a very important point that these scholars make 
is the preference for assessments given by national citizens based upon 
their peculiar knowledge of the culture and their inner understanding 
of the system. That system would put them in a position of privilege in 
the assessment of the quality of democracy. This point is a very 
interesting one because it expresses a definition of democracy that is 
anchored in locality and gives this aspect a fundamental role in the 
usage of a universal framework based on a more universalistic 
definition.  As seen until now, the two original questions about quality 
of democracy are intertwined inextricably. The first one only recently 
gained prominence in the field and the methods that have been created 
in order to empirically assess it are strongly influenced by the 
definition of democracy that the scholars refer to and to the most 
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salient elements that constitute them, according to this concept. The 
definition of the second element is not an easy step. 
Gallie actually places democracy in the category of a contested concept.  
I think it is worthy to go a bit more into the details of this theory since it 
represents a successful attempt to illuminate fundamental problems in 
understanding and analyzing concepts but also to.... Its findings stand 
as a warning against any pretention of absolute accuracy in methods of 
analysis of democratic regimes and their so-called "qualities". In 
another way, these remarks can also be interpreted in a positive light, 
which I will talk about later.   
The main issue that Gallie addresses is of conceptual contestation. 
Briefly and clearly, Gallie states that attempts to define concepts that 
belong to this category ‘inevitably involve endless disputes about their 
proper uses on the part of their users’. The scholar himself mentions 
democracy as one of the main examples (together with art, social 
justice, religious life etc.) Its definition and meaning will always raise 
harsh debates and will not lead to any accepted conclusion; moreover, 
it will be always possible to recognize a fixed path on which the debate, 
and all attempts of conceptualization take form. 
First of all, essentially contested concepts have a strong 
"appraisiveness". They have normative valence, as to say that their 
definition implies a certain achievement. Moreover, these concepts are 
in general very complex ones: this makes it likely that different users 
prefer different conceptions and definitions and make different uses of 
the significant. The different use of the concepts in different contexts is 
reciprocally recognized by the various users, specifically because of the 
unanimously acknowledged difficulty in defining these concepts in an 
unquestionable way. 
The feature of complexity is visibly recognizable and fitting of the 
concept of democracy within the debate that we are dealing with. 
Different kinds of democracy are recognized most of the time without 
contrasting since the accent is posed in different characteristics (it is 
sufficient to take few examples of definitions that stress one aspect or 
another: liberal democracy, representative democracy, delegative 
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democracy, ethnic democracy etc.) A very sharp and legitimate 
criticism to the problem of internal complexity is that it would be the 
result of the involvement of multiple concepts. The disaggregation of 
the macro-concept would therefore be a viable solution. On the other 
side however, the will of separating all of the concepts into completely 
independent ones is utopic and not useful in terms of finding a clearer 
understanding of the original concept. The internal complexity is 
essential to the concept itself; a concept that is clearly multidimensional 
and it is not the result of a corollary of accessory features. At this point 
however, somebody who is constantly comparing the theoretical 
explanation to the practical object of our study, democracy, can find 
himself in a sort of paradox when thinking about the development of 
the concept its creation. Everybody can notice how the original concept 
was far different from democracy as intended today. Still, back in that 
primordial definition is anchored the modern and more sophisticated 
idea of democracy. This could lead one to think that democracy has 
been primped with a corollary of concepts that, in fact, blur the true 
meaning of the concept and thus hinder a consensual definition. Gallie 
attributes this perceived paradox to another feature of the essentially 
contested concepts: openness. Essentially contested concepts are subject 
to meaning renegotiation due to changing circumstances. They change 
according to human development, awareness and more general 
modifications in the political, economic, and social systems. These 
modifications, of course, cannot be predicted in advance and are 
mainly related to historical development. 
Beside the idea of openness, Gallie recognizes also the idea of 
exemplar, the original idea around which the concept was created and 
on whose validity everybody agrees. Many criticisms have been moved 
to this point and I agree with the main one which claims that if we 
recognize the existence of an original model, the definition of a/the 
contested concept becomes a dispute about deviation from the original 
unanimously recognized definition. The concept of exemplar is alien to 
contested concepts and, like in the case of democracy, and although we 
can trace back the primordial idea, I think it would be too dangerous to 
accept it as a conceptual example or, even worse, to establish the 
practical realization of that idea as a model. The feature of openness 
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makes the change so likely and so essential that it would be more 
appropriate to talk about "steps" instead of exemplars. What this serves 
to present in other words is that with the development of the 
definitions throughout history, it is possible to trace a type of evolution 
for which there is a progressive enrichment of the "uncontested parts" 
of the definition through steps.  
What I have just said is deeply connected to the idea of progressive 
competition as the cause of a high quality argument in the dispute, or 
as further explained by Collier, my claim is closely linked to the 
concept of progressive cooperation. Even though it follows different 
approaches and arrives to different conclusions, the community who is 
dedicated to the definition of these concepts moves itself along a 
common path which appears to lead to actual progress in clarification; 
to to a sort of decontestation (or at least to a reduction of friction.) 
The analysis of Gallie’s position on essentially contested concepts is 
very useful in the academic debate over democracy and the study of 
democratic quality. It is able to answer many of the criticisms that 
undermine the different approaches of study regarding the subject. 
Contrarily, it encourages a careful analysis that would allow a more 
thorough understanding of these concepts. Such a theory would 
certainly praise those methods that try to be as extensive and 
comprehensive as possible, including the usage of different research 
approaches and a broad definition of democracy that is the result of a 
(maybe unintentional) "progressive cooperation." 
Another circumspect and very useful contribution comes from Plattner  
who, in a later study, specifically addresses the "new" trend of studies 
on the quality of democracy. Plattner considers this more recent 
scientific interest as a third step, a natural evolution both as political 
aim and as scientific interest after democratization and consolidation of 
democratic regime. 
As Gallie does with the concept of democracy, also Plattner expresses 
one of his main warnings about the definition of quality of democracy 
itself. This concept, according, to the scholar, hides a default tendency 
to a normative approach. "Quality" is definitely an appraisive concept; 
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its desirability moreover is accompanied by a certain grade of 
subjectivity that would depend on the researcher and on his personal 
paradigm. This way, the idea of quality of democracy would imply an 
assessment that is biased by the personal orientation of the scholar. 
The critical contribution of Plattner continues on the semantic field and 
specifically targets the complexity of the definition democracy. It 
considers the risk of misreading and underestimating the complexity of 
political and social assets in an attempt to find some measurable 
indicators. This is a possible risk in every method that seeks to follow a 
strict quantitative approach when studying social science through 
trying to guarantee the results a better reliability, comparability and 
"objectivity". Moreover, the definition of these indicators and the 
relevance that is attributed to them may be greatly influenced by 
personal views. It is largely recognized that not only is the selection of 
indicators is heavily influenced by the researcher's vision, (especially in 
the case of an "essentially contested concept" like democracy,) but also 
the interpretation of the data. Another point that denounces the 
superficiality of some studies regarding the quality of democracy is the 
conflicting nature of the very concept of liberal democracy (that he 
assumes as a model for today’s democracy). In more detail, one of these 
controversial points is that since democracy is a form of government, it 
has to confront its ideal pureness with its existential purpose i.e., 
governing. Like Strauss and many others, Plattner questions himself on 
the tradeoffs between contrasting characters of democracy that exhibits 
their "incompatibility" when dealing with the practical implementation 
of an effective governmental regime that wants to keep a high standard 
of democratic quality. This is especially true in regards to the basic 
principle of popular rule. Deepening the issue of the "schizophrenia" of 
democracy, Platter gives examples of governance results and 
responsiveness warning on the danger of confusion while relating them 
to the quality of democracy. Finally, another important aspect that he 
recommends not to leave out is the cultural one. Democratic culture 
(culture of freedom, of tolerance and so on) is a landmark of quality of 
democracy and should never be underestimated both in analysis and as 
a causative aspect of determined results.  
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As stated in the beginning of this paragraph, an accurate and 
systematic analysis of Israeli democracy and its qualities is absolutely 
necessary in order to understand the state of art and the role of religion 
in creating and maintaining this condition. The nature of the "third 
step" that Plattner attributes to quality of democracy should not 
obscure the fact that a study on quality of democracy can be done in 
any stage of the process of democratization. Moreover, specifically 
conducting this analysis in a regime that is generally recognized as 
democratic would illuminate some commonly accepted practices that 
are not entirely responsive to democratic standards. Additionally, this 
analysis could exemplify how consolidated democracies deal with that 
"schizophrenia" in a more or less efficient ways than other regimens. 
This would be more effective than a "deviance" in a fluid situation of 
transformation toward a democratic regime. The very agreed upon 
concern about objectivity and personal paradigm should not be a 
reason for renouncement, especially on the light of Gallie's theory. 
What is fundamental instead is a previously expressed declaration of 
the "paradigm" (or at least of the main points of reference that one has 
in mind while conducting the research) and a consequent coherence to 
what is declared. After all, even though the term “democracy” is 
defined in a million ways, there are some basic points that are largely 
recognized on the basis of which more articulated schemes could be 
produced. Even if it crosses the frontier of scientific interest, a very 
stimulating point stems from the idea of quality of democracy implies a 
perceived superiority of some regime model over others and that it 
might be dangerous. In the case it would become an instrument of 
political action as, for example, all the actions of democratic promotion 
and assistance that have been object of discussion in the last decades as 
a colonizing attitude of some western states and international actors. 
Back to the case study of Israel; as already mentioned, Smooha’s 
concept of ethnic democracy as a diminished type of democracy, in my 
opinion, does not lead to a totally satisfactory explanation of Israeli 
democracy. In the process of assessment, equality and participation are 
taken as fundamental points of reference and individuated as the main 
critical aspects. The main limit is of almost exclusively comparing the 
two main ethnic groups without lingering on the concept of citizenship, 
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while this should be the unit of reference for a correct and deep 
analysis. This opens a serious reflection on the internal dynamics that 
rule the membership of the dominant group, displaying some 
weakness in the ethnic approach while corroborating the importance of 
the religious aspect in order to provide a more accurate representation 
of reality. 
An invitation to a thorough and systematic analysis comes from 
Agassi's scientific speculation, especially about the rule of law in Israel. 
His suggestion, and in some respects Rubinstein's as well, is to pay 
attention to the role of the legislative power in Israel and to its 
effectiveness in shaping important parts of citizen life. Agassi 
denounces a dangerous lack of recognition of the law’s ruling 
supremacy. This is the consequence of both cultural (scarce separation 
of religion and state) and practical conditions (absence of a written 
constitution); nonetheless the positioning of individuals and bodies 
above the law would give a strong bias to the quality of democracy in 
Israel.  
Also Menachem Mautner gives an interpretation based on Israeli law 
and law bodies in shaping Israeli culture and democracy. The 
dichotomy that he draws is between the Western cultural model (the 
Anglo-American democracy and legal system) and a more traditional 
culture (law based on Jewish religious sources). In his research he 
analyzes the role of the Supreme Court and its progressive judicial 
activism, defining it as the incarnation of the secular action for the rise 
of liberal values in the country's political order. 
These kinds of remarks from different scholars confirm the dichotomy 
existing between formal and practical realization of a democratic 
regime. In addition, they stress the importance of cultural and historical 
aspects that could transpose in the society and deeply affect the 
evolution of a regime. All these factors reveal the urge and stimulate at 
the same time the interest for a methodical analysis of Israeli 
democracy. 
This research, analysis of the quality of democracy in Israel will be 
based on Morlino's TODEM method. Morlino has been interested in 
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studies on democracy for long time, becoming engaged throughout the 
years in popular topics like democratization, transition and quality of 
democracy. He collaborated with scholars in order to elaborate on 
theories and methodological tools. In 2005, for example, he and 
Diamonds edited the paper "Assessing the Quality of Democracy," in 
which they set up a primordial version of the TODEM tool for 
democratic deepening. They first stated the importance of law in 
realizing democratic quality since this dimension is one of the most 
basic to democracy. According to these scholars, when the law’s ruling 
power is weak, participation is not granted to all society members. 
Morlino and Diamonds refer in particular to the more heavily 
marginalized groups in regards to their economic status. 
Marginalization not only follows economic patterns but takes peculiar 
paths in different societies, changing sometimes also within the same 
society over time or with the occurrence of notable events. When rule of 
law is weak, civic groups may be unable to organize and advocate. A 
situation similar to the one envisioned by Agassi would come into 
existence with personal interpretation of law (if not actual corruption) 
overthrowing the administrative apparatus and creating privileged 
positions whose recipients are above the law. This privileged class and 
those connected to it would end up benefiting from preferential 
treatment becoming a vicious circle that would endanger, in the end, 
the very basic relation between voters and those they elect, which 
would detriment the very way in which citizens are linked to the 
regime. 
The main goal of the TODEM method is to provide a tool for the 
analysis of the quality of democracy. In dissecting of the concept, it will 
be possible to identify the different qualities of democracy, their more 
specific aspects, and the connections between those qualities.  
As said, the interest in discovering the best form of government is a 
really ancient one. This evolved from the desire to nucleate the optimal 
"recipe" for the perfect democracy.  As soon as this type of regime 
spread enough, it became recognized as a valuable one by philosophers 
and intellectuals at large. Today, the leading question in academia (and 
the one who guided Morlino in setting up this method) is: "What is the 
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best analytic tool for exploring and detecting democratic deepening 
and qualities in various countries?"  Interest in a deep and appropriate 
exploration of democratic qualities is explained with very modern 
reasons: the acquisition of the epithet of "democracy" by new regimes 
and their will to assessing the trueness of this connotation; the growing 
discontent, dissatisfaction and alienation which was spread worldwide 
in recent years and the request for reconsideration of a higher quality 
form of government. If new and old uncertainty is growing with regard 
to so called democratic regimes, a serious consideration on whether 
they are real democracies or are perceived as partially democratic 
(hybrid regimes) must be carried out and the need to look behind the 
façade of what the international community has largely accepted is still 
relevant. The third and part of the second point is the most salient for 
the present case study. In regards the second point, it is strongly 
affected by the international crisis that we are now experiencing 
worldwide. This crisis contributed to the destabilization of many 
regimes and the weakening of social order. It brought citizens to a 
reconsideration of the political order, thus to drastic manifestation of 
their discontent and the perceived need to change. Also, in Israel, this 
phenomena occurred in the summer 2011 carried by the wave of its 
manifestation in Spain and many other Western countries. One of the 
biggest protests since the foundation of the State was organized. Very 
heterogeneous movement took part in the manifestation and kept high 
the level of mobilization for months. A claim for social justice and 
egalitarian policies was made and the discontent about the 
responsiveness was expressed in clear terms. These events obscured the 
ethnic divide, and even if the Arab population did not really take part 
in the protests, a few events were registered in which Arab 
communities or organizations demonstrated sympathy to the 
movement.  
The previously mentioned questions and claims open the way for 
research on the quality of democracy and the need for specific research 
tools as a consequence. The main critical points that were already 
mentioned above and the TODEM method were designed as a response 
to those remarks with a goal of remedying their aforementioned 
weaknesses. The initial difficulty of building an analytic tool to deeply 
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detect a contested is solved by not only declaring concepts and 
hypotheses on which the tool is modeled but by maintaining the 
empirical part as much coherent and clear as possible. It capitalizes on 
what was defined before as progressive cooperation, accepting 
different conceptions of democracy and incorporating the constituting 
elements within the method. both in the definition and by singling out 
the dimensions of democratic quality. This variety and the integration 
of different approaches are also coherently maintained in by method of 
investigation. Quantitative and qualitative analysis, empirical 
descriptions and explanations are used. This avoids the risk of 
narrative oversimplification, ensures the authenticity of the description 
(and a certain comparability among the case studies) safeguarding the 
clarity of exposition and the accessibility of the results to a larger 
public.  
A crucial premise of the TODEM method that actually constitutes the 
spine of the "deepening activity" is the semantic exploration of the 
concept of quality. The normative bias here is avoided by specifying 
that quality assumes the meaning of dimension being spoiled by any 
good or bad connotation. 
Quality is defined in three acceptations. In terms of procedure, quality 
is defined as the result of specific and controlled procedure, traceable in 
time and repeatable in terms of method. In terms of contents, the 
quality of something is determined by the essential traits of it and 
based on substantial investigation of the object in analysis. In terms of 
results, quality is the user's perception of the final product without any 
real connection to the procedural or substantial quality of the object. 
Once clarified and once the concept of quality is understood in all its 
meanings, it is possible to enucleate the "product" to which the qualities 
are referred - that is democracy. How to complete an exhaustive list of 
qualities of democracy that would be useful for the purpose that would 
be universally accepted as satisfactory?  
Following the triple vision of quality Morlino associates a triple 
definition of quality of democracy: in procedural terms, in substantial 
terms and in terms of result. From a procedural point of views, quality 
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is a system of procedure that guarantees the popular rule over the state 
institutions, consistently with the primordial meaning of democracy 
"demos-cratos". Substantially, quality can be found in the degree of 
citizens' equality and freedom, since these two values are unanimously 
recognized as fundamental in a democratic regime. Lastly, (and going 
back to the sovereignty of people in democracy,) quality of democracy 
can be defined in terms of result as the total satisfaction of citizens and 
thus to their complete legitimation of the regime. Following this 
division, eight possible qualities (or dimensions) are listed. The first 
five dimensions are the rule of law, electoral accountability, inter-
institutional accountability, participation and competition.  These are 
defined as procedural dimension. It is not possible, of course, to 
consider these elements as if they were totally autonomous 
compartments but the definition of procedural is clearly the most 
appropriate inasmuch as these qualities are mainly related to 
procedures and rules.  
Rule of law is well explained by Morlino who opposes to the narrow 
conception of simple enforcement of law. On the contrary," It also 
connotes the principle of the supremacy of law that is, the Ciceronian 
legum servi sumus, and entails at least the capacity, even if limited, to 
make authorities respect the laws and to have laws that are non-
retroactive, publicly known, universal, stable, and unambiguous." 
Accountability, in general, is the obligation of elected political leaders 
to answer for their political decisions. This obligation has two main 
addressees: the electoral body (from which the vertical accountability 
stems) and other institutional bodies (from which the horizontal 
accountability originates.) Electoral accountability is a tool in the hands 
of the citizens through which they can exercise their sovereignty over 
the state, even in the case of a representative democracy. It is called 
vertical because it goes from the basis (the citizens) up to the 
governmental representatives. This kind of accountability is mainly 
(but not only) a posteriori, since citizens usually exercise it at the end of 
a political mandate through the new vote. The inter-institutional 
accountability, defined also as horizontal, is based on the mechanism of 
checks and balances among the institutional bodies of a state (or a 
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supranational entity).  This aspect should be a more formal and stable 
one, as the law normally regulates it.  
Participation can be defined as the entire set of behaviors, be they 
conventional or unconventional, legal or borderline vis-à-vis legality, 
that allows women and men, as individuals or as groups, to create, 
revive, or strengthen group identification or to try to influence the 
recruitment of, and decisions by, political authorities (the 
representative and/or governmental establishment) in order to 
maintain or change the allocation of existing values. 
Participation is the main tool through which citizens have an impact on 
the regime. A very important distinction is made by Morlino between 
identity participation and instrumental participation. The former is the 
participation that allows citizens to feel part of a community and to 
identify to some extent with the state.  The instrumental one is a more 
active type of participation since it implies a goal to be reached.  
Competition it is considered to be a sine qua non for democracy since it 
guarantees constant involvement of all the popular representatives in 
the decisional bodies and the real possibility for the realization of the 
majority rule (thanks to the possible alternation of government forces). 
 The substantial dimensions that define quality in terms of content are 
freedom and equality: Freedom and equality are the two main 
democratic values that stand at the core of many definitions of 
democracy. Their basically uncontested importance is proved by the 
relevance that is given to those political and civil rights which are 
considered concrete mainstays of freedom and to those social rights 
that are indicators of equality. These two dimensions have a duel 
relationship because since they are both essential contributors to 
democracy, sometimes the values may compete as to which different 
ideologies should be considered most prominent.  
The eighth dimension, which defines quality in terms of results, is 
responsiveness. Responsiveness is the capacity of the system to satisfy 
the expectations of its citizens. Once again the core value from which 
this dimension originates is the popular sovereignty that individuals 
renounce in favor of a collective solution to the administration of 
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power. They still, however, remain the real "owners" to which the 
representatives need to respond. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Assessment of the procedural dimensions in Israel  
 
 
2.1 RULE OF LAW 
 
 
 
Individual security and civil order  
Crime rate 
In order to assess the degree of individual security and civil order, this 
section will focus on the crime rate in Israel. In this matter, Israel 
collocates itself in an average position compared to other OECD 
countries with similar level of economic and social development1. This 
kind of comparative analysis takes into account the most serious crimes 
against property (mainly burglary and other kind of theft) and those 
against life (assassination, rape etc.). 
The estimation of criminal actions in 2011 (including different types of 
crimes against the property and against the person: murder, 
aggression, robbery, violence, familial violence etc.) was above 400,000 
(364,7302 reported cases plus about 10% of exposure files3). In 2008, the 
Israel Police opened some 420,000 investigation files, 85% following 
complaints by citizens and 15% “exposure files”. The share of 
“exposure files” has increased steadily from 10% in 1999. In the period 
of 1999-2004, the number of investigation files opened was consistent at 
nearly 500,000 per year. Since 2005, the number of files has declined 
steadily to approximately 420,000 in 2008. Looking at the crimes against 
life and specifically at the crime of intentional homicide, Israel places 
                                                 
1 For this comparison with OECD countries I refer to the report: Cowen N. & Williams N., 
"Comparison of Crime in OECD countries, CIVITAS, at 
http://www.civitas.org.uk/crime/crime_stats_oecdjan2012.pdf 
2  תנשל לארשיב העישפה םוכיס1122  
http://www.israelidiamond.co.il/news.aspx?boneid=985&objid=14166, 16 Jan. 2012 
3 The exposure files are criminal files opened following activity taken at police initiative.  
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itself below the mean by population (this shows greater relevance 
considering the substantial difference between inhabitants among the 
states included in the comparison). The graph (Fig. 1) clearly shows a 
difference of nearly half. 
 
Figure 1. Cases of International Homicide per 100,000 population 
(Source Comparison of Crime in OECD countries, CIVITAS, at 
http://www.civitas.org.uk/crime/crime_stats_oecdjan2012.pdf). 
 
 
 
A value that is much closer to the average value is registered with 
regards sexual violence (Fig.2). While the cases of rape in Israel are 17.5 
for every 100.000 people, the mean per population is between 14,8 
(average per country) and 16,2 (statistical data attributed to France). 
 
Figure 2 Cases of rape per 100,000 population 
(Source: see above) 
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The crime of assault, defined as physical aggression that results in 
serious body injury, is quite widespread in Israel and the number of 
cases is significantly higher than both the mean by country and the 
mean by population. Israel in fact, with its 641 assault per 100,000 
members of the population ranks fifth out of 26 countries. 
 
However, crimes against life are not the main security problem in 
Israel. According to the police reports from 1998 to 20114, the most 
diffuse types of crime are those against property which represent 48% 
of the total criminal activity on which police forces investigate, 
followed by crimes against public order (27% of which invoke threat) 
and crimes against person and life which make up 11% of investigated 
cases. 
In this case as well, if we compare the national reality with the situation 
in other countries5 (Fig. 3), we see that Israel ranks in a close to average 
position. In the case of robbery, by contrast, Israel is well below the 
average (of slightly over 200) value with 40 cases for every 100000 
people.  
 
Figure 3 Cases of burglary every 100000 pupulation 
(Source: see picture above) 
 
                                                 
4 State of Israel, The Central Bureau of Statistics, Israel Police "Crime in Israel 1999-2008", 
Statistilite 104. 
5 The comparative analysis was conducted, as regards Israel on data referred to the 
period 2004-2008. 
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A very serious issue in Israel is the one of vehicle theft. This crime is 
apparently very diffuse in the country and the number of recorded 
cases (362) is much higher than the average number (approximately 
200). However, it is also important to take into account that this kind of 
value might be affected by the level of trust the population has in the 
police force; this would directly impact the number of cases that are 
actually reported.   
Figure 4 Cases per viechle tefht every 100,000 population 
(Source: see picture above) 
 
 
This type of security issue is not central in political and social debate. 
Even though this issue is regularly exposed to the public by the media 
and other sources of information, the relevance attributed to such a 
threat is often not deemed significant enough to occupy the realm of 
Israeli political debate. In fact, the conceptual area of security has been 
largely dominated by the topic of the Territories and the Israeli-Arab 
conflict as well as more recently by the Iranian issue and the 
relationship with other countries in the area (due also to the major 
changes that occurred in the Arab world in the past years). 
The only way in which the issue of crime generally becomes part of the 
political debate is when it is discussed as a point proving the dangers of 
an individualistic system of government that produces inequality and 
marginalization. On the other hand, another interesting point was 
discussed recently due to the wave of immigrants coming from Sudan, 
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Eritrea and other African countries. Some criminal activities have been 
recorded, both on the side of the immigrants and on the side of the 
Israeli citizens. There have been reports of Israeli citizens perpetrating 
acts of intolerance and vengeance against the Africans and some social 
workers who were providing welfare services to migrants and foreign 
workers. The media covered the events in a very detailed way and 
fostered a vivid public debate. A roaring quarrel began in which the 
right wing parties and the Government forces (currently represented as 
a center-right coalition) accused the immigrants of being a serious 
threat to the security of the population (as well as to the economy and 
the demographic balance). They also provided data of a rapid increase 
of the criminal activity perpetrated by immigrants in 2012 that had 
already been growing since 2008. On the other side, leftist parties and 
some NGOs working with immigrants and refugees held the 
government and its policies responsible for the difficult living 
conditions of the immigrants in the country that would push them to 
illegal actions; they also accused the official reports and the data to be 
deliberately altered in order to nourish intolerance and xenophobia6. 
According to these critical voices, in this specific circumstance, the 
Government and the police forces were also neglecting international 
treaties signed by the State of Israel regarding asylum seekers, children 
rights and many others international laws. 
As we can see, this situation is much similar to one that has been 
experienced in many other Western countries as regarding the 
tendency to link a rising crime rate with a rising immigration rate The 
rising of a xenophobic populism in following a migration wave 
therefore is much common in many European countries7. 
 
 
Violence against minorities  
a) Sexual minorities 
                                                 
6 See the article written by Sigal Rozen, Public Policy Coordinator of the Hotline for 
Migrant Workers, http://972mag.com/police-distortion-of-crime-data-encourages-rising-
violence-against-refugees/46236/, 19 may 2012  
7 Tarchi M., (2013) Cos'è il populismo, in Diorama 3:313. 
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Israel has an active gay community who is well integrated and 
represented by a number of organizations distributed all over the 
country8. These organizations provide assistance and different services 
(hotlines, health education, legal assistance etc.), promote awareness 
among the population and the further enhancement of the conditions of 
sexual minorities. The activity of these organizations is at least partially 
state funded.  
The city of Tel Aviv (well known as an emancipated and modern city) 
has been recorded as a particularly favorable environment for the gay 
community. Since 1998, Tel Aviv has hosted an annual Gay Pride 
Parade and many pubs and entertainment centers are regularly 
frequented by the gay community. However, this tolerant atmosphere 
is not equally represented across the country, especially in the more 
conservative areas where religious members of the three main 
confessions (Jewish, Muslim and Christian) claim the intolerability of 
such sexual orientations inasmuch as forbidden by the parameters of 
their faith. A team of Israeli researchers conducted a survey in 2009 
about the perception of homosexuality as a "perversion". 71% of ultra-
Orthodox Jews, 67% percent of Orthodox Jews, 64% of Arabs and the 
57% percent of Israelis from Russia recognized homosexuality as a 
perversion as well as 44% of traditional Jews and 24% of the secular 
population. It is also showed that among the populations with Arab 
ethnicity, the general attitude toward sexual minorities was of non-
acceptance.  
Instances of intolerance have been manifested in several occasions in 
Jerusalem for example during the Gay Pride Parade of 2010 which was 
conducted under the supervision of police forces in a ratio of 1 to every 
2 participants. This was necessary due to the potential risks coming 
from the counter demonstration of ultra-Orthodox Jews and the words 
of condemnation expressed by the majority of Jewish Christian and 
Muslim leaders. There have been a number of episodes of verbal and 
physical violence against members of the gay community that have 
                                                 
8 For the paragraph on sexual minorities, the information refers to the report published in 
UNHCR website: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (2011) Israel: Treatment of 
sexual minorities; state protection and services available,  
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4dde1aca2.html. 
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been recorded  during the past few years; in a few cases the victims 
paid with their lives or sustained serious and permanent injuries.  
These crimes, especially those entailing physical damages, were in 
general persecuted and punished with heavy sentences along with the 
general condemnation of civil and religious leaders. 
In the opinion of well-known members of the gay community, the 
problems of intolerance and discrimination are represented more on 
the social-cultural level then on legal one. From the legal perspective, 
there are a number of rights that are guaranteed to sexual minorities in 
Israel. These rights exist with regard to freedom of personal choice 
(even though the possibility of marriage is not entertained); integration 
into society (gender equality in employment, military service, etc.) and 
with the official recognition of homosexual couples (as it regards for 
example the recognition of marriage performed abroad, tax discipline, 
housing assistance etc.). 
Unfortunately, the legal protection granted to this minority does not 
fully prevent the weakest segments (Arab homosexuals, poor and 
transgender) from a more "individual" discrimination.  
 
 
b) Women 
Violence against women has partially been analyzed in comparative 
perspective to the other OECD countries. The rate of sexual violence 
has been illustrates; however, this topic deserves a separate and deeper 
analysis because of its complexity and importance. In this paragraph 
the focus will be on the national reality. Violence against women is a 
very complex phenomenon to observe and to describe due to the 
various forms in which violence manifests itself (sexual, physical, 
verbal, psychological) and due to the different situations in which it can 
occur (in random circumstances, at home, at the work place etc.). 
Moreover there is a relatively scarce tendency to report the crime.9 In 
                                                 
9 Most of the data in this paragraph refer to the report published in the UNHCR website: 
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Israel (2010, February 26): Violence against 
women, including legal recourse, response by government authorities and services 
available to victims of violence., ISR103373.E, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e42616d2.html  
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Israel, as well as in the majority of the Western countries, many cases of 
violence take place at home or within the familial environment. 
Statistics show that violence against women is a common phenomenon: 
a poll conducted in 2010 in Israel showed that one out of every three 
women had been sexually abused, one out of every four women had 
been a victim of rape and one out of every six had been abused by a 
member of her own family (incestuous abuse). 
When violence is perpetrated in a domestic context, the victims are 
usually exposed to repeated episodes of abuse; in most of these cases 
the level of aggression increases until it leads to the most dramatic 
consequences. The state of extreme frustration and desperation victims 
oftentimes experience prevent them from escaping. The weaker the 
social segment to which the woman belongs, the more unlikely it is that 
she will take positive action against her persecutor. Immigrant, non-
Israeli women who have a violent Israeli partner for example, are more 
reticent in denouncing the abuse since the ending of the relationship 
would cause them to lose their rights to live in the country. The murder 
of the female partner or ex-partner is also quite common, mostly within 
the lower socioeconomic layers (for example in 2006, there were 
situations registered with regard to crimes of this type in the Ethiopian 
community)10.   
Even though it is difficult to gather specific and well organized data in 
the Arab communities, cases of violence and segregation seem to be 
more frequent than in Jewish ones. However, in Jewish communities as 
well, there are cases of domestic violence especially in the 
aforementioned immigrant communities and Haredi (Ultraorthodox) 
communities. As the former director-general of the Israel Women's 
Lobby stated, "We can't say that there are sectors where [violence 
against women] is more frequent, but there are sectors where this issue 
is more repressed, like among the Arabs and Haredim, due to their 
refusal to cooperate with state authorities. There, it is customary to 
                                                 
10 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, (2007, March 2) Israel: Violence against 
women, including statistics, legal recourse, services available and response by 
government authorities (2005-2006), , ISR102086.E, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/469cd69ec.html 
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wash one's dirty linen at home"11. Without succumbing to 
generalization and demonization of any group or culture, it is 
important to consider that the low level of integration of these groups, 
the lack of cultural and economic resources and the uncertainty of the 
future might discourage the victims from reporting abuse, favoring the 
creation of a vicious circle of segregation.12 
Another phenomenon that is worth discussing regarding the Haredi 
community is the existence of an illegal, self-appointed "modesty 
police". Predominantly prevalent in Jerusalem (but also present in less 
structured forms in other very conservative areas of the country) these 
groups of Ultra-orthodox men have committed many illegal and 
violent acts against property and people, in particular women. On the 
basis of a very strict interpretation of Judaism, they perpetrate physical 
and verbal violence to different degrees. Their offences include, but are 
not limited to: issuing verbal threats and damaging property 
(sometimes even by using dangerous substances). 
As with many other Western countries, Israel is endowed with formal 
instruments for the protection of women against violence and 
discrimination. Many laws and bills were approved in the past ten 
years; a permanent Knesset committee works on improving women 
status in the society; hotlines have been connected to police forces all 
over the country and are available to provide continuous assistance to 
victims and to women in distress. Moreover, part of the budget has 
been allocated to fund social work programs dedicated to the care, 
protection, legal assistance and reintegration of victims. Public opinion 
seems to be quite active on this issue. Many NGOs are dealing with 
abused women, especially Arab ones. Arab women are indeed the most 
discriminated against segment of the female population, suffering from 
marginalization even in the absence of physical violence. In the last 
decade, NGOs have been playing an increasing "watchdog role", 
                                                 
11 Heller M., (2012, November 2), Fighting violence against women, in Yiddish in Ynet at 
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4295222,00.html.  
12 On the cultural and social constraints to violence reporting, see United States 
Department of State (2012 May 24), 2011 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 
Israel and the occupied territories. Available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4fc75a905f.html 
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pointing out  the insufficient attention from the state and  calling for the 
creation of  specific legislation that would grant more defined and 
stricter punishment for the violators. These NGO’s have requested 
government funds for education and prevention activities especially in 
the more conservative communities (Ultraorthodox Jews and Arabs). 
They also point out that in order to remedy the existing problem, it is 
necessary to provide adequate number of shelters and protection 
programs for the.  
 
 
c) Ethnic minorities 
The problems associated with ethnic minorities is very prevalent in 
Israel both due to the presence of a substantial Arab minority that 
represents about 20% of the population and due to the very nature of 
the Israeli population that is composed of the various waves of 
immigrations of Jews (or  descendants of Jews) from different parts of 
the world. 
One of the most recent reports about violence against minorities was 
published by the Coalition Against Racism13 in March 2012. It 
documents several types of violence perpetrated against different 
ethnic and national group in Israel; mainly against the Palestinian Arab 
community, as well as Ethiopians, Mizrahim (Jews of Eastern origin), 
refugees and migrant workers. Beyond these episodes of physical 
violence, other forms of racist violence were reported in the fields of 
education (the most extreme incidents dealt with actions and attitudes 
within certain educational institutions that led to the segregation of 
Ethiopian children from children of other ethnic background), housing 
(this is one of the most important fields where ethnic violence would be 
more evident through sudden house demolitions and forced evictions, 
incitement against leasing or selling houses to Arabs and Ethiopians 
                                                 
13 Coalition Against Racism is an NGO that has been operating in Israel since 2003 
advocating for the improvement of the life conditions of the Arab minority. This 
paragraph refers to Coalition Against Racism (2012, March) The Main Findings of the 
2012 Racism Israel Report available at http://www.fightracism.org/en/Article.asp?aid=241 
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etc.), employment and in the very legislative activity of the government 
(with the approval of discriminatory bills and laws)14. 
The report also mentions a certain degree of violence perpetrated by 
the security forces (especially assault and violent reactions during civil 
protests) that have been decreasing vis-à-vis the Arab population but 
have been increasing the cases of other national minority such as 
Ethiopians (according to the report, this might be due to an increased 
awareness of the Ethiopian community thus a more dynamic political 
and civil activation of this group following episodes of discrimination). 
 
 
Organized Crime 
Organized crime in Israel is developed and flourishing. The Israeli 
mafia is run both by small groups who act locally and by bigger and 
more articulated groups who are present on the national and 
international level. The top of the hierarchy in these criminal groups is 
allegedly occupied mainly by Mizrahi families and some Bedouin 
families.  
The most practiced illegal activities are human trafficking and 
prostitution, extortion, loan sharking, drugs and arms trafficking, 
fencing, organizing illegal gambling and casinos, diamond smuggling 
and most of all money laundering. Money laundering represented a large 
attraction for the Russian organized crime, especially beginning in 1989 
with the mass immigration of Russian Jews to Israel. The economic 
policy and the banking regulation was extremely favorable in allowing 
olim (Jews who lived in the Diaspora and decided to immigrate to 
Israel) to move their financial capital at the moment of their 
immigration to the "Promised Land". The Russian organized crime took 
advantage of these conditions in order to launder a large amount of 
money and to capitalize on the fruits of a discrete and secure activity in 
Israel. During the same period and continuing into the end of the 
                                                 
14  For a more detailed description of the claims of NGOs and international organization 
as it regards the discrimination of some segments of minority population see: Minority 
Rights Group International (2011, July 6) State of the World's Minorities and Indigenous 
Peoples 2011 - Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT), available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e16d36ec.html 
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Nineties, some of the strongest Israeli groups internationalized their 
activities, becoming powerful members of the international mafia 
business. A field in which they have been particularly involved is drug 
trafficking, especially ecstasy and other synthetic drugs15 however, 
their illegal activity is practiced in every country on the broader 
spectrum of activities (from a general extortion activity to more specific 
ones according to the peculiar potential of each country)16. 
The increased activity and the escalation of violence that took place in 
Israel at the start of the new millennium, has led the government to 
rethink its strategy. In fact, in the fighting between different mafia 
groups caused harm on the civilian population, leading to many 
injuries and deaths. The lack of effective containment measures led to 
low numbers of witnesses willing to testify or people who withdrew 
testimonies which harmed important judicial procedures. In 2006, the 
Israeli Government took two important steps in order to fight 
organized crime: the implementation of an extensive contrasting 
program and the development of a witness protection program. The 
cooperation among different policy forces has been implemented (both 
on the investigative level and on the operational one) and some new 
divisions have been created ad hoc. For example, a combined 
intelligence center for the fight against both general violations and 
organized crime was founded in 2007 and a national crime unit, La'hav 
433, was inaugurated in 2008 to lead and provide specific support to 
the Crime Fighting Units (operating in local and national levels) 
already active. The second action consists of the creation of an authority 
(the Israel Witness Protection Authority) with the specific task of 
codifying standardized measures for witnesses protections, organizing 
and carrying out  the activity itself (that was considered to be defective 
                                                 
15 As it regards the activity of Israeli organized crime in the unites States see one of the 
press releases of Los Angeles Fbi: (2012 May 07) Israeli Organized Crime Figure Pleads 
Guilty in U.S. to Narcotics and Racketeering Offenses, Including Murder, at 
http://www.fbi.gov/losangeles/press-releases/2012/israeli-organized-crime-figure-pleads-
guilty-in-u.s.-to-narcotics-and-racketeering-offenses-including-murder 
16 See for example this article about some illegal activities in South Africa: Haaretz Service 
and agencies (2003, November 11) South African police confirm existence of Israeli mafia, 
in Haaretz, at http://www.haaretz.com/news/south-african-police-confirm-existence-of-
israeli-mafia-1.105210 
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especially in the long term) and promoting civic awareness and sense 
of duty17. 
 
 
Terrorism 
When talking about rule of law and security dimension in Israel, the 
discussion of the threat of terrorism is unavoidable. The threat of 
terrorism is strongly perceived by the citizens and has been shaping the 
political agenda and the government policies since the foundation of 
the state. Still, this paragraph discusses an essential difficulty that 
arises with the very definition of terrorism. Until today, the 
international community has been unable to elaborate upon an 
undisputed definition of this concept and many scholars positioned it 
among the essentially contested concepts18. Apart from complexity and 
openness, the concept of terrorism is said to be highly evaluative. Sorel 
suggests that while it is possible to talk about terrorist method and 
terrorist act (meaning its qualification, its impact and its aim), the real 
problem arises when trying to provide a definition of terrorist 
perpetrators and their reasons of action.19 Not doing so in fact the risk 
is that a country or more countries take upon themselves the office of 
judges of the legitimacy, giving of course a very partial (and useless) 
connotation to the definition. Sorel suggests therefore, to focus on 
whether the aim is to spread terror (and whether it is the impact), and 
on the conception of the fact as an action against the state or public 
order instead of entering into the oppressor-oppressed narrative. 
Lastly, having in mind a necessary nonjudgmental approach, it is also 
possible to mention reasons that led to the acts. With this theoretical 
premise, we can say that there is a terrorist threat in Israel and the 
history of terrorist attacks impacts Israeli society at on all levels.  
                                                 
17 The Witnesses protection program is accurately described on the website of the 
Ministry of Security: 
http://mops.gov.il/english/crimeandsocietyeng/orgcrime/pages/tiebreaker.aspx 
18 In the previous chapter, this notion and the original theory of Gallie are presented in 
details.  
19 Sorel, J. M. (2003), Some Questions about the Definition of Terrorism and the Fight 
against Its Financing in European Journal of International Law 14:2: 365-378. 
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During the past 10 years for example, more than 100 suicide attacks 
took place killing about 500 people. The number of this terror form of 
action has been decreasing substantially from 2002 (in its 2008 report on 
terrorism, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported a progressive 
reduction in numbers, from 55 in 2002 to 1 in 200720). The responsibility 
of these suicide attacks was almost always claimed by larger and 
smaller armed Arab groups, sometimes cooperating with each other. 
The most active ones have been Hezbollah, Hamas, the Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad and the Al-Aqsa Martyr Brigades.  
The same organizations as well in addition to small and more isolated 
ones were also responsible for other forms of terror attacks, carried on 
with non-suicide modalities. Other forms of bombings and shooting on 
civilians in a non-belligerent context are very frequently registered, 
especially (but not only) in the Southern part of the country where the 
geographic proximity with Gaza favors the activity of organized 
groups situated there. In this area, rockets and other explosive material 
reach houses, roads and building open to the public with high 
frequency. According to the Israeli Security Agency, the number of 
rockets and mortar shells being launched21 reached its peak in 2008 
when the number overcame 2000 (this violence escalation would be one 
on the main reasons that, always according to the source, led to the 
operation Cast Led between the end of 2008 and the beginning of 
2009)22 The issue of terrorism is very hot in Israeli society: it is one of 
the most present in the media debate as well as in the political arena, 
especially in coincidence of an episode of terror. 
                                                 
20 See the article from Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-
+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since+2000/Victims+of+Palestinian+Violence+and+
Terrorism+sinc.htm . See also the 2009 Annual Summary / Data and Trends in Palestinian 
terrorism published by the Israeli Security Agency: 
http://www.shabak.gov.il/SiteCollectionImages/english/TerrorInfo/reports/terrorreport20
09_en.pdf 
21 As remarked in the original source, "launch" does not correspond to "attack" since it is 
the number actually launched in one high trajectory fire attack. 
22 See the above mentioned report of the Israeli Security Agency as well as the 2010 
Annual Summary: 
http://www.shabak.gov.il/English/EnTerrorData/Reviews/Pages/2010summary-en.aspx 
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The political debate is heavily affected by the threat of terror, mostly in 
relation to the Israeli-Arab conflict and the issue of the occupied 
territories (that will not be taken into account in this analysis, given 
their extreme complexity that would require a book in itself in order to 
be treated in details). 
Both due to its high relevance in the political debate and to the real 
necessity of coping with it, to strengthen its capacity of fighting 
terrorism, the state consistently allocates the largest amount of the 
national budget for security.  
Several operative and intelligence branches of the Israeli police are 
dedicated to the fight against terrorism: the Counter Terrorism Bureau 
has been coordinating and organizing antiterrorism activity since 1996 
mostly on the intelligence side while the Special Antiterrorism Unit 
(SATU) and the Crisis Negotiation Unit represent some of the Police 
departments specialized in counter–terrorism.  
Another important aspect to keep in mind is that when referring to 
terrorism as an empirical dimension for measuring rule of law, there 
has to be a legitimate balance between measures for contrasting the 
terrorist activity and the respect of human rights to which democracies 
are committed and bound through international treaties. Dealing with 
terrorism is a very delicate task for a democratic state that wants to be 
defined as such. Crucial decisions are often made in emergency 
situations where the public pressure is high for an effective and 
definitive solution to the problem. In these moments, the risk is high 
that commitment to human rights might be perceived as unimportant 
compared to the responsibility for the security of the citizens of the 
state; indeed, the heaviness of the measures adopted might conflict 
with the compliance with the law (national and international)23. A very 
interesting article24 about the fight against terrorism and rule of law 
was written by the president of the Israeli Supreme Court in 2005, 
                                                 
23 Bendor, A. L. (2003), The Israeli Constitution and the Fight against Terrorism in 
Constitutional Forum 13: 2. 
24  See the article "Judgments of the Israel Supreme Court: Fighting Terrorism within the 
Law", 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Law/Legal+Issues+and+Rulings/Fighting+Terro
rism+within+the+Law+2-Jan-2005.htm 
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Aharon Barak. Barak discusses the role of the Supreme Court: "The 
court’s role is to ensure the constitutionality and legality of the fight 
against terrorism. It must ensure that the war against terrorism is 
conducted within the framework of the law". 
 
 
Independent judiciary and a modern justice system  
The Israeli legal system is commonly recognized as a modern one, 
where the judicial power is exercised in an effective and independent 
way25. The codification of the judiciary is delegated to a Basic Law26. 
Although definitely inspired to the Western legal culture, it can be 
defined neither as a common law nor as a civil law legal system. 
Rather, it can be defined as mixed. "Mixed jurisdictions are legal 
systems in which the Romano-Germanic tradition has become suffused 
to some degree by Anglo-American law"27. According to Kedar, this is 
the result of the coexistence between two aspects in society, which 
started showing its symptoms before the foundation of the state. Kedar 
points out a complex interplay between law and culture: while the legal 
system might be predominantly influenced by the Anglo-Saxon 
tradition, the political and legal culture is heavily inspired by ideas 
based on Romano Germanic tradition. 
During the Ottoman domination the legal apparatus was a combination 
of traditional Islamic law and modern European laws (German, French, 
and Swiss) that the Ottomans started to implement in their legal system 
mainly from the beginning of the last century. With the defeat of the 
Ottoman Empire and the resolution of the League of Nations, the 
British established their mandate government in the area replacing, 
gradually but substantially, the pre-existing law with laws inspired to 
                                                 
25 See Freedom House (2012). Freedom in the World 2012, at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/israel. 
26 Basic Laws are quasi-constitutional laws whose coverage is basically exhaustive of the 
significant constitutional issues (the main branches of government and the majority of 
basic human rights and civil liberties). The codification of the judicial power can be found 
in Basic Law: The Judiciary (1984).  
27  Walton, F.P. (1907), The Scope and Interpretation of the Civil Code. Montreal: Wilson 
& Lafleur Ltée, reprinted in Toronto by Butterworths (1980), with an introduction by M. 
Tancelin, 1. 
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the British-common law-legal tradition. The British legal system was 
well received by the Jewish community living in the territory because it 
guaranteed stability and reinforced the rule of law. Within the Zionist 
movement, however, there was a great intellectual and political ferment 
for the creation of a civil code and in general a legal system inspired on 
the European civil law model. Most of the Zionist intelligentsia in fact 
had European origins and had been formed in academic and cultural 
circles in which ideas of this kind were promoted. The implementation 
of a civil legislation represented in the imagery of the most, the 
realization of a sovereign state with a centralized and efficient 
government. In this idea of modernity and independence, legal tools 
like a Constitution and a Civil Code are raised as national symbols. The 
debate over the creation of these legal tools has been continuing for 
decades. Since the foundation of the state many steps in the direction of 
the Roman German system have been taken. Even though in Israel 
there is not a formal written Constitution, some Basic Laws have been 
elaborated and a quite widespread political consensus has been 
reached on their quasi-constitutional value (particularly two of them, 
regarding the Freedom of Occupation and Human Dignity and 
Freedom)28. A propos the lack of a Constitution in Israel, pointed as one 
of the lacks or dangers for the complete realization of a full Israeli 
democracy29, Bendor claims that the lack is much more on a formal 
level than on a substantive one. The scholar asserts that in Israel there is 
a "lack of Constitution-narrative" that does not reflect the practical 
reality. The Basic Laws in fact are granted in the legislative body an 
implicit status of Constitution. This despite the fact that most of the 
Basic Laws require a simple majority to be modified and those that 
require a qualified majority, demand for a number that would be quite 
easy to reach, because the coalitions that are usually formed are rarely 
minimal. In fact, the Knesset generally refrains from legislating 
                                                 
28 The necessity to elaborate some separate laws that would have in their complex 
constituted the Constitutional Chart of Israel was expressed by the Firs Knesset in 1950. 
This resolution is known as the "Harrari Decision". 
29 Among the many critical voices see Peleg, I. (1998), Israel's Constitutional Order and 
Kulturkampf in Israel Studies, 3:1: 230-250. 
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whenever the doubt is raised about possible conflict with one of the 
Basic Laws (especially the Basic Law Freedom of Occupation and 
Freedom and Human Dignity). According to this study, then, the lack 
of a formal Constitutional Chart would not harm the rule of law, 
granted by a "self-limitation" of the legislative power which recognized 
in these laws the basic principles of the state, to be protected beyond 
political majorities and to be inspired by30.  
Israeli laws apply within its internationally recognized borders plus 
some areas conquered in the 1967 Six Days war, East Jerusalem (from 
1980) and the Golan Heights (from 1981). Outside the Israeli legal 
jurisdiction are the West bank and the Gaza Strip even if under a 
certain degree of military control. For the tight connection between 
these territories and Israel, some Israeli laws have been applied: for 
example labor law has been applied in some controversies between 
Israeli employers and Palestinian employees. Another case of extended 
jurisdiction in these areas regards cases in which Israeli military 
members are involved. Since they act on behalf of the state of Israel as 
an occupying force, denounces against their actions in the West Bank or 
Gaza are to be directed to the Israeli Supreme Court. 
 
 
Structure of the judicial system 
The judicial system in Israel is articulated in two main branches: the 
civil one and the religious one. The civil branch has jurisdiction over 
the largest portion of issues while the religious branch has substantial 
jurisdiction over the family matters. Therefore, upon its establishment, 
Israel has delegated the management of family law to the recognized 
religious communities (such as Jewish, Muslim, or Christian) and their 
rules. Such application is subject to the supervision of the Supreme 
Court.  The historical origins of this method are to be found in the 
mandate period and previous to it, in the Ottoman Empire, where 
family matters were autonomously administered by the religious 
communities. 
                                                 
30 Bendor, A. L. (2003), The Israeli Constitution and the Fight Against Terrorism in 
Constitutional Forum, 13:2:37-41. 
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Civil courts are organized on a hierarchical pyramid and the top court 
is the High Court of Justice. On the regional level there are six district 
courts dealing with criminal and civil matters over a certain threshold 
of potential punishment (both in terms of economic sanction and in 
terms of condemnation to prison), administrative matters and appeal 
from the lower level of courts, the magistrate's ones. There are thirty 
magistrate's courts scattered all around the state which deal with minor 
criminal and civil matters or, in some exceptional circumstances with 
family or juvenile law cases. 
Some special tribunals are also functioning to grant the administration 
of justice in specific fields; these are the Labor tribunal and the Military 
tribunal.  
 
 
The Supreme Court 
This institution is at the highest level of the judicial apparatus and 
serves as a court of further appeal (from cases that passed through the 
District courts) as well as a court of first instance as it regards State 
authorities (for example claims over elections, detentions and actions of 
public servants at any level, including politicians and army members). 
Even though Israel is not provided with a formal Constitutional Chart, 
the Supreme Court has in fact a similar function to a Constitutional 
Court, having, among others, the power of judicial review. After the 
proclamation of two of the Basic Laws "Freedom of Occupation" and 
"Human Dignity and Freedom" (which bounded to the principles that 
they contained other future laws of the state), the Supreme Court 
recognized the legal superiority of two of the Basic Laws (and the 
unacceptability of any rule or verdict contrary to them) extending it de 
facto to the other Basic Laws.31 A ruling of the Supreme Court is binding 
upon every court, other than the Supreme Court itself (in application of 
the principle of stare decisis that in Israel is applied in a vertical sense (a 
                                                 
31 This statement is known also as the "constitutional revolution". The one who coined 
this expression is Aaron Barak who sat as a Chief Justice of the Supreme Court between 
1995 and 2006. See Barak, A. (1992), The Constitutional Revolution: Protected Human 
Rights in Mishpat Umimshal. Haifa, U. Haifa L. & Gov’t J. 9 (Hebrew). 
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court of lower status cannot adopt a decision that contrasts a decision 
of a higher level court). 
Claims are made by scholars over the Supreme Court interference over 
the political sphere starting especially in the Nineties. The image of the 
Supreme Court as strong and influential is reported by many scholars. 
Hofnung claims how in the early Nineties, with the attribution of 
Constitutional Review Powers to the Supreme Court, this organ exerted 
a heavy veto power on the legislation and legislative activity at large. 
According to the scholar, this would have originated a deep rethinking 
from the political power about the selection modalities of the judges. 
This debate is still active today as well as the attempt to reform the 
selection of the judges. Many Members of Knesset in fact presented 
bills and proposals to redefine the selection procedure (thus exercising 
a better control in the selection phase) and for regaining power as 
ultimate institutional actor in the legislative activity. According to 
Hofnung, the Supreme Court would seek to preserve its influential 
power in shaping the legislative activity in Israel and would have 
reached with the years a more refined method of exercising this power, 
so as not to be exposed to media or public opinion strong criticism (for 
example, through a mechanism of agenda setting and formulating 
recommendations and modification proposals before the bills get 
approved in the Knesset)32. On the other hand other scholars remark 
how these decisions are not substantially influencing the reality. 
Sometimes in fact the pronouncement is purely symbolic and does not 
entail a practical change. Even when the pronouncement does entail a 
practical change, it does not affect the large scale but it remains limited 
to the single case.  A very interest contribution on this topic comes from 
Barak Erez who is analyzing cases in which the Court ruled against 
appointments, political agreements and allocation of funds33. According 
to this research, even though there were in fact pronouncements of the 
Court in these issues, it had no relevant effect on the fulfillment of 
political agreements in the country. As it regards the political 
                                                 
32 Hofnung, M. (2012), The Limits of Judicial Independence: Judges, Law and Politics in 
Israel. Jerusalem. 
33 Barak, E.D. (2012), Judicial Review of Politics: The Israeli Case in Journal of Law and 
Society 29: 611-631. 
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appointments, even though a legal provision was set in order to forbid 
them, the margin of elusion is substantial and the practice continued to 
be accepted in the society at large. Also in the case of allocation of 
public funds, despite the intervention of the Court in this matter (which 
has been banned many "designated funds" allocations) and its 
resolution to allocate funds on egalitarian criteria and not on the basis 
of political agreement the change would have been only symbolic, 
being the circumvention of the rule as easy as largely practiced 
 
 
Efficiency of the courts 
The Israeli Courts are among the busiest in the world and a quite 
conspicuous number of cases are presented every year.  In the first 7 
months of 2012 for example, 450.000 cases in total had been presented.  
According to the report made by the President of the Supreme Court, 
Asher Grunis, 707,000 new case files were opened in 2011 while in 2010 
the number was about 10,000 lower. A big part of the cases were 
initially filed in magistrate courts. The files directly presented to the 
Supreme Court were about 4000 (administrative appeals, High Court 
petitions). 43 percent were petitions, filed by single citizens or non-
governmental organizations. In 2011, 9,775 in total case files were 
submitted to the top court. In 2010 nearly the same number of cases 
was presented too. 9,565 case files were closed in 2011, data that is 
defined by Justice Grunis as a significant success in the attempt of 
optimization of the Court efficiency. The handling time of a case by the 
Supreme Court were also reduced in 2011. In fact, 15.5 months were 
necessary on average in 2010 while in 2011, 14 months on average were 
sufficient34.  
 
 
Religious Tribunals 
Religious tribunals in Israel are responsible for matters relating to 
personal status between members of recognized religious communities. 
                                                 
34 Zarchin T., (2012, June 25), Supreme Court handled cases faster in 2011 in Haaretz at 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/supreme-court-handled-cases-faster-in-2011-
1.443648. 
79 
For these reasons there are Rabbinical Courts for Jews, Sharia Courts 
for Muslims, Druze Courts and religious courts for Christian 
communities. They are under the supervision of the Ministry of 
Justice35 and their organization is not very different from any other 
tribunal in the country. 
Due to the relevance of this topic for deeper analysis of the relationship 
between religion and the quality of democracy in the country, a more 
detailed description of Jewish religious tribunals will be given. Twelve 
Jewish Religious Courts are distributed in the territory of the State and 
one High rabbinical court sits in Jerusalem. The High Rabbinical Court 
is meant to be an appeal court and it is controlled by a President.  
The status of the religious courts judges is determined by the Dayanim 
Act (dayan is the Hebrew word for judge), enforced in 1955. Judges of 
religious tribunals are considered by the law as public servants, paid by 
the State and loyal to the State regulations. Like the civil judges they are 
appointed by the President under recommendation of a special 
committee but the selection procedure, as well as the main working 
procedures in the religious courts follow religious predicaments and 
principles. For example, only men can serve as judges in religious 
courts and no women (as well as minors and mentally disable people) 
can sit in court as witnesses. The role of woman rabbinical lawyers is 
quite complicated. The possibility for women to officially pledge in 
front of religious courts was opened in 1994 after the intervention of the 
Supreme Court. This news actually broke the de facto exclusion of 
women from being recognized as official defendant in religious courts 
with all the consequences in terms of choice for citizens who pledged 
their cases in front of a Rabbinical Court. However, claims are made 
that the procedure to gain the title of religious rabbinical advocate 
decreases the possibilities for women to become accredited pleaders to 
the Rabbinical Courts. Rabbinical advocates are in fact licensed by the 
President of the High Rabbinical Court. In order to get the license, 
                                                 
35 The institutional reference was initially the Ministry of Religious Affairs but in 2003 the 
Ministry was dismissed due to the pressure of an antireligious party, Shinui. The 
authority passed to the Ministry of Justice. When the Ministry of Religious Services was 
reestablished later in 2008 the supervision of the religious courts remain under the 
Ministry of Justice.  
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applicants need to study for four years in a Yeshiva (religious school for 
men exclusively) or to graduate in a recognized institute. A final exam 
is mandatory for all candidates (under the organization and the 
supervision of the President of the High Rabbinical Court) and their 
character and lifestyle is also examined as sine qua non for the 
appointment.   
Since the Rabbinical Court are part of the judicial apparatus of the 
country, the Supreme Court of Israel has a supervision power on all 
religious tribunals through the instrument of the High Court of Justice. 
The power of intervention of this civil judicial body included the order 
of hearing or not hearing particular cases (according to the attributed 
jurisdiction and to the particular request of the citizen involved in the 
case), and the power to nullify the decision taken by the religious court 
in case the verdict is considered illegitimate. The civil branch of the law 
has been intervening during the years in some rulings of the rabbinical 
court, motivating its intervention with the protection of rules of natural 
justice or to the basic principles of the Israeli legal system. The Supreme 
Court's activism on this matter caused along the years moments of 
tense confrontation between the two systems that resulted in vivid 
disputation in the political world and in the public opinion. A proof of 
the recalcitrant attitude toward this dynamic and asset of powers is 
evident in the self-definition of the Rabbinical High Court as a parallel 
Supreme Court. As Cohn notes well, such a definition is actually not 
accurate or respondent to the reality. However, it is explicative of the 
conception of the two legal powers are separate identities36. The 
existence of religious tribunals in the State and their jurisdiction is an 
extremely controversial issue as one of the vessels in the fracture 
between secular and religious Jews. The reason for the institution of the 
religious courts is partially explicable with ideological reasons 
(Judaism is very "involved" in behavioral practices of the believers) 
and, interestingly, partially related to historical reasons: at the time of 
the Ottoman Empire, the justice administration was decentralized and 
very dynamic, as required by the big extension of the imperial territory 
and by the presence of a great variety of population. For this purpose, 
                                                 
36 Cohn M., (2004) Women, Religious Courts and Religious Law in Israel: The Jewish 
Case, in Scandinavian Journal of Social Sciences, 107:57-76. 
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beside the Sharia law and the Kanun law, a special legal regime was in 
force for which the non-Muslim millets could administer justice 
according to their customary law. This was especially true for matters 
of personal status (marriage, divorce and burial) but also economic and 
social relations. Even penal matters were partially delegated to the 
communities but, in this case, the Ottoman court had supremacy. The 
high degree of autonomy was preserved under the British mandate. 
The "Palestine Order in Council 1922" and its later amendments 
granted religious courts the exclusive jurisdiction in family and probate 
issues (art. 51 and 53). On one hand, this contributed to the creation of 
proto-institutions, covering a broad range of educational, cultural, 
economic, legal and even political matters. On the other side, this 
strengthened religious judicial authority attributing again an exclusive 
jurisdiction on personal matters. 
With the formation of the State in 1948, existing law was to largely 
remain in force, including the Order in Council. Religious courts 
maintained a large portion of their jurisdiction even though some areas 
of personal law, such as inheritance and adoption, gradually shifted 
under the jurisdiction of the civil courts. In 1953 a specific bill explicitly 
stated the area of intervention of the Rabbinate and the rabbinical 
courts. Exclusive authority was granted in marriage and divorce 
between Jews (nationals and residents) while for ancillary matters 
related to the just mentioned issues, a concurrent system will be created 
with the institution of the Family courts. Nowadays, while divorce 
proceedings are exclusive competence of the religious courts, citizens 
are free to choose about related matters. The first court addressed by 
one of the spouses will be in fact responsible. Authoritative voices point 
out a substantial difference in the behavior of the two judicial bodies: 
generally the Rabbinical Courts tend to be more favorable for men, in 
virtue of the gender biased rationale underlying religious rules37. 
 
 
Citizens' perception of the judicial system and level of trust 
                                                 
37 Ibidem. 
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When dealing with the public perception of the judicial system, the 
absolute protagonist is the Supreme Court. As said the activism of the 
Supreme Court in Israel as well as in many Western countries is a well-
known phenomenon. The judicial power engagement in political 
questions and promotion of a legislative political agenda has been 
triggering in Israel huge debates in the public opinion and the media 
that reflected in a quite definite fracture also in the political arena38.  
Public petitions can be filed by organizations or individuals regarding 
human rights, strengthen the rule of law, and eliminate governmental 
corruption or illegal activity by any authority. Unlike class action suits, 
petitions are not filed with the purpose of gaining economic 
compensation. They rather have a social goal and often organizations 
and civic groups aim to see principles officially recognized by the 
court, often in behalf of disadvantaged segments of the society. 
Sometimes petitions or requests to the Court led to the affirmation of 
principles that served, in other cases, as a sort of precedent.  
Woods notes how this intervention in sensitive political issues causes 
the Supreme Court to acquire political power. Starting from 1988 the 
Supreme Court increased its level of involvement in sensitive issues. In 
parallel, a higher number of cases were presented to the Court. The 
liberal positions expressed and the intervention against the rulings of 
the rabbinical court made the religious institutions assuming a more 
and more intransigent attitude. The Court was accused to outrage to 
the religious institutions and their leaders. The administrative bodies of 
the State were also targeted by this more active role of the judicial 
supreme body. The media exposure provoked an increment of the 
Court's popularity: challenging the administrative power therefore the 
Supreme Court became the champion of justice among the population. 
The polls demonstrated this public attitude of increasing trust. From 
the last statistical surveys, it appears that the Supreme Court is one of 
the institutional bodies that enjoy the highest level of public trust (See 
graphic below). In 2012 the level of the citizens' trust was 72.5% among 
                                                 
38 Woods, P. J. (2008), Judicial Power and National Politics: Courts, Gender and the 
Religious Secular Conflict in Israel. Albany, NY, SUNY Press. 
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Jews and 78% among Arabs39. Among the Arab population of Israel the 
Supreme Court was the most trusted institutional body. This is 
understandable considering the rulings that the Supreme Court 
emanated in favor of the safeguard of minorities rights and equality. 
Combining the trust data with the political views of the respondents it 
emerges that Leftist voters have the Supreme Court as a first institution 
trusted. This shows a prevailing view for which the Supreme Court is 
the vessel of secularism and civil rights. 
IDI published another data in its report of 201140 that results from the 
combination of trust and general political knowledge of the statistical 
population. According to this study, the higher the political knowledge, 
the higher the trust is in the civil judicial bodies. On the contrary, the 
lower the general political knowledge of the respondents (and the 
closer they are to religion), the broader is their trust in the Rabbinate. 
This data does not intend to denigrate any part of the population of 
Israel, nor discriminating them according to their religious views. 
However, it is possible that been the Supreme Court actively engaged 
in a "reformist" activity, the respondents that more deeply trust this 
body are the ones who desire a bigger change in the society and are 
therefore more interested in knowing and be updated about the current 
situation that they wish to change.  
Figure 5 Level of Popular Trust in the Supreme Court 
 (Source: The 2011 Democracy Index, IDI) 
                                                 
39 Hermann T. et al. (2012). The Israeli Democracy Index 2012, Jerusalem: The Israel 
Democracy Institute. 
40 Hermann T. et al. (2011). The Israeli Democracy Index 2011, Jerusalem: The Israel 
Democracy Institute. 
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According to Shetreet, trust of the public is one of the priorities of the 
judicial system and in particular of the Supreme Court in Israel. Proofs 
of that are "the open court principle, which is one of those fundamental 
principles of the legal system with a basis in statutory law and a court's 
duty (again grounded in statute) to state reasons for its decisions"41.  
Another evidence of this attitude would be the strict criteria of 
disqualification of judges; the possibility of eventual bias would be 
sufficient by itself to disqualify a judge from a case, even if de facto the 
bias has not been recorded. Also the procedure followed in the 
assignment of cases is pointed out as a way of maintain public 
confidence. The general guideline about the appointment of judges 
provides that the presidents of the courts should apply an automatic 
system (that would ensure a random assignation) or operate a more 
specific selection, according to case specificity. According to Shetreet, 
the selective criteria would be distortive on one side and on the other 
side explicative of the public-support-gaining rationale generally 
followed by the Supreme Court. The specialization of some judges in 
certain matters could endanger the judicial independence, biasing the 
verdicts, according to the interpretation of one single judge. On the 
other side, the strong reputation acquired by some judges in peculiar 
matters would not rest unnoticed by press and public opinion. 
                                                 
41 Shetreet, S. (2001), The Critical Challenge of Judicial Independence in Israel, in Russell 
P.H. & O'Brien D. M. (eds.) Judicial Independence in the Age of Democracy. 
Charlottesville & London: University Press Virginia. 
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Nonetheless, this has not prevented some judges from gaining a strong 
reputation for their expertise in certain areas of the law.42 
A critical issue that is considered to be potentially harmful for the 
public perception of the judiciary and for the effective public 
accessibility to the Court comes from Association for Civil Rights in 
Israel (ACRI). An interesting point is raised by ACRI regarding the 
costs imposed by the judicial system on petitions filed by citizens and 
organizations in case of petition denial from the court. On the Situation 
Report 2012, ACRI questions the opportunity of this attitude that 
became more frequent in the last year. Negative consequences can be 
originated by the imposing of large court fees. It would prevent the 
social actors from applying to the courts for fear of economic sanctions 
whenever the petition was denied. Moreover, this would seriously 
compromise the capacity of the NGOs to continue existing and carrying 
on their work, due to the economic burden that they will not be able to 
sustain. Essentially, according to ACRI, this practice risks to endanger 
the public contribution to the amelioration of the society, broadening 
the distance between society and institutions43. 
 
 
The Ombudsman Office of the Judiciary 
The Ombudsman's Office of the Israeli Judiciary was established in 
2003, as an implementation measure of the Ombudsman for 
Complaints against Judges Law, 2002. This body is formally part of the 
Ministry of Justice, but it acts independently and it cannot be 
considered as a normal branch of the judicial. Its purpose is to 
investigate on judges following complaints from individuals or groups 
of citizens. In particular, the filed complaints can regard judges' 
conduct or trials' management. Its authority is exerted on all serving 
judges in all civil courts, religious, labor and military ones. 
As stated by Strasberg Cohen, this mechanism guarantees supervision 
of the judges from an external body in a way that the judiciary itself 
would not be actively involved in the supervision process. In order for 
the judicial independence not to be endangered, some conditions have 
                                                 
42 Shetreet, S. (2001) ibidem. 
43 ACRI, (2012) Situation Report, The State of Human Rights in Israel and OPT.  
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been set by the law: as said before, the Ombudsman enjoys a particular 
status inside the Ministry of Justice being functionally independent but 
at the same time part of the Ministry. The selection criteria enlighten 
this link: the Ombudsman is actually selected by the Committee for the 
Appointment of Judges and needs to possess the same requirements of 
a Supreme Court judge. That is why he is selected among retired 
members of the Supreme Court. In his office, he coordinates a team of 
legal experts. 
The nature of complains that the Ombudsman is entitled to handle can 
also be regarded as another guarantee of independence for the judges. 
The Ombudsman supervises judges' personal behavior in the exercises 
of their functions and the way a case is handled. Its competence 
extends to conflict of interests, unreasonable prolongation of 
proceedings or of the expression of a sentence, judges verbal 
misconduct etc. The Ombudsman is a disciplinary organ and has no 
authority to investigate about the content of a sentence; an intrusion of 
the Ombudsman in this field this would compromise the authority, 
independence and the immunity of the judicial power. The 
investigations are confidential. The decisions, however, are 
communicated to the complainant, to the judge and to the higher ranks 
of the Judicial Body (Minister, President of the Supreme Court, Director 
of the Courts and President of the Judge's court). The sentence is 
definitive and without appeal. Sanctions can vary according to the 
gravity of the violation: a simple rebuke can be made to the judge or 
more serious disciplinary sanctions can be adopted, such as a dismissal 
recommendation to the Judicial Appointment committee (in cases of 
serious violations or reiterated ones). 
However, safeguarding the above mentioned criteria of independence 
and privacy, the law explicitly forbids that the decision form a basis for 
a claim, can be used as evidence in a proceeding. 
 
 
Institutional and administrative capability  
Parliament  
The Israeli Parliament (Knesset) was established in 1949 from the 
Constitutional Assembly. The Knesset is a unicameral legislative body 
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composed by 120 members (MKs). The MKs are elected with a 
proportional method according to the simple quotient and highest 
average system (D'Hondt method). The low electoral threshold (2%) 
and the national single constituency make the electoral system one of 
the most proportional in the world.  
Every citizen of Israel, resident in the State and above the age of 18 can 
express his vote for the Parliament (not mandatory though). An 
impediment to the right to vote can be a disqualification for legal 
reasons or the non-presence in the country at the time of the elections 
(except from some state workers, Jewish agencies workers and their 
families and ship crew's members). 
As it regards the passive electorate, every citizen of the State above the 
age of 21 has the right to be a candidate, also for consecutive electoral 
tournaments. Citizens can be disqualified from this right by a judicial 
sentence and if they are condemned for five years for attempting the 
national security, they cannot be candidate until the five-years 
imprisonment has served. Some public offices are incompatible with 
the candidature: the President of the State, the two Chief Rabbis, judges 
of civil and religious courts, the State Comptroller, rabbis and minister 
of other religions, officers in the professional army, senior civil 
servants, senior officers in the police and prisons service, senior 
employees of associations established by law cannot be candidate in a 
party list for the Parliament unless they abandon the task before the 
lists of candidates are submitted44.   
The electoral lists in Israel are party closed lists. This means that voters 
cannot express their preference, nor nominal or ordinal: the seats are 
allotted to candidates according to their order of appearance on the 
list. Since the territory is not divided in constituencies but the all 
country is included in one big national constituency, the lists are 
national There are no reserved seats or quotas for women, ethnic 
minorities or other categories, even though a passionate debate is open 
on this issue in the media and in the public opinion (a very strong 
feminist movement is active in Israel and many NGOs demand a more 
inclusive representation in the Knesset). In the last years a substantial 
                                                 
44 Basic Law the Knesset, art. 7 
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effort has been made to increase gender representation in the 
Parliament. With the 2013 elections, a record number of 27 female MKS 
(about 1/4 of the total) has been reached. The following chart, gives an 
interesting comparative in historical perspective45 
 
 
Figure 6: Women Representation in the Knesset 
Source: Saragusti A., (2013 February 10) Post-Election Gender Roadmap for the Israeli Knesset, 
Heinrich Boell Foundation Israel, http://www.il.boell.org/web/96-497.html 
 
 
 
MKs stay in office for the all duration of the legislature (4 years). If one 
of the elected resigns or needs to be "replaced" during the legislature, 
the first non-elected of the same list is appointed in his place. 
The duration of the legislature can be shorter than 4 years, in case in the 
Knesset there is not a political majority able to govern or in case the 
President of the State consents to the Prime Minister's request to 
dissolve the legislative body and to organize new elections. In special 
cases, the Knesset can also decide by a special majority, to prolong its 
term beyond four years. This happened for example in 1973 while the 
Yom Kippur War was taking place46.  
The Speaker of the Knesset (who has function of President of the 
legislative body) is elected among the MKs by simple majority. The 
Speaker of the Knesset has general tasks related to the management of 
the parliamentary agenda and work sessions. Furthermore, he manages 
                                                 
45 Saragusti A., (2013 February 10) Post-Election Gender Roadmap for the Israeli Knesset, 
Heinrich Boell Foundation Israel, http://www.il.boell.org/web/96-497.html 
46 For a schematic presentation of the structure of the Israeli Parliament and for possible 
comparative studies see the Interparliamentary Union http://www.ipu.org 
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inter-parliamentary relations with foreign countries, represents the 
Parliament in international bodies and replaces temporarily the 
President of the State when he is not in the country. The Speaker of the 
Knesset has seven MKs formally appointed as his deputies (with the 
same election method). 
As it regards the activity of the Knesset, the "Knesset year" (or annual 
sitting) is divided into two sessions: the Winter Session that starts after 
the High Holidays (the days changes because of the lunar calendar but 
it is usually in September) and the Summer Session, which opens after 
Passover (March-April). The meetings of the Knesset take place on 
workdays (as stated by the Basic Law: The Knesset). Specific time is 
allocated to the relation with the executive branch (parliamentary 
requests to Ministries, answers, presentations etc.); other meetings are 
set to hear and discuss private members' bills. Most of the work of the 
Knesset is performed in the plenum and in the committees. The plenum 
is formally the supreme authority of the Parliament. Beyond the two 
regular sessions, the plenum can be convened in additional special 
sessions upon request of the Government or of a group of MKs.  
The main activity of the plenum consists in general debates, on 
discussion of bills (the former often ends without a voting, unlike the 
latter), motions, parliamentary questions (to draw the attention to an 
issue that, in the presenter's opinion, needs corrective action) and 
motions of no confidence to the Government. In the plenum, simple 
majority is usually the requirement although there are cases in which 
the law requires a qualified majority (like in a motion of non-
confidence, where the law requires the absolute majority). 
 
The laws discussed by the Knesset are usually proposed by the 
executive branch, but any group of MKs or even a single MK can 
propose ("private member's bill"). The bill iter is articulated in three 
phases: its acceptation as a proposal, the "reformulation" in the 
committee, and the vote divided by sections. Only after these passages, 
a final vote is made on the full bill.  
Like many of the Knesset meetings, deliberations are open to the media 
and the public. Also the expression of the vote is generally public 
(sometimes also through roll call) but in certain cases the modality of 
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secret-ballot vote is chosen. From 2003, after repeated scandals due to 
double voting of some MKs, an electronic system with fingerprint 
recognition device has been set up in the Parliament.  
Another significant part of the Parliamentary activity is carried on in 
the committees. There are several types of committees mainly 
distinguishable in permanent and special. Currently, there are twelve 
permanent committees: the Committee for the Advancement of the 
Status of Women; the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee; the 
Economic Affairs Committee; the Education, Culture, and Sports 
Committee; the Finance Committee; the Foreign Affairs and Defense 
Committee; the House Committee; the Immigration and Absorption 
Committee; the Internal Affairs and Environment Committee; the 
Labor and Welfare Committee; the Science and Technology Committee; 
and the State Control Committee. Their composition of these 
committees is set up during a special session of the Parliament, called 
the Arrangements Committee, organized by the Speaker of the Knesset. 
The Special Committees differ from the permanent ones only for matter 
of duration, being them active for a limited amount of time. Sometimes, 
a special committee is transformed in a Permanent one, whenever a 
more continuative work on the issue is requested. This is the case of the 
Committee for the Advanced Status of Women that was originally 
created as a temporary special committee. The Ethics Committee is 
responsible for the jurisdiction over Knesset Members who have 
violated rules of ethics of the Knesset or who have been involved in 
illegal activity outside of the Knesset. In the elaboration of the Ethical 
Guidelines for Knesset Members a public committee was created. This 
type of committee (the public one) is therefore created exceptionally to 
deal with issues that are connected to the Knesset. A public committee 
is usually composed by experts, public figures together with past and 
current MKs. Other types of committees are created ad hoc to deal with 
matters of special national importance (Parliamentary Inquiry 
Committees) or to investigate about interpretations made by the 
Speaker on which an appeal has been raised (Interpretations 
committees).  
The activity of the committees to revise the law proposals and 
reformulate them can be carried on by specific subcommittees (that the 
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committee nominates and to which powers are delegate) or by joint 
committees whenever the complexity of the issue requires a broader 
approach to the matter. As a source of reliable and updated 
information for the Committees and the MKs, the Knesset Research and 
Information Center was established in 2000. Moreover, senior officials, 
members of the Government or expert in general can be invited to take 
part to the meetings to be heard or to express a qualified opinion on a 
specific subject. There is no limit to the amendments that can be done, 
but to preserve the general topic of the bill. The committees have the 
ulterior task (clearly not unrelated to the main one) to discuss in the 
plenum any matter that is under their sphere of authority.  
 
 
Rights and Duties of Members of Knesset 
Like in most Western countries, the members of the Israeli parliament 
have parliamentary immunity47. This instrument aims to guarantee 
freedom of action and independence from the other State powers. It 
quite broad and the possibility to narrow it have been questioned 
several times. Members of Parliament cannot be persecuted for any act 
performed while fulfilling their duty. While in office, they are 
exempted from searches, detention, criminal hearings and legal 
proceedings which are not connected with his work as a Member of 
Knesset. Only the Knesset has the right to lift the immunity, following 
specific requests and iter of notifications; in this case, public expression 
of the vote is requested and simple majority is sufficient.48 While stating 
the right to immunity, the same law establishes a set of general rules of 
behavior instituting at this purpose an Ethics Committee of Members of 
Knesset49. The committee is responsible for the jurisdiction over 
Knesset Members who have violated rules of ethics or have been 
involved in illegal business outside the Knesset.  
                                                 
47 This matter is regulated by the "Knesset Members  Immunity, Rights  and Duties Law", 
1951 
48 An comprehensive frame of the issue is given in the website of the Knesset: 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/description/eng/eng_work_chak1.htm 
49 "Knesset Members Immunity, Rights and Duties Law", section 13d. 
92 
The basic ethic norms for MKs are inserted in the original text of the 
law and are listed in the Rules of Ethics of the Parliament. General 
recommendations on honorable and dignified public and personal 
behavior are made in order to protect the credibility of the Parliament 
and not to misuse the immunity that MKs enjoy. Among the rules of 
ethics there is the prohibition to accept gifts while in office as well as to 
use the title acquired for personal purposes. The warning against the 
conflict of interest is also present as well as the prohibition for the MKs 
to engage in any additional occupation beside the political one. A 
relatively new norm requires a financial declaration to every elected 
MK in order to increase the transparency and monitor the effective 
abstention from prohibited activities or conflict of interests. 
The Ethics Committee does not only have advisory and consulting 
power but also sanctioning ones. The sanctions varies of intensity 
(comments, admonitions, reprimands, temporary exclusion from the 
plenum, economic sanctions etc.) on the basis of the violation registered 
and on the recidivism of the MK. The decisions of the Ethics Committee 
are public; the identity of the sanctioned MKs is published together 
with the deliberations. This is coherent with the purpose of the 
Committee: to protect the public credibility of the Knesset and to 
guarantee its appropriate functioning. An official and renewed code of 
conduct has been in the agenda for many years now. In 2003, a public 
committee was formed for this purpose, leaded by retired Supreme 
Court Justice Zamir. From the Committee work a new code took form 
in 2006. However it never reached the final stage of voting due to the 
refusal of the Knesset to accept the figure of the Ethic Advisor (a sort of 
controller that would have been a bridge between the MKs and the 
committee and would have enforced an accurate control and an 
immediate report of any violation) that caused the members of the 
Commission to suspend their activity50. 
 
 
The Government 
                                                 
50 See the chronological review of the XVII legislation on the Knesset website: 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/review/PrintPage.aspx?kns=17&lng=3 
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Israel is a parliamentary democracy whose Government is ruled by the 
"Basic Law: The Government". After the elections a member of the 
Knesset is appointed by the President to compose the Government that 
he should lead as a Prime Minister. Actually, nowadays, especially the 
big parties already conduct their electoral campaign with a "prime 
minister candidate". Therefore in Israel, as well as in many other 
parliamentary democracies, the President usually gives the office to the 
"designated Prime Minister" of the party that won the elections. After 
the appointment, the Prime Minister-to-be has 45 days (plus a 2 weeks 
extension) to form a cabinet that will have to receive the vote of 
confidence of the Parliament to become effective. In the history of Israel 
Governments have always been "coalition Governments", since no 
party has ever gained the absolute majority of seats in the Knesset. Like 
the Knesset, the Government usually serves for four years, but its term 
may be shortened due to the resignation of the Prime Minister or a non-
confidence vote by the Knesset. The Prime Minister appoints some 
ministries (with or without portfolio) and assigns them specific 
competences. The Prime Minister enjoys a status of primus inter pares 
and has faculty to keep for himself some ministerial competencies. The 
Cabinet can include external ministries, as to say citizens that have not 
been elected as MKs (however they need to enjoy all political rights, 
thus be eligible for Knesset membership). There is not a limit to the size 
of the Cabinet; this decision is made by the Prime Minister and it is 
actually the result both of practical needs of dealing with specific issues 
(beyond the classic areas of governance) and of coalition needs 
(interesting enough is to know that the size of the cabinet had been 
growing in the last years till to arrive to the number of 30 ministers). 
Similarly to the Parliament, also the Government works in committees. 
This instrument has proven as effective and functional. The Ministerial 
Committee on Defense has been instituted on a permanent basis in 
1991. Members of this committee are the Prime Minister, the Deputy 
Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
and the Minister of Finance. Beside this "compulsory" one, four other 
committees are usually created in order to deal with economic affairs, 
legislation, foreign affairs and security, and home affairs and services. 
Evidently the competencies of these committees are inter-ministerial. 
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Special committees are sometimes created whenever an urgent matter 
arises. 
As stated in the beginning of the "Basic law: The Government", the 
Government is the repository of the executive power. Formally the 
Government can implement policies in whatever field is not exclusive 
competence of another authority51. The absence of a formal 
Constitution together with this provision potentially empowers the 
executive to shape the legal system in a way that its action will be easier 
and lest restricted. All deliberations of the cabinet meetings are 
generally secret and little is known about their proceedings, especially 
in security-related issues. As mentioned before, the Government has 
relative freedom from the Knesset. For example, international treaties 
and agreements are totally within its competency, unless the national 
existing law needs to be accordingly modified.  
Said that, it is important to remind that, in parliamentary democracies, 
the Executive is dependent on parliamentary support. As a measure of 
check and balances both the bodies have the power to dissolve each 
other whenever the level of confidence does not reach the minimum 
threshold. Any political group in the Knesset has the faculty to submit 
a motion of non-confidence and to have it voted in the plenum. The 
Knesset may also dismiss the Prime Minister by failing to adopt the 
annual budget within three months of its submission. On the other 
side, also the Prime Minister can submit a request to dissolve the 
Parliament to the President whenever the Knesset does not guarantee 
him a decent governability.  
The Prime Minister is the head of the Executive and he has 
responsibility to manage the activity of the body as well as to stand in 
front of the public as the Executive representative. His responsibility 
entitles him to nominate ministries and the heads of unelected power-
sharing institutions such as the Governor of the Bank of Israel, the 
Attorney General, and the Director of the Mossad. The whole cabinet is 
legally meant to be a strictly personal emanation of the Prime Minister's 
will. Members of the Cabinet can be dismissed in any moment by the 
                                                 
51 See the "Basic Law: The Knesset", art. 32: "The Government is authorized to perform in 
the name of the State and subject to any law, all actions which are not legally incumbent 
on another authority." 
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Prime Minister and whenever the latter resigns, dies or has a long 
impediment to govern the whole team loses its status. The Prime 
Minister cannot be removed but by a non-confidence vote (or in case of 
criminal sentence authorized by the General Attorney and aggravated 
with the accusation of the moral turpitude).52  
 
 
Bureaucracy 
Israel is a unitary State whose centralization is known and pointed out 
in many researches. The centralization of the State has historical and 
ideological roots dated in the aftermath of the establishment of the 
State. The previous experience of the Yshuv, in which the Jewish 
community enjoyed a sort of large federal autonomy, was recalled as 
insufficient to express a full national and political autonomy. The 
political elite opted for the European classic model of State, based on 
the view that centralization confers legitimacy and governability. The 
governmental apparatus was conceived and built with a central 
authority that retained the core power and with some peripheral 
emanations that would have worked as the instruments of this central 
actor53. This setting was regulated by law through the Municipalities 
Ordinance and Local Council Ordinance, originally created in the 
mandate period54. Other legislation was set in the Fifties concerning the 
work of the councils and the local elected. The political debate over the 
regulation of the local governments has been in the political agenda till 
today (even though not in a primary position). Several attempts of 
reform were made. Some changes were accomplished during the years 
but the core legal framework and the structure of the administrative 
apparatus remained the same.   
                                                 
52 See above, art. 18. 
53 For a more extensive description of the historical course of the local authorities in Israel 
see Elazar, D. (2008), The Local Dimension in Israeli Government and Politics in Local 
Government in Israel. Elazar & Kalchheim (eds.). University Press of America, Lanhham 
MD. 
54 These two laws have been later renovated (in the mid Sixties). Nowadays are 
commonly known as Municipalities Ordinance and Local Council Ordinance "new 
version". 
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In Israel there are two levels of government, central and local, with 
respective administrative apparatuses. Although the State is formally 
divided in six regional districts, it would be inappropriate to speak 
about a regional government. These districts in fact are merely 
geographical and they do not vest political or administrative power. 
Their task is mainly to facilitate of control of the local areas and in 
particular land planning. The central Government, composed by the 
Prime Minister and the Ministers is provided with a quite extensive 
bureaucratic apparatus. The organogram of the main ministries is 
broadly articulated (in departments, divisions, special offices etc.) and 
employs a considerable number of civil servants at different levels 
(below the organogram of two of the main ministries is reported as an 
example). The ministries' headquarters are in Jerusalem and only few 
of them have branches dislocated in the national territories.  
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Figure 7 Organogram Ministry of Justice  
(Source: institutional website of the Ministry of Justice, 2013) 
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Figure 8 Organogram Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
(Source: institutional website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013) 
 
 
The only political form of decentralization of the central Government is 
at the municipal level. Official data of the Central Bureau of Statistic 
from 2010, counted 253 local governments and specifically 75 cities 
(more than 20,000 people), 125 smaller municipalities (between 5,000 
and 20,000 people) and 53 regional councils55. The definition of regional 
council is articulated: it comprised both agricultural agglomerates as 
well ex-urban neighborhoods, commercial, and industrial sites. The 
number of local authorities is subject to change since the debate over 
                                                 
55 Central Bureau of Statistics, Local Authorities in Israel 2010 (Hebrew) 
99 
the inefficient too divisive asset, as well as the expansion of the 
populated areas can bring to merge but also to create units.  
As Galnoor56 remarks, the functional essence of public service generally 
is the implementation of the policymaking thus the provision of 
services to the citizens, groups and organizations. Public service also 
regulates tasks performed by others, in order to protect public interest 
an individual rights. This general definition leads to the evident 
consideration that the field of competencies changes during the years, 
according to the specific needs of the society and to the level of 
development. For example, in many Western countries, environmental 
protection as well as accountability and quality service to the public 
were included not long ago among the priorities of the public service. 
Due to the "change of times" other issues have been gradually 
abandoned by the public and other actors have replaced it (for example 
many services related to communication, that is television and 
telephone services). The empowered subjects to perform the above 
functions can change from state to state or coexist with different 
degrees of responsibility. In Israel for example the public service is 
carried out by governmental executive branches (ministries and their 
subsidiaries units, governmental corporations and statutory 
authorities), non-governmental executive branches, public institutions 
and national institutions (that are not public sector but they play a 
major role in the public arena: Jewish agency, World Zionist 
Organization Jewish national fund and Keren Hayesod) and local 
authorities. Some of these actors entered in force in more recent times 
and adjustment of authorities were made during the years. This 
confirms the idea of public service as a dynamic body, subject to the 
changes both in the political culture and in the societies in which they 
operate. 
The prominent role of the central government in Israel is well 
expressed in the 2007 country report of the Platform of Experts of 
Planning Law: "Israel is one of the only advanced-economy countries 
where no major decentralization and devolution of powers have 
                                                 
56 Galnoor, I. (2010), Public Management in Israel: Development, Structure Functions and 
Reform. USA and Canada:Routledge. 
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officially taken place. The central Government legally still retains most 
of the powers it possessed when Israel was in its formative stages".57  
Legally, the Ministry of Interior has almost total authority on the local 
level. He is charge of the establishment or dismissal of the 
municipalities and he regulates the political cycle pace ordering the 
elections (within the temporal frame dictated by the law). In justified 
cases (especially in case of malfunctioning of the local government or 
serious financial problems), the Ministry can also dissolve the elected 
council and can appoint non-elected administrators till new elections. 
The local authorities enjoy autonomy only for the powers that are 
explicitly attributed by the law and any initiative that has not explicit 
legal coverage is invalid and can be disqualified according to the ultra 
vires principle. In virtue of this principle, the Supreme Court has been 
nullifying many municipal provisions and orders making clear that not 
even "legislative silence" can be interpreted as a free space for the local 
authorities to exercise their power58. The only legislative power 
retained by the municipalities is the secondary legislation, necessary to 
perform the activities that are legally attributed to the peripheral 
government.  
Local governments are the closest institutions to citizens as it regards 
their daily life and the use of basic public services. Municipalities are in 
fact responsible for the basic infrastructures (paving local roads, 
building and renovation permissions, sewage systems, sanitation etc.) 
and for some practical aspects related to the provision of social services 
(sport and cultural areas, public schools and other buildings where 
educational activities are performed). This does not mean that the 
municipalities are fully responsible (even at local level) for the above 
mentioned policy areas. The specific ministries retain the core 
authority; any initiative of the local authorities can be dismissed in any 
moment as not legitimate. Also in case of provision of services that 
                                                 
57 Alterman R., (2007 December 12)Introduction to Israel's Planning and Building Law, 
Platform of Experts in planning law,  
http://www.internationalplanninglaw.com/templates/mercury.asp?page_id=1514&countr
y_id=6&dossier_category_id=6 
58 For an interesting review of legal cases see Navot S., (2007) The Constitutional Law of 
Israel Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International. 
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need a direct contact with the citizens and physical presence in the 
territories, the ministries directly provide them with offices in loco. The 
Ministry of Interior for example provides basic services to citizens 
(emission of identity cards and certificates) not through the 
municipalities but through its own offices dislocated in most of the 
towns and cities. The centralism is mostly evident in matter of finances: 
according to the 2011 country report from OECD the central 
Government collects over 77% of revenues and accounts over 72% of 
total expenditures59. Taxes therefore are mostly centralized and the 
municipal ones are anyhow monitored. Also in case of municipal taxes 
(like the municipal tax on property) that usually represent the main 
entrance for the municipalities (in Tel Aviv, for instance, it provides 
nearly two-thirds of the city’s annual income) the municipalities must 
move within a minimum-maximum range established by the Ministry 
of Finance according to inflation rates and the cost of living index.  
The restricted autonomy of local governments has been questioned 
many times during the years, due to its impact on the daily 
management of cities and towns. If it true that there was not a radical 
renovation in the matter, however some change have occurred, also 
due to the modern era new needs of which we discussed above.  
Looking back at the original bureaucratic setting, it is possible to see 
that some kind of progressive decentralization has been taking place, 
new authorities (detached subjects but accountable to the Ministers) 
have been created to which the central government has delegated 
specific competencies regarding agriculture, science, cultural events of 
national relevance, economy and the regulation of specific fields 
(nowadays the number of these authorities amount to about 45, with 
approximately 20,000 employees)60. From the Eighties moreover, a 
significant privatization process have been taking place, usually selling 
the entire enterprise to private buyers or issuing a minority stake to the 
public. Privatization in the Israeli case is not a pure one since the public 
administration retained a strong regulative power. This creates strict 
bounds to the private organizations and prevented some foreign 
                                                 
59 OECD (2012) Country report, Government at a Glance 2011, OECD Publishing. 
60 On the authorities and some non-central bureaucratic subjects See above Galnor, I., 
(2010). 
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entrepreneurs to invest in the local economy. Nonetheless, the 
privatization of publicly owned firms and services has improved the 
state of the economy. Also local authorizes were affected by this 
"decentralization process", getting more involved in issues on which 
the State had the exclusive authority. For example, 1995, local 
commissions were appointed to approve some local building plans of 
minor impact (but being it quite a sensitive issue in Israel the ministry 
retained ultimate control power. In general and beyond the official 
reforms, they have been increasing their inform authority, handling 
issues that are not among their official competences.  
Actually, Elazar61 pointed out how the political culture of the citizens of 
Israel contrasted with the constraints of the central government. For 
this reason, new informal methods have been adopted in order to 
bypass the formal rigid procedure and establish an informal order that 
is closer to people's mentality. Despite the central-Government 
presence in many sectors, negotiations and various expedients have 
been implemented by the local authorities in order to gain a broader 
margin of action. Doing so, the highly centralized government 
practically lost some of its prerogatives and a quite consistent 
decentralization took place in an informal but still effective way. This 
informal decentralization partially increases the quality of the service 
provided to the citizens but poses other considerable problems. First of 
all, it creates institutional insecurity and scarce attitude to a steady 
collaboration, since the responsibility is not clearly stated. Critical 
voices remark how the central power is reluctant to an official 
reorganization since this would mean a serious limitation of the 
ministerial powers. A similar approach would come also from the local 
authorities who are free from a full responsibility and can maintain a 
certain margin to "blame" the central government. 
The gap between legal frame and practice has also economic 
consequences. As previously mentioned, the majority of the resources 
and the responsibility of distribute them are in the hands of the central 
government. The extended informal competences of the peripheral 
authorities require financial resources that the municipalities do not 
                                                 
61 Elazar (2008), See above. 
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possess (not they are likely to receive as part of their budget since the 
tasks are not legally envisaged). Municipalities are forced to maximize 
the fruitfulness of the allocated resources, saving on the services that 
they are called upon to deliver. Even doing so, the fundraising for the 
additional activities can be very difficult. Among the local authorities 
the practice of "deficit management" has been spreading. In order to 
perform the activities for which a sufficient budget has not been 
allocated, mayors borrow money from banks and only after will ask for 
a further financial allocation from the State62 
Together with the analysis of governance and bureaucracy, it is useful 
to have a more detailed insight of the nonpolitical actors of the process: 
the public servants. The organ that is in charge of coordinating and 
regulating the civil bureaucracy in Israel is the Civil Service 
Commission, put in force by the Civil Service Appointment law. 
Officially the commission is an autonomous subsidiary unit of the 
Ministry of Finance but in the past it has been subject to the authority 
of the Prime Minister Office. Through its departments, the Civil Service 
Commission supervises the government ministry personnel quotas and 
approves the structure and division of powers among government 
agencies and ministries. It is in charge of coordinating the publications 
of the vacancies and the selection process. It decides on promotions 
tracks as well as dismissals and retirements and organizes training. The 
Civil Service Commission is also in charge of setting the terms of the 
work, optimization and disciplinary sanctions.     
Recruitment in the Israeli public service is based on educational 
credentials and a civil service entry examination63. When a position is 
opened, applicants from within civil service system are considered first, 
with a second competition open to external applicants if no suitable 
internal applicant has been found. The competition process usually 
includes a series of written and oral public exams included an 
interview held by an examination committee. Mechanisms of minority 
                                                 
62 For a more detailed explanation of the mechanism and some proposed solution to the 
economic malfunctioning of Israeli administration at local level see: JCPA & the Milken 
Institute (1998) Practical Privatization: Lessons from Cities and Markets, Jerusalem: JCPA 
and the Milken Institute.  
63 See the Civil Service Appointment Law (1959). 
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inclusions are active and during the years many initiatives have been 
set in order to favor the entrance of women and ethnic minorities in the 
public work. Still they are underrepresented. A very sensitive issue in 
the recruitment process is the political influence that since the 
beginning of the State significantly influenced the appointment of civil 
servants. A big concern about it has been emerging for two decades and 
legislatives steps have been taken in order to forbid this practice, 
exception made for some "confidential appointments" that mainly 
regard the strict entourage of ministries, and high executive positions. 
Despite the fact that merit and professionalism are the legislative basis 
for the appointments, nonetheless political influence causes the 
distortion of the merit-based selection.  
The Ministry of Finance, through the Wage and Labor Agreements 
Department is responsible for setting and implementing wage policy in 
the public sector. Basic economic treatment as well as bonuses, 
management tools and work conditions are to be negotiated with the 
Unions (the general Union for the general agreements and the specific 
Union divisions for the sectorial secondary agreements). Recently the 
practice of individual contracts for employees in professional positions 
in public administration have been increasingly used, formally to keep 
excellent employees or to afford greater managerial flexibility64. 
Determinant criteria for salaries are the specific ministry, educational 
qualifications, experience (especially in similar position to the one 
covered) and seniority. Retribution of civil servants and the retributive 
disparities among employees are much debated issues in the Israeli 
public opinion. The debate is fomented by the frequent mobilization 
and strike of certain categories of public workers who claim that their 
professional activity in granting fundamental public services is not 
fairly compensated. The average gross salary of civil servants in 2011 
was of NIS 14,321/month (about 2,870 Euros). The need of wage 
increase is generally recognized especially in critical sectors like 
medicine and ministerial bureaucracy, to attract highly qualified staff. 
The evident retributive disparities among public servants however are 
                                                 
64 On individual contracts see Michelson, N. (2012) The effect of personal contracts in 
public administration in Israel on length of service". Research paper commissioned by the 
Bank of Israel. Available at http://www.boi.org.il/en/research/pages/papers_dp1202e.aspx 
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the main trigger for criticism and contestation: the political inability to 
enhance equality and workers' rights in this field creates unrest. As 
reported by the newspaper Haaretz, the Finance Ministry's wages 
director, Ilan Levin (in charge till May 2012), stated during an 
interview: "I don't sleep at night…A social worker's average gross 
salary is NIS 13,000 per month, while forklift operators at the ports 
gross between NIS 35,000 and NIS 40,000…There's no logic or justice in 
the public sector…Wages are set based on each institution's power… 
The pressure by workers' committees at the large government 
monopolies - including the ports, the electric company, the railways 
and the airport authority - lets the workers boost salaries and 
employment terms unreasonably"65. The here mentioned example of 
the port workers is the most striking: this category of workers has the 
highest average overall wage among all public workers. 
The current Finance Ministry's wages director, Kobi Amsalem, in a 
recent interview in Haaretz, blamed the distortive effects of the 
bureaucratic system and the legislation for the unfair remunerations of 
public servants: "Many well-paid civil servants are entitled to income 
supplements because of a distorted set of criteria in need of a complete 
overhaul…As a result, public sector employees earning an average pay 
of NIS 10,000 a month were designated as being in the minimum-wage 
income bracket"66 (for the law, income supplements should be given to 
those workers who earn less than the minimum wage, established in 
2011 at 4,100 NIS a month). 
Despite the non-encouraging situation of public service workers, 
according to an OECD report67, Israel goes much better as it concerns 
performance incentives and performance assessment. Israel makes 
more use of performance assessment in HR decisions than the average 
OECD country. Assessment is mandatory for almost all employees and 
takes the form of an annual meeting with, and written feedback from, 
                                                 
65 Haaretz Editorial, (2012 March 16), Israel needs public sector reform in Haaretz at 
http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/israel-needs-public-sector-reform-1.424504 
66 Bassok M. & Zrahiya Z. (2013 January 7) Doctors topped list for public sector salaries in 
2011, treasury report finds. In Haaretz, athttp://www.haaretz.com/business/doctors-
topped-list-for-public-sector-salaries-in-2011-treasury-report-finds.premium-1.492347 
67 OECD (2012) Human Resources Management Country Profiles 2012 at 
http://www.oecd.org/gov/pem/OECD%20HRM%20Profile%20-%20Israel.pdf 
106 
the immediate superior. A wide range of criteria are used: activities 
undertaken, timeliness and quality of outputs, interpersonal skills, 
improvement of competencies etc. Performance assessment is of high 
importance for career advancement and contract renewal, and lesser 
importance for remuneration. However, Israel uses performance 
related pay (PRP) to a substantially greater extent than the average 
OECD country. PRP takes the form of permanent pay increments and is 
used for most employees. The maximum proportion of base salary PRP 
can represent is 21-40%.  Promotions are a result of performance 
appraisal as well as a semiautomatic upgrade after years of service.  
According to a survey conducted among a small sample of public 
servants (but still significant for the coherence with other issued 
discussed above and for the "insider perspective" that it gives), many 
public workers (mainly not in managerial positions) consider 
organizational politics tenure, and pressure on the supervisor much 
more determinant factor to gain a promotion than merit criteria68. 
The necessity to further improvements more evident if considering that 
public employment is, for most employees, a long-life position. Despite 
the necessary adaptation to a more flexible job market due to the 
growing privatization of the last decades, the Unions have been 
fighting for the rights of the "old" workers to maintain their guarantees 
and for the stabilization and equal conditions of those hired with more 
precarious contracts. Public sector remains, like in many countries, one 
of the safest from firing and mobility among different offices is not a 
common practice. The Government, however, has faculty to dismiss 
employees with open-term contracts due to restructuring (proposing 
reallocation plans). Voluntary departures with attractive allowances 
and early retirement packages are another common option69. 
 
 
Bureaucracy and governance  
                                                 
68 For an interesting survey on the perception of civil servants and managers in matter of 
promotion process in public sector see: Sharabi M., (2012) Performance or Politics: 
Promotions in the Israeli Public Sector in Public Administration Research; 1:1. 
69 OECD (2012) Human Resources Management Country Profiles 2012 at 
http://www.oecd.org/gov/pem/OECD%20HRM%20Profile%20-%20Israel.pdf 
107 
Many scholars have been pointing out the relation between poor 
executive performance in Israel and a scarce bureaucracy support to the 
Government. Freilich, analyzing the decision-making process in the 
field of security criticizes the ineffectiveness of the policy-making 
machine and its poor performance in formulation and coordination.  
The Prime Minister Office is formally well articulated and has 
expanded in the last decade. Its main task is to support the Prime 
Minister in his daily work as well as to increase the efficacy of the 
Executive in the implementation of policies. A plethora of advisors are 
working in the Prime Minister Office and different departments are in 
charge of a step by step consultancy. The Government Secretariat has a 
more general function to assist the needs of the ministers and 
committees and to facilitate their relations with the legislative body. 
The secretariat should be a fundamental tool in the formulation of the 
agenda as well as in providing all the background information to the 
ministers.  
The main criticism against these bodies consists in the lack of 
organizational capabilities and the scarce provision of information, 
sometimes due to a lack of communication and coordination. These 
flaws would seriously endanger the whole executive process: not 
possessing the Ministries the necessary knowledge to effectively assess 
the problems, the governmental debate cannot be deep and 
constructive. As a consequence, the formulation of policies is difficult. 
El Gendi70 depicts the consequences of this insufficient preparatory 
work. The Cabinet meetings penalize the phase of debate and 
deliberation in favor of a general presentation of the issue usually given 
by the policy advocate (the relevant Minister, ministry official, or the 
Prime Minister). The MKs reliance on the partisan presentation (due to 
the superficial knowledge of the noninvolved Ministers), would cause a 
deliberation that is based on the partisan point of view of the 
proponent. A weak bureaucratic support (together with the growing 
tendency to personalization) not only influences the deliberative phase 
but prevents the inter-ministerial collaboration for the definition of 
policies. The highly politicized composition of the cabinet has 
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Influences. Beirut: Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations. 
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downplayed the collaborative approach. Ministers have been 
increasingly avoiding consultations and preparatory work. Prime 
Minister’s Office and the Cabinet are not able to organize systematic 
staff work that is fundamental to prepare the Ministries and to give 
them deeper knowledge of the issues that are to be discussed. 
 
 
Relation with the public    
Achieving excellence in results and creating a more user-oriented 
service are objectives of the Civil Service Commission. Beside the   
optimization of the service, amelioration of the working procedures, 
human resource development and inter-ministerial cooperation are 
sought too.  
To ameliorate the relationship with the citizens, every Minister has an 
institutional website and many non-official portals are regularly 
updated with reliable information. In the institutional websites 
explanations are usually available in several languages (Hebrew and at 
least Arabic, English, and Russian) given the multilingual population in 
the country. Assistance is provided both online and on the phone, in a 
way to minimize the need to physically go to the offices. The possibility 
of complain is granted through administrative tribunals, law courts and 
through the State Comptroller (with functions of Ombudsman). 
Administrative tribunals and law courts deal with conflicts between 
State bureaucracy and the citizens. The number of administrative 
departments dedicated to complaints management and appeals is 
impressive and has been growing in the last decade71. As a 
consequence, competences are more and more fragmented and the 
cooperation among the units is more difficult.  
Since 1971, the State Comptroller has been fulfilling the function of 
Ombudsman. In this function, it is the recipient of complaints from any 
person who claims to have been harmed by a State or public body 
subject to the audit of the Comptroller. In its original form, the State 
Comptroller Law included two acceptations of audit: audit of 
regularity and legality; and audit of efficiency and economy. In 1952 
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the audit of moral integrity was added. Over the years, the 
competencies of the Comptroller broadened further. As of today 
government corporations, local authorities, subsidiaries of audited 
bodies, institutions of higher education, health insurance funds and 
public transportation cooperatives are under the State Comptroller's 
supervision. Since the 1980's, the State Comptroller's Office turned to 
be, in specific cases, an evaluator of the results of government 
performance and policy. Besides being a great instrument for fighting 
corruption and for guaranteeing accountability to citizens, the 
Comptroller is actually a positive tool for the improvement of 
democratic quality. On the light of its investigations it proposes 
solutions to the malfunctioning and the ineffectiveness of the State.  
 
 
 
Fight against corruption, illegality, and abuse of power by 
state/public agencies  
Transparency International (TI), a world leader in the fight against 
corruption of all kinds, developed the Corruption Perceptions Index72 
where it assessed countries and territories based on how corrupt their 
public sector is perceived to be. The countries were attributed a score in 
a range from 0 to 100, where 0 means that a country is perceived as 
highly corrupt and 100 means it is perceived as very clean. In 2012 
Israel reached a score of 60 was ranked 39th out of 176 countries 
analyzed73. Even though Israel is not the last ranked among the 
Western countries, its placing is among the lowest and its score is lower 
than the previous years. When the report was published, the news did 
not arouse a strong reaction in the public. According to the newspaper 
Haaretz, the indifference is the result of a widespread feeling of 
resignation among the citizens. Citizens accepted a condition of 
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73 Transparency International, (2012) 2012 World Ranking at 
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"spoiled legality"74 that concerns the high ranks of governance as well 
as the everyday life.  
This tendency is in contrast to the legal framework aiming at 
preventing corruption. Indeed it is very articulated and undergoes 
constant updates. Regulative efforts are also done in compliance with 
the international conventions to which the country adheres. Efforts 
have been made also to improve the level of transparency. In 1998 the 
Freedom of Information Law gave legal impulse to a more transparent 
governmental approach to citizens' information, included the 
disclosure of governmental documents. The purpose of the law was to 
empower the public with further awareness and knowledge regarding 
State management. Under this law, citizens are entitled to ask for 
public documents to the State and to receive it, even though with 
certain limitations. A discrete amount of material has been made 
available through the media, including the internet. Nowadays, the 
institutional websites publish (mostly in Hebrew and Arabic) 
Government resolutions, meeting agendas, drafts, annual plans of local 
and central authorities and legal texts including the ones related to 
anti-corruption measures.  On this specific topic a dedicated website 
has been opened under the supervision of the Ministry of Justice: the 
website is fairly updated on new legislation and on the main measures 
implemented by the Government to fight corruption both in private 
and public sector. 
The strict confidentiality of many State's reports, however, creates a 
grey area that is impenetrable by the citizens. Israel is a country that 
suffers from security problems (both on the internal and on the external 
side) and this cause a deep sense of insecurity as it regards the dispatch 
of any information that is perceived as potentially revealing for the 
"enemy". The strict secrecy of some issues is accompanied by a big 
range of non-secret information about which the State lacks to give the 
maximum diffusion, for example uploading them as a digital free 
content. This might be due to strategic or logistic ones, or simply might 
                                                 
74 The Marker, (2012 December 6) Israel fails to improve corruption ranking in Haaretz at 
http://www.haaretz.com/business/israel-fails-to-improve-corruption-ranking.premium-
1.482924 
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be the result of a superficial implementation of the norm. The lack of 
systematic publication of the material discourages public review. In 
fact, even if the non-classified material is available upon formal request 
to the specific Ministries, Authorities, State Comptroller's or other 
offices, this procedure requires a deliberate, much bigger effort of 
activation that is not justified, given the great use that citizens makes of 
the internet. The partial compilation of the English version of the 
websites (some ministers do not have it at all) might also depend on 
different causes (lack of resources, arbitrary decisions on the utility of 
such information, the less probable deliberate attempt to reduce 
English speaking access to such information etc.). Independently from 
the reason, it has a very negative impact on the accessibility to the 
websites of a large community of users (the new immigrants for 
example as well as the consistent English speaking community in 
Israel). Many of them have no or non-sufficient knowledge of Hebrew, 
As a consequence their possibility to get information is somehow 
limited. 
 
 
Budget and allocation of funds review 
Commenting the low performance of Israel in the Corruption 
Perception Index75, Yoav Lehman, a member of the Transparency 
International Israel board commented: "The fact that Israel is treading 
water in the global corruption perception index is disturbing and 
requires concrete action to improve it…Public money and the way in 
which budgets are allocated is not transparent enough. The data exist, 
but it is very difficult to get a true picture and to trace where the money 
goes". This statement describes one of the main plagues that afflict the 
Israeli commitment to eradication of corruption.   
The contrast between a highly regulated process of allocation of funds 
(to local authorities, third sector organizations and other recipients) 
and a scarce monitoring activity is stated as the conundrum by many 
                                                 
75The Marker, "Israel fails to improve corruption ranking" in Haaretz December 6, 2012. 
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experts in the field. In the funds-allocation procedures, the phase of 
evaluation and follow up is poor. This prevents a result-based 
refunding of projects that have proved not successful. According to 
Schwartz76 the problem stems from partisan considerations that 
prevent the adoption of efficiency criteria. Even though some efforts 
have been made to provide the bureaucratic system with stronger 
evaluative skills (organization of specific trainings, development of 
research centers whose main task is the public policies evaluation etc.) 
significant results are still to be noted.   
In a critical analysis of the Israeli governance and institutions, 
Galnoor77 maintains that in Israel internal audit is not effective against 
corruption. The scholar claims the necessity of binding rules on ethics, 
independence of the internal auditors (with authorization to publish 
the results of their investigations) and more stringent procedures in any 
phase of the budget allocation. Etzioni Halevy78 notes how in Israel the 
material resources are consistent since they do not come only from the 
fiscal pressure on the citizens but also by conspicuous donation of 
foreign organization or privates (namely Jews in diaspora). Thus, the 
need is even more pressing to have a much controlled procedure of 
allocation. Moreover, the need of a strict supervision is due to the fact 
that while the allocation general rationale has governmental (so 
political) source, the actual management of the funds carried out by 
non-elected actors (the administrative body) whose influence might put 
them in a situation of democratically illegitimate power. The 
commission for budget allocation is in fact usually composed by 
ministerial auditors and senior bureaucrats, for the most part 
appointed by the Ministry on the basis of personal trust. The decision is 
not subject to review.  
Classic ways of non-transparent allocation of funds are: the politically 
driven allocation of funds through local authorities and the politically 
                                                 
76Schwartz R., (2000) State Audit - Panacea for the Crisis of Accountability? An Empirical 
Study of the Israeli Case in International Journal of Public Administration 23:4: 405-433 
77 Galnor Y., (2010) See above.  
78 Etzioni Halevy E., (2002) Administrative Power in Israel in Maor M. (ed.) Development 
in Israeli Public Administration London, Frank Cass Publishers. 
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driven allocation through special funds.79 In the first case, the Ministry 
of Interior delegates the local authorities to allocate funds to 
associations and different bodies. The political connotation of the 
Ministry of interior (and that of the Government in general) has proven 
crucial for the allocation of money to institutions that are ideologically 
or culturally close to that political connotation. Even if since the 
Eighties, a regulation was instituted in the attempt to stop this 
dynamic, funds are still allocated according to this rationale, despite 
the formal prohibition. Suspicious allocations have been reported by 
the State Comptroller and defined as a persuasive method to maintain 
and enlarge electoral consensus. The closer the electoral moment, the 
more sizeable the funds are. The availability of the local authorities to 
act as delegates of the "national level" in the political allocation of funds 
id due to financial reasons (since their budget depends on the 
allocation of the Ministry of Interior) and to political reasons (since the 
political influence in the appointment of bureaucrats at any level, they 
are more likely to respond to a political logic and contravene formal 
regulation). Special funds are distributed via Ministries (often 
Education and Religious affairs). These are usually negotiated in 
coalition forming agreements. This practice is very common: religious 
parties for example, are used to trade their political support for funds 
religious institutions and associations linked to the party.  The Knesset 
passed in the Eighties a resolution to block the arbitrary allocation of 
funds. The core points of the resolution were the establishment of a 
clear set of criteria for the allocations, strict verification of the 
requirements and follow up activity. This resolution and the legal 
provision that came afterward did not lead to a substantial 
improvement of the situation: criteria that were set vaguely or a 
posteriori; partisan evaluation of the projects and many other 
irregularities that proved the problem to be particularly resistant80. 
The control and follow up measures are the main problem in this 
process. The initial phase of the allocation is, as we said, out of any 
                                                 
79 Ibidem. 
80 Barak Erez D., (2002) Judicial Review of Politics: The Israeli Case, in Journal of Law and 
Society 29: 611-631.  
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independent review. As it regards the implementation of the projects 
and the responsiveness to the criteria expressed in the ministerial "call 
for interest" the problem is mainly the State Comptroller's dimensional 
incapacity to audit all the cases. Hetzioni Halevi points out that the 
only real possibilities of a more stringent control would be only 
through the ministries themselves that unfortunately are the starting 
point of a defective allocation for the just mentioned political reasons.  
 
 
Basic Legislation against Corruption in State Bureaucracy81  
Weak points in a country are physiological but dangerous since they 
loosen the control, favoring the insurgence of distorted practices. 
However, the State of Israel is committed both at the national and at the 
international level to eradicate the plague of corruption. There are a 
comprehensive general set of provisions regulating public service in 
Israel among which a set of rules against corruption and related crimes. 
These are contained in the Civil Service Regulations (Takshir). The 
Takshir is published (only in Hebrew) on the Civil Service 
Commission's website. Corruption of a public officer is a penal crime 
and the offenders get severe sanctions. Public servants are requested to 
report any case of corruption that they witness at work to their 
superiors or to the representatives of the law (Code of Ethics art 4.2 and 
Civil Service Law (Discipline), Art 17). Public servants who do not 
report substantial information concerning an act of corruption are 
charged with disciplinary sanctions. The cooperation instead is 
considered a proof of loyalty to the State. To favor cooperation, public 
employees who report a case of corruption are protected against 
retaliation (and especially against the removal from their office) by the 
Protection of Employees (Exposure of Offences of Unethical Conduct 
and Improper Administration) Law that was created in 1997. 
 
                                                 
81 Information about this paragraph is mainly extracted from the report of the Ministry of 
Justice (2011) "Information Regarding Certain Preventive Measures Under Chapter II of 
the United Nations Convention against Corruption". 
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Legal Provisions against Bribery 
The Israeli Penal Law draws an articulated system against bribery, both 
in the public and in the private sector. In 2008 article 291 of the Penal 
Code, regulating the crime in object was enriched of a section that 
extended the validity of the law also in case of bribery of a foreign 
public employee.  The article includes indirect and direct bribery 
aiming at promoting personal interest in the business sector or in any 
other field. The definition of foreign public employee is broadened to 
employees of a foreign State, public office holders and employees of 
international organizations. The definition is also extended to State 
bodies that do not belong to a recognized State, like the Palestinian 
Legislative Council. The sanctions have recently strengthened through 
a further modification in the Penal Code. Currently, bribery is punished 
with seven years' imprisonment and a monetary sanction (that can 
reach almost 500.000 Euros). Corrupted officers are punishable with ten 
years imprisonment. Also the fiscal legislation contributes to the fight 
against national and international bribery. The Israel Tax Authority 
acquired in 2009 the authority of rejecting taxes deductions for 
payments that arouse reasonable doubts about their legal nature. 
 
 
Investigation on Corruption at High levels 
Corruption has recurrently plagued the Israeli democracy, with 
resounding cases among the national political leadership. Prime 
Ministers and members of Government have often been investigated 
for corruption or similar crimes, either during their mandate or 
afterwards. At the moment, the ex-Foreign Minister Lieberman 
(reconfirmed with reserve for the current legislature) is being accused 
for fraud, breach of trust, aggravated fraud, money laundering and for 
harassing a witness. The main allegation regards the transfer of 
millions of shekels to shell companies and accounts belonging to 
people close to him. Under Israeli law, if he is found guilty of these 
accusations, he should be deposed from his political office.  In case of 
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an absolution or in case of a light non-custodial sentence he will be able 
continue his political career as a member of Knesset and Government.82 
The current minister Netanyahu was also investigated in 1997 for a 
suspicious political appointment of an attorney general and in 1999 for 
a 100.000 dollars case of corruption in free services from a government 
contractor (though not indicted for insufficient evidence in both cases). 
Ehud Olmert, the former Israeli Prime Minister, left his office after 
being impeached on charges of fraud, breach of trust, false entries in 
corporate documents and acquisition through fraudulent means in 
different cases. The accusations were definitely heavy and an 
imprisonment sanction was not a far hypothesis. Olmert was acquitted 
of these charges due to reasonable doubt. He has was declared not 
guilty for two charges of corruption but sentenced for another count83.  
The complete judgment has not been expressed and some of the 
accusations are still under the analysis of the competent legal bodies.  
Ariel Sharon, now incapable of standing in any possible trial due to the 
serious consequences of a cerebral stroke, was investigated for several 
corruption cases and suspicious appointments. One of the most famous 
cases that involved his unclear relationship with an Austrian 
businessman has been then related to Sharon's sons considered 
responsible for mediating bribes between the businessman and their 
father. Many other members of Parliament and local politicians have 
been involved in illegal activities and namely bribery and corruption. 
In recent times Ramat Gan mayor, Zvi Bar, was indicted on charges of 
bribery. The main charge would be (beside fraud, money laundering 
and obstruction of justice) bribes acceptation in exchange for support in 
real estate projects in Ramat Gan84.  
 
                                                 
82 The Guardian, (2011 April 13). Avigdor Lieberman set to face Israeli corruption charges 
in The Guardian at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/13/avigdor-lieberman-
israel-corruption-charges. 
83 Greenwood P., (2012 July 10) Ehud Olmert convicted in corruption case, in The 
Guardian, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jul/10/ehud-olmert-guilty-
corruption 
84 Cohen Friedman N., (2013 Jenuary 31) Ramat Gan mayor charged with taking bribes, in 
Ynet, at http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4339575,00.html 
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Money Laundering 
As mentioned when analyzing the crime rate in Israel, money 
laundering is one of the most lucrative activities associated with the 
organized crime in the country. In the early nineties, it has proved 
especially attractive for Russian organized crime since the bank system 
and the economic policy favored new immigrants' capital transfer and 
investment. The speculation has been discovered and regulated but 
also today cases of money laundering are reported for conspicuous 
sums. In 2000, the New York Times called Israel a "Paradise for Money 
Laundering"85 referring to the massive financial operations that were 
done every day in Israel, most of which remained unpunished or 
uninvestigated for lack of specific legislation. Further documents state 
how criminal organizations of different kind took advantage of the 
Israeli financial system to perform financial illicit operations. Also 
American citizens were accused to "export" their financial assets in 
Israel to cover fiscal evasion86.  
 
 
Bank Secrecy 
For many years, Israel did not possess a specific legislation for fighting 
the financial illicit operations. Also nowadays, bank secrecy is largely 
maintained and the banks are not entitled to disclosing information 
relating to a customer’s business to third parties. Bank secrecy is not 
clearly regulated in a separate law but is included in the privacy 
                                                 
85 According to this article, Yossi Sedbon, head of the investigative division of Israel's 
national police at the time, defined Israel as a paradise for money laundry activities. See 
WILLIAM A. ORME Jr, (2000 February 21) "Israel Seen as Paradise for Money 
Laundering", in The New York Times at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/02/21/world/israel-seen-as-paradise-for-money-
laundering.html 
86 Browning L., (2011 September 16), U.S. tax-evasion probe turns to Israeli banks in 
Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/16/us-usa-tax-swiss-israel-
idUSTRE78E7PU20110916 
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protection laws and all the norms that aim to preserve and improve the 
freedom of the individual (or corporation) in their private life. Bank 
secrecy therefore is also an extended consequence of the penal norms 
regarding confidential data disclosure. A shared opinion among Israelis 
is that the bank has a fiduciary duty toward the clients, whose interest 
is to be preserved against third parts intrusions. The same legal 
principles, from which bank secrecy originates, create also the premises 
for the exceptions to the bank secrecy. Being secrecy a tool that aims to 
protect the interest of the clients and being the bank bound to a 
fiduciary relation, clients themselves can give the permission to the 
bank to reveal their data to third parts for personal reasons. Cases in 
which the bank is freed from the fiduciary duty are the cases in which a 
superior interest is at stake. For example, the bank is obliged to reveal 
information on the financial status/activities of a client whenever a 
specific bodies like Police, Tax Authority, the Bank of Israel (that has a 
supervision role on the other banks in the country and can be involved 
in dispatching information related to money laundering investigations), 
the Israeli Security Authorities, and the Israeli Money Laundering 
Prohibition Authority requires such information. The disclosure 
obligation is also applicable whenever public interest might be 
endangered by a non-disclosure, like in the case of an international 
police operation. The bank may disclose information also if its own 
interest is seriously endangered (for example in case of a claim against 
a client for repayment of a debt). 
 
 
The prohibition of money laundering role 
In 2000 a specific law to fight money laundering was enforced in 
compliance with the Financial Action Task Force demands for the 
international fight to money laundering (and illicit financial activities in 
general) and terror financing. Money laundering was defined as the 
performance of a property transaction, on property originating directly 
or indirectly in an offense, used to commit an offense, or enabling the 
commission of an offense, with the object of concealing or disguising its 
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source, the identity of the owners of the rights therein, its location, its 
movements or the performance of a transaction with respect to such 
property.87 The law established The Israel Money Laundering 
Prohibition Authority that became operative in 2002. This body has the 
function of a financial intelligence unit and it is the coordinating body 
in the fight against money laundering crime. The Authority is 
responsible to receive and process all banks' reports made in 
compliance with the above mentioned law. Report activity is another 
fundamental piece in the puzzle. Banks are provided with an automatic 
program that reports of transactions that exceed a certain amount. 
Banks are obligated to clearly identify the account holders (or clients at 
large) and as well as others that might be related to those accounts or 
business. Besides that, banks are requested to report any suspected 
transaction, at discretion of the bank itself. The Israel Money 
Laundering Prohibition Authority is authorized to request additional 
information to the banks and, in case this information is necessary to a 
national or international investigation, the Authority is entitled to 
divulge the data to other foreign money laundering prohibition 
authorities, Police and to General Security Services. Art. 3 of the law 
prescribes heavy sanctions for money laundering crime: the sanctioned 
can receive up to ten years imprisonment sanction and conspicuous 
monetary sanctions ("a fine twenty times greater than the fine specified 
in section 61(a)(4) of the Penal Law")88.
 
In the frame of the Mapping 
Financial Secrecy project (managed by the Tax Justice Network)89 a 
report on financial secrecy was elaborated for the purpose of improving 
the international activity of fighting against financial illicit activities 
and increase transparency. Even though positive aspects were 
enlightened in the report, Israel was found only partially compliant 
with the FATF recommendations on money laundering. On the 
international level, Israel has still to complete the ratification of some of 
the most relevant international treaties about international 
                                                 
87 From the General Overview over the Anti-Money Laundering Activity of the Israeli 
Ministry of Justice; available on the official website. 
88 Anti-Money Laundering Law (2000), art 3.. 
89 Tax Justice Network, Mapping Financial Secrecy. Israel, (2011 October 4)Updated in 
January 20, 2012. Available at http://www.secrecyjurisdictions.com/PDF/Israel.pdf 
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transparency. Moreover, the cooperation with other states can be 
further developed. According to the report, Israel does not fully 
participate in projects of Automatic Information Exchange and the 
bilateral cooperation with OECD states regarding broad information 
exchange, covering all tax matters is also not complete. 
In the Tax Justice Network Ranking Israel positioned in 38th position 
with a secrecy score of 58. According to the network, this result shows 
that Israel still needs to increase its efforts in creating a more 
transparent financial system. Such an improvement would allow the 
country to acquire more credibility in the financial international 
panorama as well as would facilitate its internal activity in impeding 
illicit financial flows. 
 
 
Conflict of Interests 
As previously noted in the paragraph related to the Parliament, 
Members of Knesset are prevented from engaging activities or holding 
parallel appointments that would create a situation of conflict of 
interest. They are also requested to declare the state of their properties 
once their mandate starts in order for them to be monitored. Such a 
report includes the family members' state of property in order to avoid 
the conflict of interest to be hidden behind a relative's name. The 
transparency on these matters is formally granted by several 
regulations like the Rules for the Prevention of Conflicts of Interest by 
Ministers and Deputy Ministers, active from 2003 and other legal texts 
(circulars, directives etc). The State Comptroller is the main monitoring 
body in this respect. It has the authority of controlling the declarations 
made by Ministers and Deputy Ministers and to notify the Knesset 
committee in charge whenever any irregularity is found. This 
mechanism should guarantee a certain degree of self-control among the 
elected representatives even though, as we saw while analyzing the 
cases of indictment of high political figures, this deterrent proves not to 
be effective in certain cases.  Also elected bodies at local level are 
subjects to basic legal provisions that are dated many years in the past. 
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This indicates that, despite the political and governmental role of the 
peripheral authorities was not a priority in the Israeli government 
system, certain values such as transparency and legitimacy of public 
decisions were at the very basis of the state early ideology. The main 
legislation about conflict of interest in local government is contained in 
the Municipalities Ordinance (New Version) 1968, the Local Councils 
Order, 1951 and the Regional Council Order, 1958. According to these 
laws, elected officials are forbidden to have professional relations with 
the municipality in which they have been elected and cannot proceed 
to the hiring to relatives, but with a special permission from an 
independent committee. Violations of these and other prescriptions 
contained in the three mentioned laws encounter penal sanctions. 
Another important provision of 1965 (Planning and Building Law) 
states the impossibility of elected municipal officials to deliberate or 
vote in case of personal interest coincident with the matter at stake, 
informing the chairperson of the assembly about the incompatibility. 
Moreover, local authorities are often updated on the most recent 
provisions in matter of conflict of interest and corruption by the 
Director General of the Ministry of Interior through circulars that 
address specific issues. In 2009, for example, a significant directive was 
dispatched warning on the personal responsibility of elected local 
officials (and employees) whose actions have resulted in an illegal 
expenditure for the local government. The Union of Municipal 
Authorities plays quite an active role in implementing the rules that 
favor a transparent and not corrupted governance From 1984 it created 
the Advisory Committee for the Prevention of Conflicts of Interest of 
Elected Officials in Local Government together with the Attorney 
General and the Ministry of Interior published in 2002 a Code of Ethics 
for elected. The committee is a consultant body that the municipalities 
can address in matters of conflicts of interest. The committee addresses 
also topic arouse by the large public on matter of municipal affairs, 
serving this way a bigger social purpose in the enhancement of 
transparency.  Code of Ethics for Mayors and Heads of Other Local 
Authorities was also set up by the Union of Local Authorities reviewing 
in detail all the legislation on conflict of interest and corruption as well 
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as dictating guidelines on good governance at the service of public 
interest.   
The Civil Service Regulations, main regulatory tool for the public 
service in Israel explicitly prohibit the gaining personal benefit from 
public positions and operating in conflicts of interest. Many other 
provisions that reinforce this prohibition are in force. Duties and 
sanctions are expressed in them. An entire section of the Public service 
law (1979) is dedicated to the prohibition of accepting gifts related to 
public servant-s professional function. The regulations apply to central 
bureaucracy as well as to local one. Also directors of government-
owned companies, usually nominated by the government (and whose 
nomination need to respect certain criteria that avoid the conflict of 
interest), are subordinated to such regulations and can be charged with 
sanctions. Under the same rationale of the elected bodies, also several 
senior public officers, heads of municipal authorities and their deputies 
are required to submit declarations concerning their private interests, 
including properties, financial income, debts and other interests. This is 
particularly important once it has been clarified the enormous power 
that certain public servants detain in the allocation of state budget, that 
could be otherwise misused as a resource for personal enrichment.  
Also at local level elected authorities and public servants are bound by 
some common rules to contrast the conflict of interest. The planning 
and building law for example applies the same concept of 
incompatibility both to elected and non-elected member of a 
deliberative assembly. The directive taken as an example in the above 
paragraph also attributes personal responsibility both to elected and to 
public servants in case an illicit expense is done on behalf of the local 
authority.  
Collaborative behaviors of public servants to fight illegal practices are 
encouraged and protected through the Encouragement of Public 
Morality in Public Service Law (1992), about which we have previously 
elaborated.   
The Israeli law does not limit itself to regulate the period in which 
personnel is in charge as public servant but also the Post Employment 
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period. Some restrictions are imposed by the Civil Service law about 
positions that the ex-public servant could obtain thanks to his previous 
office. Similar limitations are posed also for Members of the armed 
forces.  
 
 
Fight to corruption at the international level 
Despite the claims of Tax Justice Network about Israel not being fully 
engaged in international activities against international corruption and 
illicit activities, in the last years the country took crucial steps in this 
direction.  In February 2009 after four years from the initial signature, 
Israel ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption 
(UNCAC). The Convention aims to improve state's commitment to 
prevention, criminalization, international cooperation and asset 
recovery against corruption. In the frame of the UNCAC a special unit 
is active to fight against money laundering and financing of terrorism: 
The Law Enforcement, Organized Crime and Anti-Money-Laundering 
Unit of UNODC. Through the management of a global program, this 
unit seeks to further empower the States in defeating such illegal 
activities and provides them assistance in detecting, seizing and 
confiscating illicit proceeds. Not long after the ratification of the 
UNCAC, Israel ratified the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. Doing 
so the country joined the most important organ in OECD area 
dedicated to the fight against international corruption and in particular 
the bribery of foreign public officials in international business 
transactions. The internal body that carries on most of the international 
activity of the state regarding the anticorruption actions is the IMPA. 
To this actor is delegated the international activity foreign financial 
intelligence. Part of the international cooperation takes place in the 
frame of the International Monetary Fund, the Financial Action Task 
Force (and in particular the MONEYVAL) and the Egmont Group, an 
international organization that Israel joined in 2002.  Other 
relationships are set as bilateral agreements.  
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Corruption in the Armed forces 
In 2012 Transparency international published a report on the risk of 
corruption in the Defense Ministries and Armed Forces90. In a 
comparative study among the MENA region Israel occupies a critical 
position in the study, being it in level D, which is high risk of 
corruption. However, the report analyses potential corruption not just 
in the classical meaning of bribery or illicit monetary activity. The 
definition comprehends the political aspect, the financial aspect, the 
personnel aspect, the operation aspect and the procurement one. As 
referring to a more classical acceptation of the term "corruption" the 
evaluation is different. According to the report, corruption is nor an 
institutional plague neither in the IDF nor in the Israeli Police. Some 
rare cases have been registered of individual corruption. Whenever 
these phenomena occur, the fact is publicly blamed by the military and 
civil authorities. The responsible is immediately deferred to the justice 
that sanctions him according to the law. 
 
 
Security forces that are respectful of citizen rights and are under 
civilian control 
For the scope of this paragraph, it is important to divide the security 
forces in Israel in two macro-groups: the Israeli Defense Force, known 
as IDF and the Israeli Police. These two actors have different functions 
in the field of security and are subordinated to different ministries (the 
former is subordinated to the Ministry of Public Security. The Israeli 
Police is a civilian professional force responsible mainly for public 
security and order (in daily life, special events, riots etc.), law 
enforcement and crime investigation and fighting. The IDF is the sole 
                                                 
90Transparency International (2012), Government Defense Anti-Corruption Index. 
Available at http://government.defenceindex.org/sites/default/files/documents/Israel.pdf 
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military branch of the military forces and it is responsible for the 
defense of the country and all the defense related activities. Intelligence 
bodies like the Mossad, the Shabak (Israel Security Agency) and the 
Aman (Directorate of Military Intelligence) are also part of the Israeli 
Security forces (together with the Emergency forces like the emergency 
medical service, the fire and rescue service, etc.) but have a marginal 
role in this analysis that will focus mainly on the IDF.   
 
 
Budget 
The defense sector has been draining enormous amount of money from 
the national budget since the foundation of the state. The peak was 
reached in the Eighties when the defense expenditure overcame the 
20% of the GDP. In the following years the military expense has 
decreased, but still remains considerable. A report on military 
expenditure as a share of GDP in the period 2005-2010 shows that the 
expenditure oscillated between 6.5 and 8% of the national GDP91 (see 
table below). In 2011 the budget allocated to the Ministry of Defense 
was of 49.4 billion Shekels, reduction that provoked criticisms in the 
political opposition and in the IDF for the negative consequences 
deriving from a cut in this policy field.  
 
Military Expenditure in Israel 2005-2010 
(GDP rate and Shekels billions) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
8.0 
 48,264₪ 
8.1 
52,518₪ 
7.5 
51,251₪ 
7.1 
51,481₪ 
7.0 
53,656₪ 
6.5 
53,251₪ 
 
                                                 
91 Stockholm International Peace research Institute, (2002) Report on 15 countries Military 
Expenses Database, at http://milexdata.sipri.org/ 
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The sizeable allocation of money to the defense sector rises among the 
public opinion contrasted feeling. On one hand Israel lives in a 
perpetual status of mobilization and agitation due to the instable 
external relations with its neighbors; this favors a shared view about 
the necessity of a modern and well prepared army. On the other hand 
the large budget allocated to defense creates shortages in other fields 
like education, social welfare and development. 
Another issue discussed by some Israeli press and by the scientific 
community is the scarcity of information regarding the actual 
destination of the money. In 2010 Haaretz published an article that 
addressed critically the matter92: it was noted that only a very general 
description was given about the expenses chapters and that the last 
budget prevision was almost not specific at all. Some incongruence was 
noticed comparing the previous budgets like for example an increase in 
personnel costs despite a decrease in personnel. A scarce transparency 
in the elaboration of the annual budget was also denounced: according 
to the article the line of budget regarding the Ministry of Defense was 
not sufficiently explicative and could let to an erroneous evaluation. A 
closer examination of the budget and a broader consideration of extra-
budget voices could reveal that a much bigger sum had been made 
available for defense. The lack of information on defense budget is 
generally acknowledged. The scarce intervention of the Ministry of 
Defense and the acceptation of vague report activity leave a broad 
margin of action to the IDF in presenting its requirements and priorities 
and integrating them into budget requests and official planning 
documents. To the Knesset political analysis, the defense budget arrives 
divided in three macro-areas: cost of personnel, local purchases and 
imports of major weapons systems. This setting leaves a big part of the 
data unrevealed. The necessity to preserve from the public a consistent 
amount of classified information prevents a complete overview on the 
matter. In the balance between accountability and confidentiality the 
                                                 
92 Bassok M., (2010 October 21) Secrets of the defense budget revealed, in Haaretz, at 
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/business/secrets-of-the-defense-budget-revealed-
1.320356 
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second element seems to be much heavier.93 Classified lines of budget 
are known only to a very strict group94 and the legislative oversight is 
minimal. The total secrecy of this information from the public and from 
most of its elected representatives is a common reality in all the MENA 
area, as reported by Transparency International. Apart from Lebanon, 
all the analyzed MENA countries refrain from revealing the percentage 
of spending on secret items and programs.  
 
 
Efficiency and Corruption Monitoring Activity  
Assessment of budget, efficiency and corruption is very problematic in 
the sector of defense and often creates frictions among the ministerial 
apparatuses. Debates among Finance Ministry and the Defense are 
common and sometimes the tones rise as in an irreconcilable diatribe 
over efficiency as opposed to transparency95. The Defense Ministry has 
a budget control division (thought the Minister's accountant) and a 
specific internal civil comptroller that operates as a general auditing 
body in all the defense dominion but does not operate corruption risk 
assessment. The State Comptroller is tasked with investigating 
corruption risk within Israel's Government. If the auditing activity of 
the State Comptroller reveals some suspected or critical points, the 
information passes to the Attorney General for an inquiry to be opened. 
Relevant comments on the matter of efficiency and integrity are made 
by the State Comptroller in the annual report but doubts are often 
expressed about the real consequences that these comments have. The 
                                                 
93 Steinberg G., Israel in Arms Procurement Decision Making, SIPRI at 
http://books.sipri.org/files/books/SIPRI98Singh/SIPRI98Singh04.pdf 
94 The Joint Committee is the body in charge of reviewing and approving the annual 
defense budget. It has the power of amending the budget every three months according 
to specific requests of the Ministry of Defense (generally suggested by the IDF) The Joint 
committee is composed of five Members of Knesset (MKs) from the Finance Committee 
and five MKs from the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. All the activity of the 
Joint committee is of course confidential. 
95 Harkov L., (2011 September 12), Barak blames Steinitz for defense budget dispute in 
Jerusalem Post, at http://www.jpost.com/DiplomacyAndPolitics/Article.aspx?id=248782 
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legislative should contribute to the work of the State Comptroller tanks 
to subcommittees that deal respectively with security services and with 
the compliance with the Comptroller's suggestions.   
 
 
Salary and Integrity 
Salaries in the armed forces and the work conditions are relatively fair 
and cannot be considered as the cause for eventual corruption. The 
entrance salary is above the minimum wage salary and it increases 
according to the activity (determined mainly by the degree of danger), 
education level, rank, special skills and other elements. Working in the 
army entitles to additional "corporate" benefits like preferential 
treatments in certain banks, discounts etc.  The current retirement age 
is 45 but on the aftermath of recent agreements a long term plan has 
been set in order to raise it to 50.  
 
 
Disciplinary rules 
The 1955 Military Justice Law established the military courts system to 
regulate the conduct of the army members. Military offenses were 
defined and the consequent punishments. The legal procedure to 
follow in court was also described as well as the recipients of the 
provision: military personnel, (including reservists on active duty), 
civilian employees of the IDF, and other civilians categories related to 
defense related activities. For the effects of this law the Military 
Advocate General's office was activated as the responsible for legality 
awareness in the IDF. The Military Advocate General promotes justice 
and the integration of the rule of law within the army. 
Beside this general provision of civil origin, internal regulations are in 
force in the army and in the corps. A Code of Ethics exists that the IDF 
set up in order to publicize its own basic values and to inspire the 
soldiers to maintain those priorities while serving the military body. 
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Important points for this study are the principle for exemplar conduct 
and the principle of loyalty to the State. The spirit of the IDF mentions 
the importance of respecting the directions of the democratic civilian 
authorities and the laws of the State. The safeguard of Israel as a Jewish 
and democratic State is the main scope that is to reach also at cost of 
life96. Even though this code is very general and almost rhetoric it is 
possible to recognize in it some of the genuine ideological apparatus of 
the army as a structure. The specific mention to loyalty is an additional 
guarantee on the loyalty to the army to the democratic basic structure. 
The case of the settlement dismantling in 2005 is an interesting case of 
refusal to comply with superior directives, (contrasting with one of the 
basic army rules of conduct). Many religious IDF troops declared their 
difficulty in obey orders and some refused to evacuate the Jewish 
settlements because of rabbinical prohibition and religious believes. 
These cases were handled with different approaches due to the 
sensitivity of the issue both from a personal and from a political point 
of view. Some of the unsubordinated soldiers were deferred to 
disciplinary bodies and charged with consequent sanctions. Some 
others, according to superior discretion, were assigned to other 
positions and their refusal was approached in a more understanding 
way. 
 
 
Relation with elected power 
Being the Army subject to the democratic power of the State by law 
(Basic Law: the Military), the legislative oversight of the defense policy 
has taken the form of a permanent committee (the Foreign Affairs and 
Defense Committee). In the Parliament the Subcommittees of the 
Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee are also active. They 
are specifically in charge of monitoring the army's activity. Members of 
Knesset have faculty to summon and interrogate army workers in the 
frame of an investigation; the Parliament indeed is derives its authority 
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directly from the popular mandate. However, according to 
Transparency International, the monitoring activity of the Knesset is 
spoiled by its investigative scarce capacities, by a general supportive 
approach to the defense establishment and by some obstructionism 
operated by the Ministry of Defense. As a consequence, a limited 
parliamentary influence and supervision on the defense is assessed. On 
the practical side however this has never led to army's subtraction to 
the legal procedures of action. In fact, a quite clear line of approved 
directions is traceable when analyzing army's operations.  
Another view is expressed by Cohen in a 2006 article. Cohen maintains 
that the risk of a civilian intromission in the military apparatus seems 
nowadays much more potentially harmful than the opposite option. 
One of the examples that he uses to prove that this phenomenon is 
already is process, is the activism of the Supreme Court on military 
issues. According to Cohen the Supreme Court has overcome its 
original reticence to deal with military-related-issues and has been 
extending its judgment on a judicial area that is specifically designated 
as divided from the "regular justice".97 The point is clear and the 
pronouncements of the Supreme Court about army operations and 
similar events related to the defense system created a massive opinion 
movement in the public opinion, proof that this act was perceived by 
many as an undue intromission. Also the recent pronunciation on the 
unconstitutionality of the Tal Law marks another big step taken by the 
Supreme Court on a civil provision that significantly impacts on the 
defense system. It needs to be said however that the submission of the 
army to the civil power is the first essential point of the "Basic Law: The 
Military", from which the Israeli armed force was originate (see Art 2).  
 
 
Public perception 
                                                 
97 Cohen S., Changing Civil–Military Relations in Israel: Towards an Over subordinate 
IDF? In Israel affairs 2006 
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The IDF is a very present institution in the daily life of the citizens. 
Almost every youngster is called to serve for three years (girls for two 
years) in the army. Arabs are exempted to serve (not prohibited) like 
other minorities like the Druses that regularly serve in the Israeli armed 
forces. The army is regarded as a life formative experience and in the 
past it was regarded as one of the finest tools for social integration and 
identity building. According to the Democracy Index 2012, the IDF is 
the most trusted public body among the Jewish population (with a 
percentage of 94.2% of the respondents stating their trust in this 
institution). IDF is the first choice in terms of trust by center and right 
winged citizen and the second trusted by left winged citizen (whose 
first preferred is the Supreme Court). Among the Arab population the 
perception is different: the IDF is middle ranked as trusted institutions, 
interestingly before the Government and the Prime Minister. However, 
critical voices in the public opinion have been strengthening: among 
the representatives of the negative views are NGOs, academics and the 
media. In the past the public debate never questioned efficiency of the 
army or the legitimacy of its actions. A full supportive approach was 
encouraged by the State and by the Ministry of Defense in specific, who 
is still the most supportive actor in the governmental arena. Nowadays 
the debate is more open, even though the dominant feeling is still the 
supportive one.  
NGOs and grassroots movements started stigmatizing the scarce 
transparency of the Defense budget, the massive financial allocations 
and the scarce legislative overview. Sensitive issues as human rights 
violations and abuse of power have been brought to public attention 
with alternate fortune inside and outside the country. The Government 
has been responding to these claims with a double attitude. If from one 
side the organizations that actively criticize defense and security 
policies are looked at with suspicion, on the other side the Government 
hastened to prove that provisions are taken to guarantee that the army 
will remain one of the tools of the Government to promote democratic 
improvement and not prevent it. 
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2.2 ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
Accountability is the capacity of the political class to respond to the 
public about what they do, say or the policies they implement. For 
practical reasons, electoral accountability is measurable mainly on a 
periodic cyclical base and it regards the national or the local level (we 
will focus on the national one). Accountability is deeply related with 
transparency and it can realize only upon three conditions: 
information, justification requirements, and sanctioning ability of the 
voters. Informed voters in fact might decide to reward or punish 
politicians with their vote. The system can facilitate this process 
imposing transparency in the political process and multiplying the 
occasions of judgment from the electorate. In this paragraph, some 
variables that influence electoral accountability are taken into account. 
After a brief introduction on the electoral and the party system, 
fundamental frames in which the electoral accountability originates, the 
legal apparatus that regulates the electoral competition in the country 
and triggers mechanisms of electoral accountability will be studied. In 
particular the focus will be on the general electoral provisions, the 
discipline and the activity of the Electoral Committees, the sanctioning 
system, the laws on propaganda and party funding and the selection of 
candidates through the primary method, which is also regulated by the 
law of the State.  
 
 
Electoral System 
The political competition in Israel takes place in a proportional system 
according to the D'Hont method (simple quotient and highest average 
system). The constituency is national and the threshold is 2%, among 
the lowest in the world. The total number of Parliamentary seats is 120 
and number of seats which every list receives in the Knesset is 
proportional to the number of voters who voted for it. Only parties can 
compete for elections and there is no other actor that can present a list. 
The vote is given to the entire list and not to a single candidate: in fact 
there is no possibility to express any preference and the allocation of 
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seats within the list follows a progressive order (the first names on the 
list have more possibility to gain a seat). The Knesset elections take 
place once every four years, but the Knesset or the Prime Minister can 
decide to hold early elections. Under certain circumstances, the 
Parliament can serve for more than four years. 
This almost perfect proportional system favors the formation of a 
multiparty system, a broad competition among the parties and the 
presence of a rich representation in the Knesset. This is especially true 
since the Seventies, when the socialist party MAPAI, that had 
dominated the political scene since the formation of the State, lost its 
predominance. Voters' preferences opened to a broader spectrum, 
allowing a more differentiate composition of the Knesset and a more 
vehement representation of ideas that, till that moment, had 
encountered less success.  
The impossibility to express a nominal preference with the vote, 
transfers the electoral accountability and the reward-punishment 
mechanism to the party. Nonetheless, a certain personalization have 
been emerging as a tendency for the last decade. This process, which 
surely is part of an international trend of personalization of politics 
(due to the media logic of news exposition, the simplification of the 
political discourse, etc.), was partially encouraged by the parliamentary 
presidentialist electoral reform that was enacted between 1992 and 
2001. The current electoral system is the original one, in use at the 
beginning of the Israeli state-experience (except for the electoral 
threshold that was initially 1% and was progressively raised till the 
current 2%). Due to a significant instability of the Governments and the 
impasses that often led to stagnation in the policy making (mainly 
imputed to the high veto power of the smaller coalition members), the 
system was reformed. A very unique formula of direct election of the 
Prime Minister was set up. The hope was that the Prime Minister 
would have been strengthened by the direct election. The Prime 
Minister would have been less conditioned in the coalition making 
process and the likelihood of political impasse would have been 
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minor98. The results however led to a higher fragmentation in the 
Parliament and to a weakening of the bigger parties, since the "strategic 
vote" got lost with the possibility to cast a double ballot99. After three 
electoral turns, in 2001 the Knesset went back to the previous electoral 
system that is currently in force.  
 
 
The party system 
The electoral system as it is, favors the insurgence of multipartitism 
and a wide representation. About 30-35 parties usually take part in the 
elections and of them usually 10-15 sit in the Parliament. Generally 
correct implementation of the rules, formally allows the alternation that 
actually took place quite regularly from the Seventies. The two main 
parties in the political panorama are Likud and Labor (Avoda), 
collocated respectively in center-right and center-left of the political 
spectrum. These two parties have played a predominant role in the 
formation of governments in almost all the elections even though, not 
receiving a sufficient majority to govern alone, they have always 
needed to form a coalition in order to reach the majority in the Knesset. 
Besides these two parties, that experimented themselves joint lists with 
other parties, there is quite a changing party panorama that offers 
different voting options almost in every election, sometimes with 
successful results in terms of consensus. Defections are the norm 
among the Israeli Members of Knesset. So are the creation of new 
parties and the transformation of old ones. In the 2000s a new centrist 
party, formed by some Likud members and new personalities, gained 
the scene and reached the majority of the votes in two elections, 
Kadima (but managed to form the government only once, with Olmert, 
while in 2009 Livni was not able to form a government coalition and 
                                                 
98 For an effective explanation of the cause and desired effect of the electoral reform see 
Hazan, RY (1996). Presidential Parliamentarism: direct popular election of the prime 
minister in Electoral Studies 15: 21-38. 
99 For a comment on the malfunctioning of the system see Brichta A (1998)., The New 
Premier-Parliamentary System in Israel in Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, 5:180-192 
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left the place to the Likud party, second most voted in that election). In 
the last election, while the comet of Kadima seems to have dissolved, 
another centrist party has raised gaining a considerable amount of 
votes (it was the second most voted party), Iesh Atid (There is future), 
guided by Lapid. Party volatility is associated with electoral volatility, 
Israel has the highest electoral change per election over the post-war 
period and about 1/4 of voters change their electoral preference from 
one election to the other100. The political spectrum is multidimensional 
in Israel and the parties position themselves along the lines right/left, 
religious/secular and doves/hawks. The issues that orient these 
dimensions are the socioeconomic one (that is regaining power in the 
last years and became one of the main topics of the last electoral 
campaign following the social unrest of 2011/2012101), the secularity of 
the state and the relationship with the Arab neighbors (including the 
security issue and the territorial claims). Religious parties usually hold 
more conservative positions and are intransigent as it concerns the 
relations with the Arab and their claims on the land. For this reasons, 
they are usually collocated on the right side of the political continuum, 
with the right wing conservative parties with whom they share the 
hawkish attitude in matters of foreign relations and Arab-Jewish issues 
(it is important to keep in mind the multidimensionality of the political 
space and to think that not necessarily the socioeconomic positions of 
the parties on the right side of the party scheme coincide). On the left 
side of the secular, dovish parties are located. Together with them, the 
Arab parties: their positioning is mainly due to the opposition to the 
right wing and religious parties that they perceive as hostile and 
because of the recurrent social claims that compose their agenda of an 
equal distribution of resources and a social reform that will help the 
Arab social segment to grow and develop. About 70% of the population 
felt attracted by such a party arrangement since 2000 and was 
motivated to express their vote. This data is not negative in absolute 
                                                 
100 See Krouwel A., Rajmil D., The increasingly polarized and fragmented party system in 
Israel will make it difficult for a stable government to emerge from this month’s elections. 
At http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2013/01/14/israel-elections-2013-israeli-party-system/ 
101 See Hexel R., (2013 January)Israel after the elections: Is the country facing political 
change? International Policy Analysis, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. 
136 
but it is significant if looked in comparative perspective with the past 
elections. While the population keeps growing in Israel and so does the 
population who is entitled to vote, the turnover is low. This would 
require a more specific analysis in order to understand the causes of 
this disaffection (see table below). A particular indifference to the 
electoral call is registered among Arab Israelis whose turnover is lower 
than 55%. The negative attitude of the Arab population is due to the 
perception of a discriminatory attitude toward the Arab population, 
both in the representative bodies and in the implementation of policies. 
An unequal distribution of resource and the systematic exclusion of the 
Arab party formations from the governmental activity would 
discourage the electorate from participating102. 
 
Figure 9 Electoral Turnover 1949-2013 
(Source: IDEA, Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 
http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?CountryCode=IL) 
 
 
The formation of the Government, as said, entails usually the creation 
of a coalition. The most voted list is given by the law the possibility of 
                                                 
102 Khouri J., (2013 January 20) Israel's 'Arab parties' seek to combat indifference and low 
voter turnout, in Haaretz at http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/israel-s-arab-parties-
seek-to-combat-indifference-and-low-voter-turnout.premium-1.494979 
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forming the ruling coalition103. Important to note that the assignment of 
the office to the most voted party is a custom and not a law since. The 
President of the State, considered a guarantee figure, is left with the 
choice of the most appropriate candidate to be chosen. Whenever the 
attempt of the first member of Knesset fails, another party (usually the 
second preferred in terms of votes) gets the chance to form the 
Government. The alliance dynamic is an interesting phenomenon to 
observe. As mentioned in the previous chapters, Arab parties are 
informally not considered potential allies by the main parties. The 
ethnic fracture in Israel has been preserving its relevance since it has 
always directly linked to foreign policy (in particular with the hostile 
relations with the neighbor countries), the internal security, the 
territorial issue and the very existence of the State. Arab parties pay the 
price for representing a social group that is often looked at with 
suspicion, and that has been considered a "local branch" of a 
threatening enemy committed to the usurpation of the land and to the 
destruction of the State. Not even the left wing parties, more open to 
dialogue and the inclusion, which contributed many times to public 
battles for the enhancement of the conditions of the Arab population, 
dared opening their governments of the Arab parties, fearing maybe 
the reaction of the public or the requests of these allies. On the contrary, 
a much practiced alliance is the one with the religious parties. As said, 
till now, the most frequent winners of elections were Labor and Likud. 
Both parties turned often to the religious political groups in order to 
reach the majority. With a declared preference for the right wing 
coalitions (because of the Labor proximity to the extreme left parties, 
unpopular in the religious world), the religious parties usually 
accepted the invite of both parties, stably obtaining the role of 
kingmakers. Their crucial position allowed them to maximize their 
requests, by many judged disproportionate for the effective numerical 
strength of these formations. Shas, ultraorthodox Sephardi party built 
on this strategy a real political phenomenon that traduced in a well-
organized social system on the model of the traditional mass parties. 
The creation and the preservation of this system, offered the voters a 
                                                 
103 See Basic Law The Government, art 8. 
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specific kind of accountability: a material one, made of funding to the 
community institution and of legislation that would protect group's 
interest. The mechanism is looked at by the main parties with 
ambivalence: from one side in the moment of need, the religious parties 
represent a secure option for forming the government. From the other 
side their requests and the constraints that they pose both in the 
beginning of the negotiation and during the governmental activity limit 
the ray of action of the government. The effects sometimes fall on the 
government itself (thus on the main party) that is harshly criticized by 
the public (in particular by the secular one), averse to the decisions of 
the government. In the last election, with the insurgence of a third 
political power, Iesh Atid, the Likud (that run in a joint list with another 
"historical" ally of its, Ysrael Beitenu, without by the way a significant 
increase of seats) renounced to the alliance to the Ultraorthodox parties 
(upon which Iesh Atid, centrist party that built its successful campaign 
on the elimination of some privileges reserved to the religious 
communities, had posed a veto). Instead, HaBait HaYehudi, a right wing 
religious party that gained a massive consensus in the elections, born 
from the ashes of the National Religious Party and other religious 
political formations, was included in the government. The 
ultraorthodox parties were left apart and in the near future will be 
possible to tell whether the government will be able to survive without 
their support or if external negotiation will be opened to secure the 
majority to the leading party.  
 
 
General provisions on Elections 
The electoral process in Israel formally follows the basic rules for free, 
fair, recurrent, and competitive election. The Parliament (Knesset) is a 
120-members body whose status and features are described by the 
Basic law: The Knesset, the first basic law to be approved after the 
formation of the State. The law establishes the status of the Knesset as 
the supreme legislative body, expression of the democratic will of 
people. Article 4 states that the Knesset is to be elected through 
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"general, country-wide, direct, equal, secret and proportional elections". 
This article set the main traits of the electoral system and can only be 
amended by a vote of a majority of the Knesset members. 
In this law, the articles 8, 9, 10 establish the basic feature of a recurrent 
electoral process, determining the tenure of the Knesset (4 years), fixing 
a day for the election (Art. 9 (amended): "The elections to the Knesset shall 
take place on the third Tuesday of the month of Cheshvan104 in the year in 
which the tenure of the outgoing Knesset ends, but if the year which preceded 
that year was a leap year, the elections shall take place on the first Tuesday of 
that month") and attributing a social solemnity and priority to the 
election day declaring it a day of rest (with public transportation and 
services to regularly performs their work, so that the mobility across 
the country would not penalize the actual possibility to perform the 
vote). Beside the normative tenure of the Knesset an earlier dissolution 
is contemplated (with the call for earlier elections); in emergency 
cases105 and after the consent of a qualified majority, the Knesset can 
also prolong its mandate.  
The law set the general requirements for active and passive electoral 
rights, extending the right to vote to all nationals who have reached the 
age of eighteen (unless the national has been deprived of this right by a 
court or he has been sentenced to a penalty of actual imprisonment for 
at least five years for specific crimes against the state and five years 
have not yet passed since the day when he terminated his period of 
imprisonment) and allowing the potential election for all citizens above 
the age of twenty-one (unless court restriction and on the premise that 
the person is part of a party list during the elections). The candidature 
is also forbidden to those holding specific political or social roles106 
                                                 
104 The Hebrew calendar is a lunar calendar. Cheshvan is the name of a Hebrew month 
that corresponds, in the Gregorian calendar to October/November. 
105 In case of war, for example. This was actually the case during the Yom Kippur war 
(1973) when the Seventh Knesset remained in power few months more because of the 
Yom Kippur War. 
106 According to art 7., the President of the State; the two Chief Rabbis; a judge, so long as 
he holds office; a judge of a religious court, so long as he holds office; the State 
Comptroller; the Chief of the General Staff of the Defense Army of Israel; rabbis and 
ministers of other religions, so long as they hold office; senior State employees and senior 
140 
(unless their renounce to the positions and held the previous 
conditions).  
The other main law that frames the electoral process are the Knesset 
Elections Law (Consolidated Version) approved in 1969, The Knesset 
Election Law (on Propaganda methods), the Party financing Law (1973) 
and the parties Law (1992). 
While the Basic Law: The Knesset set the general provisions, the 
Knesset Elections Law107 deals with all of the organizational and legal 
aspects of the elections, defining them more in detail. The Knesset 
Elections Law determines who has the right to vote and where108; it 
defines the election districts (administrative units) and the polling 
districts (physical places) according to geographical continuity, 
municipal units and populations. The law defines moreover the 
procedures for the preparatory activity, Election Day, the counting 
activity and the proclamation of the results. Moreover, it lists the 
sanctions concerning the electoral process. 
 
 
The Electoral Committees: preparation and management of the 
electoral process 
                                                                                                           
Army officers of such grades or ranks and in such functions as shall be determined by 
Law cannot be candidate of a party list, this cannot be elected. 
107 For the English version of the law see the official website of the Knesset: 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/elections19/eng/law/ElectionsLaw1969_eng.pdf 
108 The Knesset Election Law provides with specific indications on some groups of voters 
who are entitled to express their vote even if they are not on Israeli soil or anyway 
outside their voting districts. Sections nine and ten of the law are in fact dedicated to 
soldiers, police forces and workers under Israeli vessel. Soldiers who are in a mission 
and cannot reach their usual voting district in order to cast their vote are entitled to 
cast their vote in the camp voting station. The same logic is valid for workers under 
Israeli vessels abroad. Specific restrictions for the propaganda directed to these 
citizens are also specified in these sections. Policemen are allowed to cast their ballot 
outside their usual voting station whenever there are in service during the Election 
Day to guarantee security and legality of the voting process.  
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The law establishes the collective figure of Electoral Committee, in 
charge of organizing and administering the electoral process. This body 
is composed by a central organism and by several peripheral branches 
both in the election districts (Districts Electoral Committees) and in the 
polling districts (Polling Committees, more than 10.000 in the territory 
of the country). The committee is comprised of representatives of the 
political parties proportionate to the party size in the sitting Knesset 
and is chaired by a Supreme Court justice appointed by the justices on 
the court. In the district committees the party representation is the 
same as in the Central Committee and the chair is judge nominated by 
the Supreme Court. The composition of the Polling Committees is 
decided by the District Committees that is requested to maintain a 
certain degree of parties' representation while performing this task.  
The Central Electoral Committee, together with the Ministry of Interior 
is responsible to set up the Voters' Register. The law expresses in 
details the modalities of preparation of the Voters' Registers, specifying 
the requirements to be inserted in the registry and offering the public to 
review them (in a public exhibition in time and place decided by the 
Committee and the Ministry of Interior) and ask for modifications. The 
section 6 of the law establishes the criteria for the candidates' lists 
remarking the impossibility for a candidate to be part of more than one 
list. A deposit of 5000 pounds is requested at the moment of the 
presentation of the list. At the moment of the presentation of the list, 
the list is entitled to choose the identification letter (or two letters) that 
will be used as identification mark in the voting papers. In Israel in fact 
the voters do not write themselves their party preference nor make any 
sign on the ballot. In fact they choose among cards printed with the 
symbols of the competing parties and put them in an envelope that 
they will cast as an expression of their vote. Upon request however, the 
voter could receive a blank slip in which he could express its vote, 
writing the identification letters of the party he chooses. The admission 
of a list is prerogative of the Central Electoral Committee (that will 
judge the admissibility of the list follows the criteria dictated by the 
law) but, in case of an appeal on this judgment the Supreme Court can 
be asked to give a definitive verdict. The law sets the criteria of 
selection of the polling station, giving strong preference to public 
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buildings without religious or other partisan connotations (in most 
cases actually schools are used as polling stations). The number of the 
polling stations is determined by the number of voters that should not 
exceed 1000 per station. As it regards the operation of vote, the secrecy 
is safeguarded since the voters are asked to exercise their voting right 
in a cabin and to cast themselves the ballot inside a box, without 
anybody else to touch the envelope containing the voting card. 
Disabled people are allowed to receive help in their voting activity 
from a person that they choose. The cards are written both in Hebrew 
and in Arabic, the second official language of the country. This 
however is not established by the law as mandatory but under specific 
request of the list at the moment of presentation to the Central 
Committee.  
The law specifies the cases in which a vote would be considered 
invalid, among which the cast of a double vote or identification marks 
(for example, in the case of a voter who requires to write himself the 
vote, any other sign beside the letter/s of the party provokes the 
annulment of the ballot). 
The counting operation is done at the end of the Election Day and it 
follows a formal procedure that involves the three levels of the 
Electoral Committees. The Polling Committees count the ballots of their 
own station; the ballots and the relative report is then passed to the 
District Committee that elaborates a further and more general report on 
the result obtained by the Polling Committees and pass the material to 
the Central Committee that is responsible to elaborate the final and 
global report. 
 
 
Sanctions related to the electoral process 
The Knesset Election vote lists also sanctions regarding irregularities 
concerning the vote. The mentioned cases concern the falsification of 
the voters' registers or the voters' list (at the polling station or once they 
are delivered to the Ministry of Interior). The sanction is notably 
heavier if the falsification is made by a member of the Election 
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Committees. Members of the Election Committee are also punishable 
for abandonment of election material (punishable with monetary 
sanction and imprisonment) and for behaving irresponsibly toward 
their duty of state trustees. 
Other action sanctioned by the law is the interference with the election 
procedure and, most of all the interference of freedom of vote. Specific 
articles are in fact dedicated to describe the actions that might be 
interpreted as interference with the freedom of vote: threats to force or 
to prevent the vote (vote is not obligatory in Israel), exploitation of 
positions of authority in order to influence the vote (in employment 
context for example) and attempt to bribe the voters with money or any 
other kind of personal benefit in exchange for a vote. Attempts to vote 
more than once or to vote on behalf of another person are also 
considered to be illegal acts and are punishable under this law. 
 
 
Electoral regulation regarding propaganda and political information 
The main law that regulates the propaganda is the Election law 
(propaganda methods) but other laws fix important rules that are to be 
mentioned in this section. 
For the purposes of procedures, propaganda and financial matters (for 
example the calculation of the electoral expenses) the Party Financial 
Law regulates the period of the electoral campaign. In a regular case, in 
which the Knesset completes its four years mandate, the campaign 
period starts 101 day before the Election Day. In case of dissolution of 
the Knesset, both for voluntary decision of the Knesset or for other 
reasons (decision of the President in the cases contemplated by the law, 
for example) the campaign commences three days after the provision of 
dissolution takes effect. The general election campaign period lasts 
from the “determining day” until the Election Day. 
The Knesset Election Law (Consolidated Version) expresses some 
restrictions as it regards the propaganda for special categories of voters 
(soldiers and nationals under Israeli vessels) posing limitations on 
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material that can be submitted to their attention, especially in public 
space. The rational seems to be the one of safeguarding the public 
decency of the place granting its neutrality; moreover the possibility of 
clearly and publicly campaigning might create abuses of power in 
contexts where the hierarchic ties are stronger and more direct than in 
other workplaces. However, the proper source deputed to deal in detail 
with the electoral campaigning is the Knesset Elections Law 
(Propaganda methods) that was approved in 1959 and, after many 
modifications during the years, is still the main text of reference. The 
Knesset Elections Law (Propaganda methods) is meant to ensure a fair 
and equal exposition of the public to the electoral propaganda, 
considering the media a powerful and dangerous (if not regulated) tool 
of expression and persuasion109. The prescriptions about electoral 
propaganda are quite detailed regulating the use of various media and 
in certain cases specifying the technical traits of the propaganda tools 
(defining for example the size of the posters or the specification of the 
sponsorship on press advertisements). At the time of the creation of the 
law, the main prescriptions regarded the radio and movies 
broadcasting, being those the most modern media at the time to which 
was attribute an enormous persuasive power. The bill's purpose was 
also to guarantee a fair competition, avoiding possible exploitation of 
the media by the party in government, who detained an economic and 
a political power that would have created an evident and exaggerate 
gap toward the other parties. A careful approach to the matter of power 
abuse by parties in government is still traceable today in the law. It is 
therefore forbidden to use funds originating from bodies that are 
subject to the control of the State Comptroller (Ministries, local 
councils; public managers etc.) for electoral campaigning (paragraph 
2a). 
The media exposition was regulated this way by the original version of 
the law: every party was assigned 25 free minutes of exposure in the 
media in which they could have aired their electoral message (prepared 
                                                 
109 Caspi D., Leshem B., (2006) From Electoral Propaganda to Political Advertising in 
Israel in Kaid L. L. & Holtz-Bacha C. (ed.) The SAGE Handbook of Political 
Advertising.  Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc. 
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at their expenses). Additionally, every party present in the Knesset 
would have had an extra time proportionately to the seats occupied in 
the Knesset by its members. Beside the allocated time, propaganda 
during the regular programming was strictly forbidden and even the 
avoidance of showing candidates or even airing their voice was 
absolute.  
The allocation of free space to the parties have been surviving till 
nowadays with substantial differences as it concerns the length of the 
allocated spaces (reduced in general and in comparison), the timing of 
airing and the channels (since the introduction of the television and 
then the creation of a multichannel service). The method of allocation 
has been criticized many times due to the disproportion of exposure 
that the law creates among small and big parties and among new and 
"old" parties. Especially in periods in which a neat majority was hold 
by a party compared to the smaller ones, the allocation rate was 
disproportionately bigger (as Caspi and Leshem note, a party with 40 
Knesset representative could have gained 170 minutes of exposure in 
television and 185 on the radio, while an incumbent party would have 
acceded to the basic quota only). When interrogated on this matter, the 
Supreme Court justified the disparity with the need of the bigger 
parties to explain their platform (and possibly their action in 
government) more extensively than smaller parties and filed the case 
considering the gap as not harming the equality principle in electoral 
campaign110. The disproportion was noticed as particularly evident 
during the presidential parenthesis of the electoral system in which, big 
parties presenting a candidate for the premiership were entitled to a 
more consistent propaganda than smaller or newer parties that 
presented a candidate without, an equal and equally effective 
possibility to promote him. 
The prohibition of broadcasting images or voices of candidates, present 
in the original text of the Knesset Elections (propaganda methods) Law 
                                                 
110 For this and for following considerations on the inappropriateness of the law 
governing the propaganda in Israel see  Shejter A. M.& Yemini M. (2009) Eyes have 
they but they see not: Israeli Election laws, Freedom of Expression and the need for 
Transparent Speech in  COMM. L. & POL’Y 14:411–452  
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and in its amended version, was emphasized on the Laws governing 
the Broadcasting service in Israel. On the television context the 
Supreme Court ruled that while events in which candidates took part 
could actually been broadcasted (because responding to the television's 
task to air a news and to inform the public of an event), the physical 
image of the candidates was not to be shown nor his presence should 
have been mentioned, since this would have constituted a violation of 
the law. Sheiter and Yemini notice the naïve if not contradictory 
interpretation of the law, that was limited in its efficacy for a non-
thorough consideration of the possible propagandistic aims of 
candidate's participations to events and for the scarce attention to the 
messages that they might have delivered to the electorate with their 
presence or with interviews that were considered to have non 
propagandistic contents. In 1996, after progressive amendments on the 
discipline (mainly regarding the period of application of the ban) the 
prohibition of showing images or airing events in which candidates 
where present was abolished and only the ban on airing propaganda 
messages beside the free space allocated with the proportional methods 
mentioned before remained valid. Sheiter and Yemini underline how 
the previous misconceived focus on the image of the candidates cause, 
with the abolishment of this constrain, to the indiscriminate (and 
usually unsanctioned) broadcasting of events and images of candidates 
that actually might be considered as impropriate  due to the prohibition 
on propaganda outside the assigned allocated spaces. 
The current asset about electoral propaganda through television 
consists in ten minutes of electoral commercials (plus the proportional 
quota) to be aired two weeks before the elections by each party, mainly 
in non-prime time (despite the earlier custom, based on a decision of 
the Supreme Court to broadcast them in prime time). It is forbidden to 
the parties to purchase additional broadcasting time for purposes of 
propaganda. With the introduction of the satellite TV and its great 
diffusion in the Israelis' houses the ban on purchasing visibility on the 
TV channels have been circumvented by some parties, especially by 
those with a specific electorate, particular consumer of these satellite 
channels. 
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Another cop out to the limits posed by the law, and a natural result of 
the further development of the media world is the use of the internet. 
The use of the internet is not strictly regulated and offers an exceptional 
opportunity for the parties, given also the massive audience that it is 
possible to reach through this media. Recently the Central Election 
Committee extended some of the criteria applicable to the propaganda 
via press to the publication through the internet: anonymous political 
advertisements will be considered illegal, since, like in newspapers and 
other forms of press they should always indicate their sponsorship. The 
lack of a specific regulation might in fact lead to the misuse of the net, 
also for denigration purposes (negative advertisement)111. Some 
scholars maintain that the new media are the frontier of the political 
propaganda (as well as of a big portion of communication) and that the 
law should be revised accordingly, further diminishing or abolishing 
the use of television that  has already lost its prominence as a deliverer 
of political propaganda in electoral time.112 
 
 
Electoral funding 
The party financing is regulated mainly by the Party Financing Law 
created in 1973 and, partially by the more recent Party law approved in 
1992. Framing the financing of electoral parties can be an effective 
method to guarantee transparency and to avoid manipulation of the 
parties (that should safeguard the interest of the citizens and promote 
policies that enhance the quality of people's life) by third actors 
through the allocation of financial or other material resources. On the 
other side, the limit of expenditure and the provision of a public 
funding guarantee as a principle a free competition and equal access to 
the political competition, not based on the ability to find economic 
                                                 
111 Jerusalem Post Staff (2013 January 5) Elections C'tee: Propaganda Law also applies to 
Internet in Jerusalem Post, at http://www.jpost.com/Breaking-News/Elections-Ctee-
Propaganda-Law-also-applies-to-Internet 
112 For this and for a general comment about some obsolete features of the Israeli laws on 
elections see Atmor N.& Kening O., (2012 December 19)  Brushing Off the Dust in Israel 
Democracy Institute (IDI), at http://en.idi.org.il/analysis/articles/brushing-off-the-dust/ 
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support (or on owning economic resources). The financing of political 
campaigns  in Israel is derived from both private as well as government 
funding, with the last one playing a crucial role in the allocation of 
resources to the parties (that by the law, are the only subject entitled to 
present a list). As it regard the latter, for election campaigns, every list 
is funded on the basis of the seats earned in the previous legislature 
and the seats earned in the current legislature (plus an additional fixed 
amount, whose amount changes according to the decision of a public 
committee). For the new lists (of parties that were not represented in 
the previous Knesset but the got admitted to the election after their 
registration), the calculations are made only on the basis of the seat 
won on the new legislature (plus the fixed amount). Part of the sum 
(that is perceived as a reimbursement for the electoral campaign and 
the ongoing expenses) can be requested in advance by the parties. 
Private contributions to general elections are limited in a way to 
guarantee transparency and traceability. In fact, no anonymous 
donation is allowed for electoral expenses113 and the donor must be a 
citizen of Israel who is eligible for voting114. The contribution from 
corporations or registered partnerships in Israel or abroad is explicitly 
forbidden for any election, local or national and also for primary 
elections. As mentioned in the previous paragraphs, there are some 
subjects (like NGOs) that are not included in such a restriction with the 
provision that their support is limited in quantity and purpose 
(especially if given to parties' cultural foundations).  These 
contributions are anyway subjected to verification by the state organs 
(State Comptroller). Moreover quantitative limits are posed to the 
electoral expenses. This should prevent candidates or parties to take 
advantage of personal availability of money; moreover, it should 
prevent the creation of a significant dependence of the parties on 
                                                 
113 Party financing Law Article 8, Clause d2 (page 6) (as reported in the English version by 
the Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance, IDEA): "A party group or candidates' 
list shall not receive anonymous contributions. For this purpose, contributions given by a 
person whose identity and address are not checked and verified by or on behalf of the 
party group or candidates' list are deemed to be given anonymously." At 
http://www.idea.int/political-finance/country.cfm?id=103 
114 Party Financing Law, Section 8, Clause a 
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private subjects that might use it as a leverage to promote its own 
interest in the decisional organisms of the state. Actually, since the limit 
amount differs from party to party (with a similar calculation as for the 
allocation of direct public funds, that is considering the number of 
previous members of Knesset, with a maximum amount fixed by the 
same public committee in charge of the allocations) the smaller parties 
or the new ones are much more strictly limited in the electoral expenses 
than the big ones. 
The control of the electoral expenditure is stated by the law. Article 10, 
Clause a of the Party Financing law imposes that "Within ten weeks 
from the end of the month in which the election results are published, 
the representatives of a party group or candidates' list shall deliver to 
the State Comptroller its accounts for the election period." For the 
working procedure of the State Comptroller that has been analyzed in 
the previous chapters, the data transmitted by the parties are not 
completely public (in the report, only the violations are pointed out). 
This is significant since it somehow limits the possibility of the public 
to control the party expenditure and to exercise a detailed control. A 
further step toward a total transparency might actually allow a more 
conscious approach to the electoral phase and might stimulate a public 
debate, independently from the violations that the State Comptroller 
publishes. 
Whenever irregularities are found in the reports (or through 
investigations of other kind), sanctions are inflicted in various forms 
according to the gravity of the infraction. Overspending and over-
financing are usually punished with pecuniary sanctions (in a similar 
way to the infraction to the propaganda rules); if a major fraud is 
discovered, however, imprisonment can be ruled by the court. 
 
 
Parties and party primaries 
The Parties Law, approved in 1992, represents another tassel of this 
analysis. It provides with a definition of party, specifies some matters 
regarding the party formation, management and funding and gives a 
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legal frame to a very important phenomenon that is more and more 
diffuse in the party lives in Israel: the primaries. Parties in Israel are the 
only subject who is allowed to formally present a list for electoral 
competition.  Not affiliated candidates can participate in the lists but 
the party plays a formal and essential role in the formation of the list.  
The law defines the party as a group of people who have associated 
together in order to advance, in accordance with the law, political or 
social goals, and to represent these goals in the Knesset by way of their 
elected representatives. Every citizen and resident of Israel can, in 
accordance with at least other 99 people form a party and ask for its 
formal registration. Provisions are set regarding the bureaucratic iter to 
follow in order to be recognized. Among other documents, the 
programmatic platform needs to be deposited to the Party Registrar. 
The programmatic platform is analyzed and whenever it contains the 
rejection of Israel’s existence as a Jewish or democratic state, the 
promotion of the armed fight against the state or the incitation to 
racism as among the basic principles, the party cannot be recognized as 
legitimate. As mentioned, among the most salient points treated by the 
law there is that of the primaries (Parties law, Chapter II). The 
legislation does not make the primaries a mandatory instrument for the 
composition of the electoral list. In fact, different parties use very 
diverse method of selection. In some parties (and in the majority till the 
Nineties), the party leader (that can be religious or lay) determines who 
the candidates are. The selection can also be operated by a party 
committee or through a party congress where the elected are the mirror 
of the factions that compose the party. The primaries are the newest 
method of selection in the country and for the moment they follow the 
model of "closed primaries"  
This method of choice of candidates entered in the Israel party system 
exactly in 1992, when the Labor Party decided to renounce to the classic 
method of internal selection of candidates operated by party 
nomenclature and to turn to the voters for a more participate form of 
selection (that in the moment was also functional to part of the Labor 
leadership). Labor's initiative was followed by the Likud and 
progressively by other parties. In the past elections three parties 
officially called for primaries: the Labor, the Likud and the religious 
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party Bait HaYehudi. These parties ruled with internal regulation the 
process of voting and selection, organizing though same aspects of the 
procedure in a way to guarantee a balance between participation needs 
and party priorities. The internal regulation addressed mainly the 
eligibility to vote in the primaries, the district formation and the 
representativity of the lists. The eligibility to vote in the primaries 
generally does not coincide with the party membership. Membership in 
fact is a necessary but non-sufficient condition, since members are not 
allowed to vote before acquiring a certain seniority (that can very 
sensibly from party to party). This limitation of participation, that is 
actually an unequal treatment of the membership, is due to the need of 
safeguarding the party interest against overthrows brought by new 
waves of members, especially if they are the product of strategic moves 
of one of the internal factions. This rule was adopted by the parties 
with the claim of endorsing the opinion of the membership without the 
primaries becoming a strategic tool for low party politics. Even though 
this will not be analyzed in this work, an interesting analysis would 
come out from the comparative study of the relation between the 
requested seniority and the party dynamics (concentration of power, 
methods of recruitment, etc.). Another internal regulation regards the 
division in districts. Likud, therefore, guarantees the geographical 
representation through a double vote that all primaries voters are 
entitled to cast: one ballot contains a general list of names and it has 
national distribution in the polling station of Likud's primaries. The 
second one is different in every district and aims to ensure that 
representatives of each district will have chances of being elected. This 
provision has undoubtedly strategic purposes beside the will of 
ensuring a better representation and increasing accountability with a 
geographical-proximity dynamic. The population in Israel is in fact 
distributed, especially in some areas, in homogeneous groups. Giving 
the possibility to vote for district candidates, will attract the population 
of that specific district and the winning candidate will be more 
appealing also for those who are not party members but share with the 
candidate a common cultural or ethnic background.   Another 
provision that can be considered a point of contact between ensuring a 
broad and fair representation of the society in the list and profiting in 
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terms of electoral consensus by candidates that the electorate can 
identify with for a number of reasons is the reservation of quotas in the 
lists. Women, young people, non-Jews, settlers etc. have some granted 
positions in the lists that would attributed to them in case their absolute 
results were not competitive with the results of other candidates. 
Again, this originates from the idea that some candidates are voted 
because of a direct identification with them or their interests115.  
Israel is one of the few countries where the primaries are examined in 
detail by the law and precise limits and rules are posed116. Competitors 
in the primaries are asked to provide their own financial statements to 
the regulating authority that is in charge to verify the respect of the 
founding (governed by similar rules as the main elections) and the 
expenses for the campaign. The rationale of the law is to ensure a fair 
intraparty competition and to avoid the contraction of dependence 
bounds with external funders that might spoil the representative role of 
the candidate once he gets elected  
The primaries were saluted, in the academia also, as an historic step 
toward democratization. Transparency and participations were to 
replace the oligarchic methods of internal nomination117 and a new 
season of inclusiveness was envisioned. a procedure in which all rank-
and-file party members participate in choosing the party's leader and 
list of candidates for the Knesset, marked the climax of a 
democratization process that saw the parties shift from the closed, 
oligarchic era of nomination committees to a more open and inclusive 
method. Benvenisti stressed how the primaries system would make the 
legislative body a more independent and assertive body, that could 
                                                 
115 A broader analysis of the primaries and their internal regulation is available at 
http://en.idi.org.il/analysis/articles/primary-season-in-israel/ .  This IDI analysis of the 
primaries for the 19th Knesset elections quotes as a main source Rahat, G.( 2011) The 
Political Consequences of Candidate Selection to the 18th Knesset. in Arian A. et al. (eds.) 
The Elections in Israel—2009,  Transaction Publishers. 
116 Hofnung M.,(2008) Unaccounted Competition : The Finance of Intra-Party Elections in 
Party Politics  14: 726 
117 See Kenig, O.,(2012 March 17) The Primary System in Israel: A Balance Sheet, IDI 
Analysis, at http://en.idi.org.il/analysis/articles/the-primary-system-in-israel-a-balance-
sheet/ 
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more effectively perform the legislative task and the supervision on the 
government118. The scholar noted how the dependence from the party 
decreases with the popular election of the candidate. Thus the party 
discipline is loosened. Shifting the decisional power on the hand of the 
electorate, the accountability would grow and would foster a more 
independent behavior especially of new candidates or those who do 
not hold a central and majoritarian position within the parties. The 
party and the party establishment would actually be deprived of a 
crucial instrument in terms of ensuring party discipline in favor of a 
stronger and more direct control by the citizens. The candidate might 
decide to attract specific groups in the electorate addressing side issues 
upon which the group disagrees with the official position of the party 
(even though agreeing with main values). With this strategy the 
candidate might be recognized as a "specialist" on some specific issues 
(usually social ones, that deeply affect the daily agenda of the target 
electorate) and become a point of reference (so a voted candidate) by 
the target addressed. 
As a consequence of this new form of accountability originated from 
the institution of the primary selection, a secularization of the Knesset 
activity is pointed out. According to Benvenisti the primaries posed the 
religious parties in a less powerful position while increased the power 
of the religious Jewish parties. The position of the latter, decisive for 
almost every government starting from the Seventies, would be in 
danger because of the dissolution of a bipolar setting in the Knesset 
from which they earned the biggest advantage. More independent 
member of parliaments, even in the majority coalition decide to ride 
popular antireligious issues in the country (profitable in terms of 
consensus) and establish transversal temporal alliances with other 
parties' members in order to propose legislation on the matter or 
opposing to religious parties' agenda On the other hand, Arab members 
of Parliament, have the possibility to establish partnerships with the 
members of other parties that decide to "play independent" on specific 
                                                 
118 Benvenisti E., (2002) Party Primaries as Collective Action with Constitutional 
Ramifications: Israel as a Case Study, in Theoretical Inquiries in Law 3:1:197-206 Available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=304019 
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issue. This provides them with a bigger visibility and with the 
participation in the resource sharing, through legislation and 
participation in Knesset committees. In the same way, Arab members of 
"non-Arab" parties can decide themselves to grow autonomous on 
certain issue and establish temporary alliances with Arab parties.   
However, some criticisms were moved to the Parties Law and to the 
primaries system itself. Hofnung119 noted how the control on 
candidates' financial activity was limited in time (9 months prior the 
candidature) allowing a discrete maneuvering power to candidates. 
The implementation of the regulation was another weak point that was 
pointed out in comparison with the strict enforcement of the electoral 
competition regulation. In the original version of the Parties Law 
therefore, parties themselves were put in charge of ensuring the respect 
of the law and reporting the violations of the candidates. The task 
attributed by the law was often neglected due to the will of protecting 
the party image (especially before the elections) and evident 
misconduct of some candidates (as it regards the limit of expenditure 
or the collection of funding) took place120. Other minuses, that did not 
entail any violation of the law but can be considered as side effects of 
the primaries are the strategies of election that groups of candidate to 
the primaries put in act. It has been stressed how the multiple-choice of 
preferred candidates in the primaries originates electoral agreements 
among competitors what would share their respective electorates in a 
way to maximize their consensus121.This way, the genuine popular 
voice would be driven by political agreements and the power would 
return, at least partially inside the party. As it concerns the later 
repercussions on the legislative and governmental activity, a tendency 
of some Members of Parliament would be clear to over-legislate (for the 
above mentioned autonomy that they develop with the selection by the 
electorate and their need of visibility to show accountability to their 
supporters). Furthermore, the stability of governments would be 
                                                 
119 Hofnung M. (2008), See above.  
120 In 2006 the Parties Law was amended and the controlling power passed to the State 
Comptroller.  
121 Tauber D., (2012 December 20) Understanding Israel’s ‘Deal System’ in Jewish Press at 
http://www.jewishpress.com/blogs/hadar/the-likuds-top-25-the-deal-system/2012/12/20/ 
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weakened because of the loosening of the party/coalition discipline 
(other side of the medal of the increased autonomy and more 
independent judgment of the members of Parliament)122. 
  
                                                 
122 For a brief but comprehensive analysis of the criticisms to the primary system see 
above Kening O. (2012 March 17), The Primary System in Israel: A Balance Sheet,  IDI at 
http://en.idi.org.il/analysis/articles/2012/the-primary-system-in-israel-a-balance-sheet/  
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2.3 INTERINSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
The inter-institutional accountability is the procedural dimension that 
deals with checks and balances among the institutions. In democratic 
regimes in fact the equilibrium among the basic powers is considered 
as the optimum in terms of quality government and safeguard from 
malfunctions. A good inter-institutional accountability should grant the 
procedures to be respected and should contrast abuses of power by the 
public bodies. Many actors play a role in this net of reciprocal control. 
The most relevant in this context are the Parliament, the Government 
but also the State Comptroller and the audit bodies. A final section will 
be dedicated to the media, a non-institutional actor that nonetheless 
promotes accountability. 
 
 
The role of the Parliament in legislation and executive overview 
Israel was born as a parliamentary democracy and after a short 
"presidential parlamentarism" parenthesis it returned to the original 
type. In a parliamentary democracy the legislative power and the 
executive one are in the hands respectively of the Government and the 
Parliament. The Government, however, is usually entitled to contribute 
(in most of the cases in a consistent manner) to the legislative proposal 
that the Parliament, direct emanation of citizens, will discuss and 
possibly approves. The Parliament is undoubtedly the highest symbolic 
actor in a parliamentary democracy since it represents the voters and 
from them it originates its power. The supremacy of the Parliament is 
demonstrated through its ability to overthrow the Government through 
a vote of non-confidence. The government in fact is meant to be the 
expression of a constructive majority, able to implement policies agreed 
upon by the representatives of the people. The survival of the 
Government in parliamentary democracies is determined by the 
existence of a majority support in the Parliament.  
As explained in the previous paragraphs, the legislative body operates 
in plenary sessions and through its committees. In plenary sessions, 
general debates are conducted on government policy and activity, as 
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well as on legislation. The legislative initiative can be taken by a 
Member of Parliament (or by a group of members) or by the 
Government (whenever a legislative proposal is introduced by a 
Ministry, the Government has to approve it anyways before presenting 
it to the Knesset). The legislative procedure is articulated in several 
steps that allow the Parliament to discuss and to exercise its power of 
legislative control: after a first reading in the plenum, the bill is 
analyzed and revised by the appropriate Knesset committee. The 
Committee's eventual modifications or observations are then presented 
in the plenum where a vote is expressed on the need to return to the 
committee for further modifications or on the possibility to approve the 
bill directly. 
While traditionally, the government was considered to play a main role 
as provider of legislative proposals123, in the last decade an increased 
legislative activity of Members of Knesset has been observed. Chazan124 
notes how the Knesset became one of the most active parliaments in the 
world and defines hyperactive for them number of bills that are 
presented and discussed every year. This might be a direct 
consequence of the primary system of selections of candidates that, as 
argued above, would foster single members' autonomy and desire of 
visibility in order to gain popularity in front of the electorate. The 
massive activity, however, is not considered to be an optimal one nor 
for the legislative procedure nor for its responsiveness toward the 
citizens. 
Posed that the substantial role of the Knesset as a legislative body is 
certainly performed and that the research does not aim to discuss the 
democratic nature of Israel and its institutional apparatus but the 
quality of it, we can trace few issues that prevent the Knesset to be 
defined as a high quality legislator. Some of them are quite widespread 
in Western democracies and can find explanation in the political culture 
                                                 
123  Brichta A. Zalmanovitch Y., (1986),  The Proposals for Presidential Government in 
Israel: A Case Study in the Possibility of Institutional Transference, in  Comparative 
Politics, 19:1:. 57-68 
124 Chazan, N (2005) The Knesset in Cohen Almagor R. (ed.), Israeli Institutions at 
crossroad. London and New York, Routledge  
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of the country as well as in the peculiar traits of the society that reflect 
on this representative body. 
The first one is the high rate of absenteeism progressively increased 
since the foundation of the State. A low attendance does not halt 
concretely the legislative activity since in Israel there is no quorum for 
debates of deliberations. The Basic Law: the Knesset (art 24) states that 
"The Knesset shall hold debates and pass decisions whatever the 
number of members present" unless specific provision are dictated by 
peculiar laws (required special majorities for example)125.  
 Despite the fact that the attendance to the parliamentary meetings 
(plenary sittings, committee meetings or general ones) is not 
commanded by the law (that explicitly gives the MK the possibility to 
decide whether to be present or not), a low attendance affects 
negatively the legislative debate and the representativeness of the 
deliberation (even though remaining totally within the sphere of legal 
legitimacy). 
A more mature interpretation of the MKs freedom of choice as it 
concerns the participation to the Parliament's activities and the critical 
reactions of the public opinion, led to a reconsideration of the issue, to 
safeguard the accountability and promote the substantial legitimacy of 
the body. The Research and Information Center of the Knesset 
addressed the issue of the quorum and evaluated several methods that 
Western democracies implement in the approval procedures126. A more 
active involvement was warmly advised to the MKs and some 
attendance norms were created by the Ethics Committee that fixed a 
general limit to the absences stating also sanctions in case of 
contravention. The most common sanction in case of unjustified 
absence (especially if significant and reiterated) is the detraction of part 
of the MK's salary. This measure has been applied in several cases but it 
has not seemed to be an effective deterrent. As a measure of 
                                                 
125 See Basic law: The Knesset, art 24, 25  
126 See for example The Knesset Research and Information Center (2003),  Quorums in 
Parliaments, Presented to the Joint Team of the Association for Parliamentarism and the 
Knesset House Committee,  available at 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/mmm/data/pdf/me00563.pdf 
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transparency and in order to enable the public to exercise a (symbolic) 
control on the matter, a digital system of monitoring has been set up 
with which, at any moment, is possible to see in the Knesset website the 
MKs present in the Knesset. The system is however not perfectly 
functioning since also during holidays or days in which the Knesset is 
closed, a certain number of MKs are anyway reported to be present. 
Media have been also focusing on the attendance issue: reports and 
ranks have been published. “Open Knesset” an unofficial website that 
gathers information about MKs and their bills, averaged the attendance 
data of every MKs of the last legislation (XVII) and found that Uri 
Maklev (United Torah Judaism) was the most present MK, 
participating for about 30.7 hours per week. Defense Minister Ehud 
Barak was instead the less present. He spent in the Knesset about 4.4 
hours per week, an eighth of which was usually spent in the Monday 
appointment with the press127. 
In the commission this problem has translated in a less effective 
functioning (given that commission are still considered by the majority 
one of the most productive moments of the legislative activity) and 
even in the refusal by expert and consultants to participate, given the 
scant audience. 
In the plenum, debates suffer from the same problem. Not more than 
30% of the elected take part in the discussions and only at the moment 
of the vote the aula becomes more populated. The impossibility of a 
rich and various exchange of opinions in many cases reduces the 
debates to a subsequence of slogans. For the most important and 
sensitive issues the aula gets full and the situation is overturned: the 
rhythm becomes pressing and the debate is of difficult management on 
part of the Speaker. The method of consultation largely considered to 
be the most popular is the unofficial consultations and meetings (one of 
the most common meeting points is the Knesset cafeteria).This however 
eludes the control of the formal interaction in the legislative body and, 
for some aspect can represent a risk more than an opportunity of 
debate. In these meetings negotiations and agreements are carried on 
                                                 
127 Harkov  L. ,(2012 October  18) "The 18th Knesset Yearbook"  in Jerusalem Post ,  at 
http://www.jpost.com/Features/FrontLines/Article.aspx?id=288459 
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between speakers of different parties for the legislative activity. This is 
regarded by Chazan128 as a typical phenomenon in the Israeli politics at 
large that creates a lower quality political procedure: the presence of a 
formal structure is almost disdained and alternative informal channel 
are established. 
The activity to which the elected seem to attribute priority and to which 
they dedicate more time is the internal one. Factions meetings are the 
more attended and during these, political issues are discusses and 
strategies are decided. The link between the individual MK and the 
political formation to which he belongs could be though as a decisive 
one in promoting a more responsible participation and in general a 
positive element for the stability if the legislative activity. 
Unfortunately the party discipline is progressively loosening and often 
single members prefer to "play free" in order to gain media attention or 
to preserve their own political interest.  
The overview independence and a the contribution to a high quality 
legislation whose only goal is to pursue the common good might also 
be endangered by the status that lobbyists enjoy in the parliament. In 
the Knesset, lobbyists have almost unlimited access to the meetings, to 
the Knesset itself and to most of the facilities (they have special prices 
for the canteen service for example). This welcoming environment has 
favored a constant presence of the lobbyists and the establishment of 
quite friendly relations with the MKs. Whenever issues affecting the 
future of powerful financial corporations are discussed or voted, the 
lobbyists enter in action to convince the Members to vote in favor of 
their clients. Advocacy affects also the legislative initiative of some 
members, inspiring bills proposals. The relationship between the 
lobbyists and the Members has been addressed in the legislation: 
transparency and a certain distance are requested to the MKs in order 
for their independency to be preserved and their honesty not to be far 
questioned. Bribes in fact do not seem to be an element in this equation. 
The issue in this case is the role that lobbyists play the influence that 
they have on the MKs. The former are a precious source of information 
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for the latter, giving them updated news in a short time and with no 
effort on their part. The "dependence" on these to-go-information put 
the MKs in a weak position that sometimes lead to manipulations. 
According to Jerusalem Post's columnist, "the tragedy of the matter is 
that there are MKs who do not seem to mind this role (of puppets), 
especially if acting in accordance with the instructions of the lobbyists 
will win them a headline in the media"129. 
Another factor that represents an obstacle to an efficient legislation 
activity and to an effective overview of the executive, is the 
fragmentation of the Knesset under the party/political perspective. 
Many scholars point out how the extreme proportionality of the 
electoral system and some events that signed the political system and 
the society are the main cause of party fragmentation. After a period of 
relative homogeneity in fact (with the biggest parties in a neat 
majority), starting from the Eighties the solidity of the party asset 
started to crumble, reaching the peak of fragmentation when the 
electoral reform was put into force. From 1996 to 2003, the double cast 
method (one for the Prime Minister and one for the Knesset) made the 
number of parties grow exceptionally ad the scarce governability 
induced the institutions to go back to the old method. The abolition of 
the Prime Minister direct did not restore the previous situation and the 
fragmentation index kept growing in the last years. Also from the 
graph below, it is evident how the effective number of parties (ENPP) 
was only partially dependent on the electoral system giving a hint on a 
possible increasing fragmentation in the society that would reflect in 
the representative bodies.  
 
                                                 
129 See  Hattis Rolef  S., (2012 February  9)Calling the Knesset lobbyists to order  in 
Jerusalem Post,  at  http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Article.aspx?id=258505 
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Figure 10 The Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties (ENPP) 
 
 
Fragmentation represents a problem for the executive, since it 
decreases the governability. The Prime Minister cannot count on a 
strong majority from his own party and he is forced to group many 
different parties in order to reach a decent majority. Strong ideological 
differences, often non-negotiable, reflected in a fragmented 
composition of the Knesset, affects also the ability to the Parliament, as 
a legislation producer, to respond to the society needs. The debate over 
the “Tal Law”130 in the last legislature is an outstanding example of this. 
The Tal Law was declared invalid by the Supreme Court and expired in 
August 2012, leaving uncovered one of the hottest issues that has 
consequences both in the security and in the social sector. A number of 
proposals from different parties and MKs were made but the 
discussion had proved itself totally unfruitful. No consensus was found 
on the matter and the ad hoc commission that was established 
demonstrated all the inability of the legislative body to find an 
                                                 
130 The Tal Law, officially known as Deferral of Military Service for Yeshiva Students Law, is a 
temporary law approved in 2001 as a result of a committee work headed by Zvi Tal. It 
provided the legal framework for ultra-Orthodox men's deferral of military service. 
During the years this law has been used as a massive cop out for Haredi men to avoid the 
compulsory draft. 
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agreement on such an urgent problem. In a highly conflictive 
atmosphere, the Haredi parties boycotted the panel and the 
government, caught in between of public opinion and electoral 
considerations, ended up dissolving the committee. A legislative 
vacuum has been left since then while the difficulties of the Knesset to 
effectively legislate (especially on certain issues) have been showed 
once again. The extreme fragmentation can also harm the effective 
control that the legislative exerts on the executive since the fragility of 
the government could lead to extra-coalitional agreements of external 
support whenever the fragility of the government should force the 
executive to search for external support. Potential external allies would 
guard themselves, at least in some occasions, from directly attacking 
the government in view of a possible agreement and would lead to a 
more cautious approach to the government overview. 
 
 
Legislative supervision on the Executive 
The Knesset has some formal instruments to hold the executive 
accountable. In the Plenum, the dedicated moment for the 
parliamentarian debate and the discussion/approval of the laws, the 
members of parliament have faculty to ask Ministries to provide the 
Knesset with information or to appear before it. The instrument of 
parliamentary questions is a well-known instrument in many 
parliamentary democracies that allows a Member of Knesset to pose 
specific questions to a member of the Government (in particular the 
ministry of the field concerning the question). In Israel three kinds of 
questions are possible: ordinary, oral and direct questions131. Questions 
are limited in quantity, in wording, in the structure and in the content. 
Ordinary questions (maximum 50 words) are passed from the Member 
of Knesset to the Minister by the Speaker of the Knesset, after a 
preliminary evaluation on their opportunity. The answer is expected to 
be given in the Plenum in three weeks to six months by the addressed 
                                                 
131 The data of this brief descriptions can be found in the official website of the Knesset at 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/description/eng/eng_work_mel4.htm 
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Minister, a vice minister or another delegated component of the 
government. It is possible to choose the form of answer, except the 
cases in which the Minister refuses to answer publicly in order not to 
endanger the state affairs. Every Member of Knesset can ask thirty 
ordinary questions per Knesset years (two sessions). In case of an 
urgent matter to discuss, that needs to match some specific conditions 
in order to be declared as such, the question (structured in no more 
than 40 words) is publicly read in the Plenum and the Minister must 
answer within two days. Only seven questions can be asked as urgent. 
The third type of question is the direct one that arrives to the addressed 
Minister through the Knesset secretariat. The Minister has 21 days of 
time to answer or to send a delegated minister to answer. Each MKs 
disposes of sixty direct questions per Knesset year. 
Occasions of debate and confrontation between the Parliament and the 
Government are also the motions, presented by MKs to discuss specific 
matters. The interested Minister is allowed to appear in the Plenum and 
express the Government's position on the matter, answering the facto to 
the motion.  
Beside the Plenum, the Parliament is entitled to carry on its role of 
legislator and controller of the executive power in the Commissions. 
The commissions are a much restricted organs, whose rationale is to 
guarantee a better practicality and to allow a deeper activity. Art 21 and 
22 of the Basic Law: the Knesset provides the legislative organ with this 
tool and encourages using it in all its different forms  
 As broadly discussed, the Commissions are considered the most 
profitable occasion for the parliamentary work. The fact that they hold 
such a central role in the legislative process clearly reveals the power 
that it is attributed to these organs. The closest collaboration and the 
greatest availability from the government are commanded by the Basic 
Law: The government. Art 42 disposed that the Government and its 
members will provide all the information necessary to an informed 
legislative deliberation (both to the committees and to the Plenum), also 
with personal interventions of Ministers, upon request of the legislative 
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body. However, as many studies prove132, the formal empowerment is 
not sufficient to guarantee an efficient activity, due to structural and 
logistic problems that weaken significantly the powers that the law 
grants. A logistic problem is registered as it regards the composition of 
the committees: the number of the MKs that entitled to participate to 
the commissions is significantly small compared to the necessary 
committees' members. The same member is thus obliged to take part in 
more than one committee, significantly decreasing the possibilities for a 
continuous and fruitful participation. Low attendance to the 
committees is partially explained as a consequence. Usually one third 
of the designated members take part to the committees. This 
attendance, which anyhow varies according to the relevance of the 
topic, is registered at the moment of the vote and usually it is even 
lower. Since the attendance is not compulsory and there is no quorum 
for debating and voting, the members participate only to the last part of 
the meeting and do not attend the all debate; the case might be that 
they have to attend to more meetings and divide their time in a way to 
be present at the vote. Being committees one of the fundamental places 
for the legislative scrutiny on the government, it would be more 
effective to assign to each of them the specific supervision on a 
particular ministry. On the contrary, there is a radical incongruence 
between competencies of the committees and the ones of the ministries. 
This causes some committees to cover an extensive field to review, that 
comprised several areas of different ministries. If the cross-
ministeriality might give a broader overview, however it deems their 
control to remain in the surface, weakening their activity. The 
composition of the committees and the mechanism of replacement do 
not contribute to a quality control over the government. As stated by 
the law, the composition of the committees is decided on the basis of 
proportional representation tha mirrors the composition of the Knesset. 
The allocations of seats in the committees are done on the basis of 
general calculations and the smaller parties are usually left outside 
from some committees. Even though they are usually invited to 
participate as auditor, the process of deliberation remains anyway 
                                                 
132 See Hazan R.(2001), Reforming Parliament Committees, Columbus Ohio State : 
University Press. 
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detached from them. More gravely, professional or personal 
competences of the MKs are not kept into account when forming the 
commissions. New members of Knesset are the most burdened in terms 
of appointment to the committees and usually the most active. Their 
participation is a determinant moment of political growth for them but, 
without a significant guide from more experienced MKs their activity 
risks to be less incisive. From year to year moreover (and sometimes 
also in the middle of the year), the composition of a committee can be 
changed by the parties who are entitle to replace the participants, even 
without the consent of the interested MK (this can usually happen 
because of the separation of a MK from the party group or, more 
interestingly, because the participant to the committees has expressed 
opinions or votes contrary to the party line). As a result, the 
familiarization with the matters and with the working method of a 
specific committee results in vain and the replacing member will have 
to undergo the "learning process" again, to the detriment of a 
professional and not superficial committee activity.  
As stated by the above mentioned art 42 of the Basic Law: The 
Government, the members of the government are invited to provide the 
Committees with the maximum collaboration, appearing before them 
whenever they request and producing the necessary documentation. 
Committees indeed can request hearings of ministers or functionaries 
in order to gather information on specific issues. However, only the 
inquiry committees (rarely activated) can actually compel someone to 
appear before it. The refusal to appear before a permanent or a special 
committee does not lead to any sanction. This way it is easier for the 
government to elude the control of such organs while the committees 
are left powerless in case of a lack of documentation or information. 
The lack of information that a collaborative attitude can lead to is to 
take seriously: the resources of the Committees for the consultancy of 
experts and professionals on specific questions is very limited 
compared to the necessity. The main source on which they can rely on 
is, indeed, the governmental apparatus, political and bureaucratic 
(beside, of course the Knesset administration and the more and more 
active Knesset Research and Information Center). Not possessing 
coercive authority, the committees can find themselves in a 
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disadvantaged position. The non-binding powers are also a main 
obstacle as it regards the implementation of the committees' 
conclusions about matters. The only obligation that the Ministries have 
is to give a feedback within three months on the recommendations 
received but still they have no binding value133. 
 
 
Government Dissolution 
In a parliamentary democracy the subsistence of a majority in the 
elected body that sustains the nominated Government (that not 
necessarily is formed only by elected people) is sine qua non. Occasional 
episodes of denial of the majority are not regarded as official end of the 
ruling coalition power (even though it is a clear sign of unpopularity 
and weakness of the Government that evidently lost its majority). 
Exception is made for the budget law: the approval of this law is 
therefore crucial since it decides the destination of the economic 
resources for the implementation of the policies (and so the actuation of 
the line of government). 
The direct way for the Parliament to exercise its sovereignty and to give 
effect to the lack of support toward the Government is the vote of non-
confidence. Any political group in the Knesset has the faculty to submit 
a motion of non-confidence that is then object of vote in the plenum. If 
the motion gains the absolute majority of 61 the government is defeated 
and loses its right to stay in power. 
The basic tool of non-confidence in Israel is actually molded in the form 
of "constructive" non-confidence134. In fact, when a group presents the 
motion to the plenum, an alternative potential Prime Minister has to be 
                                                 
133 On the weaknesses of the Parliamentary committees as an actor of inter-institutional 
accountability see also Freidberg C., (2008) Legislative oversight and the Israeli 
Committee system. Problems and Solutions in Pellizzo R.,  Stapenhurst F., Olson D, Von 
Trapp L. (ed.), Legislative Oversight and Budgeting: a World Perspective, Washington: 
World Bank. 
134 The constructive non-confidence procedure is stated by the Basic Law: The 
Government, as amended in 2011. 
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proposed in order to try form a new ruling coalition. The instrument of 
non-confidence is actually very used by the opposition as a method of 
political pressure on the Government. Through non-confidence 
motions (that usually do no pass because of the lack of absolute 
majority support) the opposition aims to send public message of 
distrust and harsh criticism toward the government, triggering the 
public debate and sending signals to the other parties (also of the ruling 
coalition) about possible alternative solutions. The instrument of non-
confidence has been put under question many times and bills have 
been proposed by the majority to limit the ability of the Parliament to 
use this tool. A much debated reform is the establishment of stricter 
requirements to propose: for example, the required absolute majority to 
present the motion and not just to approve it135. Such proposals' 
consequences are double sided. If on one hand they aim to strengthen 
the government stability, they sensibly reduce the possibility of the 
opposition to carry on their watchdog task on the executive branch. 
 
 
Parliament Overview over the Budget Law 
The Basic Law the Government rules that "the Government is 
collectively responsible to the Knesset". One of the highest moments of 
responsibility is the presentation of the budget law that has a particular 
relevance since it is the program of State resources expenditure in order 
to pursue public interest. This general principle is well absorbed in the 
Israeli law that attaches to the budget approval an informal value: in 
fact, the budget needs to be approved within three months from the 
government's submission. If the Knesset does not approve the Budget 
Law, the government is dismantled. The institutional sources prize the 
budget process as a transparent one, on which the legislative body 
exerts a consistent surveillance in order for it to actually mirror efficient 
                                                 
135 For the most recent bill proposed on the matter see Lis J., (2013 May  6)Israeli Ministers 
back bill to stymie no confidence motions in Haaretz, at 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/israeli-ministers-back-bill-to-stymie-no-
confidence-motions.premium-1.519515 
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and fundamentally agreed upon policies136. The procedure attributes in 
fact a consistent power of review to the Parliament and treats the 
Budget Law approval with the same accuracy of any other law, if not 
more. However in some cases academic considerations have been made 
on the potential reforms that the budget procedure should pass 
through in order to guarantee a more significant impact from the 
Parliament, in order to guarantee a more broad representation of 
interests and actually pursue that general public good that the theory 
recognizes as aim of the democratic public policies. Galnoor137 for 
example states that the main actors in budget shaping are the Ministry 
of Finance and the Prime Minister who uses the budget to appease the 
coalition parties and in particular those with the higher coalitional 
power. As a consequence, small parties that are functional to the 
survival of the coalition receive big budget allocations to carry on their 
agenda and the interests of the groups they represent. Once the budget 
has left the Finance Ministry and been approved by the Prime Minister, 
there is relatively small alteration from part of other Ministers, political 
parties or the Knesset finance committee. The tenure of the budget 
proposal is proportional to the stability of the governing coalition. The 
Financial Committee is vested with great authority by the law as it 
regards the budget. However, due to the structural and functional 
limitations that we mentioned above, the changes are rarely substantial. 
In particular, a nonnegotiable chapter of the budget is the security one, 
which is not included in the general negotiation but is discussed in the 
joint security committee composed by the Finance Committee and the 
Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. Another procedure that de 
facto reduces the possibility of the MKs to influence the budget as well 
as to implement far reaching and expensive policies was instituted in 
2002. In order not to endanger the stability of the budget, an 
amendment to the Basic Law: The State Economy posed the 
                                                 
136 See for example the introductory page about the budget in the official website of  
Minister of Foreign Affairs, at 
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/AboutIsrael/State/Democracy/Pages/The%20Knesset%20-
%20House%20of%20Representatives.aspx 
137 Galnoor Y.,(2008) "Public Management Reforms in Israel," in Public Administration 
and the Quality  of Public Services, Athens: Koinokiko Polykento.  
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requirement of a special majority (50 MKs) to approve (at any state) 
any private bill whose realization required a cost of more than 5 million 
shekels. 
In budget matters another criticized method of action is the recurrent 
presentation by the Government of the Arrangements Law, a particular 
law that the Government initially used as an emergency corrective for 
the budget. With time, it became a very popular method for the 
Government to deal with a much broader range of issues. The choice of 
this instrument is due to the more agile procedure138 of approval that is 
exploited to initiate legislation, complete legislative acts and stall or 
eliminate private members' bills already legislated. Though this 
expedient, the Government relies directly on the majority coalition to 
gain support for matters that sometimes has nothing to do with the 
budget. The role of the Parliament is reduced to a symbolic vote on 
which the majority safeguards its own survival. In the Caesarea 
Economic Policy Planning Forum the Arrangements Law was pointed 
at as one of the major evidences of the high centralization of the 
budgeting process and was accused to significantly lower the quality of 
the democratic process139.  
An isolated case that nonetheless is important to be mentioned is the 
approval of a biennial budget for 2011-2012, thanks to a special 
amendment to the general rule that provides the annual formulation of 
the budget. The issue was brought to the Supreme Court to evaluate 
the constitutionality of such an action. The concerns regarded the 
possibility of amending a constitutional law and of damaging the 
constitutional balance of power between the Knesset and the 
Government. It was argued that the biennial review had as a 
                                                 
138 Unlike the other law proposals from the Government, the Arrangement Law is usually 
sent as a whole bloc to the Financial Committee and receives relatively less attention in 
the debate. This point was brought up with particular attention in the Fifteen Knesset, 
when the Parliament requested that the Arrangement Law will be actually discussed in 
the parliamentary committees interested in the specific contents. 
139  Recommendations from the session about "Balance of Power in the Budgetary 
Process," presented at the IDI's 13th Caesarea Economic Policy Planning Forum in 2005. 
At http://en.idi.org.il/analysis/idi-press/publications/hebrew-books/the-balance-of-power-
in-the-budgeting-process/ 
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consequence the reduction of the legislative power of supervising the 
implementation of policies and a deprivation of its power of distrusting 
the Government through the non-approval of the budget. The Supreme 
Court rejected the request, considering this exceptional measure as the 
continuation of an experimental procedure initiated for logistic reasons 
on the previous biennium. Reassuring on the improbable harmful 
effects in terms of inter-institutional accountability, nonetheless the 
Court invited the Government to consider the amendment of 
constitutional provisions an exceptional undesirable procedure140.  
 
 
The executive power 
In a parliamentary democracy like in Israel the parliament is 
considered to be the highest actor because of its symbolic 
representation of the popular will. The Government is mainly 
composed by elected members of the parliament that assume another 
role in order to carry on the executive task. The check and balances, at 
least the institutional ones, go prevalently in one sense, which is from 
the Parliament to the Government. This because the collegial 
government for the public good is not abdicable to a strictly majority 
approach in the implementation of policies. That is, the government is 
entitled to represent its electorate (that is supposed to be the majority) 
but the Parliament's authority to restrain it safeguards the general 
balance of the governmental action and prevents it to become "the 
tyranny of majority".  
This general premise granted, however, it must be noticed that the 
Government is attributed, by law, an extensive power as the titular of 
the executive power in Israel and some noticeable concessions are made 
to it that actually influence the parliamentary dynamics. 
                                                 
140 For a more detailed explanation of the case see Levush R., Israel: Supreme Court 
Leading Decision on Constitutionality of Two-Year State Budget. Library of The 
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On the field of policies implementation, the Government detains 
authority in any field that is not exclusive competence of another 
authority141. Some deliberations can become effective without 
necessarily passing through the approval of the Knesset: fields like 
security and foreign policy for example are usually classified for 
security reasons. This allows the total secrecy of the concerning 
meetings and the autonomy in the relative deliberations. According to 
the law, the cabinet can declare war without the consent of the Knesset 
and to declare the state of emergency142 that empowers it to adopt 
regulations without necessarily consult the legislative organ. This 
freedom does not only include strategic decisions or matter 
immediately connected to a security threat but also the institutions of 
special taxes (even though the law requests the special powers to be 
strictly exercised for matters related to the exceptional situation). The 
only boundary that is left also in the state of emergency is the 
constitutional one. The government in fact cannot rule in any case 
against the basic laws143. 
 
 
Executive's influence over the legislative body 
As said, the Government shares with the Parliament a consistent role in 
the legislation process. In a quite dated but very explicative analysis, 
Mahler observed that in the legislative process the Government 
maintains a position of strength toward the Parliament. This position is 
given by structural advantages like the more efficient means that the 
Government possesses thanks to the ministerial bureaucracy. Legal, 
budgetary and administrative aspects are more easily at their disposal 
and this can create an efficiency gap that reflects in the proposed bills. 
Beside this advantage as members of the executive the political 
                                                 
141 Basic Law: The Government (2001 version), art. 32 
142 The state of emergency can anyway be revoked by the Knesset whenever the 
legislative body considers appropriate. 
143 For the declaration of the state of emergency, declaration of war and special powers 
see Basic Law The Government (2001 version), art. 38-41 
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advantage is also decisive. The members of the government in fact are 
also leaders of the factions that sit in parliament. Their "control" over 
the MKs of the coalition's parties establishes de facto their ability to 
succeed as legislative actors144. The strongest is the political control 
exercised by the ministries as leaders of factions (together with the 
coalition's unity), the smaller is the actual possibility for the Knesset to 
be a "honest" reviewer and critic of the Government proposals. As clear 
in any country and in particular in the extremely fragmented Israeli 
political system, the ruling coalition does not always maintain its unity 
that is instead variable. The government legislative initiative will also 
take into account the current status of the coalition in a way to 
maximize its legislative effort achieving, at the right moment, the 
success in the Knesset. The strength of the government legislative 
activity is clearly visible in terms of results. While the majority of 
government bills becomes a law, a much inferior number of individual 
members bills manage to pass in the Knesset (the probability is of 
course increased by the government support of the proposal that 
usually entail a vast if not unanimous consensus among the MKs of the 
majority coalition). As notes in the previous paragraphs the weakening 
of the party discipline creates some anomalous cases in terms of 
parliamentary support but in decisive votes the call to order is still 
pretty powerful.  
In case of the presentation of a ministerial bill, the minister in charge of 
the presentation can dictate quite strict conditions to the Knesset, 
requesting for example that the bill will be posed in the agenda before 
the institutional two days of waiting. This possibility that is not given 
to the members of Knesset (whose proposals presentation, the 
Government can actually exercise a delay power). In particular cases145, 
the presenting minister can also ask and obtain a shorter iter of 
discussion and approval of the bill. If the requested is approved, the 
whole process takes place in only one day. This procedure, profoundly 
affects the work of the committees that cannot review the bill 
                                                 
144 See Mahler G.S., (1982) The Knesset: Parliament in the Israeli political System. East 
Brunswick, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, Associated University Presses. 
145 Formally in case of particular urgency; in reality this practice has been used also in 
non-urgent cases. 
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thoroughly. From the moment of the presentation till the moment in 
which the law is not voted, the Government has the right to withdraw 
the bill, waiting for a more favorable moment for the proposal to be 
approved. Even in the case in which the bill is defeated in the plenum, 
it can be proposed again after a very short time (extremely useful 
opportunity, in case of critical absences among the members of the 
majority in the Knesset). This faculty again is a prerogative of the 
Government and it is not conceded to the MKs. 
In the case of a private member bill too, the Government operates as an 
influential agent. Before the proposal is presented in the plenum the 
government receives a copy and is asked to take position about it. 
Political and coalitional considerations play a crucial role in this phase 
and in case of a compact majority, the Government can basically decree 
the approval or the defeat of a legislative proposal. The executive can 
also dismiss a single MK's proposal whenever declaring the plan to 
present in the near future a bill on similar issues. This act is particularly 
significant since it concretely shifts the legislative focus from the 
Parliament to the Government146.  
 Another provision, already mentioned above is worthy to be repeated 
in this context. The provision regards the special majority requested to 
the Knesset in order to approve a MK's proposal that is not supported 
by the executive. Whenever the cost of implementation of such a policy 
is more than 5 million, at least 50 MKs are required to support the 
proposal during the whole iter. This norm, introduced as a method to 
safeguard the national budget decreases sensibly the likelihood that 
articulated and big legislative plans on part of individual MKs will 
become law. Considering in fact the divide party system in Israel, such 
a majority might be very hard to reach.  
 
 
The Government's Dissolutive Power 
                                                 
146 These observations are expressed more in detail in Sager S. (1985) The Parliamentary 
System of Israel, Syracuse:Syracuse University Press. 
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On the basic premise of governability that an existing and collaborative 
majority should guarantee, the Prime Minister verified the lack of 
possibility of fruitfully implement policies and rule the country for the 
lack of support by the Knesset can turn to the President of the State 
submitting a request to dissolve the Parliament and call for new 
elections. The President in this case is guarantor of the legitimacy of the 
operation and the safeguard of the democratic principle is ensured. 
However this phenomenon, can lead to another situation that deserves 
to be analyzed: the transitional government and its constitutional 
status. As well as in case of resignation of the Prime Minister, 
dissolution of the Government by the Knesset, or the transitional 
period after a new election (when the new government is not formed) 
the outgoing executive is given the status of transitional government. 
This phenomenon is not unique per se since it is present in almost all 
parliamentary democracies and it is due to logistic need of continuity 
also in a period of change (of transition indeed). The peculiarity in this 
case consists in the fact that the transitional Government in Israel is not 
curtailed of any power compared to a normal Government (elected and 
legitimate by an existing majority). On the contrary, its status consents 
the Government a more secure situation than a normal one. The 
outgoing executive can formulate laws without the fear of being 
dismissed by the Parliament and can appoint or dismiss Ministries 
without the Knesset approval. The transitional period, as happened in 
the past, can last for several months. In this period, the granted power 
might be exploited to gain popularity (both in the party system and 
toward the public), turning the institutional role in an electoral tool. 
The anomaly was addressed in 2000 by the Supreme Court that, 
through Justice Barak, recommended a certain caution to the 
provisional Governments. Even though the law empowers them with 
full powers, the peculiar status should be kept into account. In an act of 
responsibility, the provisional Government should abstain from 
deliberate on controversial issues, unless urgent situations occur147. 
 
                                                 
147 On the issue of Transitional government and its constitutional status see  Navot S., 
(2007) The Constitutional Law of Israel. Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International 
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Audit Bodies as Accountability Agents  
One of the main monitoring tools that Israeli public bodies are 
provided with are Internal Audit bodies. They are effective by law 
starting from 1992, when the Internal Audit Law was established as a 
mean to ensure transparency, internal awareness and control; the effort 
put in improving the quality of democracy through an effective 
accountability system is evident in this choice. According to the law 
provision, internal auditors are to be nominated in all public bodies, 
local and central.  The presence of internal auditors is mandatory in 
governmental authorities and corporations, in publicly traded 
commercial enterprises, banks and insurance companies148. Schwartz 
notes how the creation of an internal auditing could potentially 
empower the single bodies with a more active control on their 
efficiency and ethics of their procedure, while allowing the State 
Comptroller to focus on results evaluation. However, the law did not 
explicit this passage creating a shared authority in this field. 
 
 
The main audit body: the State Comptroller 
The main tool for bureaucratic audit in Israel is the State Comptroller, 
whose functions have partially explained in the previous paragraphs. 
The State Comptroller is actually an instrument of control directly 
dependent on the Knesset, elected by the Knesset and is completely 
independent from any other executive body. Nonetheless, given the 
particular traits of the organ, a short investigation is definitely 
appropriate. 
The State Comptroller has authority over many fundamental 
institutions in the Israeli public arena (among others public institutes, 
                                                 
148 Schwartz, R. (2002).Controlling Government: Budgeting, Evaluation and Auditing in 
Israel in Israel Affairs, 8:4.  
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parties and the Histadrut149). Its authority and possibility of 
investigation are very broad and, as is it easy to note from the previous 
paragraphs where it is continuously mentioned, the State Comptroller 
in Israel is almost an omnipresent reality. This organ determines in 
total autonomy its working agenda i.e. which subjects or bodies to 
audit. The Knesset or the Government can ask the State Comptroller to 
start specific investigations. On the contrary, the legislative power 
cannot prevent the State Comptroller from investigating. The State 
Comptroller is in charge of an incredible number of tasks: as single 
institute it monitors about 350 institutions and relevant public actors. 
Since its creation, the law gives the State Comptroller authority in 
assessing "the economy, the property, the finances, the obligations and 
the administration of the State, of Government ministries, of all 
enterprises, institutions, or corporations of the State, of local 
authorities, and of bodies or other institutions which were defined by 
law as subject to audit by the State Comptroller"150 (beside the 
Ombudsman activity and the complementary ones that are also 
assigned to it by the law). According to Schwartz, the activity of the 
State Comptroller in Israel (that is largely considered one of the most 
efficient and active in the auditing activity) actually focuses on the 
analysis of procedures and only in part on an efficiency evaluation. The 
State Comptroller in fact would be divided between the will to remain 
detached from too sensitive political issues and the desire of attracting 
public opinion attention on its work. Its role then would stress more the 
accountability in terms of correspondence to the bodies to a legal 
procedure than in terms of providing citizens a justification of their 
actions in terms of results Posed that I do not have the material 
resources necessary for a precise comparison or to trace a functional 
evolution of this body in the last 10 years, I find it necessary to 
acknowledge that the State Comptroller nowadays plays a very positive 
role as a censor of deviant behavior in the public sector. It is often 
                                                 
149 The Histadrut is the biggest Israeli workers union, historically recognized as one of the 
main social bodies in the country. Its relevance in political and social negotiations is not 
negligible. 
150 Basic Law: The State Comptroller, art  2 
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mentioned as a champion of ethic and effective functioning of the 
public bodies and often intervenes harshly on the examined bodies, 
from a position of a safe neutrality and independence. Presenting its 
findings to the audited actors and to the Knesset it offers a valid 
opportunity for the public administration to improve the quality of 
their actions and to engage a more serious self-monitoring activity.  The 
publication of annual reports is moreover a precious instrument for the 
citizens to acquire awareness of an important part of the democratic 
process. As a sign of appreciation toward this activity and toward the 
working methodology of the State Comptroller, citizens mentions is as 
one of the most trusted public bodies (especially the Jewish ones, 
according to the IDI Israeli Democracy Index 2012). 
 
 
Judicial power and accountability 
As the representative of the judicial power in the country I will take 
into analysis the Supreme Court, highest level of the judiciary that is 
recognized publicly as a powerful actor in the political and social life. It 
position is actually quite controversial and it deserves attention in the 
rationale of the examination of the inter-institutional accountability. 
The description of the functions of this body has been done in the 
previous paragraphs but it is useful to remark its double function: the 
Supreme Court is both an extreme appeal court and a High Court of 
Justice. Its judges are appointed by the President of the State, following 
the recommendation of a special Committee composed of nine 
members: three judges of the Supreme Court, two representatives of 
the Government (the Minister of Justice, head of the Committee and 
another minister), two members of the Knesset and two representatives 
of the Israel Bar Association. Specific requirements are taken into 
consideration in the designation of candidates, among which a 
considerable experience in judicature or in the world of the legal 
academia. The appointment is not limited in time unless a disciplinary 
sanction is taken against the judge, they resign or retire. 
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The decisions of the court are definitive and no further appeal can be 
made. Nowadays, the power of the Supreme Court is quite extensive. 
Due to a functional evolution that had its peak in the Nineties, its role 
as a controller of the legislative and the executive is unanimously 
recognized (as existent but not as legitimate by some).  The 
development of this significant role has been signed by institutional 
milestones (legal mainly) and by a progressive extension of the doctrine 
of justiciability by the court151.In parallel to the political stalemate of the 
late Eighties, the Supreme Court started to take numerous and 
significant stances in many fields as to replace the political immobility 
that the political situation lead to. The approval of three Basic Laws in 
1992 gave the Supreme Court a legal reason to actually strengthen 
further its position as a judicial reviewer. The Knesset in fact that till 
that moment had almost unlimited authority in changing any law with 
a simple majority, included in the new laws some important rules that 
limited its own power152 and conferred to these laws (at least two of 
them) a superior status, due to the specific requirements for their 
modification. The existence of the Basic Law Freedom of Occupation 
and the Basic law Human Dignity and Liberty evidently dealing with 
the recognition of some basic human rights conferred the Court the 
authority of actually dismissing laws and acts on the basis of the 
coherency with the two "superior legal sources". This non codified 
power of judicial review was initially intended as a development 
concerning the future legislation but, even though the older legislation 
is formally protected by the judicial review, the enforcement of the new 
basic laws inspired the Supreme Court to creative and more liberal 
interpretation of the old legislative corpus. The Supreme Court 
increased exponentially its public visibility and popularity and raised 
ferocious criticisms by members of the political system that felt as 
                                                 
151 On the evolution of the court as a more active body in the sociopolitical arena see 
Hofnung M., (1996) The Unintended Consequences of Unplanned Constitutional Reform 
in Constitutional Politics in Israel American Journal of Comparative Law, 44:4  
152 The new legislation in question is: The Basic Law: The Government (amended), The 
Basic Law Freedom of Occupation and the Basic Law Human Dignity and Liberty. While 
till now a simple majority was sufficient to change any law (with few exceptions, like the 
Basic Law The Knesset), these laws contain different provisions that protect them from 
being changed by a simple majority as to confer them a superior legal status. 
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illegitimate the new substantive intervention of the judicial body in the 
annulment of laws, in political decisions, appointments etc. Its action 
led the legislative and the executive to rethink at least in part the 
legislative strategy and to adequate, sometimes also preventively, the 
laws in order not to incur in thorny interpretations by the Supreme 
Court. It has been questioned whether the Supreme Court's activity 
genuinely contribute to improve inter-institutional accountability or 
represents the failure of the judicial neutrality and the occupation of 
this body by an ideologically oriented group with a definite agenda to 
carry on. If on one side it is undeniable that the Court activity (and 
activism to some extent) pose a further check on the executive and the 
Knesset and limits their autonomy, usually granting the people higher 
degree of liberty, on the other side, the creative interpretation on 
principles and rights risks to involve the Court in a value-based 
adjudication. The divisive and troublesome impact of this attitude is 
clear when thinking of the fact that basic principles in Israel, even those 
clearly expressed in official documents (like the Declaration of 
Independence and to some extent in the legislation in general) find a 
different kind of legitimation and interpretation in different groups of 
the population. Some scholars and representative of religious groups 
for example, have accused the Court of having abdicated its original 
role of arbiter and having become an active actor in the political arena, 
promoting its liberal agenda and preserving this power through the 
selection of judges that are ideologically inclined to serve the cause153. 
 
 
Non-governmental actors promoting accountability: the media 
The media system is worth to be mentioned in this paragraph even 
though it does not formally belong to the institutional system. 
However, freedom of information and a critical and neutral approach 
to the political world undeniably contributes to the insurgence of a 
non-superficial public debate. An informed public opinion exercise 
                                                 
153 On this issue see for example Azulay M., (2011 July 13) Knesset to veto Supreme Court 
judges? in Ynet, at http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4094834,00.html 
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pressure on the political system questing for transparency and 
responsiveness. The political power is, this way, compelled to improve 
its level of accountability to the public.  
On the other side, the political power will try to exercise its power on 
the media system, in order to guarantee a pluralistic approach and not 
to fall victim of private economic interests of the information tools 
ownership. This dynamic in fact could alter strategically the political 
perceptions of the citizens or, in a worse scenario, endanger the state 
interest sacrificing it on the altar of a profitable newsworthiness.  Press 
freedom is a generally respected principle in the country, not expressly 
mentioned in the legal sources but declared to be an essential 
component of human dignity by the Supreme Court. Information is 
pluralistic and is carried through a wide variety of newspapers 
targeting different groups, read daily by about one million Israelis (out 
of a population of about 8 million people). National newspapers 
published mainly in Hebrew (Yedioth Achronot, Haaretz, Maariv and 
Israel Hayom the main ones) but also in English (The Jerusalem Post), 
Russian (Kurier, with a smaller diffusion than the previous mentioned 
ones) and Arabic (Al Sabar and some other with regional diffusion). 
Press also differentiate its target according to level of religiosity; many 
newspaper and information magazines are in fact directed to the 
Jewish religious communities and are clearly recognizable for their 
format and the contents (HaModia for example). The biggest 
newspapers have an internet portal, with open or semi-open access to 
non-subscribers. All newspapers are privately owned and most of them 
play a watchdog role toward the government, stimulating critical 
debate and denouncing cases of public malfunctioning or violations. A 
big portion of them provide free copies to the public (shortened or 
entire ones) thus in public transportation, stations, and in various cities' 
open spaces is possible to receive copies or, at least consult them free of 
charge. On the other side, some newspapers are totally free; this allows 
a large diffusion that, in some cases has been regarded as a danger to 
the independence and neutrality of journalism in the country. This is 
the case of Israel Hayom (Israel Today) that started its activity in 2007 
and became the most consulted newspaper in the country. The 
criticisms moved to this source of information regard its ideological 
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balance. The newspaper is therefore owned by an American 
businessman who declared its support for Netanyahu and the Likud 
and shaped the newspaper in a clear Likud-sided fashion. The strong 
ideological orientation would add up to the financial pressure that a 
free newspaper that offers low prices for advertisements would put on 
the other magazines, struggling to survive in the era of technological 
information. 
Public radio and televisions are also granted with freedom and are 
compelled by the law to respect equal representation of the political 
stances both in electoral period and in non-electoral one. The legal 
provisions at this regard, bind the privately managed televisions too.154 
Satire and criticisms toward the political establishment are frequent 
and are actually among the most followed programs. Israelis are big 
consumers of cable and satellite channels and this contribute to open 
information, also on the outside world.  
Internet is another fundamental source of information: 70% of the 
population declared to regularly access to the net that is basically 
unrestricted (except for few applications, mainly of geographic 
mapping that are partially restricted by the government for security 
reasons).  
Freedom of information has been protected by law since 1999, when the 
Freedom of Information Law came into effect. The law entitled 
residents and citizens to obtain information in possess of a public 
authority. This included the government, the Knesset and any other 
public body. Thanks to this provision, journalist and other actors 
interested in the social and political review have wide access to official 
information. Access is highly restricted however, for matters of foreign 
policies, intelligence services, national security and privacy rights.155  
Freedom of information and press are indeed not absolute rights but 
can be sacrificed in virtue of the above mentioned exceptions. The 
security threat is intended to be both factual and potential: hate speech 
                                                 
154 For a deeper analysis of this issue see the paragraphs above. 
155 Freedom House,( 2013 May 1) Freedom of the Press  2013 - Israel ("Draft"), available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/5187a20b16.htm 
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and public incitement to violence are legally prohibited, especially if 
they praise terrorist actions and the destruction of the State.    
The governmental bureaucracy exercises a certain formal control over 
the information system, being in charge of releasing licenses and 
accreditations to journalists and to newspapers. According to Freedom 
House, Israel has a censorship system that is unique for a modern 
democracy. Not surprisingly in my opinion for a country were the 
security issue is that central, press is under the control of the Military 
Censor (whose officers are largely independent from the military and 
mainly subject to civil judicial authority). With the Censorship 
Agreement media accepted to submit articles on sensitive issues to the 
preventive control of the Censor. Severe actions can be potentially 
taken by the Censorship bodies against newspapers that do not comply 
with the directives (including the confiscation of the printing 
machines). However, nothing similar has ever taken place and, by law, 
power of appeal to the civil court is given against the decisions of the 
Censor.  
Two recent events have been taken very seriously by Freedom House 
and cost Israel the downgrade from "free information" country to 
"partially free"156. One regards the charges filed against an Israeli 
journalist for unauthorized possession and use of state secret 
documents (leaked by a blow whistler operating in the army)157. The 
initial accusation of aggravated espionage was regarded as a dangerous 
precedent for press freedom in the country, especially on the premise 
that the Censor had permitted the publications of the articles 
containing some of the information later incriminated.   
Another episode was considered as a dangerous move putting political 
pressure on the investigative activity on the televisions. At the 
                                                 
156 This decision by Freedom House has provoked a huge scandal in the Israeli public 
opinion and it has been criticized by Israeli and foreign journalist as too severe. See Rettig 
Gur H., (2013 May 1) Israel downgraded in press freedom report, at 
http://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-downgraded-in-press-freedom-report/  
157 Zarchin T.,(2012 July 24) Haaretz journalist Uri Blau found guilty under plea bargain 
of holding secret IDF info, in Haaretz, at http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/haaretz-
journalist-uri-blau-found-guilty-under-plea-bargain-of-holding-secret-idf-info-1.453292 
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beginning of 2011 a scandal exploded after an investigation of alleged 
corruption involving the Prime Minister was brought to light by a 
television channel. Pressures for apologies were exercised and a libel 
suit was filed by the Prime Minister against the channel. This episode, 
then resolved in an informal agreement between the parts (in which the 
channel stated that it would not have hurt the image of the Prime 
Minister anymore), has been connected by Freedom House to the later 
denial by the Knesset to the channel of postponing its debt payment to 
the government. The denied postponement, conceded to another TV 
channel, caused the insolvency and thus the withdrawal of the 
broadcasting license. Only an intervention of the prime Minister 
allowed the postponement to be given and the channel to survive158.  
Other concerns have been raised about the possible consequences of the 
political debate in the country and some legislation that has been 
proposed during the years.  Amendments on the raise of the sanctions 
against libel were broadly discussed in 2012. Bills regarding the 
prohibition of use of Nazi symbols or comparisons to Nazism in 
protests159 were debated in 2012 and recently a new bill on the 
prohibition of defamatory definition about the IDF (the Israeli army) 
was presented160. Possible success of this legislation might harm 
information freedom, forcing the media to exercise their informative 
role with caution in order not to be incriminated or sanctioned.161 The 
main concern is that strict legislation will not be implemented and the 
                                                 
158 A similar correlation  is made by  Bronner  E.,(2011 December 26) Israel TV Station’s 
Troubles Reflect a Larger Political Battleground in New York Times, at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/27/world/middleeast/struggle-of-israels-channel-10-
tied-to-political-wars.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
159 The proposal was discussed after the umpteenth Ultraorthodox protest in which Nazi 
symbol were used as a metaphor of the perceived barbarity of the state of Israel against 
the religious Jews. See  Lis J.,(2012 January 9) Israel cabinet supports bill to prohibit use of 
Nazi symbols in protests in Haaretz, at http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/israel-
cabinet-supports-bill-to-prohibit-use-of-nazi-symbols-in-protests-1.406344 
160 Levy G.,(2013 May  9) 'Jenin, Jenin Law' will prove something's rotten in the IDF, in 
Haaretz at http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/standing-at-attention.premium-1.520038 
161 Freedom House (2012) Freedom of the Press Report 2012, at  
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2012/israel 
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media will continue their mission of information and stimulation of a 
critical and multifaceted debate of which the society nurture itself. 
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2.4 PARTICIPATION 
Participation is unanimously recognized as a landmark of democracy. 
The possibility for the public to actively contribute to the state is the 
prerogative for public sovereignty: through participation citizens 
impact on the decisions on and of the representative bodies. The desire 
of every member of a community is to see the community itself more 
respondent to his interests or to his values; the higher this coincidence, 
the stronger the identification will be. A basic sense of identification is 
anyhow necessary to encourage the participation (if a society is totally 
extraneous to the individual, there is no incentive for him to fight for 
the change) as well as a minimum level of information of the current 
situation. In this paragraph, the most classic forms of participation are 
analyzed, in the strictly political sense (vote and affiliation to parties). 
Also civic forms of participation will be described, since as it will be 
easy to see, they are an alternative channel of contribution to the 
improvement of the society that actually mirrors the instances of the 
political scene. Through civic participation in fact, citizens broaden the 
borders of "what is political" and negotiate with the political 
establishment new forms of communication. Another example of how 
participation strengthen the ties of identification with the state and how 
it contributes to build national identity will be given through the 
analysis of the army service. As it will be enlightened this much Israeli 
form of participation strongly shapes perception of legitimate 
citizenship triggering a dynamic of exclusion of those groups that, for 
different reasons, do not join this national experience. 
 
 
Participation through vote 
In Israel the electoral participation is granted to all citizens above the 
age of 18 (except disqualification due to specific crimes that has been 
described in the previous chapters) for local and national elections. 
Physical presence in the country in the Election Day is requested to 
vote (except for the professional categories mentioned in the previous 
chapters). The only occasions of vote for Israelis are the elections of the 
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legislative organs at central and peripheral level (the Knesset and the 
local parliaments). The legal system in fact does not consider the 
possibility plebiscites or referendum, nor advisory, abrogative nor on 
citizens' initiative. As a form of direct democracy, the referendum was 
proposed several times during the years. However this idea was never 
implemented nor systematically regulated. Actually one law is in force 
in which the referendum is mentioned as a decisional tool. In 2010 a 
law passed that included a national referendum as a possible decisional 
tool in case of withdrawal from territories subject to the Israeli law. In 
case of peace negotiation, the government would require popular 
explicit consent to close deals involving these geographic areas. The bill 
was not unanimously welcomed in the political panorama. In the eyes 
of the supporters of the law, a referendum would allow the citizens to 
express directly their opinion in such a delicate matter. Critics 
stigmatized it as a sign of weakness of the government; other 
considered it an illegitimate procedure, claiming that the decision 
should be left to the population of those areas and not to what they 
define as "the occupying force". Beside considerations on the specific 
case, the creation of a legislative setting necessary for the referendum 
was deferred to a later moment. In case it will be decided that citizens 
need to directly express their opinion on this or any other matter, the 
country will have to provide itself with a legal frame for the 
referendum to take place.  
Vote in Israel is evaluated not as much for its intrinsic value of 
democratic expression but as a way to influence the political process 
and to safeguard one's interests. The Israeli Democracy Index 2012162 
demonstrates that taking part in the parliamentary elections is 
considered by Israelis the most effective political action. The 
commitment to vote is however less strong that it used to be. The 
electoral turnout dropped sensibly in comparison to the first years of 
the state (when it reached 90%). This phenomenon is not an isolated 
one; on the contrary it regards most of the Western states and it is 
partially due to the general dissatisfaction with politics. The general 
                                                 
162 Hermann T., Atmor N., Heller E., Leber Y., (2012) The Israeli Democracy Index 2012, 
Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute 
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electoral turnout in Israel (around 70% in the last elections) is in 
average with the other OECD countries (72%, according to the last 
report)163. It is possible to trace a certain socio-demographic division as 
it regard abstentions: gender does not seem to influence the abstention 
rate while income plays a more significant role (that is anyhow much 
lower than the OECD average). In Israel the rate of abstention varies of 
8 percentage points if moving from the richest to the poorest group of 
population, while the average gap among the OECD countries is 12%. 
Another discriminant for abstention is the ethnic belonging. Among the 
Arab citizens of Israel the electoral participation is much lower 
compared to the Jewish citizens.  
 
Figure 11 Electoral Turnout, Arab Citizens of Israel. 
(Source: Schafferman T. K., (Apr. 21, 2009), see above) 
 
Even though their loyalty to the democratic rules is not in doubt, as 
well as their understanding of the formal importance to the vote 
expression, Arabs do not participate in big percentage to the vote. 
Schafferman lists several possible explanations. The first explanation is 
a general one, not based on ethnic difference but comprised in a general 
decreasing trend that regards all Israelis. The second one remarks a 
                                                 
163 OECD (2011) Civic Engagement and Governance in How is life? Measuring Well Being, 
OECD Publishing  
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sense of discouragement and impotence among Arab citizens and their 
lack of identification with the state. Some Arab voters also lack 
confidence in the Arab parties and consider them weak and incapable 
to represent fruitfully their interests in the Knesset. At last, also the 
development of a strong Palestinian identity and the following of some 
political ideologies could encourage these citizens not to take part in 
the elections, in order not to legitimize the state and the regime164. In 
the last elections (2013) a small increase in the electoral participation 
was welcomed with enthusiasm by the Arab parties and by the public 
opinion. Still, almost half of the Arab citizens of Israel did not express 
their vote (the turnout being 56%). 
 
 
Information and public debate 
Beside the electoral period, Israelis show a significant interest in politics 
and in engaging public debate. Generally the level of information is 
high, due also to news consumption through the traditional media (TV, 
radio and newspapers). In daily life, the exchange of information and 
informal debates about politics in the close circle of contacts (family, 
friends, colleagues etc.) is sizeable165. As clearly visible from the figure 
below, this is a stable trend in the Israeli society. Massive media 
consumption and a constant update on politics it is likely to affect the 
authority relations between decision makers and the public. The media 
coverage of political world and actors, which is becoming more 
pressing in the last decades, narrows the symbolic distance between 
public and politicians; furthermore, more informed and educated 
citizens feel entitled and comfortable in expressing critical opinions 
                                                 
164 Schafferman T. K., (Apr. 21, 2009), Participation, Abstention and Boycott: Trends in 
Arab Voter Turnout in Israeli Elections. IDI, at 
http://en.idi.org.il/analysis/articles/participation-abstention-and-boycott-trends-in-arab-
voter-turnout-in-israeli-elections/ 
165 The information originally reported by World Value Survey is analyzed in Arian A., 
Atman N., Hadar Y, (2006). The Israeli Democracy Index 2006. Auditing Israeli 
Democracy: Changes in Israel's Political Party System. Dealignment or Realignment? 
Jerusalem: Guttman Center of the Israel Democracy Institute  
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about any political topic. This results in a more critical and less 
dogmatic attitude to the political authority and increases the demand of 
participation in the decisional process and responsiveness from the 
political class166. 
 
Figure 12 How interested are you in politics? 
(Source The Israeli Democracy Index 2012) 
 
The age variable is not decisive in general figures, even though more 
people in older age show a more intense interest than youngsters.  
                                                 
166 Hermann T., (2012) Something New Under the Sun: Public Opinion and Decision 
Making in Israel in Strategic Assessment 14: 4:41-57 
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Figure 13 How interested are you in politics?  
(Source: The Israeli Democracy Index 2012) 
 
 
 
 
 
Party Identification 
According to the Report on the Democracy Index 2012, the principal 
area of tension, shaping the opinion of Israeli citizens (with evident 
effects in terms of political choice) is nationality (Arabs - Jews). Among 
the Jewish group, level of religiosity is the most important variable; the 
group is dichotomized in religious – secular. The division left- right is 
also relevant but it coincides significantly with the level of religiosity. 
The length of residence in Israel is another crucial variable in shaping 
people's opinion. Given the continuous Jewish migratory flux to Israel, 
welcomed by the government and regulated by the law, this factor has 
been playing and is likely to keep playing a strong impact in the 
national public opinion. A variable that is becoming more and more 
irrelevant is the Jewish ethnic affiliation (Mizrahi- Ashkenazi) that is 
blurring, especially in the secular population as a result of 
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intermarriage and the creation of a quite inclusive Israeli modern 
identity.  
 
Figure 14 Areas of tensions as perceived in the society 
(Source: the democratic index 2012) 
 
 
In the analysis of the variables influencing vote behaviors, the national 
fracture still proves significant In the survey, some factors were given 
as a possible choice: party platform; party responsiveness in the 
previous Knesset; party’s list of candidates; loyalty to party voted for in 
past; party leader; consideration on useful vote. Arab respondents 
indicated the programmatic platform as the most relevant issue (22% of 
the respondents placed it in the first position) while the Jewish group 
attached a bigger relevance to the party leader (28.4%). This trend was 
actually predicted in the previous report The Israeli Democracy Index 
2006 (where the ideological factor was ranked first in importance but 
clearly lost relevance if compared to the previous surveys). A more 
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personalistic approach to the vote, whose consequences clearly shows 
nowadays, was fostered by the personalization of politics and by 
probably the semi-presidential experience in Israel that was 
implemented in 1999. The manifestation of personalization in politics 
and the reasons for which the electorate seems more affected by the 
leader as an individual figure are schematized by Rahat and Sheafer in: 
institutional personalization (realized through the primaries, when the 
parties invite citizens to take part in  the selection of candidates); 
personalization in the media (that is the increasing relevance attributed 
to the politicians as individuals and not as representative of a party); 
the behavioral personalization (symbolized by the already mentioned 
activism in the Knesset and the research of personal popularity)167. 
Nowadays, the identification with a party is not a common sentiment 
among Israelis. About 57% of the interviewed citizens affirmed that 
they do not feel represented by any party. The negative feeling is more 
common among young people than old one. This gap mirrors the trend 
registered when measuring the interest for politics. The scarce 
identification with parties and the tendency to vote on the basis of the 
leadership might concur to increment the electoral volatility.  
Therefore, when leadership was mentioned as a determinant variable in 
the voting decision, party loyalty was rarely considered a crucial 
aspect. On the other side, some of the volatility is undoubtedly a 
consequence of the strategic vote the citizens. Even though the 
proportional electoral system should encourage a sincere expression of 
ones' preference, the extremely fragmented party system (partially 
maintained in life by the proportional system) causes citizen to cast 
their ballot according to utilitarian considerations. The utilitarian 
rationale does not only involve the possibility to reach the electoral 
threshold; it keeps into account also coalitional potential agreements. In 
Israel no party has ever been able to govern without forming a 
coalition168. For this reason, the decision of the voter is not only focused 
                                                 
167 Rahat G. & Sheafer T. (2007), The Personalization(s) of Politics: Israel 1949-2003, in 
Political Communication, 24:1: 65-80 
168 The winning party therefore, lacks the absolute majority necessary to support a party 
government. The relative majorities gained by the winner parties can be very low. In 2009 
for example the biggest party, Kadima, won the elections with 22.5% of the vote. 
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on their preferred party as a single actor but it broadens to the party's 
orientation for possible allies. If the possible allies are champions of 
issues or views that are not well seen by the voter, the decision might 
fall on another party (maybe on the second preferred one. Another 
reason for electoral volatility might be the multiplication of parties that 
are often generated by "migrant" leaders. It is quite common for Israeli 
politicians to leave the old parties and form new ones or to unite two of 
them. The growing range of alternatives, increased also by new leader-
centered parties might cause a continuous fluctuation of non-satisfied 
electorate. Most of the parties today, have a weak ideological platform 
if compared to the traditional parties. The loss of the ideological strong 
loyalty guarantee endangers them even more. The fall of ideologies and 
the consequent increase in electoral volatility are not an exclusive trait 
of the Israeli political panorama: disappearing ideological bounds, 
individualism rises and "issue centered parties" or a strong, popular 
leadership can easily gain the support of many electors. According to 
The Israeli Democracy Index 2012, electoral volatility is anyhow 
moderate and changes on the basis of political orientation. A stronger 
satisfaction with the representatives of the parties is declared both by 
leftist and rightist voters. The more undecided ones are those hanging 
in the center of the political spectrum. For this reason, "migration" from 
right to left or vice versa is quite unlikely to happen. The more instable 
electors will be the undecided centrists. In case of a volatile right-wing, 
or left-wing voter, he will probably move from a party to another 
without leaving its ideological area (opting respectively for another 
right oriented or left oriented party)169.  
 
 
                                                                                                           
Kadima's leader, Livni, was not able to form a coalition and the mandate passed to 
Netanyahu, whose party, the Likud had received 21.6% of the national consensus. 
169 On the short range volatility see also Arian A. & Shamir M. (eds.) (1999) The Elections 
in Israel 1999 Albany: SUNY Press. 
195 
Figure 15 Electoral volatility (1977 - 2006) 
Source: The Democracy Index 2006 
 
 
 
 
Participation through Party Membership 
Party affiliation in Israel is open to all citizens and regulated by the 
internal laws of the parties. Being parties under the control of the State 
Comptroller, all the information about their formal procedures, data on 
membership, finances etc. are public. Usually citizens are asked to pay 
a contribution for their membership that varies from party to party. 
Members are allowed to make donations to parties but these are 
regulated, like any other donation, by the Law on Party Financing.  
Traditionally, Israeli parties vested a much broader role than only 
collector of consensus, aggregator of interests and representation in the 
elective bodies. Like in many countries, parties' action was extended to 
the organization of basic social services like, health, education, housing 
and work (thanks also to other nonparty structures that grew parallel 
to the parties and had strong links with them. An example of this is the 
Histadrut and the Labor party). Being member of a party gave access to 
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a sort of "party-system", comprising a broad range of additional 
service. The model "from the cradle to the grave" applied for a long 
time also to Israel. Politics played a major role in structuring the social 
life of many activists. Their social circle was often built around the 
political activity and their job was likely to be provided, directly or 
indirectly by the party. Participation in party life was, to some extent, 
also an effective opportunity for social upgrading: the ethnic fracture 
that crucially affected the society, at least till the Nineties, was partially 
reduced through the active involvement in parties' life. Herut170 was 
considered a big collector of the so called Mizrahi support; the direct 
involvement often guaranteed the possibility of social integration to 
members of this ethnic group that for years found itself in a 
disadvantaged position in comparison to the Jewish population of 
Ashkenazi descent.  
With the dissolution of mass-party model, Israel followed the general 
Western trend of decreased membership and activism. Furthermore 
parties, nowadays, do not regard the membership with the same 
attitude than in the past. In fact, with the time, membership has 
decreased it centrality as source of economic support. It has been 
substantially replaced by public funding that toady is the main income 
for political organizations171. Also the functional role of the 
membership, as the propaganda activity in electoral campaigns, has 
lost its essentiality with an increasing shift toward professional 
management of the electoral campaigns. At this regard, Whitley adds 
that the absorption of parties in the state legal framework led to a 
stricter regulation and controls that constrained the membership in a 
much more regulated activity, discouraging the citizens. In the era of 
digital communication, citizens easily find alternative to the classic 
party membership, profiting from new spaces for social debate and 
                                                 
170 Herut is the major right wing party that was created in the beginning of the State. In 
1973 one of its leaders founded a new party, the Likud, in which the majority of Herut's 
factions merged few years later.  
171 For a more detailed explanation of the public funding through the Party Financing 
Law see the previous paragraph on electoral accountability.  
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engaging in activities that express a political content but are not lead 
nor pass through the parties172.  
Ultraorthodox parties and in particular Shas are an exception to this 
devolution of the parties as omnipresent actors in the life of their 
members. Shas, which has been studied in many fields of social science 
as an outstanding phenomenon started in the mid-Eighties and 
developed in Israel in the mid-Nineties, can still be considered for some 
features a mass party. Shas built a net of consensus and continuous 
mobilization of its membership with televisions, radios and 
newspapers. Forms of parallel organizations, which Shas is informally 
linked to, provide to its social target (mainly Mizrahi Ultraorthodox 
both for descendant and for deliberate choice to adopt a more religious 
lifestyle) education for infancy, schools and religious seminaries in 
which the basics of Shas ideology and the values of Ultraorthodox life 
are spread. Youth movements are also massively frequented and they 
often constitute a big bone of the party activism173.  
In the last decade, Israel placed itself on the average of other modern 
countries. A moderate and constant detachment from the parties has 
been taking place for long time and general disinterest has been 
growing toward parties' activity174.  
The Israeli Democracy Index 2012 offers an up to date representation of 
citizens that are supporters, members or activists of a party. Although 
these labels are for some of the public quite troubled especially when it 
comes differentiate among them, answers are clear enough to interpret 
the results without fears of misconception. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
172 Whiteley P. F., (2011). Is the party over? The decline of party activism and membership 
across the democratic world in Party Politics, 17: 21 
173 The literature on Shas is extensive. For a brief but complete overview on the party and 
its platform see Usher G.,(1998).  The Enigmas of Shas, in Middle East Report, 207: 34-36. 
See also Lehmann D. & Siebzehner B. (2008). Self-exclusion as a strategy of Inclusion: the 
case of Shas in Citizenship Studies, 12:3, 233-247 
174 For quantitative research on this topic and graphic representation: The Democracy 
Index 2006 (see above), 81-83.  
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Party Support/Membership/Activism 
(Source: The Democracy Index 2012) 
 Total 
Sample 
Jews Arabs 
I don't support and I'm not active 
in any party 
75.2 77.2 65.4 
I've joined a party but I do not see 
myself as a member 
3.6 2.9 7.3 
I support a party but I am not a 
member 
14.2 14.1 14.7 
I'm a member of a party 2.7 3.1 1.0 
I'm an active member of a party 1.3 1.1 2.6 
I'm a member and I hold a position 
in a party 
0.2 0.3  
Don’t know/refuse 2.8 9.3 1.0 
Total 100 100 100 
 
The impressive number of people who declare themselves almost 
totally detached from the party system (not supporting and not 
belonging to any party) pairs with the high number of people who does 
not see themselves represented by any party. Among these unsatisfied 
electors, 3/4 of the non-supporting non-members place themselves. The 
trend is inverted when it comes to activists or supporters. In this case, 
two thirds of them feel represented by a party. Activists and members 
sincerely adhere to parties for their commitment to an ideology or, 
more frequently, for an approach to reality that their share with the 
party. Activists in fact consider their party significantly different from 
the other parties, unlike the more "detached ones" who have a more 
homogeneous (and often negative) consideration of all parties. 
Internal life in parties is dictated by parties' regulations and is not 
possible to trace a general description. Also a detailed one, however, 
will not be done since it falls outside the scope of this work. A general 
panoramic, however, is given by a report published by IDI in order to 
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elaborate a Party Index175. In this research, aiming to measure parties' 
internal degree of democracy, the competitors in the last elections 
(2013) have been analyzed along five dimensions: transparency, 
accountability, competition, representation and participation. The last 
dimension in particular is central for the scope of this paragraph and its 
results are eloquent in describing the current trends in party politics in 
Israel.  The two main parties, Likud and Avoda (Labor) are considered 
to be the most democratic parties in the whole party system while some 
of the Ultraorthodox parties like Agudat Ysrael, Degel HaTorah, are on 
the bottom of the ranking (together with the Arab party Mada), marking 
the lowest score in any of the dimension (they actually gained only 2 
points in total, for the participation dimension). Scarce connection is 
found between the size of the party (or its positioning in the continuum 
left-right) and its level of internal democracy. In the fragmented Israeli 
party system only four party use the primaries method to choose their 
candidate with closed primaries176. Ultraorthodox parties usually select 
their political leaders through the spiritual leader's opinion, which of 
course affects enormously the general orientation of the party and the 
approach to the programmatic platform. The phenomenon of leader-
centered parties causes in some ways the scarce participation in the 
appointment of the party leading class and the representatives in the 
electoral bodies. The new party Yesh Atid for example, that based its 
campaign on the empowerment of the middle class and a more open 
and modern way of doing politics, was created and almost exclusively 
managed by its leader Lapid.  
The participation to the programmatic elaboration and the internal 
democratic process regulating the parties' life also varies in intensity 
from case to case. In some parties' websites, is even difficult or 
impossible to access the party statute. This is definitely not a good sign 
of developed internal democratic rationale and it does not favor the 
aware participation of citizens. It is clear however that a highly 
                                                 
175 The Party Democracy Index, (2013), The Israeli Institute of Democracy, at 
http://en.idi.org.il/projects/government-and-constitution/political-reform/the-party-
democracy-index/ 
176 For a more detailed description of the primaries system in Israel and its legal 
framework see the previous paragraph on Electoral Accountability. 
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personalized party or a party in which the central authority is imposed 
by actors other than the membership (if not directly through some form 
of congress) will significantly sacrifice a genuine contribution from the 
base both in designing the program of the party and in its management.  
 
 
Participation through other forms of associations 
One of the reasons why the civic participation through party activism 
declined is because alternative forms of participation flourished, 
opening new channels for citizens to deliver political and social 
messages. In the literature, citizens are told to acquire new roles for 
participations not only as citizens but for example as consumers 
(through initiatives of selective buying) and as users of technological 
tools (that are to be considered not only like media but, nowadays, like 
real spaces where the interaction take place and where specific norms 
and codes are in effect).  
These forms of participation and expression that are progressively 
spreading in the Israeli society are parallel (and sometimes used as 
modality of action) to organized groups that gather a big portion of 
citizens with various degree of activism and often gain attention at 
media level as well as at political one. Organizations in Israel are 
counted to be around 45.000 with about half of them being effectively 
active. The state inserted these actor in a legal frame for which any 
organization needs to be registered in the Registrar of Organizations 
that is supervised by the Ministry of Justice. Every organization needs 
to produce periodically a detailed documentation about activities and 
funding. The control is even stricter if the organization wants to apply 
for governmental funds or for the collection of private tax deductible 
contributions. These controls and passages require time, precision and 
competence in fulfilling the bureaucratic duties. The organs in charge 
to analyze the organization requests are mainly elected bodies at 
various levels, at last the Knesset Financial Committee. The higher the 
level of certificate, the smaller the number of organizations recognized. 
As seen by the above mentioned numbers, the associative world in 
Israel is quite developed. An extremely vivid social activity is 
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registered, with interest in various social, cultural and political matters. 
It is possible to observe that many organizations are structured along 
the main fractures of the society: several organizations deal with Arab 
rights (of Arab citizens, Arab residents that do not possess citizenship 
and Arabs living in the West Bank or in the contested territories); other 
groups advocate for Israel in the context of the conflict against Arab 
states; some promote the dialogue and cooperation among the two 
groups; others foster equality among Jews (among the different 
religious streams, the ethnic groups, the levels of religiosity etc.). Also 
the religious organizations and movements that we mentioned above 
are conducible to this maxi-category. As it has been observed, they 
propose an insight of how the world would be if those values 
supported by the political parties that they are close to would become 
majoritarian177. A broader generalization is possible in this regard when 
resembling the bulk of the associative action to a civic struggle over the 
boundaries and the meanings attributed to the concept of citizenship 
and over the establishment of a balance between the Jewishness and the 
democratic feature of the State178. Organizations can be direct 
emanation of parties or maintain a close tie with them. Parties are a 
precious source of support, material and not. An exchange of coverage 
and visibility among NGOs and political actors are also very common. 
In other cases, organizations deliberately avoid to be linked with 
political entities but being their agenda full of social issues that are on 
the verge of the political debate, their membership is likely to be quite 
homogenous from the political point of view. The above mentioned 
issues often overlap in the agenda of the organizations, mirroring the 
platforms of political areas. 
Other organizations active in the society are connected to less divisive 
issues. This kind of activism found its framework in and has been 
                                                 
177 Davis N. J & Robinson R. V (2012), Claiming Society for God: Religious Movements 
and Social Welfare, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
178 Religion Ben Porat G. & Turner I. S. (eds.) (2011). The Contradictions of Israeli 
Citizenship: and, Religion and State, New York: Routledge and State, New York: 
Routledge 
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fostered by the prosperity of the third sector in the country.179 
Organizations dealing with emarginated groups, people in distress, 
environment, culture and other issues developed during the years, 
some as a result of international movements or as branches of 
international NGOs and some as local initiatives that, as it will be 
argued in the next chapter represent a precious occasion for social 
integration of some groups and deeper legitimization as citizens. 
 
Participation through protest 
A brief paragraph is to be dedicated to the civil participation to the 
state through a particular mean of expression: protests. Participation is 
the contribution that citizens give in order to shape the society and 
entails the recognition (or the will of recognition) of the society in 
which this participation takes place. Protest is surely to be considered 
as a fundamental act of participation because the contribution is 
devoted, in a stronger effort, to change the society.  
In Israel, the right to manifest is granted by the law. Episodes of tension 
verify sometimes between the protestors and the police that monitors 
the protests180 but protest is still a quite common instrument of 
participation, which often ensures media coverage and triggers the 
public debate. The same themes that mobilize the associative net are 
often brought to the public through public manifestations, especially in 
concomitance with parliamentary debates on related issues, 
declarations of politicians, new laws or the verification of particular 
events.   
Frequent protests are organized on the issue of Arab residents' status 
and rights. In some cases their recurrence became a tool to maintain 
continuous attention. The continuous mobilization delivers by itself a 
political message:  it demonstrates the commitment of the protestors 
                                                 
179 Gidron B. (2012), The Israeli Third Sector: Patterns of Activity and Growth, 1980–2007 
in Hermann T. S. (ed.) By the People, For the People, Without the People?, Jerusalem: The Israel 
Institute of Democracy 
180 Episode of tension and, more rarely, of violence,  are more frequent in case of protests 
in the contested territories, initiated by Arab groups or where issues regarding Arab 
rights and the problematic coexistence of Arabs and Jews in the country. 
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and the persisting indifference/inability of the political class to find 
viable solutions. 
Religious Jews and secular ones were also very active in the "protest" 
scene in the last years. Through the protests, they represented their 
views about old and new social arrangements (one of the most debated 
issues nowadays is the legislation on military exemption of Haredi 
young males. Since the Supreme Court urged the Government to find 
an alternative solution to the expired previous arrangement known as 
Tal Law, the protest of the two groups exploded. Seculars claim the 
necessity of the inclusion of the Haredi males in the army while the 
Haredi community opposes it vehemently181). 
One of the most recent massive protests, and an example of 
participation originated in a digital space (as a confirmation of what 
asserted above about alternative forms of civic engagement) is the 
protest of 2011. The event (actually protracted for some months), 
showed a powerful demand of change in the society along a cleavage 
that had been considered a minor one in the society: the socioeconomic 
one. The term cleavage here is not proper since the protest did not 
exactly traced a division within the society. Rather a broad group, 
young people182, directed its claim against the state for the long lasting 
indifference toward the increasing cost of life and the poor quality of 
public services. Some sort of socioeconomic cleavage emerged with the 
continuation of the manifestations within the movement itself. The 
composite, heterogeneous group of protestors held different 
prerogatives and views, not only for their different ideological drives 
but for different socioeconomic backgrounds they came from. Thanks 
to the survey conducted and published in The Israeli Democracy Index 
2012 is possible to observe in the following chart the complexity of the 
group of protestors and to understand the internal cleavages that 
                                                 
181 The valence of the army service and the debate on it will be analyzed further on and in 
the next paragraphs. 
182 Not only young people took part in the protest but certainly they were the promoters 
and the protagonists of the events for all its duration. Among the respondents to the 
survey of The Israeli Democracy Index 2012 about 30% of young respondents (29.8%) and 
middle aged respondents (27.5%)took part to the protest while only the 18% of the older 
adults took part to the protest. 
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emerged with the time. Since the data below refer specifically to the 
Jewish group, it is fundamental to add that, also among the Arab 
respondents, a 15.7% reported to have been involved in the protest 
(while among the Jewish sample, the reported attendance was 27.6%).  
 
Figure 16 Who took part in the protest (Jewish Sample) 
(Source: THe Israeli Democracy Index) 
 
 
 
Participation through the military service 
This paragraph goes beyond the strict application of the TODEM model 
and rarely will be found in other case studies. As it regards 
participation in the army, two option are describable in general terms: 
in some countries the army service is voluntary (with further 
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possibility for military career) while in others is compulsory. A higher 
valence as a participation means might be attributed in voluntary 
systems; Israel is not included in the latter group. Military service in 
Israel is compulsory for men and women for a period of respectively 3 
and 2 years. Specific groups, however, are granted exemption through 
different methods (Arab citizens for example are exempted unless they 
volunteer while Ultraorthodox yeshiva students can postpone 
indefinitely the enlistment). After the compulsory period, reserve 
service is periodically requested (though not completely compulsory) 
till the age of 35 (this case regards primarily men; women usually are 
not called to reserve). 
The army service, even though not definable as a spontaneous act of 
participation can be regarded as a crucial moment of participation in 
the State, i.e. legitimation and self-legitimation as citizens. This 
particular connotation is evident if considering the prominence 
attributed in Israel to the army service. The army period is considered a 
crucial developmental stage for Israeli youth and its power of 
integration and strengthening of an Israeli identity recognized both as 
an ideological tenet (it is important to note that the role of the army in 
the process of nation building is not exclusive of Israel) and as an 
academically observed phenomena.183 
The dynamics that Levy defines as Republican Exchange for which the 
state would grant rights, services and protection to the citizens in 
exchange for their military sacrifice184 has been overcome in the Israeli 
society. In Israel in fact, the enlistment in the defensive body became 
one of the main ways to be legitimized as full citizens and to express 
the total adherence to the state.  
Helman, in a qualitative study about the reserve service, depicts a very 
vivid picture of the perception of the military service among Israelis. 
According to Helman the military service is perceived as a political 
responsibility and a moment of integration of the individual in a 
                                                 
183 Ben Shalom U. & Horenczyk G (2004), Cultural identity and adaptation in an 
assimilative setting: Immigrant soldiers from the former Soviet Union in Israel in 
International Journal of Intercultural Relations 28:6: 461–479 
184 Levy Y. (2011), Military hierarchies and collective action in Ben Porat G. & Turner B. S. 
(eds.) The Contradictions of Israeli Citizenship: Land, Religion and State, New York: Routledge 
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community. Participating in the army expresses commitment to certain 
goals that are shared by other people, unknown till the enlistment. 
During the army experience, bonds of national solidarity are 
established among individuals that were strangers to each other till that 
moment. A new community is created on the basis of the shared 
commitment to this supreme value that is the defense of the country. 
From the case studies is possible to evince how the sense of belonging 
to this community is perceived as empowering. In the imaginary of the 
respondents in fact, this is the legitimizing key for a full participation in 
the civil society.  
In the Zionist ideology, of which basically any sector of the Israeli 
socialization is imbued, the patriotic rhetoric and the collectivistic 
attitude are focal points. The daily diffusion of such message 
(especially in the past) and the experience of the army that interested 
the majority of the population reinforced the perception of the military 
service as the normality. As a consequence, the basis was created for 
the marginalization of those groups that do not partake in this 
experience. The abstention from the military service is considered to be 
a deviant behavior and, as a consequence, entails to a lower degree of 
social legitimization. The investigation conducted by Helman proves 
that this attitude persists also as it concerns the reserve service, proving 
the ideological meaning that Israelis attach to this kind of social 
participation. In the eyes of the tested population, the fulfillment of the 
military duties has an immediate repercussion in terms of possibility to 
legitimately take part in the society; without the accomplishment of this 
social duty other forms of social participation are deprived of their 
meaning and most of all the experience of "Israeliness" is not complete. 
Following this rationale it is clear why participation through the army 
is a particularly interesting case for our study. In the popular imagery 
(elevated to state ideology) the boundaries of the Israeli nation are 
shaped by this experience. It creates a very specific idea of Israeli 
national identity, triggering discriminatory dynamics that will be the 
object of future paragraphs. 
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2.5 COMPETITION 
This paragraph might appear shorter and, at first sight, less complete in 
the analysis of the topic. Actually, this is due to the very nature of the 
dimension, which includes many aspects that are related to other 
dimensions that have been previously described. Competition is an 
essential feature of democracy because it incarnates the freedom of 
presenting political alternatives and to engage political battles to affirm 
them in the society and in the representative bodies. The presence of 
more than one party (and in a broad sense the legal possibility of 
forming new parties and the limited and equal requirements necessary 
for the creation of a new party and for its presentation in the electoral 
competition) is the basis for establishing a competitive system. A stable 
and fair regulation on electoral campaigns and party funding will 
guarantee the competition on the vigil of the elections, ensuring that 
citizens will be allowed to choose according to their preferences and 
that parties will be actually able to present their alternative proposals to 
the electoral body. The electoral system represents a further step, 
greatly affecting the degree of competition within the decisional 
organs. Different electoral systems will provide with different results, 
and will enable parties with different amounts of powers. The 
distribution of power will shape the ability of the parties to carry on 
their agenda and to manifest their dissent to the executive and 
legislative initiatives. Mechanisms affecting the autonomy of the single 
elected representative are also to be considered effective causes of an 
increased or reduced competition. According to the political culture 
and the dominant state ideology, limits might be posed by the law to 
the expression of specific ideas or to behaviours considered to be 
beyond the line of acceptability. This varies from system to system and, 
is determined by values that are part of the state dominant identity185. 
The quality of competition can also vary along the time, due to social 
changes (also technological) and the emergence, disappearance, 
                                                 
185 The roots of these limitations are usually to be found in the dominant collective 
narrative. The prohibition of the formation of the fascist party in Italy is a typical 
example. Even if, in many countries, they have a mostly symbolic meaning, they are to be 
considered, nonetheless a constriction of competition.  
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intensification or weakening of social cleavages. Parties' purpose is to 
gain popular consensus and adapted strategies are set in order to 
pursue this scope.    
 
 
Competition among political actors: the progressive fragmentation of 
the Israeli party system 
As explained in the section dedicated to Electoral Accountability, the 
possibility of forming a party in Israel is open to every citizen who, in 
agreement with other 99, undergoes a quite fair bureaucratic procedure 
(mainly presentation of documents) and registers the new political 
formation in a public registrar. A similar procedure is set for the 
participation in the elections. Israel has been experiencing a huge 
proliferation of parties since the creation of the State, with recurrent 
electoral and political unions, transfugism of Members of Knesset that 
joined other parliamentary groups in the middle of the legislature and 
members of parties' factions that left their parties to enter in other 
formations or to fund new ones. The law does not express any 
prohibition on this regard favoring freedom and a certain political 
dynamicity. 
The number of parties that presented lists in the elections have been 
always quite high (about 30-35 parties, usually) as well as the number 
of parties that gained parliamentary representation (10-15). The pure 
number is indicative of the competitive attitude that the political 
system in Israel adopted since the beginning of its existence, probably 
being encouraged by one of the most proportional systems in the 
world. Israel, in fact, adopts a proportional system with a very low 
threshold (2% as of now186) and with national constituency. The 
                                                 
186 The original threshold was of 1%. The first change occurred for the elections of the 
Thirteenth Knesset (in which the threshold was raised to 1.5%) and again in occasion of 
the elections of the Sixteenth Knesset (in which the threshold was raised to 2%). Debates 
over a further rising are very frequent in the Knesset and many bills are proposed at this 
regard. One of the last proposals is to raise the threshold to 4%. See Azulay M., (May 8, 
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electoral system therefore, seems to grant competition. The high 
number of parties concurring in the elections, however, does not 
explain more than the choice of the political elites of presenting their 
platforms to the people. In order to understand how the public opinion 
is divided in Israel and what the relevant political groups in the 
Parliament are (with evident effects on bargaining dynamics, legislative 
effectiveness etc.) the calculation of the effective number of parties is 
necessary.  
 
Figure 17 The Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties 
 
  
A historical overview of the effective number of parties along the years 
can be useful to understand the trend of parties' competition in Israel. 
The moderately high number of parties registered in the early years of 
the State confirms that the Israeli society, since the establishment of the 
State, has been divided along many lines and the space of competition 
has been definitely multidimensional. After the afflatus of the first 
elections, with the consolidation of MAPAI, the trend decreases and 
remains relatively low till the second half of the nineties. In the second 
                                                                                                           
2013) Knesset approves Governance Bill in preliminary reading, in Ynet, 
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4377769,00.html  
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half of the nineties, it jumps to a record, probably as a consequence of 
the temporary electoral reform that allowed to the electors to split their 
votes (one vote for the Prime Minister, one vote for the preferred 
party). The following elections are characterized by a reduced (but still 
high, except if compared to the earlier period) number of parties. To 
acquire a more substantive explicative power regarding the dimension 
in analysis, competition, these data should be considered together with 
some indication of the power distribution among parties. The most 
interesting indicator of party power for the research is the 
parliamentary power, roughly measurable looking at the number of 
seats that a party has gained. 
 
Figure 18 Electoral gains (seats in the Knesset) 
 
 
From the chart it is possible to notice that the first party (the one who 
won the elections; of course it is not the same party in all elections) has 
progressively lost its power in terms of autonomy, for it has gained less 
and less seats (the peak registered in 2003 is consequent to the 1999 
elections in which, probably, the big parties were weakened by the 
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electoral reform that discouraged strategic voting). Taking into account 
the performance of the second party, a different trend is traceable. 
While in the beginning the gap among the first and the second party is 
bigger, it progressively shrinks and, starting from the seventies, it 
almost disappears. In few cases this weakening is well visible because 
of the overlapping of the lines (the difference between the first and the 
second party was of only one seat).  
Crossing the evidences of the two tables (number of effective parties 
and gap between the first and the second party in terms of 
parliamentary representation) it is possible to infer common 
characteristics of the Israeli competition, marking some eras187. In the 
first period, the effective number of parties is smaller than the pure 
number of actors that actually took part in the elections and gained 
seats because of the dominance of one party (MAPAI). MAPAI played a 
decisive role in the majority because it possessed a high number of 
seats that granted it a good margin of autonomy and a significant 
power in government (even though, no party has ever reached the 
absolute majority in the Knesset, dooming Israeli governments to be 
coalition governments, as in most proportional democracies). The 
competition among parties was somehow practically diminished by the 
existence of a colossus (in terms of ability of gaining consensus). The 
existence of a dominant party will be a trait of the Israeli political 
panorama till the Seventies. MAPAI in fact, maintained a position of 
great advantage on the others.  
From 1977, when the right-wing Likud gained the power for the first 
time in Israeli history, the hegemonic constraint to party competition 
ended. Right and left engaged a political duel that lasted for decades, 
alternating each other in the government and dividing the electorate 
much more than in the past. Multipartitism remained a typical feature 
of the Israeli political arena but, due to the close competition among the 
two main formations (that gained both large parts of the available seats 
in Parliament), the effective number of parties decreased sensibly 
(because of the few seats that remained available). Governments 
                                                 
187 A similar division is proposed by Stoll H. (2013), Changing Societies, Changing Party 
Systems. Ney York: Cambridge University Press 
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continued to be formed through coalitions and the winning party had 
to negotiate with the smaller parties for their support. The littler gap 
among the two main parties gave the minor groups a higher power of 
negotiation, undermining the leadership of the majority party and its 
autonomy in leading the executive.  
After the reform experiment, that introduced a "presidential 
parliamentarism" in the attempt to grant more stability to governments, 
the bipolar dynamic seemed to persist (even though with a sensible loss 
of power of the Labor Party, political heir of the defunct MAPAI) till 
2006 when a centrist party, Kadima took the scene. This party had been 
established in 2005 by Ariel Sharon, prominent figure of Israeli politics, 
himself a good example of the above mentioned political transfugism. 
The new party gathered politicians both from Likud and from Labor. 
The centrist attitude of Kadima gained large popular consensus, 
promoting a political alternative on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the 
territorial issues. Kadima's views merged the willingness to 
compromise typical of the left wing area with a distrustful attitude 
toward the Arabs, typical of the right wing parties188. Kadima gained 
the majority of votes in two consecutive turns but in 2009 its leader, 
Tzipi Livni, failed to form a government that was in fact built by Likud. 
In the last elections, the phenomenon of Kadima had already lost its 
sparkle, due also to the internal scission that the party went through. 
Likud regained power (loosing seats though) in a joint list with a 
sectarian party (Ysrael Beitenu). Another actor emerged, confirming 
once again the overdeveloped nature of the party system in Israel: Yesh 
Atid, a leader-centered formation that targeted the secular middle class 
and became the second party in the country.  
 
 
 
                                                 
188 On the 2006 elections, the power of the cleavages in the competition and dynamics of 
vote and on the phenomenon of Kadima see Arian A. & Shamir M. (2008). Israel 1996 --
2006 A Decade Later, the World Had Changed, the Cleavage Structure Remained in Party 
Politics, 14: 685-705. 
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The effects of fragmentation 
Political fragmentation has long lasting repercussions on the relation 
among parties and deeply affects the ruling dynamics as well as the 
functioning of the executive body. No party in Israel has ever been able 
to form a government on its own. The proportional electoral system, 
originated in the political organization of the Jewish community before 
the State was formed, was necessary to guarantee representation to all 
groups and notably increased the likelihood of coalitional 
governments. Also in periods in which the dominance of MAPAI was 
overwhelming, the absolute majority was never reached. The Prime 
Minister however, was empowered by its numbers to detain a certain 
authority over the coalitional parties and enjoyed quite a large margin 
of autonomy (sometimes, like in the case of Ben Gurion's governments, 
this autonomy was exercised at the price of executive crisis).  Over the 
years, a bipolar competition emerged in the multiparty system and the 
need of negotiating with smaller parties for the survival of the majority 
became more evident. The weakest the main party, the more difficult 
have been for the Prime Minster to keep harmony within the coalition 
whilst playing a decisive role in the governmental agenda. After the 
elections, usually, an intense negotiation takes place in which the 
winner tries to find suitable partners to build a coalition. The coalitions 
have become progressively more multiparty, and this initial phase has 
been transformed in a complex puzzle to build. Since this early phase, 
the Prime Minister and his party are forced to narrow their margin of 
action as leaders of the executive in order to compensate the allies. 
Small sectorial parties have been constantly protagonists of these 
negotiations and they have been empowered to fiercely advocate the 
sectorial instances of their electorate.189 Sectorial parties have been 
defined by Stoll190 as representing ascriptive social groups (like 
religious or ethnic groups). The scholar suggests how the development 
of such parties is the result of a lack of integration in the society and in 
                                                 
189 See Carmon A. (January 30, 2010), Decade in Review: Israeli Governance in Crisis, IDI, 
at http://en.idi.org.il/analysis/articles/decade-in-review-israeli-governance-in-crisis/  
190 Stoll H. (2013), See above. 
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the political context191. Some sectorial parties acquired in few years a 
stable minority power that makes them precious allies for a 
governmental coalition. The experience acquired on the dynamics of 
the Israeli electoral system and the increasing need of the big parties for 
coalition partners, trained the smaller parties to valorize their tie 
breaker position with ambitious request in exchange for their support. 
Ministerial positions and programmatic issues are essential tools of 
these negotiations. In the frenetic research of a viable coalition, 
expertise and personal inclinations are usually a secondary criterion in 
the allocation of offices, while party games and personal agreements 
vest paramount importance. The non-negotiability of certain political 
positions makes the task of building and managing a coalition very 
hard for the Prime Minister. In fact, it opens a sub-issue: the 
compatibility among the platforms of the coalition members. Electoral 
competition is deeply shaped by this issue. Foreseeing the need of 
negotiation with sectarian parties, the biggest formations are usually 
cautious in engaging sensitive issues. Declarations that result 
disgraceful in the eyes of the sectorial parties might prevent a future 
alliance and since these parties have proved to be quite stable in their 
consensus, the loss might be costly (also in terms of concessions, 
whenever the sectarian party would decide to join the future coalition).  
The fragmentation of the system generates a difficult management of 
the executive coalition. Continuous negotiations to maintain the 
support, a difficult implementation of policies and thus a political 
instability are quite the norm in Israeli governments. The cabinet is not 
bound under a strong cohesive power. On the contrary, a long lasting 
competition goes on. The political coverage of ministries grants them a 
wide autonomy and power within the government and they keep 
promoting their party agenda in order to maintain popularity among 
their target electors. The Prime Minister that formally can destitute 
ministries and has predominance on the executive, is in fact in a weak 
position and is not as free to set the pace as the law formally grants 
                                                 
191 Stoll also notes how the effective number of parties increases in correspondence of an 
immigration wave, as to demonstrate how the need of political integration of the new 
citizens is not satisfied by the existing offer. Therefore, encouraged by the proportional 
system, they create political new alternatives to represent their agenda. 
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him. In order for the government to reach a homogeneous position, 
huge intra-coalition diplomacy is deployed. Problematic issues are 
regarded with fear in the executive body for their divisive potential 
(that might be lethal). The prevalent adopted strategy ends to be 
postponement, till a safer political moment arrives (or for the next 
government to come). Certain matters are deferred to the last urgent 
moment in which everybody is compelled to unity by the absence of an 
alternative.  
 
 
Ideological distance and political cleavages 
The ideological polarization of the Israeli party system and the 
competition among them has undergone centrifugal and centripetal 
phases. Mendilow reports that in the early days of the State, there was a 
neat ideological difference among parties. The differences among 
platforms included substantial issues regarding the main features of the 
new State. Differences between parties contrasted with a relative 
internal homogeneity, preserved under the vessel of ideological credos. 
Coalitional dynamics, however, dictated at that time the necessary 
ideological renounces to share the power. With the bipolarization of the 
competition, parties with relatively close orientation started making 
electoral or political alliances. The respective ideologies ended up 
merging and two quite stable political blocks emerged. A bipolar 
competition with centripetal tendency came as a result: the two blocks 
moderated their ideologies, competing for the median electorate. In the 
Eighties, after the wars and the emergence of a strong nationalism of 
religious inspiration, competition polarized again. Therefore, extremist 
parties broke the equilibrium of the centripetal competition and tried to 
acquire the less moderate voters, unsatisfied because left without an 
alternative192. The revenge of the center arrived in the mid-2000 with 
the phenomenon of Kadima and partially continued with Yesh Atid in 
                                                 
192 Mendilow J. (2003), Ideology, Party Change, and Electoral Campaigns in Israel: 1965 – 
2001. Albany: SUNY Press. 
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the last elections (during which also the Labor, tried, without success, 
to move to the center in the attempt to recuperate some votes). 
Despite the tendencies of the competition, it is possible to say that 
Israeli parties cover a broad ideological spectrum, even though with a 
weaker impetus toward the left. Competition in the country takes place 
along several cleavages that have been persisting for decades. The 
future of the territories and more generally the relations with the Arab 
neighbors has been considered prominent since the Six Days War 
(when the territorial issue emerged, following the capture of those 
territories by the Israeli army). The centrality of this topic is absolute 
and its power of shaping the consensus has been clearly understood by 
the political leadership who heavily addresses the issues of security, 
territories and conflict in every electoral campaign193. The resistance of 
such an issue is due not only to historical reasons but to the persistence 
of a regional instability in terms of foreign relations with the neighbor 
countries. The risk of conflict is always perceived as extremely high and 
the internal unrest of the Arab countries in the Middle East is followed 
with preoccupation by the Israeli public opinion. Moreover, frequent 
skirmishes at the borders and acts of terrorism keep high the level of 
alarm. As an evidence of the supremacy of this issue, Arian and Shamir 
notice that any party, which seeks to acquire a stable role in the Israeli 
party system, must to address this topic. The explanation that they 
provide is that the conflict is not simply a foreign affairs issue. Instead, 
it is correlated to the Jewish-Zionist identity issue that, in front of this 
topic, reacts with strong cohesion, sweeping away the collective 
identity dilemmas194.  
The defense of the Land of Israel (Eretz Ysrael, as a biblical concept, 
referring to the land that was promised by God to the Jewish people to 
dwell in and to live in as a nation) is strongly connected with the 
                                                 
193 The power of the security issue and military intervention as characterizing the pre-
campaign period in 2009 is exposed in a broader analysis of the 2009 elections in  
Sznajder M., (2010) The 2009 Elections in Israel ,Institut Europeu de la Mediterrania,  at 
http://www.iemed.org/anuari/2010/aarticles/Sznajder_elections_en.pdf  
194 Arian A. & Shamir M. (2008), see above.  
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Jewish identity and so is the perception of the destructive threat 
coming from other populations (also of religious reference). They are 
perceived by most religious, especially the Zionist streams as a 
comprehensive topic whose solution urges for material and for 
spiritual reasons. A strong push to religious nationalism came after the 
Six Days War. This ideological "renewal" was translated, on the 
political side, in a stronger support for right-wing hawkish parties. 
Religious parties became gradually more exposed on the issue of the 
territories and in virtue of a more similar view on this topic, implicitly 
declared their preference for an alliance with the right-wing parties 
(even those of secular origins, like Likud). Both the alliances with-right 
wing and left-wing parties did not prevent religious formations from 
promoting their agenda. Conservative policies are the main topic of the 
religious agenda, whose roots are based on the religious tradition and 
on the desire of safeguarding and expanding religious institutions that 
constitute the core around which the religious community preserve 
itself. Religious parties in fact are the main representatives of another 
cleavage in the society: the secular-religious one. Religious parties are 
not the exclusive recipients of the religious vote, also because the 
Jewish religious world in Israel is articulated and different positions 
can be found among those who define themselves religious. Many 
religious people vote for traditional right-wing parties; some are closer 
to the left and other engage centrist projects like the one of Lapid, who 
expressed his negative views on the different social arrangements 
granted to the Ultraorthodox communities. Nonetheless, the fracture is 
evident and it shapes the electoral competition and the political activity 
dividing it in two groups: those who intend to relegate the religiosity to 
the personal sphere, with no interference or support from the state; and 
those who support a more penetrative role of religion in society, as an 
indispensable part of the national Jewish identity.  These contrasting 
views clashes continuously because of their pervading nature in daily 
life and because of the governing arrangements that impose de facto 
some religious control over the life of all Israelis, independently from 
their will (the respect of the kasherut in public places, the religious 
authority in matters of personal status etc.) 
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Compared to the previous two, the socioeconomic fracture has proved 
less divisive and less urgent in the political discourse. However, in the 
last two elections (2009 and 2013) the topic emerged more consistently, 
due to the international crisis and to the social protest that in 2011 
exploded in the streets. More dedication in improving social justice and 
the conditions of young people was requested to the Government. As a 
result of the extensive public debate that the claims triggered, the 2013 
electoral campaign saw social issues in the first line. Socioeconomic and 
religious fracture overlapped in the public discourse. In particular the 
enrollment of Haredi men in the army as a contribution to the State and 
the public funds to the religious institutions and communities were 
seen by the secular group as an illegitimate expense because of the 
scarce contribution of the Haredi group to the common good. In the 
agenda of Yesh Atid, this rationale took a central position.  
 
 
Personalization of the Competition 
The Israeli electoral system does not allow citizens to express 
preference for specific candidates and the national constituency 
weakens a direct link between candidates and a certain 
community/geographic area/group of electors. These mechanisms 
should discourage the establishment of personal links and of a 
personalized dynamics of competition. However, in line with the global 
trend of personalization, Israeli politics has slipped toward a more 
individualistic competition and political dynamics. In fact, it has been 
noted that a certain institutional personalization has been developing 
since the Nineties, following the electoral reform. Even though the 
popular election of the Prime Minister was later abolished and the 
traditional proportional list modality was restored, the figure of the 
Prime Minister has been formally strengthened by the power of 
dissolution of the Parliament and by the institution of the constructive 
non-confidence195.  
                                                 
195 Balmas M. et al. (2012), Two Routes to Personalized Politics. Centralized and 
Decentralized personalization, in Party Politics 1-24. 
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Another "semi-institutional move" toward a more personalized system 
is the institution of primaries as a method candidates selection. These 
changes, which have been described in previous paragraphs, 
contributed to the shift of attention and political relevance from the 
parties to the single politicians. 
Electoral competition has been deeply influenced: primaries for the 
selection of the candidates took the form of a party electoral event, 
necessary to mobilize the members and to gather them in view of the 
imminent electoral appointment. Membership in fact shrunk not only 
in numbers but in terms of assiduity of participation; events like 
primaries can be useful to close the ranks. 
Medias' approach to the coverage of politics has changed also. The 
focus shifted to party leaders, relegating the parties in the shadow.  
Simplification and shortening of the messages, as well as dramatization 
and research of newsworthy details better apply to individuals rather 
than to formal institutions like parties. Even in a highly regulated 
framework of rules governing the media coverage of politics, 
politicians learnt rapidly how to use television and the other media to 
gain personal popularity and to increase their public appeals. Opinions 
are presented within the media format and using media language. 
Politicians' appearance in media events is guided by image consultants 
and spin doctors that try to maximize the profits from media exposure. 
A careful job on politicians' aspect, on the most appropriate topic and 
vocabulary is made by these professionals. Communicative talent 
became a big advantage that sometimes proves more effective than 
solid political contents.196 As a new precious tool for electoral 
competition, the internet is used by many candidates to establish a 
more direct form of communication with the electorate. Special 
attention is dedicated to candidates' personal websites. Through the 
analysis of personal websites, researches197 show an individualization 
of political communication and a neat detachment from the parties. An 
intensive use of the internet is recognized as a method of bypassing the 
                                                 
196 Livak L. et al. (2011) MK websites and the personalization of Israeli politics in Israel 
Affairs, 17:3: 445-466 
197 Idem. 
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filter of the media and the political parties, to gather activists and to 
advertise events.  
Personalization affects relations among parties not only in the electoral 
competition. Party discipline has sensibly given away to a more 
personalized approach to politics, both of ministries and of MKs. 
Coalition commitment that should strengthen the authority of the 
Government and facilitating the Knesset support is reduced in a 
considerable way. For this reason, loyalty has to be secured on the basis 
of personal bargains, with the risk of weakening the autonomy of the 
Prime Minister and of increasing the size of the Cabinet till becoming 
dysfunctional. Politicians find more profitable to satisfy the sectorial 
interests of their constituency and do not have incentive to behave 
according to the parties' directives. Populist tones prosper in the 
legislative body and the number of private bills has exponentially 
grown. Especially in the case of parliamentarians elected through 
primaries, their appointments do not depend on the parties; therefore, 
they direct their efforts to secure their popularity in view of a possible 
imminent electoral turn. In this atmosphere of permanent campaign, 
personal image acquire a disproportional value. Strategic advisors and 
media consistently influence the governmental activity of ministries 
and MKs at the expense of a genuine and totally dedicated executive 
activity.  
The effects of personalization in the electorate are demonstrated in The 
2012 Israeli Index Democracy where an appealing leader results to be 
the main determinant for vote decision among Jewish Israelis. This 
dynamic of course, promotes a more extemporaneous approach to the 
vote, detaching it from ideological constrains and party loyalties. 
Volatility grows. Gaining electoral consensus becomes more and more 
a mission that entails leader's appealing image, communicational skills 
and catchy contents. The successful Yesh Atid party seems, in a way, to 
be the example of these personalized political features. Yair Lapid, a 
popular journalist who created and assumed the leadership of a new 
party, based its consensus on a platform dedicated to the middle class, 
presenting himself as the interpreter of the diffuse discontent for the 
socioeconomic situation and riding popular issues within the religious-
secular cleavage. 
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Extremist parties and competition 
As said, party competition develops along social fractures that deeply 
scar the society. Inevitably therefore, ethnic conflict becomes a 
significant dimension. Ethnic fracture is certainly the most explosive in 
the country and episodes of violence and intolerance are registered 
frequently. The main source of ethnic conflict is the difficult coexistence 
between Muslims and Jews. The repercussions of such conflict are not 
only in daily life but also in the representative bodies. Violence in its 
physical form is much more common in the civil context, both in mixed 
cities and in more homogeneous environments. The tension between 
Arabs and Jews is always quite high. More than extremist organized 
groups, a number of extremist individuals are acting, often with 
massive violence, on the wave of extremist ideologies on both sides. 
Occasionally, clashes between Arabs and Jews result in aggressions also 
with dramatic consequences: it is not infrequent in fact that episodes of 
stabbing and lynching are reported by media. These crimes have a high 
emotional impact on the population, are passionately followed by 
public opinion and foster fervid debates in which the ethnic fracture is 
analyzed under different point of views (often contrasting, according to 
the political views and the ethnic belonging). During these debates, 
many other related sub-issues are brought on the table. The response of 
the Government to these extremist acts is prosecution and 
condemnation. Nonetheless, they represent a major problem in the 
achievement of social and political stability.  
Some very sporadic episodes of violence have been registered also 
among Christians of different streams. Even though Christian minority 
is known to be rather pacific and more extraneous to the use of 
violence, some cases of violence happened. The fight between Greek 
and Armenian clergy that took place in 2008 in the Church of the Holy 
Sepulcher is quite emblematic. This episode is the evidence of a much 
tensed situation that involves not only classic ethnic rivalries but also 
222 
inter-ethnic or minor ethnic contrasts over concrete and symbolical 
issues. 
A more unique extremist group (if to say so) is the Haredi "modesty 
police". This ultraorthodox group is one of the top manifestations of 
ultra-religious Jewish extremism and even though not many indictment 
actions are usually taken against the perpetrators of these acts (because 
of the strict secrecy of these groups and some conspiracy of silence in 
this community), media report them and open the way to public 
debate. This group represents a serious threat to the authority of the 
State inasmuch as they self-appoint as patroller of specific areas in 
many Israeli cities and aim to enforce a strict set of rules derived by an 
extremist interpretation of the religious sources. Their punitive code 
consists not only in verbal threat but also in physical one (with assaults, 
throwing of rocks, water and acid) as well as in damaging properties 
and private goods. 
Social extremism, whose roots are in the deep social cleavages, has its 
counterpart in the political scene. Therefore, at political level, extremist 
acts are perpetrated too, even though most rarely involving physical 
violence. The law198 forbids the electoral participation to parties whose 
programmatic platform implicitly or explicitly negates the existence of 
the State of Israel as the State of the Jewish people, denies the 
democratic character of the State or incites to racism. These are the 
forms of forbidden extremism that are recognized as such and opposed 
by the law. Evidently, they are not exhaustive of the broad spectrum of 
extremism that is verifiable in such a divided context. As a 
consequence, large margin is left for the representation of positions that 
can generate scandal and bitter fights in the representative bodies. 
Political debate becomes often radical during the assemblies of the 
Knesset. The polarization of political debate is of course bidirectional. 
Once an "extremist" statement is made by the representative of a 
faction, members of opposite factions respond with equally heavy 
accuses of treason, racism, violation of human rights etc. Offensive 
speeches are often directed to Arab Members of Parliament accusing 
                                                 
198 Basic law: The Knesset, amendment 7a.  
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them to be traitors of the State and infiltrators of enemy States or 
terroristic groups. Striking episode of violent political action in the 
Parliament was the fight among Anastassia Michaeli, member of Ysrael 
Beitenu (a right wing sectarian party, whose electorate and elected are 
mostly Russian Jews) and Raleb Majadele, an Arab member of the 
Israeli Labor party. The fight over a school manager's approval to the 
mass participation of students to a human rights march, ended up with 
MK Michaeli throwing some water to her political adversary199. 
Another extreme action that reveals the harshness of the political fight 
was the participation of MK Zouabi (elected for the Arab party Balad) 
to the Mavi Marmara mission to Gaza. The mission was a strong 
message of challenge to the Israeli State and to its blockade on Gaza. 
The enterprise ended dramatically, with the intervention of the Israeli 
army and the death of some of NGO's activists. The participation of 
MK Zouabi had a strong symbolic impact on public opinion and on the 
Knesset. A strikingly harsh reaction was manifested in the following 
parliamentary session in which a violent debate took place and the 
right to parliamentary immunity questioned. One political part defined 
the action of MK Zouabi as a legitimate tool of political action; the other 
part saw it as an attempt against the integrity of the State. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
199 Azulay M., (January 9, 2012) MK Michaeli throws water in MK Majadele's face, Ynet, 
at http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4173224,00.html 
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CHAPTER 3 
What does religion explain? 
 
 
In this chapter the connection between Jewish religion and the findings 
of the previous chapter will be analyzed. Not all the dimensions that 
have been analyzed have a direct relation with religion but in four out 
of five it is possible to recognize some influence of religion. 
The argumentations in this chapter do not aim to discredit Judaism nor 
religious people in any way or to attribute them a harmful role in the 
society. The positions that are attributed to the religious community 
(especially in the first part in which crime rate and discrimination are 
posed in connection with religious views and institutions) are of course 
not to be intended as a homogeneous trait of the entire religious 
population and it is good to remark how Judaism in Israel (and all over 
the world) assumes different shapes and degrees of Orthodoxy. It will 
be remarked several times how variegated the approach to religion can 
be. Even when the differentiation would not seem enough clear, it is 
important to clarify that religion here is dealt with as an aggregate 
social phenomenon and not as a personal one. Different interpretations 
of the religious principles (or the emphasis on one predicament over 
the other) are always possible. In Judaism in particular, this have been 
generating a continuous debate among authoritative social and 
religious figures and have been influencing the views and the 
behaviors of individual and group of believers.  
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3.1 RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW 
The analysis of the Rule of Law was particularly extensive due to the 
importance of this dimension and to it complexity. I argue that, within 
the area of Rule of Law, two sub-dimensions are especially affected by 
religion. 
 As regarding the first sub-dimension, crime rate, religion will be 
analyzed both on the personal perspective (as a fostering agent in 
personal criminal activities) and for its role in the state's reaction.  
 
 
Religion and gender discrimination 
a) Sexual minorities 
Israel is one of the most advanced countries in the world in the matter 
of sexual minorities' status. Tel Aviv is known to be an extremely 
modern city, where the LGTB community has a vivid social life and fair 
possibilities of professional realization. Same sex marriage is not 
allowed (see below about rabbinical courts and the exclusive authority 
on marriage) but the State recognizes unions celebrated abroad, 
together with paternity-maternity of natural and adopted children1. 
Individual freedom is guaranteed by the law and discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation is explicitly forbidden. Homosexuals serve 
the army and are entitled to the same rights in the armed forces 
(treatments, tasks, promotions etc.). The legal setting generally grants 
equality and most of the population does not hold discriminatory 
views over homosexuals. 
In more conservative areas, discrimination and episodes of violence 
(verbal or physical) have been directed toward sexual minorities. The 
discriminatory behavior is not a prerogative of Jewish believers and 
                                                 
1 The recognition was ordered by the Supreme Court in 2006. See ACRI, (November 21, 
2006) Court orders the state to register overseas same-sex marriages at 
http://www.acri.org.il/en/2006/11/21/court-orders-the-state-to-register-overseas-same-sex-
marriages/ 
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their religious leaders but is common to all three main religions, 
Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Many leaders of these three religions 
define homosexual relationships an abominable sin, a mental deviation 
and an intolerable social conduct in light of the sacred laws. Christian 
churches express condemnation against homosexual acts in official 
documents and declarations2, taking inspiration from the Old and the 
New Testament and defining it a sin that needs to be repented in order 
to be reintegrated in the religious community3. 
The Quran explicitly teaches that homosexual practices are beyond the 
limits that Allah posed to men (the story of Lot in Sodom and Gomorra 
is emblematic in this regard). While in ancient times the admiration for 
young virgin boys was described as a common occurrence4, the 
rejection became progressively stronger and homosexuality 
intercourses became a crime punishable with imprisonment, economic 
or corporal sanctions and even death. 
In Judaism (Orthodox and Ultraorthodox in particular) the source of 
such discriminatory attitude can be found in religious normative 
literature as the Torah and the Talmud. The most known sentence is 
from Leviticus: a passage of this book warns against same sex physical 
intercourse, defining them as an abomination. The practice of 
homosexuality is recognized as originally exogenous from the Jewish 
people that allegedly was chosen, among other reasons, for their 
immunity to homosexual behaviors. Rabbinical interpreters retrieve 
this information from another passage in the Leviticus where the 
Jewish people were warned not to assimilate to other people's conduct 
(referring, according to the interpretation, to homosexual practices). 
According to this rationale, the fact that other communities perished 
under the wrath of God would prove that their conduct was 
unfortunate and that it should not be imitated. 
                                                 
2 For the Roman Catholic stream, see among others, the Catechism of the Catholic 
Church, part 3, section 2, chapter 2, paragraph 2359. In this paragraph, homosexuals are 
recommended to observe a chaste life. 
3 In many official documents of the Evangelical Presbyterian Church is possible to read 
that homosexuals must repent to remain Christians and to be accepted by the religious 
community. 
4 See Abu Nawas, one of the most famous Islamic poets 
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From a survey conducted in 2009 among about 500 Israelis5, a 
correlation emerges between discriminatory attitude against 
homosexuality and religious observance. 71% of the interviewed 
Ultraorthodox Jews 67% percent of Orthodox Jews, as well as 44% of so 
called Traditional6 Jews defined homosexuality a perversion. The 
percentage of people who defined homosexuality as a perversion 
decreased sensibly within the secular population (24%).  
Studies proved that the intolerant views toward homosexuality in 
religious communities are not only a consequence of a religious strict 
observance but are the result of a close and homophobic culture. These 
elements contribute to the rejection of sexual behaviors that are 
considered deviant and push some of the members of these 
communities to verbally (or in worst case physically) discriminate 
homosexuals.7 Shapiro Safran explains that in the case in which a 
"perceived deviant behavior" was showed by a member of the 
community, the stigma would echo also on the close and large family. 
Sometimes, "normalization treatments" are offered. This proofs that 
homosexuality is perceived as a sick condition against which medical 
or para-medical tools can be used. The acceptation of such option is 
often a sine qua non to remain in the community. The high social 
pressure could force individuals to choose between the devotion to 
their community and their sexual identity8. In such cases a very 
interesting phenomena is also noted: a difficult process of acceptation 
of the self, due to discrimination and pressure from the original 
community, is often aggravated by a non-complete acceptation from 
                                                 
5 See  Ilani O., (2009, August 6)"Haaretz survey: 46% of Israelis thinks gays are deviants" 
in Haaretz, at http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/haaretz-survey-46-of-israelis-
thinks-gays-are-deviants-1.281474 
6 The definition of "traditional Jew" is quite broad. In general, traditional Jews respect 
some of the religious practices mainly linked to traditional aspects. 
7For a detailed quantitative study on American Orthodox and Ultraorthodox 
communities' approach to homosexuality see Shapiro Safran R., (2012) A 
Multidimensional Assessment of Orthodox Jewish Attitudes toward Homosexuality. 
Seton Hall University. 
8 See Chabin M., (2012, June 13) Gay Orthodox Jews See Growing Acceptance In Israel in 
Huffington Post  at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/13/gay-orthodox-
jews_n_876296.html  
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the gay community. Being the homosexual community frequent target 
of religious-based condemnation, the religious world is looked at with 
suspicion. Due to their social provenience, religious homosexuals might 
have a more difficult integration among the homosexual peers.  
A more open attitude is however developing in the religious world. A 
growing number of religious scholars and rabbis are elaborating more 
moderate positions on homosexuality and even expressly calling for the 
end of discriminatory behaviors. This progressive stream asserts that 
Jewish gays should be recognized as members of the Jewish people 
despite the gravity of the transgressions that they are inclined to 
commit to satisfy their inner tendencies. These experts refer to the 
writings of the Sages and remark that every Jew should be welcomed 
and encouraged to stay in the community despite his sins. Nonetheless, 
homosexual practice is looked at with contempt. These tones, have 
been adopted by some Haredi rabbis in their "Torah Stance on 
Homosexuality", a document that was made public in 2011 and that 
called for the unavoidable necessity of psychological and spiritual 
rehabilitation. Rabbi Botheach, in one of his papers, equated 
homosexual behavior to the transgression of Kashrut or Shabbat. With 
this comparison, he showed how not even the transgression of one of 
the most sacred commandments (also sanctioned with death in the 
Torah) can be punished with the estrangement from the community9. 
Beside this distinction between sin and sinner (that Judaism has in 
common with Christianity), another distinction is made. Judaism 
separates between the sin as a desire and the sin as an act. Every 
human being has the natural desire and inclination to sin but the 
interior struggle and a successful result ensure the closeness to God. 
Torah commandments therefore are not meant to be insurmountable: 
anything can be achieved through commitment and sacrifice. Some 
rules are also given by the Sages in order to lessen the temptation: in 
specific eras for example, men were forbidden to enjoy the exclusive 
presence of one another (in order not to be tempted). Rabbi Nachum 
                                                 
9Boteach, S. (1994) Moses of Oxford:  A Jewish Vision of a University and Its Life. 
London: Andre Deutsch Ltd . 
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Amsel10 explains the dichotomy between desire and act through a 
Midrash11: "A person should not say I do not desire pig meat, I don't 
desire that thing (that is forbidden). Rather (he should say):  -I do desire 
(it), but what can I do? My Father in Heaven commanded me (not to 
partake in it)." Through this comparison it is evident the logic of 
acceptation of the potential desire but also the implicit request not to 
satisfy it, refraining from living a "sinful" sexual life. Whether 
homosexuals should remain single or should form a heterosexual 
family is also under discussion in the rabbinical environment. 
However, idea of self-control and continuous struggle against the inner 
sexual impulse encounters a shared consensus in the Orthodox 
community. Evidently, the Jewish Orthodox attitude toward 
homosexuality is still quite rigid even though, nowadays, more open 
religious approaches have been advocating for the respect of human 
dignity and for the separation between sin and sinner. Rabbinical 
discussions at high level, however, represent a vanguard and cannot be 
taken as widespread positions. As stated before, the stigma around 
homosexuality is still strong within the Orthodox community 
(especially in some ultraorthodox circles). Many believers remain 
attached to the strictest and oldest Halachic interpretations, fomented 
by community practices and segregated lifestyle. The most conservative 
rabbis, moreover, encourage a strict interpretation of the norms, 
claiming that modern openings to homosexuality are the consequences 
of politically-driven exploitation of the sacred scriptures. 
A discriminatory attitude is more spread in the society than in the legal 
and political framework. This does not mean that the quality of 
democracy is not affected by such manifestations. Beyond singular 
episodes of intolerance that are difficult to report and, as episodes, have 
scarce significance, the intolerant behaviors has manifested repeatedly. 
In the occasion of the 2005 Gay Parade in Jerusalem three people got 
stabbed by the participants to a counter-manifestation of Jewish 
                                                 
10 Amsel N., Homosexuality in Orthodox Judaism  at 
http://www.lookstein.org/resources/homosexuality_amsel.pdf 
11Yalkut S. Midrash Vaykira 20. The Midrash (lit. exegesis) is a form of rabbinic literature. 
The Midrashim can be divided in two types: Midrash Aggadah (which explores ethics and 
values in biblical texts) and midrash Halacha (which focuses on Jewish law and practice). 
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Orthodox and Ultra-Orthodox believers. The stabber was condemned 
for his crime but the religious wrath was not stopped. In the following 
editions, other counter-demonstrations were organized and harsh 
verbal treatment was reserved to the participants to the Gay Parade. In 
2010 Baruch Marzel12, one of the leaders of the counter-demonstration, 
commented to Haaretz: "It (homosexuality)  is a disease of choice, and a 
man can change his taste and his ways…when someone has AIDS they 
tell them not to infect others, so why are these people allowed to march 
here in Jerusalem and infect us with their disease?"13. 
Despite State's general commitment to protect sexual minorities and to 
promote full equality, the political debate is influenced by diverse 
positions, some of them extreme. The sensitivity of the issue is 
perceived in the Parliament. Members of religious parties opposes 
regularly to demonstrations promoted by organizations that defend 
homosexual's rights, especially if the events have high symbolic 
relevance or if they are to take place in Jerusalem. In the last years 
amendments have been proposed to ban gay parades and rallies. The 
motivations adduced are public disturbance, offense to the public 
morale or religious considerations. A Shas MK, Nissim Zeev, defined 
oftentimes homosexuals as a plague for the society and a threat for the 
existence of the Jewish State. He proposed an extensive campaign for 
the recovery of homosexuals in rehabilitation centers where they could 
undergo "normalization" treatments (adding that the treatment should 
be mandatory for homosexuals who break the law)14. In 2007, the same 
MK declared that he was ready to promote a bill that would ban gay 
sexual relations if a sufficient political consensus was found in the 
                                                 
12 Baruch Marzel is a well-known right wing activist in Israel whose extreme positions in 
various fields often earn him the prime scene. He was affiliated with many right wing 
political parties, He was a candidate for a small right wing party during the last Knesset 
elections but the party did not reach the electoral threshold. 
13 Kyzer L.,  (2010,  July 29) Anti-gay protesters: Sick perverts - get out of  Jerusalem in 
Haaretz at http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/anti-gay-protesters-sick-perverts-get-
out-of-jerusalem-1.304824 
14 Zino A. (2008, January 29), MK Zeev: Gay 'plague' could destroy Israel" in Ynet, 
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3500042,00.html 
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Knesset.15 Also inside the Likud, one of the two biggest parties in Israel 
since the Seventies, representing a laic right wing, some internal 
factions have been promoting much conservative views on gender 
minorities. Emblematic is the figure of Moshe Feiglin who openly 
declared in 2009 to be a proud homophobic and refused to confront 
with organizations that engaged in the defense of homosexual's rights 
in order not to legitimize these movements. Only recently Feiglin 
denied his position, maintaining however that, despite the respect for 
homosexuals as human beings, he will oppose any attempt to spread in 
the countries values that are dear to that community16.  
Leaving the most critical voices aside, the Knesset has been often 
accused of scarce activism in improving the rights of sexual minorities 
in Israel. Nitzan Horowitz (from Meretz, a left wing party that has been 
present in the Knesset with an average of 5 seats in the last 10 years), is 
one of the most committed MKs as it regards sexual minorities rights. 
He proposed in 2012 a bill that would allow gay marriage (as well as 
interfaith one. The bill was rejected with a result of 11 in favor and -39 
against. Accusations were made by the proponent of the bills and by 
the supporting group. The Government was blamed for trading social 
progress for coalition interests and for being hostage of the extremist 
religious logic that would let the majority of the secular population 
without representation17. Coalition interests undoubtedly play a strong 
role in this kind of issues; religious parties are basically always 
involved in Government coalitions (both leaded by right and left wing 
parties). They strongly oppose any controversial issue that might 
endanger their sets of values; their opposition (or better, the 
abandonment of the coalition) might mean the end of the   
Government. Moreover it is to note that also the leading parties (in 
particular the Likud) have factions that appeal to a religious or very 
conservative electorate. This creates internal divisions on sensitive 
                                                 
15 Meranda A. (2007, June 21), Shas MK Proposes 'rehab centers' for Gays in Ynet at 
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3415870,00.html  
16 Elis N., (2013, July 2)  Feiglin tells 'Post': I am not a homophobe in Jerusalem Post, at 
http://www.jpost.com/NationalNews/Article.aspx?id=302560 
17 Harkov L, (2012, May 16) Knesset rejects marriage equality bill,  in Jerusalem Post at 
http://www.jpost.com/Diplomacy-and-Politics/Knesset-rejects-marriage-equality-bill 
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issues that are likely to push the global equilibrium toward more 
moderate approach. The result and the scarce attendance to the vote in 
fact, enlighten how the issue is generally perceived as a minefield in 
which also the non-religious-bound- MKs (or the non-coalition-bound- 
ones) prefer not to go into. The direct and the transversal impact of 
religious positions causes the legislative body to progress with 
difficulty on this path of integration and struggle for equality. Even if, 
in general, the country can boast a modern and quite progressive 
position on sexual minorities issues, any further progress (with an 
adequate and complete legislative apparatus) and the fight against 
discrimination (through the equalization of sexual minorities status) 
becomes every time a critic political and social issue.  
 
Women 
Another serious discriminatory attitude that is traceable in the society 
despite the general commitment of the State to avoid it, is the 
discrimination against women. Violence against women is an 
unfortunate widespread phenomenon all around the world, without 
exception for the "well civilized and liberal Western countries". An 
increasing sensibility has been growing on the issue to prevent violence 
and discrimination of any kind included the domestic one. A 
comprehensive regulative framework aiming to protect women's right, 
to defend them from violence and to valorize them in the society is one 
of the basic indicators of a country's social development nowadays. The 
commitment to educate the entire society to respect women and to 
denounce crimes against them is another basic element. As previously 
mentioned Israel is a modern country, equipped and committed to 
protect women. A legal framework exists on this matter and public 
structures are available to allow women to escape from a violent 
environment. Gender equality and the emancipation of woman as a 
fundamental actor in the development of public good is one of the basic 
ideological tenets of Zionism. It found expression in the socialist 
culture of the kibbutzim since the beginning of the Jewish enterprise in 
Israel. Nonetheless, criticisms have been moved about the existence of a 
patriarchal Jewish conception that relegates women to the role of 
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mothers and wives in the society18. This view has been attributed to the 
classical Jewish view of woman, derived from religious practices and 
interpretations. 
Premised that many women belonging to religious communities (of 
any kind, also the more strictly observant) enjoy a satisfying life and 
are free to realize their professional and personal aspirations; premised 
also that violence, segregation and discrimination are not exclusively 
ascribable to religious communities but are the result of individual 
brutality and deviated practices that can be traced in all stratus of the 
population (both in Israel and in the world) it is worthy to analyze 
more in detail how some religious predicaments often re-elaborated 
and crystallized in a closed and stagnant social practice can lead to 
women discrimination and to a general underestimation of the 
feminine role in the society. 
Holy Scriptures and Jewish tradition assign to women an ancillary 
position, usually inferior and subordinate to men, with rare exceptions. 
Beyond physical considerations on biological inferiority (that might 
have been justified in a period in which biology knowledge was not 
developed), women have been forbidden to study sacred books for a 
long time (exclusion that Judaism shared with other religions) and from 
being ordained leaders of the religious community (trait that, again, is 
not an exclusive one). A chauvinistic view of women as untrustworthy 
and inclined to lies and malice spread in the past and still endures, 
even though mitigated, in most of the communities (women for 
example are not allowed to serve in the religious judicial bodies and to 
appear as witnesses). In the event that the malicious nature of the 
woman manifest, the man is allowed to intervene to re-establish her 
moral equilibrium or her obedience. This corrective action can be 
performed, according to the Sages also through physical violence.  
The positive function attributed to the woman, usually regards her 
central role in the family, in her procreative capability her serene 
                                                 
18 Berkovitch N., (1997). Motherhood as a national mission: The construction of 
womanhood in the legal discourse in Israel, in Women's Studies International Forum, 
20:5/6: 605-519. 
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obedience. When women have these qualities, they can succeed in 
another fundamental task: to make men's life more complete and 
pleasant.  Religious books praise women for their familiar-care-giver 
role. Through Jewish tradition (and through the main monotheistic 
religions), the domestic role of women became popular and commonly 
accepted for a long time in all Western world. Most religious Jewish 
communities today regard these concepts with veneration for their 
sacred or authoritative provenience and at the same time, with a more 
detached attitude as it regards their applications. For many scholars 
(especially those following the feminist approach), the justification of 
this picturesque domestic ideal of woman is only a more gilded way to 
have a discriminatory practice19 accepted. More "optimistic" 
interpretations however can be taken into account as a quite genuine 
attempt to safeguard sacred concepts or authoritative teachings in the 
light of a modern approach to Judaism and to interpersonal relations. 
For example, the popular statement that women have a less stringent 
obligation to pray and no need for holy garment because of the higher 
spiritual elevation; the renewed centrality of family and of the raising 
of Jewish new generation acquired (with a consequent exaltation of 
woman's role) can certainly be interpreted as attempts to give tradition 
a new more modern meaning without abandoning the ideal. 
The modern interpretation of these ideas is however not equally spread 
or accepted in Jewish communities. In certain cases, individual and 
community practices are still strictly related to a literal interpretation of 
the most discriminative parts of the religious teachings. The 
community dynamics, at times, are still ruled by obsolete patriarchal 
logics that entails heavy gender based discrimination. In some ultra-
Orthodox communities women are subject to a strict code of behavior 
both inside and outside the domestic environment. Ultra-conservative 
views of woman status are applied also to women that are not part of 
the community. A rigorous application of the concept of tzinut 
(modesty) limits freedom of choice in dressing and in establishing 
                                                 
19 See Serebro K.L., (2010) Perspectives of Orthodox, Jewish women regarding the 
perceived effects of Jewish religious and cultural values on women’s choices in abusive 
relationships. Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand. 
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interpersonal relationships. Women are requested to wear long and 
usually dark clothes. Physical contact (and sometimes also eye contact) 
is allowed only among the marital sphere (with certain restrictions also 
in this sphere, on the basis of the physical "purity" of the woman20). The 
exclusive presence in a closed space of two people of different sex is 
forbidden as well. In certain neighborhoods special segregation applies 
also to public spaces. Several attempts have been made (some 
successful, some not) to set segregated public spaces (walking sides for 
example).  
The contrast with the principles of a modern democratic society is clear. 
If this segregationist attitude was limited to women that voluntarily21 
chose to live in these communities and to adhere to this set of beliefs, 
the "problem" would be only cultural and educational. On the contrary, 
when discriminatory and segregationist attitudes are extended to all 
women, independently from their will, they constitute a substantial 
harm to the quality of democracy. Segregated communities exist in 
which discriminatory attitudes are the result of a common morale. The 
common morale is enforced in public and also "outsiders" are subject to 
it (they must dress "properly", behave "properly" etc.). This marks the 
existence a State within the State, in which the law becomes somehow 
subordinate to other ruling principles. In Israel, a woman who lives in 
or passes by specific neighborhoods (or close to them) can be directly 
discriminated against if she does not comply with the social rules that 
the community. Discrimination can consist in social pressure (isolating 
behaviors of different kinds), verbal or even physical violence. This 
attitude can be attributed to crystallized social practices and radicalized 
interpretation of religious norms. In Ultraorthodox neighborhoods 
episodes of intolerance are frequently registered: spitting to women 
and  young girls (also religious) for their colored (so immodest) clothes, 
yelling at them offences, assaulting them with irritating spray because 
                                                 
20 The marital physical contact is regulated by the concept of Niddah that requires a 
physical distance between spouses during the menstrual period and about seven days 
after the end of it (with small differences according to the ritual followed). 
21 The issue of free will in the adhesion to such a paradigm should be analyzed carefully 
considering the eventual lack of alternatives, at practical level or at the level of social 
constrains. 
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of their  forbidden proximity to guys or men22. Also members of the 
community are punished if they deviate from the behavioral standards. 
Punitive actions are perpetrated by family members or by organized 
modesty squads (previously mentioned) that intervene, even with 
physical power, to "reestablish the morality". Intervening with violence 
for the sake of an alleged morality is already an abuse. Furthermore, 
this kind of social dynamic sometimes gives a perfect alibi to cases of 
more elementary deviant behavior of men who act violently against 
their wives, sisters, daughters and female relatives. Violent men count 
on women's submissive attitude that they have been educated to, their 
difficulty to find a way out from the closed community or their 
inability to get valid help. Abused women in segregated community 
are weaker victims because often they do not possess cultural and 
material strength to rebel. Religious education and values to which 
they adhere usually proudly and happily are proved to influence 
women’s attitude and choices in abusive relationships. Gender 
stereotypes are perpetuated by the religious logic, especially when this 
is strictly applied23. Graetz maintains that women self-validation 
through male approval can lead to justify abuses and to perceive them 
as legitimate educational means24. Sense of shame is also very 
developed in religious community: damaging the name of somebody is 
expressly forbidden by the sacred scriptures and a certain hesitation is 
perceived in denouncing the abuser, especially in the case of family 
members. Moreover an important religious task that is assigned to 
women in the religious culture is to keep peace in the house. This 
concept has been criticized by feminist scholars for the burden that 
inflicts on women. Women, therefore, are held responsible for 
maintaining calm and serenity in the home. Doing so, they accomplish 
the aim of a happy marriage. In case of domestic abuse, the deeply 
                                                 
22 The Associated Press, (2008, October, 4) Jewish ‘modesty patrols’ sow fear in Israel in 
NBC News at http://www.nbcnews.com/id/27023066/print/1/displaymode/1098/ 
23 Serebro K. L.(2010) Perspectives of Orthodox, Jewish women regarding the perceived 
effects of Jewish religious and cultural values on women’s choices in abusive 
relationships, Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand. 
24 Graetz N., (1998) Judaism Confronts Wife-Beating in Woman in Judaism in A 
Multidisciplinary Journal, 1:2.  
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interiorized concept of Shalom HaBait25 can create a sense of guilt in the 
woman for not being able to maintain a peaceful house.  As a 
consequence she might increase her level of submission in the attempt 
to reach a more peaceful atmosphere. Beyond the religious personal 
beliefs, a woman might encounter practical obstacles to rebel to an 
abusive condition. Especially in the Ultraorthodox world, both for 
religious and for economic reasons, it is unlikely that an abused woman 
will inform a lawyer or an external member of her situation of distress. 
She is more likely to ask for suggestion to a family member or, better, 
to a rabbi. Since the above mentioned morale is generally respected by 
all family members (and in case of the parents even enforced by them), 
sometimes women's request of help are downplayed. Many reasons can 
lead to ignore women's complain: families might be unwilling to 
expose themselves to scandals in the community; women's complains 
might be considered exaggerate; violence might not be seen as a serious 
phenomenon. In this phase, rabbis have a crucial role. Women who 
turn to a rabbi to ask for help demonstrate firm trust in religion as an 
institution and commitment to live according to religious rules. 
Therefore the rabbi's answer is likely to be accepted and not contested. 
Rabbis' reaction might be very different from case to case since the 
position on woman abuse (especially physical) is various. Many rabbis 
have been taking a clear stance against gender based discrimination 
and violence. Basing their positions on sacred scriptures and Sages' 
opinions, they actively cooperate with shelter houses or programs of 
rehabilitation for abused women. These rabbis would certainly advice 
the woman to leave the abusive house and even ask for a divorce.  
Other rabbis, especially in case of nonphysical violence, might instead 
encourage the woman to tolerate the situation, minimizing the abuse as 
a sporadic episode and reminding the woman of her sacred duty of 
keeping Shalom HaBait.  
Divorce is another big obstacle for religious women. The fear to shame 
their families discourages the departure from the abusive home. 
Furthermore, this would put at risk their personal reputation and that 
of their children. Divorce is not an enticing option for religious women, 
                                                 
25 Literally: Peace in the house 
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and not only for personal reasons. In Israel matters of personal status 
are ruled by religious tribunals and the margin of intervention of the 
civil tribunals is minimal26. Moreover, religious people are expressly 
forbidden (by religion) to turn to a non-religious tribunal. Religious 
tribunals are judicial bodies administered almost exclusively by men 
and that judge according to the same religious beliefs and practices that 
have just been mentioned. Even though exceptions have been verified 
and in some cases the judges stood for wives' and mothers' rights, a 
more favorable attitude toward men is generally recognized in 
religious tribunals. In many cases actually, contrasting positions have 
been taken by civil and religious courts27. The guarantees that the civil 
law offers in matter of divorce (and mostly in matter of children 
custody) prove ineffective in these cases. Another problem related to a 
request of divorce is the possibility of the husband to oppose. In Jewish 
religious law a woman has word over the man to marry (autonomously 
chosen or selected by her family, practice that is much diffused) but she 
does not have any word on the ending of the marriage. During the 
wedding ceremony in fact, a contract is stipulated between the 
woman's father and the husband-to-be in which he acquires authority 
on the woman and exclusive rights on their union. Only the husband 
will be able to rescind the marriage, renouncing on his rights over the 
wife and freeing her from his authority (through an authorization 
known as get). Women whose husband would not agree to free them 
from the marital obligation remain bound to the marriage contract and 
cannot marry again nor have halachically legitimate children while 
men enjoy a bigger freedom even in the case they are in an open 
divorce-trial28. In light of what said, the decision to divorce for a 
religious woman can lead to lose her husband, her name, the support of 
                                                 
26 This argument will be extensively treated in the following paragraphs. At this stage it 
will be only briefly mentioned to guarantee a complete analysis of the topic of gender 
based discrimination.  
27 As it will be explained in the following paragraphs, religious and civil courts have 
competitive authority in cases of divorce. Moreover, the Supreme Court can be asked to 
review religious tribunals' verdicts. 
28 Children's status, according to Halacha, is determined from the mother. In case of a 
non-divorced woman the children would be the result of adultery, thus considered 
bastards, with heavy consequences for their religious and social integration. 
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the family and of the community, her children and not to be able to 
start a new life as a woman, wife and mother of legitimate Jewish kids. 
With these premises, the perspective of a new life is likely to seem 
scarier than desirable and the risk is significant that women will not 
take stance against their abuser and will keep living in a situation of 
degradation and abuse.  
As discussed the State actively fights against women discrimination 
and violence through an articulated set of rule. The establishment of a 
competitive authority between religious and civil courts for the ruling 
divorce-related matters represents a crucial tool for the fight against 
women discrimination. However it is not sufficient to grant a total 
avoidance of discriminatory behaviors, partially because of reticence of 
the abused women to conceive the violations as crimes and partially 
because of the circumvention of the law and a lax commitment to 
control.  
The existence of segregated buses is another striking example. IRAC 
dates the creation of the first segregated Mehadrin29 buses in 1998 but 
the first "official" source is dated 2001. In this year, Egged (the main 
public transportation company in Israel, cooperative owned and 
subsidized by the State) established segregated bus lines to serve routes 
most used by Ultraorthodox. The agreement was stipulated by the 
transportation company in order not to lose market in favor of private 
Haredi companies. In the agreement with the Mehadrin Council, 
cheaper fares were set and special conditions were agreed between the 
two parts30. In these buses, appropriate clothing is generally required, 
distribution of advertisements and commercial radio programming is 
forbidden. Moreover, there are separated entrances and seats for men 
                                                 
29 Mehadrin (lit. beautified) is a term that is usually used in relation to food religious 
restrictions. It indicates the more rigid standard of rabbinical supervision as it regards the 
application of dietary laws. As a metaphor it indicates a specific very strict interpretation 
of religious predicaments that would lead to the total avoidance of contact between men 
and women outside the marriage context.   
30 For a more detailed report on the agreement and see Ilan S., (2001 October 24 ) 
Haredim may get gender-separated bus line, in Haaretz, at 
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/haredim-may-get-gender-separated-bus-
line-1.72777 
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and women: women enter from the back door and sit in the back seats 
while men enter from the front door and sit in the front seats. The 
rationale behind it is to avoid any contact among travelers and preserve 
their mental purity. Since the beginning, the fact instigated a fervent 
debate on the consequences in terms of gender equality and on the 
democratic failure that these buses represented. The transportation 
company and the Ministry of Transportation maintained a careful 
approach: at first they denied the existence of such an arrangement and 
then they assumed a detached position and remarked on the possible 
economic loss if they were not to perform the service (that would have 
been performed anyway by unauthorized Haredi buses). The initiative 
started in places with significant ultraorthodox population (like Bnei 
Brak or specific religious neighborhoods in Jerusalem), and developed 
year after year. In 2010 about 50 Mehadrin lines were active (serving 
cities like Ashdod, Haifa and Arad, where the Ultraorthodox 
population is a minority).  Voluntary spatial disposition in a bus does 
not necessarily mean segregation (even though it can result strange, 
obsolete and also not educational in the eyes of an external observer). 
However, episodes of mistreatment, verbal and physical violence 
occurred several times when women occupied front positions and 
refused to move to the back upon request of male passengers31. In 2007, 
the Israel Religious Action Center (IRAC) filed a petition against Egged 
and the Ministry of Transportation, representing five women who 
claimed to be victims of violence due to their resistance to obey to the 
segregation practice32. The State set up a committee that would 
investigate about the dynamics that regulate such a public service. As a 
result of the committee, an experimental season was initiated with a 
stricter commitment to control. Due to the scarce results reached in this 
phase, the Supreme Court was called again to pronounce a judgment 
on the matter. With a sentence that was welcomed by both sides as a 
                                                 
31 One of the most popular reports on these events is described in: Berman D., Canadian 
woman beaten on Egged bus joins High Court petition (2007 February 2) in Haaretz at 
http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/anglo-file/canadian-woman-beaten-on-egged-bus-
joins-high-court-petition-1.211790 
32 IRAC, (2010) Excluded, For God’s Sake: Gender Segregation in Public Space in Israel at 
Jerusalem: Israel Religious Action Center. 
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victory, in 2010, the Supreme Court ruled the illegality of forced 
segregation in public spaces but it did not forbid any voluntary 
arrangement, not enforcing significant changes to the situation. Special 
bus lines are still active in Israel. The transportation company denied 
that an official arrangement is still in force but in the Haredi press 
announcements have been published about "special lines" with time 
schedules and further details33. Cases of discrimination and pressure 
toward women that oppose segregation are still registered and 
denounced. NGOs and activist groups are monitoring the situation and 
updating the media and the political world. The main request is not the 
cancellation of these lines but the creation of alternative ones for 
citizens that are not willing to conform to segregation. At the moment, 
the choice to take "normal" buses is onerous in terms of money and 
time, since the Mehadrin buses drive in faster routes and cost less. On 
the political side, general condemnation is given to specific episodes of 
violence and women "resistance" is praised as civil symbols against 
extremism34. However no political stance has been taken so far to 
improve the situation. 
 
 
b) Ethnic Discrimination 
The ethnic dimension in Israel is a complex one due to the political 
ethnic-based conflict that started before the creation of the State, 
accompanied its formation and resulted in military conflicts along the 
years. Moreover, the ethnic fracture is perceived in Israel both as an 
internal and as an external issue. Most of the Arab neighbor countries 
are considered a potential threat (or, worse, declared enemies); the 
Arab population of Israel is assimilated to the Arab enemy and 
identified as an internal danger to the survival of the State. Also 
                                                 
33 Ettinger  Y., (2011, June 21) Israeli bus company advocates segregated seats despite 
court ruling in Haaretz at http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/israeli-bus-
company-advocates-segregated-seats-despite-court-ruling-1.368789 
34 Ettinger Y., (2011, December 19) Israeli leaders are to blame for the religious 
segregation they decry, in Haaretz at http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/israeli-
leaders-are-to-blame-for-the-religious-segregation-they-decry-1.402330 
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historical reasons play a fundamental role in the perception of other 
ethnicities as a potential danger for the Jewish people and contribute to 
a defensive attitude toward them. Religion plays a crucial role in 
enlarging the ethnic fracture and in making positions more extreme. In 
Judaism, Jewish people are seen as an exclusive group. Recurrent calls 
are made for the defense of Jewish identity, beliefs and culture from 
exterior influences. Non-Jews are not considered to be inferior per se but 
the acceptance of the religious norms by the Jewish people pose them 
on a higher level (a higher level of responsibilities thus closeness 
toward God). From this basic concept, however, many doctrinal 
extensions have been generated in the religious literature. For example, 
it is still controversial whether the principle of the sacredness of life 
(that is prevalent over any other commandment) applies or not to non-
Jewish lives35. Even though other prescriptions are present that incite to 
tolerance and harmonious coexistence, some famous interpretations 
undoubtedly encourage a discriminatory approach to ethnic 
differences36. As a practical result (with religion not being the exclusive 
cause, as explained above), many well-known rabbis in the country 
were authors of incitement to violence and discrimination, especially 
against the Arab population, defined as the enemy37. Even though this 
                                                 
35 As said, this prescription is actually controversial but finds authoritative and influential 
supporters. Doctrinarian texts present different views on the issue, limiting sometimes 
the permission to Jews or to righteous Gentiles. The modern interpretation, also 
promoted by the Rabbinate of Israel, is an egalitarian one: Jews and non-Jews should be 
saved, transgressing the Shabbat or any other commandment. From time to time, 
however, the debate is reopened by provocative declarations of religious Jewish 
authorities. See Ynet, (2012, May 17) Rabbi Yosef: Treating gentiles violates Sabbath in 
Ynet,  at http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4229767,00.html    
36 Mozgovaya N.,(2010 October 20) ADL slams Shas spiritual leader for saying non-Jews 
'were born to serve Jews' in Haaretz at http://www.haaretz.com/jewish-world/adl-slams-
shas-spiritual-leader-for-saying-non-jews-were-born-to-serve-jews-1.320235. 
37 Verbal discrimination against the Arab population is fostered by political reasons 
beside religious ones. However definitions of Arabs as enemies and somehow inferior 
beings are not exclusive. In fact they are part of a more general verbal discrimination 
against non-Jews. Rabbi Joseph Ovadia for example stated that Gentiles have been 
created to serve Jews and their life is granted by God only not to create a material loss to 
Jews, like in case of a donkey. More extremist voices have defined Arabs "dogs" (Rabbi 
Meir Kahane, well known in the Eighties for his defamatory activity toward Arabs and 
killed by an Arab gunman in 1990) and Gentiles animals in comparison to Jews. 
243 
attitude is not universally agreed upon and even if religion per se 
cannot be held responsible for a discriminatory approach to 
interpersonal relations, its use as one of the sources for ethnic 
discrimination cannot be denied. 
As an example, the phenomenon of selective housing and the attempt 
to create homogeneous ethnic neighborhood is one of the causes of 
ethnic discrimination and harm the quality of democracy, even if 
perpetrated as an individual act and not in conformity to the law. In 
Deuteronomy 7:2 is written: "You must doom them to destruction, grant 
them no terms and give them no quarter" referring to the nations that the 
Jews had to defeat in order to take possess of the Land of Israel. As 
further elaboration of this sentence, many Sages derived the 
prohibition of giving land (or properties) situated in Israel to non-
Jews38. It is controversial how Muslims should be treated in the 
observance of this prohibition. Muslims, in fact, are considered by 
Judaism on a higher level than other gentile religions since they hold 
monotheistic belief. According to this view, some religious authorities 
consider the possibility to rent or sell them Jewish property in Israel 
less abhorrent than selling it to so called "idolaters".  From a minority 
but important position, Rabbi Menachem Hameiri39and Rabbi Baruch 
Epstein maintain that this prohibition regarded only the seven ancient 
immoral nations populating Israel in biblical times. It would be wrong 
to apply it to ethical "strangers" whose lives are guided by religious 
norms40. Nonetheless, this remains an almost unheard voice. Rabbi 
Ovadia Yosef (spiritual and political leader of Shas), has been 
confirming with vehement tones the halachich prohibition of selling 
houses to non-Jews. Besides the religious forbiddance, he has been 
presenting further social reasons to respect such a provision. Therefore, 
the presence of non-Jewish population in a Jewish neighborhood might 
jeopardize the Jewish lifestyle, introducing a complete different culture 
                                                 
38 Talmud Mas. Avoda Zara 20a 
39 Mishnei Torah Beit Habehira AZ 20 
40 Brody S., (2010, November 19) Why the call not to sell land to non-Jews in Safed? in 
Jerusalem Post, at http://www.jpost.com/Jewish-World/Judaism/Why-the-call-not-to-sell-
land-to-non-Jews-in-Safed 
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and customs that might favor by the way a sharp conflict41. The 
position of Rabbi Ovadia was actually shared publicly by about 40 
rabbis who turn to the vast public warning the Jewish population on 
the risks of selling or renting Jewish property to Gentiles. After the 
public message in which the cession of Jewish property to Gentiles was 
described as contaminating the Jewish lifestyle, exposing the 
community to the unfortunate risk of intermarriage and causing a 
devaluation of the estate in all the area42, Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu took the distances from this position. The statement was 
rebuked for leading to possible antidemocratic derives. Netanyahu 
invited the religious community not to promote such ideas that in the 
past had been used against Jews. Moreover, the Prime Minister recalled 
the tolerant message of the Torah that suggests living in peace and 
harmony with the neighbors.43 The reaction of the Prime Minister is in 
line with the legal provisions that do not ban any estate transaction 
with any ethnic group and promote equality and freedom. On the other 
hand, some influence of this discriminatory attitude on the large public 
and, partially, on the institutional apparatus is traceable. An interesting 
case is the one of the rural community Nevatim. In 2010 a Jewish 
couple was heavily bullied (with disparaging message, damages 
against the patrimony and heavy harassment) for renting their house to 
a Bedouin family. In Nevatim, an internal committee had the authority 
of admitting interested buyers to be part of the community. When the 
community ruled against the rental to the Bedouin family, the Jewish 
renter turned to court, which established restrictive conditions for the 
new inhabitants in the attempt to find a compromise with the 
community. The phenomenon of the vetting committee is not a rare one 
in Israel and it has often been used to maintain ethnic homogeneity 
inside the area. About 700 rural communities in Israel applied 
discriminatory criteria against non-Jews and remained exclusively 
                                                 
41 Nashoni K., (2010, October 28) Rabbi Ovadia, selling homes to non-Jews prohibited in 
Ynet at http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3976568,00.html  
42 Jpost Staff, (2010 July 12) 40 rabbis Jews shouldn’t rent sell homes to gentiles , in 
Jerusalem Post, at http://www.jpost.com/LandedPages/PrintArticle.aspx?id=198353 
43 Mandel J & Hartman B., (2010 December 8) PM blasts rabbi's calls not to sell 
apartments to non-Jews in Jerusalem Post at 
http://www.jpost.com/JewishWorld/JewishNews/Article.aspx?id=198473 
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populated by Jewish population44. Independently from the legal status 
of these communities that might be private areas in which the owners 
retain the complete authority on the admission of new members, it is 
important to reflect on the political inactivity about such situations 
(even when they produce to explicit discriminatory results) and on the 
broadness of the attitude, that is posed into action publicly and 
effectively. Yair Ettinger, commenting the letter of the rabbis said: 
"These things (discrimination against Arabs, saying that their way of 
living is different than the Jews and that Jews' oppressors are among 
them) in the past wouldn’t be acceptable in Israeli society. But now, 
even though it is not politically correct, people allow themselves to say 
things in public that you wouldn’t even dare to say in a private 
synagogue. It's a big change".45 
 
 
c) Discrimination against other religious group 
Discrimination against proselytizer religious movements in the country 
is only partially based on ethnic criteria but poses a shade on the 
relation between religion and rule of the law. This kind of 
discrimination is mainly perpetrated by individuals or private groups 
but it strays in the political sphere and it occasionally reflects on 
legislative initiatives. Proselytizing is legal in Israel and missionaries of 
all religious groups are allowed to carry on their mission. Israel has 
signed many of the international conventions on freedom of religion46 
and its Declaration of Independence expressly exalts freedom of 
                                                 
44 Cook J., (2010, March 22) Israel's no renting to Arab policy, in Global research 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/israel-s-no-renting-to-arabs-policy/18267 
45 Mitnick J., (2010, December 9) Rabbis tell Israeli Jews not to rent to Arabs; even 
Holocaust museum frowns. in CSmonitor, at http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-
East/2010/1209/Rabbis-tell-Israeli-Jews-not-to-rent-to-Arabs-even-Holocaust-museum-
frowns 
46 See, for example, many of the United Nations conventions: the UN Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the UN International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, the UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights etc. 
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worship and abhorrence of discrimination in this field. Citizens, 
residents and visitors are formally allowed to practice their religion, 
including conducting proselyting activity47. Some limits however are 
posed by the law: from 1977, offering material benefits as an 
inducement to conversion is forbidden by law. It is also illegal to 
perform a conversion ceremony for persons under 18 years of age 
unless one parent is an adherent of the religious group. Despite the 
legal permission, several intolerant messages have been addressed by 
Jewish clergy to religious movements that deploy missionaries for 
conversion purposes. Israel is a multicultural and multi-religious 
country inhabited and visited by millions of believers of different 
religions (due also to the presence of places that are sacred to several 
religions, like Jerusalem, Hebron, the Jordan River etc.). Some 
missionary groups are active in the area, in particular Witnesses of 
Jehovah and some Christian cults. Judaism (like Islam to a certain 
extent) does not seek conversion and, on the contrary, requires a 
complicated path for conversion in order to discourage applicants and 
limit the conversion to those who prove an exceptional commitment. 
The general feeling toward proselyting movements therefore is of 
suspicion. Moreover, proselytizers are the incarnation of the external 
influences that could undermine the closeness to the Jewish people to 
God and, in the eyes of Jewish believers must be fought against. Rabbis 
and religious groups raise their voices against proselytizers whenever 
their activities become public. The case of Jehovah's Witnesses is 
emblematic of the contrast between the law and the actual conduct, 
carried on also by elected officials. Whilst a Jehovah's Witnesses 
community was initially allowed to hold their meetings in Raanana 
sport hall, the room was successively negated, in the aftermath of a 
protests made by a member of the city hall. Similarly, in another city, 
two Jehovah's Witnesses who were doing door to door activity were 
fined with the accusation of "peddling" without a license and their 
                                                 
47 US Department of State, International religious freedom report Israel and occupied 
territories  at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2002/13997.htm 
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Bibles were confiscated48. One of the Christian cults more dedicated to 
proselyting, the Evangelical congregation, was prized for stipulating an 
agreement with the government renouncing to its missionary activity 
in Israel. Particular attention is devoted among the Jewish religious 
establishment and in the public opinion to the Messianic Jewish 
community. This religious group is composed by halachically Jewish 
people who accepted Jesus as the Messiah. They live as Jews respecting, 
in addition, the predicaments of the New Testament. It is obvious to 
understand why the Messianic community is committed to persuade 
their fellow Jews to accept in their Jewish lives, the figure of Jesus as 
the Messiah. This group represents a hybrid because of its ethnic 
belonging to the Jewish people (recognized by the State) but poses de 
facto a threat to the Jewish theological apparatus (accepting Jesus as the 
Messiah). Religious authorities and groups of believers are especially 
active against Messianic Jews' activity. Threats against them varied 
from verbal to physical harassment. In 2006, the chief rabbi of the 
Ethiopian community of Rehovot expressed the Jewish community's 
dismay over the activity of a Messianic community in the area. The 
rabbi asserted that his community was ready to attack the missionary 
group if they would not stop their activity of proselytism49; he also 
proposed to create a black list within the Ethiopian community to 
exclude those who engage in missionary activity from any social 
intercourse in the Ethiopian community. This act would have had 
harsh consequences on the excluded members, preventing them from 
marrying and living an integrated life within the Ethiopian community. 
In September 2007, the Chief Rabbinate warned Jews not to participate 
to the Sukkot celebration organized by the Messianic community since 
it might have been an occasion for the group to approach Jews and 
convince them to convert. In a more violent manifestation, in May 2008, 
some Yeshiva Haredi students burnt several copies of the New 
                                                 
48 This emblematic episode is reported on the United States Department of State,  (2012 
July 30), 2011 Report on International Religious Freedom - Israel and the occupied 
territories, at  http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,USDOS,,ISR,,502105b15f,0.html 
49 Wagner M. (2006, October 18), Ethiopians fight Christian proselytizers, in Jerusalem 
Post at http://www.jpost.com/LandedPages/PrintArticle.aspx?id=38318. 
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Testament as a sign of protest for the missionary activity of some 
Christian groups and Messianic Jews.  
As said, missionary activity directed to Jews is generally not well seen; 
nor is the interest and conversion of Jews to other cults. Formal and 
informal Jewish groups have been deploying discriminatory campaigns 
against the missionary groups, sometimes publicly stigmatizing them 
through leaflets containing pictures, names and addresses of the 
adherents50. One of the most active organizations in fighting against 
proselytism, whose mission is to help new immigrants and Jews in 
general to integrate in Israel and to live a Jewish life, is called Yad 
LeAchim (Hand to the Brothers). This organization was reported to 
harass and assault groups of proselytizers (or individuals) and to 
pressure landlords and employers to adhere to their anti-missionary 
campaigns (thus potentially encouraging the application of 
discriminative criteria in the employment sector and in the estate 
transactions). Yad LeAchim promoted in 2013 an anti-missionary 
campaign on the IDF radio to warn the audience about the dangers of 
the missionary activity of certain religious groups. The Supreme Court 
intervened in this initiative denying at first the permission to air the 
advertisement and then accepting a new formulation that stressed the 
prohibition of material compensation as an incentive to conversion.51 
This organization has been denounced by the media and by several 
NGOs for its illegal and violent methods of action. In 2010, for example, 
The Jerusalem Institute of Justice filed a petition to the Attorney 
General asking the dismantling of Yad LeAchim. The file contained a 
detailed analysis of the illegal acts committed by the organization in 
contrast with the national legal framework. The document also 
                                                 
50 Eglash R., (2011 September 1) Messianic Jews ‘named and shamed’ in J'lem-area town 
in Jerusalem Post, at http://www.jpost.com/National-News/Messianic-Jews-named-and-
shamed-in-Jlem-area-town  
51   Arutz Sheva,(2013, February 8) Anti-Missionary Campaign due to start on IDF Radio,  
in Arutz7, at www.israelnationalnews.com/News/Flash.aspx/261689#.UR4LpaWpXng 
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denounced an "unlawful cooperation between Ministry of the Interior 
officials and (the) activists" of the organization52. 
Despite proselytism is a legal activity, the position of the Government 
has been increasingly harshening on this topic. From the Nineties, 
several bills have been presented to the Knesset, especially by MKs 
from religious parties who tried to ban the proselyting activity in the 
country. The 1997 anti-missionary bill was promoted by a number of 
MKs among which Nissim Zvili (Labour Party) and Moshe Gafni 
(United Torah party). It aimed to the prosecution of those who 
advertised and recommended conversion opportunities distributing 
leaflets and other written material. After an intense debate both in the 
local and in the international public opinion, the bill was eventually 
modified and defeated. The pressure of national and international 
bodies and organization that denounced the potential harm that the bill 
would entail in terms of freedom of religion played a decisive role in 
the matter. In 1998, Raphael Pinchasi (Shas) presented another anti-
missionary bill with stronger sanctions for attempting to change 
somebody's religion (up to 10 years of prison). In more recent times 
(2007), Yaakov Margi (Shas) proposed to punish missionary activities 
with an imprisonment sanction from 6 months to one year. Recent facts 
demonstrate a particular restrictive interpretation of the norms till de 
facto establishing an informal illegality of proselyting in Israel and 
spreading among the public the perception that this activity is illegal53. 
Some nonresidents (tourists, clergy, students etc.) were temporarily 
detained for religious reasons at Ben-Gurion Airport, prevented from 
entering the country, and sent back to their countries of origin because 
they were suspected of being missionaries. These events represent a 
serious infraction of the rule of law. Proselytism is legal in Israel. The 
denial of entrance in the country on the basis of religious beliefs is a 
serious violation since it is not based on any evidence of a committed 
                                                 
52 On behalf of the Jerusalem Institute of Justice, Mayers C.,(2010 February 22), "Request 
to Dismantle the Yad L'Achim Organization" at http://jij.org.il/articles/JIJ-
AG%20Request_ENG_.pdf  
53 United States Department of State,(2012, July 30) 2011 Report on International Religious 
Freedom Israel and the Occupied Territories, at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/502105b15f.html 
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crime but it assumes a predisposition to commit and illicit activity. A 
certain degree of collaboration between the Ministry of Interior and 
anti-missionaries organizations like Yad LeAchim has been denounced. 
The Ministry in fact would rely on the information obtained by this 
private organization to deny entries to the country and to expel 
people54. This method has been criticized by the judicial power which 
overturned in 2010 a ministerial decision to deny a visa to a clergy 
member, accusing him of missionary activity.  
 
 
d) Discrimination against non-Orthodox Streams of Judaism 
The unequal treatment that non-Orthodox streams of Judaism are 
subject to represents another case of discrimination clashing with the 
formal regulation. The Declaration of Independence, considered the 
document that contains the core values upon which the country is 
constituted, declares the freedom of religion and expression as rights to 
safeguard. Moreover, it defines Israel as the State where all Jews will be 
able to live safely and freely, without being discriminated. After all, this 
was the original Zionist purpose. Beside the Ultraorthodox and the 
Orthodox groups, other streams of Judaism are present in Israel, the 
Conservative, the Reform and the Reconstructionist. These streams 
differ from the Orthodox ones for the acceptation of a lighter 
theological apparatus and for a less rigid interpretation of the religious 
rules. Some of their religious practices differ from the Orthodox ones 
and such differences have been the reason of disputes also at State 
level. Religion therefore has many implications on the public sphere 
and the rabbinical establishment has a certain institutional power, both 
as an institution and on the political level, through the influence that 
exercised through religious parties. In conformity with the legal 
provision, non-Orthodox streams have no representation in the 
                                                 
54 For the collaboration between Yad L'achim and State officials as it regard the exchange 
of information on potential missionary activists, see note 45. See also Editorial "State-
backed persecution" in Haaretz, Oct 6 2009 http://www.haaretz.com/print-
edition/opinion/state-backed-persecution-1.6623 
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rabbinical institutions and are not allowed to carry on the institutional 
functions that Orthodox Rabbis are entitled to (celebrate marriages or 
convert, for example). For the same reason, some religious practices in 
public places are forbidden to non-Orthodox streams. "Women of the 
Wall" is a very famous example of unequal treatment among Jewish 
streams. "Women of the Wall" is an organization, whose members are 
mainly women from the Reform community that actively advocates for 
equal rights to all streams of Judaism. The women of the group are 
regularly prevented from praying in the most sacred Jewish place, the 
Western Wall, because of their praying method that is considered as 
unacceptable according to the Orthodox standards. These women in 
fact use specific religious tools and clothes that in Orthodox Judaism 
are a prerogative of men. Moreover, they conduct prayers and publicly 
read from the Torah. These practices are considered to be inappropriate 
and even blaspheme by the orthodox and the ultraorthodox 
movements. Since the Western Wall is managed according to orthodox 
rules, the praying area is strictly segregated (and sometimes the entire 
square) and non-Orthodox practices are forbidden but in a small 
secondary area of the Western Wall55. 
Usually, whenever the Women of the Wall approach the Western Wall 
and start their prayer, the security forces stop them, sometimes 
arresting them for disturbing the public order and performing a 
forbidden action (that is praying according to non-Orthodox 
procedures)56. Even though, formally, the accusations moved to the 
Women of the Wall have a normative source, it is easy to see how these 
norms clash against freedom of expression and are functional to satisfy 
specific requests of one Jewish stream. The State position is ambiguous: 
it condemns extreme acts of discrimination but it enforces or does not 
prevent the enforcement of discriminatory provisions. Doing so, the 
State neglects some of the fundamental intentions expressed in the 
                                                 
55 United States Department of State, (2012, July 30) 2011 Report on International 
Religious Freedom - Israel and the Occupied Territories, at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/502105b15f.html  
56 Mort J. A., (2012 December 14) Union for Reform Judaism Reform Movement Dismayed 
by Continued Religious Discrimination in Israel, Union for Reform Judaism, at 
http://urj.org/about/union/pr/2012/?syspage=article&item_id=98020 
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Declaration of Independence, and in particular, a very existential one: 
to be a shelter for the Jews all around the world. The attempt of non-
Orthodox streams to gain legal equality before the law and in the 
society has encountered impenetrable resistance from the religious 
parties that defend the interests of the Orthodox and Ultraorthodox 
groups and are encouraged outside the political arena by the rabbinate 
establishment. Even the steps that have been taken in order to improve 
the conditions of these streams reveal a discriminatory attitude. It is 
true that the recent recognition of Reform rabbis57 establishes a 
precedent for public funding to Reform clergy and confers them 
legitimacy. However, this recognition has taken place under the 
authority of Ministry of Culture and Sport and not, like the other 
religious clergy, under the Ministry of Religious Services58. The fact, 
which was welcomed as an historical step in the non-Orthodox world, 
leaves an important aspect uncovered: the fact that the non-Orthodox 
rabbis will receive their stipend through Ministry of Culture and Sport, 
explicitly poses them in an inferior level in comparison to other 
religious officials (also non-Jewish) that are vested with religious 
authority and derive from it fundamental civil power. Even though 
their recognition as chiefs of cultural communities might strengthen the 
non-Orthodox communities and their legitimation in the eyes of the 
population, it does not grant them (or their followers) the same rights 
of any other recognized religious community.  
 
 
Legal and Judicial System 
                                                 
57 The civil and legal battle emblematically carried on by Miri Gold, reform rabbi and 
from other petitioners (individuals and organizations, among which, IRAC, the formal 
petitioner) lead in 2012 to the recognition of Rabbi Gold and other 15 non-Orthodox 
rabbis  whose stipend would be financed by the government and no, like that moment, 
through private funding. 
58 Ettinger Y., For first time, Israel to recognize Reform and Conservative rabbis May 29 
2012 in Haaretz, http://www.haaretz.com/jewish-world/jewish-world-news/for-first-time-
israel-to-recognize-reform-and-conservative-rabbis-1.433171 
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In matter of administration of justice and legal system in general, a 
general commitment to democracy is easily recognizable. Aharon 
Barak, president of the Supreme Court till 2006 underlined the distance 
of the Israeli legal culture from the religious one. In his interpretation, 
also in the cases in which the Jewish law is applied, it is the result of the 
secular legislation that is rather inspired to the Western model of 
democracy based on equality, peace, rationalism and freedom. In one 
of his articles Barak maintained that "While Israel is a "Jewish and 
democratic State" its Jewishness does not make it part of the Jewish 
legal culture". Nonetheless Barak recognized that the influence of 
Jewish law is evident in the content and the language of the law, and 
that the coexistence of religious and secular laws has a deep influence 
in the Israeli legal system59.  
In this paragraph, an evident relation between religion and the legal 
and judicial system will be stressed. Religious tradition played a crucial 
role in the creation of the Israeli legal system and has been exerting a 
lasting influence on it. As main examples of this influence, I will 
address the constitutional issue, the functioning of the religious 
tribunals and the ruling principles within them. In the previous 
chapter, the legal system and the administration of justice have been 
described. Briefly, the legal system structure has been influenced by the 
historical experience of the Ottoman Empire in which the central 
imperial power was mitigated by some regional autonomy (that 
allowed the religious communities, including the Jewish one, to enjoy a 
certain degree of freedom in internal matters). The British Mandate did 
not implement major reforms, strengthening the rule of law, but 
maintaining the Ottoman habit to leave the communities free to 
conduct many activities in line with their legal and social costumes. 
With the acquisition of independence, the burden of constituting a set 
of laws that would have shaped the State, the society dynamics and the 
administration of justice became a political urge that needed to be 
resolved. The Zionist elite had in mind the construction of a modern 
state, on the model of the European States, from which most of them 
came and in which they had received their political and social 
                                                 
59 Barak A., (1997) The Tradition and Culture of the Israeli Legal System in Justice 13: 3-10 
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formation. The European conception of modern State was the one of a 
centralized state, whose legislation was emblematic of civic 
development and institutional strength. While most of the Zionist elite 
was distant from the Jewish spirituality, a religious component 
participated significantly to the Zionist enterprise and it played its 
influence in the moment in which the features of the newborn state had 
to be arranged. Putting aside the so called Religious Zionists, the 
Zionist movement itself was further articulated in different groups 
which attributed to Judaism a crucial role not only from the religious 
point of view, but from the cultural, historical and traditional. A non-
Zionist religious component was also present at the moment of the 
establishment of the State. All these groups were for all intents active 
parts of the Jewish community before the independence was reached, 
underwent the process of State-building and had words in it.  
The Declaration of Independence is a symbol of the complexity and 
variety of positions at the time of the creation of the State. The intent to 
be a modern nation, integrated in the international political system, 
adherent to the basic principles of democracy (equality of social and 
political rights; freedom of religion, conscience, language, education 
and culture, justice etc.) is clearly expressed. In the same way, the recall 
to tradition (incarnated in the biblical values and historical contents) 
and the commitment to find in it inspiration for the management of the 
State is strong and recurrent. Analyzing the first official document of 
the State it is possible to notice a certain consociational stance. It was in 
fact the result of an intense negotiation. Rubinstein60 recommends 
prudence in referring to the Declaration of Independence as something 
more than a declaration of principles with certain celebrative intent. 
However, what is immediately inferable is that the theocratic option as 
a form of government is rejected and the democratic one is embraced 
(as premised by Ben Gurion in the Status Quo letter). In the Declaration 
of Independence therefore, after a solemn premise that refers to the 
historical, cultural and spiritual origins of Israel as the homeland of the 
Jewish people, an explicit mention to the Constitution-to-be is done. 
                                                 
60 Rubinstein E., (1998) "The Declaration of Independence as a Basic Document of the 
State of Israel" in Israel Studies 3:1:195-210.  
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The Constitution appears as the tool that will lead the State-building 
process and will serve as a basis for the creation of a democratic 
modern State (whose principles are described in the following of the 
Declaration). In particular it is written:  
 
"WE DECLARE that, with effect from the moment of the termination of the 
Mandate being tonight, the eve of Sabbath, the 6th Iyar, 5708 (15th May, 
1948), until the establishment of the elected, regular authorities of the State in 
accordance with the Constitution which shall be adopted by the Elected 
Constituent Assembly not later than the 1st October 1948, the People's 
Council shall act as a Provisional Council of State, and its executive organ, the 
People's Administration, shall be the Provisional Government of the Jewish 
State, to be called "Israel"."61 
 
Without going into language analysis details, that are not pertinence of 
this work, the positioning of this concept seems to attribute to the 
Constitution the role of trait d'union between the historical Israel to the 
creation of a modern Israel, clearly defining it as a modern State ruled 
by the law and the democratic principles.  
The possibility to elaborate a Constitutional Chart however did not 
remain an unquestioned matter, and ended, as known, with the 
renounce to a written compact Constitution. The debate spread before 
the formation of the Constitutional Assembly and has remained on the 
public agenda. The internal debate was fostered both by religious and 
non-religious groups and discussed matters of principle and practical 
ones. While in matters of principle the religious component expressed 
its contrariety to the Constitution, a certain degree of openness to 
negotiation and collaboration was present in the early preliminary 
constitutional works. The early constitutional attempts were not 
perceived by the religious component as a serious threat coming from 
the liberal world. To a certain extent, some kind of legal formalization 
                                                 
61 For the complete text of the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel see 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Declaration+of+
Establishment+of+State+of+Israel.htm 
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was considered as a viable tool to officialise the Status Quo. The 
religious groups maintained a relatively collaborative approach to the 
creation of a Constitutional Chart based on the Torah. The Torah was 
indeed considered the ultimate legitimate normative source for Jewish 
life. This supremacy translated at the aggregate level, to the entire 
Jewish State. Rabbi Kook, one of the most authoritative voices of the 
Mizrahi movement, one of the Sages of Religious Zionism, stated: 
 
The spirit of religion, oppressed and shattered, that existed in Christian 
Europe and in Moslem Asia, could not live concurrently with a social revival, 
full of vigor and a lust for a shining life. In order to properly perfect this 
revival one needs the true light of God in the collective soul. This is found in 
Israel. The separation of religion and society is good for them, while it is 
dangerous for us.  However, if we will not go out to enlighten the darkness, to 
explain the difference between the religions, that is between a religion which 
should not be called by this proper noun by virtue of its superiority and 
sources, and an imitation which only has what it could draw from the source 
by way of thievery, the matter would remain hidden from the eyes62 
 
In this writing, the necessity of preserving the Jewish allegiance to the 
religious norms and that of translating the Jewish blessed status in a 
national realization are seen as inseparable. Also the Ultraorthodox 
groups, united under Agudat Ysrael, showed in the beginning a milder 
attitude toward the Constitution, remarking the central position of the 
Torah and negotiating for being constitutionally recognized as an 
independent community. A significant number of researches attribute 
to the religious resistance a main role in the failure of the Constitutional 
enterprise in the aftermath of the independence63. The religious 
abhorrence for the human rebuilding of Israel before the coming of the 
Messiah would have been aggravated by the idea of a legal chart not 
                                                 
62 Rav Kook A., Igrot Rayah, Vol I p 215. 
63 See Kretzmer D., Constitutional Debate in Israel D. Kretzmer, (1990) 1:3. Constitutional 
Forum constitutionnel 13-14. See also Wald K, The religious Dimension of Israeli Political 
Life 
257 
based on the Halacha. On the other side, several scholars64  maintain 
that the main opposition came from the majority party, Mapai, and in 
particular by the Prime Minister Ben Gurion on the basis of much more 
practical reasons. A written constitution would have posed strict 
constraints on the Government in a moment in which a wide margin of 
autonomy was needed to deal with the new challenges of the State 
building. A cautious approach was suggested, for the adoption of an 
essential chart in a moment in which the population was not 
representative of the much bigger Jewish mass that was still in the 
Diaspora and that would have emigrated in the following years.  This 
attitude of Mapai would have incentivized religious parties to step 
back, strengthening their arguments against the Constitution and 
pushing in the political debate the supremacy of the Torah as a 
normative source. Even if the absolute reliance on the religious laws 
and the idea of a Jewish State that was to be organized under the sacred 
authority were not the determinant cause, at least they concurred to 
abort the constitutional project. As Elazar explains, the main 
manifested fear was that the document would threat the supremacy of 
the Torah and the constitutional tradition elaborated on its footsteps, 
that the Jewish community had been preserving for centuries. 
According to the scholar, this opposition should not be seen as a 
symbolic attempt to preserve traditional customs. "This would be a 
serious misreading of the situation. The most traditionally Orthodox 
Jews are as convinced that their constitution, the Torah, is law and not 
custom or convention, as the most ardent supporters of a modern 
written Constitution"65. The legal value of the Sacred Books in ancient 
Israel and the later Halacha that is based on the religious prescrptions, 
would be the proof for the actual validity of the religious law as a 
normative tool for a society and could be maybe flanked but not be 
replaced by a Constitution derived from convention. As time passed, 
                                                 
64 See Goldberg above but also Barzilai (Barzilai G., Communities and Law: Politics and 
Cultures of Legal Identities, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003) who stresses 
the scarce priority that Zionism gave to the traditional democratic pattern and to the 
constitutional option et al., Elazar et al 
65 Elazar D., The Constitution of the State of Israel, Introduction in Jerusalem Center for 
Public Affairs, at http://jcpa.org/dje/articles/const-intro-93.htm 
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the religious narrative of opposition to the secular legal codification 
strengthened, due also to a much more rigid approach of the religious 
parties on the issue.  Among the religious parties in fact, a view spread 
of the secular sector as attempting to secularize the society and the 
State.  
The absence of a written Constitution has been harshly criticized, 
especially because it has been considered the cause of inequalities and 
particularism. Peleg66 recalls how a Constitutional Chart would have 
guaranteed to Israel a higher quality democratic strength, absolving 
one of the functions that he sees as fundamental for a democratic State: 
the protection of minorities. Even though the scholar refers to the Arab 
minority, the statement is correct and it can be actually be extended to 
other minorities (Jewish minorities) or, even to the entire Jewish group, 
which, as Peleg mentioned, found their freedom of action somehow 
trapped in a non-universalistic approach to the society that the 
renounce to a Constitution symbolized. 
One of the main concerns of the religious groups related to the 
implementation of a written Constitution was the role of the judiciary 
in the State and the maintenance of the Rabbinate's authority. Before 
the creation of the State of Israel in fact, both during the Ottoman and 
the British domination, the religious authority enjoyed a braod degree 
of independence that allowed the different ethnic and religious groups 
to live as semi-independent communities, administering, among others, 
personal matter issues. As an effect of the Law and Administration 
Ordinance (section 11) passed in 1948, the legal apparatus effective 
before the Declaration of Independence remained in force, with the 
idea that needed modifications would occur by the hand of the 
Provisional Council of State or, later by the legitimate State authorities. 
In 1953, the Mandatory order was changed with the enactment of the 
Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law. This norm 
recognized the Rabbinical Courts exclusive jurisdiction over marriage 
and divorce between Jews and concurrent jurisdiction with civil courts 
                                                 
66 Peleg, I. (1998), Israel's Constitutional Order and Kulturkampf in Israel Studies, 3:1: 230-
250 
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over matters involving division of marital property, custody of 
children, and maintenance. According to Rubinstein, this law is a 
milestone in the narrative of the rabbinical authority and in the role of 
religion in the State. In pre-State era and before the enactment of this 
norm, Jews could actually decide to submit themselves to the rabbinical 
law through their voluntary adhesion to the Jewish community, 
Knesset Israel (without suffering consequences in terms of recognition 
of their Jewishness in case they did not adhere to the body). From that 
moment, the authority applied automatically to all Jews, empowering 
the religious authority on the entire ethnic group67. This law, that had 
the same effect also on the Muslim and the Druze population (the latter 
did not have an automatic inclusion in the religious community, like 
the Jewish community) expresses an important State view on the 
citizens of the State whose ethnicity was equalized to a religious status. 
The State of Israel defines itself as Jewish and democratic State, 
negating any theocratic aspiration. It is interesting however, how 
religion in this case proves to be fundamental for the State definition of 
citizens' identity and for the establishment of the judicial power, one of 
the maximum organs in a democratic State. Adopting the equation 
ethnicity-religion thus attributing exclusive jurisdiction to the religious 
courts in specific matters, the State renounced to manage a large area of 
jurisdiction, regarding the individual sphere of its citizens and 
somehow contradicting that liberal stance expressed in the Declaration 
of Independence. Some might disagree with this stance and would 
recall how the State does not exonerate itself from the authority on 
personal status since the Religious tribunals and the rabbinical judges 
are direct emanations of the State authority. In 1955, the Knesset 
recognized the Dayanim (religious judges) as State officials and 
equalized them to normal judges in economic treatment and status. 
Also a special commission was set to help the President of the State to 
choose the religious judges. Religious judges' activity was submitted to 
the authority of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (during the 
reorganization of the Ministry of Religious Affairs the jurisdiction 
became the Ministry of Justice and this way it remained) and to the 
                                                 
67 Rubinstein A., Law and Religion in Israel 2 Isr. L. Rev. 380 1967 
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Supreme Court, the highest judicial organ in the State who has the 
function of last appeal court.  
Religious courts are incorporated in the State system. This means that a 
body that bases its activity on religious values is considered a 
legitimate instrument of the rule of law in the country. Even if it is not a 
sufficient element to declare Israel as a theocratic country, its influence 
on the quality of democracy should be kept into consideration. The 
formalization of a double judicial apparatus, one religious and one 
secular and the concession of the exclusive authority to the religious 
courts on certain matters entailed the acceptation from the State of 
religious principles as legally binding for the citizens of the State. The 
functioning of the religious courts (not only its judicature) is based on 
religious principles that the State accepted as valid but have been 
contested by the public opinion and by the academia as contradicting 
the equality principle to which Israel committed in the Declaration of 
Independence and that have been confirming in the Basic Laws and 
other legislation.  
Rabbinical courts follow the Orthodox Jewish rules in the 
administration of justice. Judges are ordained Orthodox rabbis 
(therefore women cannot work as judges in these courts) who rule 
according to the Halacha, the religious law. As mentioned in the 
previous paragraphs, religious norms are quite strict about the role of 
women in the society. For this reason, also the role of witness is denied 
to women in a rabbinical court. Moreover, not all lawyers are free to 
debate causes before a religious judge, since a rabbinical license is 
necessary. The mechanism of obtainment of the rabbinical license 
perpetuates the almost total exclusion of female or non-religious 
lawyers. Actually, the fact that women can actually apply for the 
license is already a progress. It was indeed introduced as a possibility 
in the mid Nineties, as a result of public pressure and the intervention 
of the Supreme Court). These rules are in open contrast with the 
commitment of the State of Israel to eliminate any form of 
discrimination based on gender and conscience. The inclusion of 
special articles in many laws in order to create a legal exception and not 
to harm religious norms that have been incorporated in the legal 
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system is hard to accept in a democracy68. Following the same 
mechanism of subordination to "religious-State laws" Israel had often to 
limit its adherence to international conventions and bills69. In a major 
convention such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the State faced its inability to intervene in family matters and 
was forced to make a reserve on specific articles of the Convention70. In 
an extensive interpretation also the articles pertaining freedom of 
religion71 and conscience and the equality before the law72 were rejected 
because inapplicable to the Israeli context. A similar reserve was 
                                                 
68 One of the most significant examples is the Basic law Freedom of Occupation. In art 4 is 
written: "There shall be no violation of freedom of occupation except by a law befitting 
the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater 
than is required, or by regulation enacted by virtue of express authorization in such law". 
69 The following examples were suggested by De Bloiis M., (2010) Religious law versus 
secular law in Utrecht Law Review, 6:2:93-114. 
70 The main reservation was made on Article 23. The text of the articles is attached so that 
it is easier to estimate the essentiality of the principles enucleated and realize the impact 
that the religious courts and religion-inspired legislation can have in the society. Art 23 
says: "1. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to 
protection by society and the State. 2. The right of men and women of marriageable age 
to marry and to found a family shall be recognized. 3. No marriage shall be entered into 
without the free and full consent of the intending spouses. 4. States Parties to the present 
Covenant shall take appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of 
spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. In the case of dissolution, 
provision shall be made for the necessary protection of any children." 
71 International Convention on Civil and Political Rights. The article 18 says: "1. Everyone 
shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall 
include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either 
individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.  2. No one shall be subject 
to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his 
choice. 3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, 
health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 4. The States Parties 
to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when 
applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children 
in conformity with their own convictions." 
72 See above. Art. 26: All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit 
any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against 
discrimination on any ground such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
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attached to the Convention on Elimination of all Form of 
Discrimination against Women. The reserve was made on art.16, 
addressing equality in marriage and family73 and art.7b74, addressing 
gender equality in political and public life.  
The acceptation of the religious authority as the only authority in 
marriage and divorce means that no other form of marriage or divorce 
can be granted in the country. This condition entails the attribution of 
the exclusive legitimacy to the sets of religious norms that govern these 
matters. Unlike Islam and Christianity (to certain extent), Orthodox 
Judaism strictly prohibits intermarriage (among people of different 
religion, see Deuteronomy 7:3, note) as well as same sex marriages 
(Leviticus 18: 22, 20:13). Marriage is one of the pilasters of Jewish 
religion and culture. It is seen as a pious action, relished by God, 
inasmuch as it results in a Jewish family (an observant one, in the 
religious ideal) that will bring to life Jewish children75. Besides the 
religious rationale, this family paradigm entails also a social rationale 
that is the preservation of the tradition and the Jewish identity, 
perpetuated generation after generation by ensuring a homogenous 
cultural background of the families. In a small ethnic group like the 
Jewish one that was scattered all around the world for centuries, 
conservatism allowed the survival of the group and its traditions.  
Those who opened their horizon to other communities and formed a 
family with one of their members were exposed to public contempt. 
The firmest position has been taken by religious Jews who, observing 
                                                 
73 Convention on the Elimination of all form of Discrimination against Women.  Art 16 is 
a very detailed one and comprehends several aspects regarding marriage and family 
relations. It addresses equality of rights of marrying and divorcing, rights on education 
and custody on children, disposition of property, equality in the marital relationship. For 
the original text of the Convention see: 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm#article7 
74 See above. Art. 7 commits the state to insure and encourage gender equality 
guaranteeing to men and women the same possibility "to participate in the formulation of 
government policy and the implementation thereof and to hold public office and perform 
all public functions at all levels of government" 
75 Jewishness is inherited from the mother (or by conversion, rather a difficult process in 
Judaism), so the Jewishness of the female spouse is a crucial issue when dealing with 
family matters. 
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more strictly the religious precepts, felt invested with the responsibility 
of preserving the pureness of their ethnicity as a sign of loyalty to 
God76. In the "Jewish State of Israel", this approach took the further 
meaning of ensuring the continuation of the Jewish identity, 
paramount in the State's identity (leaving aside the "demographic" 
challenge, well known concept in the public debate and relevant point 
in the political platform of some parties). This religious rationale, which 
has implementation in the legal frame, creates a gap that leaves many 
citizens without an option for marriage. Intermarriage, as much as it 
can be considered by somebody as an unfortunate decision, a betrayal 
of one's ethnic belonging or even an infraction of the religious morale, 
has been for centuries a reality and now more than ever the occasion of 
contacts among people of different religion and ethnic belonging are 
frequent. The openness to contact with other communities is a daily 
reality for Israelis, who live in a multicultural society, experience 
massive tourism from all over the world and themselves conduct their 
life in a cosmopolitan way, often working in international environment 
and travelling abroad for a number of reasons. This of course increases 
the possibilities to find a partner who is not Jewish. Moreover, as a 
result of the Israeli immigration policy (and specifically the Law of 
Return77), consistent waves of immigration arrived in Israel through the 
years and many people of Jewish descendant (but not Jewish according 
to the Halacha) were granted citizenship in the country, integrated and 
became part of the society. They constituted a broad group of Jewish 
citizens that, however, is not entitled to a Jewish marriage or to another 
                                                 
76 One of the most quoted Biblical sources from which the maternal descendant is 
established is Deuteronomy 7:3-4 "Neither shalt thou make marriages with them: thy 
daughter thou shalt not give unto his son, nor his daughter shalt thou take unto thy son. 
For he will turn away thy son from following Me, that they may serve other gods; so will 
the anger of the LORD be kindled against you, and He will destroy thee quickly". As it is 
possible to see, the intermarriage here is associated with a detachment from the Jewish 
faith and with the spiritual degeneration of the future generation of the family. 
77 Briefly, the Law of Return is one of the laws regulating the immigration policy in Israel. 
On the basis of the ideological concept of Israel as the historic homeland where Jewish 
people can freely return to, this law allows to Jews or Jews' descendants (and their 
spouses) to easily acquire the Israeli citizenship and get integrated in the Israeli society. 
For the text of the law see: 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/1950_1959/Law%20of%20Return%205710-1950 
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form of marriage in the country. In fact they belong by law to the 
Jewish community or, at best, they have been registered as not 
belonging to any group. Members of non-Orthodox streams find 
themselves in a dead end street when it comes to marry.  As explained 
the Rabbinate is exclusively run by the Orthodox movement and 
Conservative or Reformrabbis, do not hold any legitimacy in matter of 
personal status. Premised that the members of these communities do 
not usually intend to marry in a different ritual than their own, they 
might be prevented from doing so: non-Orthodox converts are usually 
not recognized by the Rabbinate and also in the case of a native non-
Orthodox Jew its Jewishness might not be recognized by the Orthodox 
establishment. Also some Jews, recognized as such by the Halacha 
might encounter problems to marry. Their freedom in fact might be 
restricted by the religious rule that forbids the marriage among specific 
groups of people. A male member of a Cohen family (that in Ancient 
Israel was the sacerdotal caste) is forbidden to marry divorcees, 
converts, a widow who performed chalitza78. Whoever was born from a 
non-legitimate relationship (extramarital relationship79 or incestuous 
relationship) is considered mamzer (lit. bastard). The mamzer can only 
marry with other mamzerim and this prohibition is valid for several 
generations after him. 
For the above mentioned people, the only viable option is to marry 
abroad and to get later recognition by the State, through the 
registration in the population registry. This option is in fact chosen not 
only by people who cannot marry under the legal provisions of the 
country but also by many Jews who are entitled for marriage in the 
Rabbinate, mostly not observant (or not entirely) who perceive the 
Orthodox views on marriage as retrograde or simply do not wish to 
attribute a religious value to their union. 
                                                 
78 Chalitza is a ceremony that a widow without children performs in order to be free from 
her husband's brother to marry her. With this ceremony she becomes free to marry again 
but her status is the same of a divorced woman that a Cohen is prohibited to marry. 
79  As already mentioned, extramarital relationship can be considered also the one of a 
woman whose husband has refused to give permission for the dissolution of the previous 
marriage. 
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Delegating exclusive authority to the religious apparatus, the State also 
accepts the views that guide the religious management of such 
personal status matters. The approach to the marital relationship is not 
egalitarian in Orthodox Judaism and this shows its most practical 
consequence in case of divorce80. Unlike marriage that can be 
performed abroad and recognized as valid (also by the Rabbinate if it 
matches specific parameters), divorce of two Jewish Israeli citizens can 
only be performed by the religious authority in order for the union to 
be recognized as totally dissolved81. As mentioned in the previous 
paragraphs, divorce in the rabbinical courts is a prerogative of the 
husband who is entitled to refuse to "free" the wife from the marriage 
bound. While a man is in divorce procedure can start a new legitimate 
relationship and can have legitimate children. On the contrary, women 
remain "chained" (agunot in Hebrew) to the marriage until the 
husbands want. This power can be used by the husband to blackmail 
the wife, asking for economic compensation or other concessions. 
Religious courts do not fight these dynamics and, even if they dispose 
of strong tools to avoid stalemate situations82, they often do not 
intervene, depriving women of the right to remarry and to have 
legitimate children. According to the religious morale, women are 
judged more strictly as it comes to extramarital relationship or 
misbehavior within the couple. In such cases the verdict can be 
extremely unfavorable for them (as it regards alimony, property matter 
and custody of children for example). A quite unbalanced behavior as it 
                                                 
80 The divorce issue is a delicate one also in other religious communities in Israel. 
Catholics for example do not allow divorce. In order to break the marriage, Catholics do 
not have other choice but to engage a long and expensive procedure of dissolution, which 
is very difficult to obtain. 
81 A divorce that is not performed by the rabbinical court is generally considered not 
valid. This affects the woman's status and her possibility to remarry and to have 
legitimate children. This set of rules has repercussion on the future children of this 
woman, which will be considered mamzerim, so ineligible to marry with non mamzerim 
in Israel. 
82 The power to inflict sanctions is granted by the Rabbinical Courts Law. On the 
Rabbinical Courts Law and its implementation in order to solve divorce proceedings see: 
Kaplan Y. S., (2012) "Enforcement of Divorce Judgments in Jewish Courts in Israel: The 
Interaction Between Religious and Constitutional Law in Middle East Law and Governance 
4:1–68 
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comes to economic matters has been often noted, disregarding to the 
"spouses' faults", often penalizing women. Also custody of children is 
attributed according to religious consideration, for which custody of 
boys after the age of six is normally granted to the father or more 
generally to the parent whose lifestyle is closer to religious 
observance83. 
The authority of the Religious Courts, however, is not unlimited. 
Ancillary matters related to divorce proceedings such as alimony, 
children custody and economic matters can be discussed both in a civil 
and in a rabbinical court. The competence is assigned on the basis of 
earlier attribution that is depending to which court the request has been 
filed first. Religious courts apply religious rules in the determination of 
these matters while civil courts apply norms based on equality of the 
spouses. For this reason, this concurrent competence might result in a 
very different response, both with binding value and both accepted by 
the State as legitimate. As it is easy to imagine many couples perceive 
this dual system of judicature as an opportunity to receive a more 
favorable treatment (in case of the woman, it is usually the fear of 
receiving a less favorable one). When a divorce request is filed, a real 
competition is engaged by the two spouses for filing the ancillary 
matters suit in one or another court. The case should be really taken 
into account not only for the discriminatory attitude toward women 
that is so often recognized in religious courts' rulings but also for an 
evident infraction of the principle of univocal justice that is one of the 
basics of a democratic country. The inacceptable contrast between 
verdicts of the two different courts had been enlightened also by the 
civil judicial power, in particular by the Supreme Court. The Supreme 
Court remarked the superiority of civil law principles in matters in 
which religious tribunals do not have exclusive competence. Significant 
interventions of the Supreme Court on the rulings of the religious 
courts are not very frequent and they are usually received not 
positively by the religious establishment. The pronouncements are seen 
as an intrusion of a laic institution in the autonomy and legitimacy of 
                                                 
83 See Cohn M., (2004) Women, Religious Courts and Religious Law in Israel - The Jewish 
Case, in Scandinavian Journal of Social Sciences 57-76.  
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the religious based justice. One of the most famous cases at this regard 
is the Bavli case that took place in the mid Nineties. In this case, the 
rabbinical court detained decisional power with regard to alimony and 
division of assets. The verdict on such matters followed the religious 
law and attributed to the wife a much inferior sum than the one she 
would have obtained in a civil ruling. While the civil decision would 
have been based on the Spouse- Property Relations- Law that 
establishes an equal division of assets among the spouses, the religious 
court calculated the sum on the basis of the marriage agreement, a 
document that most of the couple consider a symbolic one (actually a 
purchase contract) that is signed in absence of the bride on the wedding 
day by the groom and a male member of the bride's family (usually the 
father). Mrs. Bavli appealed to the Supreme Court that decreed the 
illegitimacy of the sentence, demanding for a more equal formulation 
in the light of the principles of gender equality to which Israel inspires 
its legislation on the matter. It was remarked by the Supreme Court 
that rabbinical verdicts should keep into account the civil legal 
bounds84. The reaction of the religious court was furious. The anger of 
the religious establishment derives from the feeling that civil courts 
intrusions undermine the status of the rabbinate and the Torah as a 
legitimate legal source. In these cases, the rabbinate appeals to the 
judges' unconditional loyalty to the Halacha that cannot be 
compromised to satisfy any negotiation with the secular branch of the 
judicature. Moreover, as sustained by De Bloiis,85 the pressure exerted 
by the secular branch of the judicial system on the religious tribunals is 
considered to affect the legitimacy of the divorce proceedings, since 
they would violate the voluntary nature of the spouses' decisions that is 
the core of a "kosher divorce". Potentially a divorce, in which the 
intervention of the civil courts played a determinant role, might be 
challenged by another rabbinical authority, in a different time or place, 
                                                 
84 See Segal Z., A tower of Bavli in Haaretz, 22 Nov 2004 at 
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/a-tower-of-bavli-1.140954. For a more 
detailed description of the case see Cohn M., Women, Religious Law and Religious Court 
in Israel, 27 Retfaerd, Scandinavian Journal of Social Sciences 57-76 (2004). 
85 De Bloiis M.  (2010), See above. 
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and its validity rejected. This constitutes a potential vicious circle that 
perpetuates a clash of authorities and principles. 
The conflict of judicature described above shows here another aspect of 
paramount importance. Two different institutions both financed and 
legitimized by the State and in charge of administering justice provide 
with different rulings and end up representing in the public opinion 
two different visions of the world to which citizens feel alternatively 
closer. The danger that originates is the labeling of each institution as 
"defendant of" or "preferred by". The Supreme Court suffers from this 
bias. It is evident when looking at the surveys on public trust on 
institutions that clearly show a more favorable attitude to this 
institution by left winged citizens who are generally the most secular 
and liberal. In a democracy justice should be seen as impartial in order 
to be accepted as legitimate. The possibility (even only in specific cases) 
to choose a preferred institution on the prevision of a more favorable 
verdict damages the very concept of impartiality of the law and deeply 
affect the legitimacy of the judicial structure. 
As seen, religion plays an important role in the administration of justice 
in the country, which delegated to the religious institutions a large 
portion of power, especially as it regards marriage and divorce. Many 
criticisms have been moved to this system. The clear liberals stance of 
Israel is seen as diminished by a court structure that is based (for 
certain matters) on religious identification and compel citizens to 
participate in the religious mechanism, subjecting themselves to the 
religious rules86.  The right to marry is a human right recognized by 
every democracy. Through the delegation of authority to the religious 
courts Israel actually impairs some of its citizens of this right. The 
option of marrying abroad might be a well-accepted and popular way 
to circumvent this regime but it is definitely not an answer that the 
State can give neither to its citizens nor to itself. On the contrary, the 
growing number of Israeli citizens who marry abroad every year 
                                                 
86 See Rubinstein A., (1967). Law and Religion in Israel in Israel Legal Review, 380:384-
88.The author states: "To subject persons to religious law and religious judges in matters 
of marriage and divorce, is equivalent to forcing them to participate in religious rites" 
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should alarm the State, who is evidently lacking the ability to satisfy a 
basic need of a big portion of its population.  
A number of steps have been taken already to remedy to blatant cases 
of disparity and to blind alleys created by the official procedure. In 
2010 the Knesset approved the Law on Spousal Agreements for Persons 
without a Religion, authorizing the registration of spousal agreements 
between two people neither of which is registered as member of any 
religion. Another option, that is becoming popular, is to be recognized 
as ieduim batsibur (lit. "publicly known" as a couple). This kind of 
common law arrangement is viable in Israel only when the partners are 
both citizens. The ieduim batsibur are not formally recognized as 
married though enjoying almost all the rights of a married couple (with 
less guarantees on the division of assets, heritage etc.). Recently the 
civil court has also issued a divorce among two homosexual partners, 
signing a milestone in the personal status jurisdiction. The marriage 
that of course had been celebrated abroad and later recognized as 
civilly valid by the State of Israel, was however not accepted as valid by 
the rabbinate, who absolutely refuses same sex unions. The State has 
normally no jurisdiction on divorce, being this issue delegated to the 
religious court. However, in this exceptional case in which the couple 
would not have had any alternative to dissolve their marriage, the state 
performed the divorce through the family court of Ramat Gan rising a 
vivid public debate and alimenting the hopes of those who seek for the 
institution of a civil option for the management of the other judicial 
issue87 (that by the way provide the double option of judicature, under 
the consent of both the litigant parts). 
 
 
  
                                                 
87  Halperin-Kaddari R., (2012 December 12) Will Israel's first gay divorce pave the way 
for others? In Haaretz, at http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/will-israel-s-first-gay-divorce-
pave-the-way-for-others.premium-1.484332?localLinksEnabled=false 
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3.2 RELIGION AND PARTICIPATION 
As previously asserted, participation is a crucial dimension of 
democracy since it allows the affirmation of people's sovereignty over 
the state and the governments bodies. The desire to constantly monitor 
public administration, to personally express one's views and concretely 
intervening in social life spells out the intention of affecting with one's 
opinion and sets of values  the reality to which he belongs.  
Religious observance is a fundamental agent in determining 
participation dynamics; the sets of values and the laws that every 
religion promotes, are likely to be interiorized by the followers, with a 
various degree according to the level of religiosity, to the religious 
streams and to the interpretation given to the religious predicaments 
(usually deriving by the religious leader of the community, less 
frequently personally inferred through personal approach to religious 
texts and prescriptions). Religious believe and practice is likely to 
influence both the modality and the content of the civic participation. 
The influence on the modality is due to the circle of socialization that 
religious practice produces (the believer is rarely an isolated individual 
but, more often is integrated, with various degree, in the religious 
community. The community is likely to be quite homogeneous due to 
the sharing of common religious values. This commonality can favor 
aggregated forms of participation). Moreover, in the participative act, 
the individual, who is bound by religious predicaments, will act 
accordingly. Religious values and norms become part of the believer's 
life and they are likely to be transferred, totally or in part in the activity 
in which the believer takes part in. For example, a Catholic observant 
believer will probably rather join a movement against abortion than a 
movement that promotes a more permissive approach on the matter.    
Judaism is not an exception to this general dynamic of religious 
influence on participation. On the contrary, it represents a very good 
example, being a very pervasive religion, which regulates most of the 
field of personal life, with some implications in communal life and 
interactions with others. The main streams of Judaism in Israel 
(generally identified as Orthodox and Haredi) imagine a society that is 
built around the religious rules and praise with favor the hypothesis of 
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a widespread respect of the predicaments of the Halacha. Since a 
general turn to faith and religious practice of the Jewish people is a 
condition for the ultimate advent of the Messiah, the importance of 
living in a global observant community is paramount. Civic 
participation to the Jewish state, is experienced very differently by 
different kind of Jewish believers, each of them promoting their own 
agenda. The agenda promotion activity includes several levels: from 
the legitimation of communities' practices and behaviors (like the 
group Woman of the Wall, mainly composed by conservative and 
reform Jewesses, fighting for the right to pray in the Kotel according to 
their ritual) to the protest for an existing condition that infringes the 
values of that group (like the mainly Haredi opposition to the 
exhibition of female singers in public ceremonies), to the 
promotion/expansion of certain practices and values in the society at 
large (like the Haredi street activity to promote the tefillin  prayer).  In 
general terms, participation in Israel is quite dynamic and even if 
political militancy is in decline, information and social activism 
(including protest) are much used tools, both to contrast existing 
situations and to propose or actively realize new alternatives in 
different social and political fields. 
Within the population some factors have been recognized to influence 
the level of participation: socioeconomic conditions for example are 
proved to influence the degree of active participation in society 
(influencing for example voters' turnout88). Relevant to this paragraph 
is the connection between religion and dynamics of participation and it 
will be argued that, within the Jewish group, religion affects mostly the 
participation of the Haredi group.  
It is important to remark that the Haredi group, also referred to as 
Ultraorthodox, is itself a composite community and an overall 
description will undoubtedly lead some kind of over-simplification and 
generalization. Nonetheless, the following claims only aim to give an 
overall picture of the common rules and dominant views on 
                                                 
88 Afriat A. & Dahan M. (2010), Socioeconomic bias in voting for the Knesset in Israel 
Economic Review 8:1:1–20 
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participation in the Ultraorthodox world and are supported by an 
extensive literature. 
In the TODEM analysis, participation has been measured in several of 
its manifestations, first of which the electoral one. A decreasing trend 
was tracked: even if Israel remains largely in average with the other 
OECD countries, active engagement in political activities is sensibly 
minor than in the past. A general disaffection has been registered and a 
lower identification with parties seems to be more and more diffused. 
The Arab sector is on top of this negative trend and reaches the highest 
abstention peaks. The causes of abstention for this specific community 
are considered to be a feeling of alienation, marginalization from and 
rejection of the political and social system. One would expect that the 
Haredi community, the majority of which nurtures anti-Zionist 
feelings, harshly criticizes the state authority as blaspheme and claims 
its extraneousness to the state of Israel would follow this declining 
trend. One would expect that the Haredi community would set itself 
apart from the political participation in a state that they do not identify 
with. Instead the electoral participation registered in Haredi 
neighborhoods is surprisingly high. In Bnei Brak for example, Israeli 
town prevalently inhabited by Ultraorthodox, the turnout in the last 
elections was 72.4%89 (77.58% according to another journalistic 
source90), above the national average that is less than 70%. The data 
might actually confirm the prevalent opinion reported in The 2012 
Israeli Democracy Index that participation in elections is considered for 
its functional aspect more than for its symbolic one. In fact, the majority 
of the respondents to the survey stressed how, through vote, it is 
possible to impact on the political process and safeguard one's 
interest91. 
                                                 
89 Flier B., (January 16, 2013) Lopsided voter turnout means skewed election results in 
Ynet, at http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4333386,00.html 
90 Hasson N., (January 23, 2013) Israel’s election results: insights and oddities, Haaretz, at 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/israeli-elections-2013/israeli-elections-news-
features/israel-s-election-results-insights-and-oddities.premium-1.495838 
91 Hermann T., Atmor N., Heller E., Leber Y., (2012). The Israeli Democracy Index 2012, 
Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute 
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Political preference of the Haredi voters is mainly directed to Haredi 
parties. Because the intra-ethnic fracture (based on the contraposition 
between Jews of Western descent and Jews coming from Middle 
Eastern and North African countries) is much alive in the religious 
world, Haredi parties maintain this division. Therefore, Ashkenazi and 
Sephardi formations have, as targets, specific sector of the 
Ultraorthodox community. Degel HaTorah and Agudat Ysrael are the 
two historical Ashkenazi ultraorthodox parties that occasionally merge 
in United Torah Judaism; Shas is the Sephardi alternative that was 
created in a later period but gained a bigger consensus (partially also 
from Ashkenazi and non-Ultraorthodox voters). Participation in these 
parties is subject to the Ultraorthodox traditional set of values. This 
entails a total exclusion of women from passive electorate and political 
activity and a more general gender segregationist approach. The role of 
women as pious mothers and protagonists of domestic life is in fact 
promoted on the basis of a traditional interpretation of the religious 
law and is exposed as an exaltation of the virtue of modesty. The choice 
of the party leadership and the main party line is heavily influenced by 
the religious authority, which is not directly engaged in public offices 
but openly directs the political organization. A possibility of future 
change in favor of a more bureaucratic leadership is hypothesized by 
Brown92. However, the authority recognized to rabbis and their central 
position in the Haredi communities is likely to safeguard their 
influence in the political sphere. Political sphere therefore is mainly 
seen as a mean to gain favorable conditions for the community and as a 
way to influence the society with religious values. If compared to the 
recent trend of internal democratization that is progressively taking 
place in the Israeli party system as well as in many Western countries, 
the centralistic management of religious parties immediately appear 
insufficient in terms of openness to participation as well as in terms of 
electoral accountability.  The total delegation of the decisional power to 
a "superior" authority would deprive the party membership of 
important tools of expression. They would be relegated in a secondary 
position, basically the same of any other elector non-member or activist 
                                                 
92 Brown B., (2011) Toward Democratization in the Haredi Leadership? Jerusalem: The 
Israel Democracy institute. 
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of a centralized non-open party. This deficiency however needs to be 
seen in a broader context. Total deference is reserved to the rabbinical 
authority in the community. According to the Torah in fact, priests and 
judges enjoy a status of privilege because of their closeness to the 
divine law and presence. People should follow their predicaments 
without contesting them as well as consulting them in any 
controversial decision. Rabbis in fact are wise and inspiring models of 
spiritual loftiness and repositories of the divine will93. The 
accountability established between the party membership and the 
elected as well as the participation to the political project of the party 
can be defined as accountability "by proxy". It is built, therefore, on the 
trust and the absolute authority conferred to the religious authority, 
which might resemble a modern version of biblical decisional bodies. 
Furthermore, the development of a classic accountability mechanism is 
somehow thwarted by a strong sense of community that is often posed 
before the personal dimension. Hakak94 confirms this idea when 
underlining how the personal narrative of Yeshiva Haredi students is 
scarce and the referral to the community is continuous. Even though 
slight signs of change have been recently developed both in the party 
management (apparently progressively more delegated in the hands of 
party bureaucrats, trustees of the rabbinical spiritual authority) and in 
part of the membership who gets occasionally involved in factionist 
rivalries for important offices95, the rabbinical decisional power results 
stable and much respected.  
 
 
Segregationist attitude in the Haredi world 
Religious orientation and level of practice are relatively recognizable 
from external features in Israel. Looking at the crowd at a bus stop 
might be possible to see women with tight, short jeans and tank tops, 
                                                 
93 Among the most known biblical sources for this concept see Deuteronomy 17: 8-12  
94 Hakak Y., (2012) Young Men in Israeli Haredi Yeshiva Education, Leiden: Koninklijke 
Brill 
95 Brown B., (2011) See above 
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women with scarfs or bends on their head wearing colorful dresses that 
cover their knees and elbows and women clothed in dark dresses 
whose hair are entirely covered by a wig, a net or a hat. The same could 
happen with men: Western and modern clothes in the first case might 
be accompanied by a knitted skullcap in the second case (and maybe by 
zizith, cords that hang down hip deep); the third man would look 
strikingly different from the previous too, wearing black trousers and a 
long black coat (rarely but possibly of another color) and a big black 
hat over a cloth skullcap. This generalization, that of course is not 
precise not exhaustive might help to mirror the level of social 
integration in the Israeli society. Secular Israelis Jews and Jews 
belonging to non-Orthodox streams of Judaism would probably look 
like the first described type; the second type is a rough representation 
of the Orthodox stream of Judaism, integrated in the modern Western 
costumes but retaining evident traits of their religious identity (this 
might actually be the case that also includes some non-Orthodox Jews); 
the third case, representing the Haredi community, would deliberately 
differentiate itself by the rest of the population, strongly marking the 
belonging to a detached group. The esthetic (and partially superficial) 
considerations mirror to a certain extent the level of integration and 
participation in the society. Secular, non-Orthodox and Orthodox Jews 
have similar dynamic of participation and social integration that takes 
place in mixed or religiously connoted events and organizations. 
Orthodox Jews maintain a strong attachment to their religious identity 
and sets of values and bring them in every activity that they engage. In 
Orthodox schools, an educational option that the state offers to its 
citizens, are one of the main moments of socialization and 
indoctrination for the new generations. Even though these schools are 
prevalently attended by religious kids and youngsters, a certain rate of 
mobility between the secular and Orthodox educational system is 
registered (meaning that not only Orthodox students go to Orthodox 
schools and vice versa). Quite an integrated bulk of citizenship results 
from this system. The Zionist idea of Israel as homeland of the Jewish 
people (with different interpretation on the meaning of the word 
Jewish and on the actual realization of this quality) is the main binding 
agent among these groups. The Haredi community is less inclined, 
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whenever not totally contrary, to the Zionist ideals. They deliberately 
maintain a separate existence from the rest of the population, choosing 
to dress differently, to educate the new generations in specific Haredi 
schools and maintain their microcosm physically and symbolically 
separated as well as imbued with a literal following of the Halacha. On 
the political side, Haredi blame the state of Israel to be a blasphemous 
attempt of what only the Messiah will be able to realize. Stadler96 
observes how the Haredi rejection of modern culture and Western 
customs, sharpened with the rise of the secular European Haskala and 
Zionism, led the Haredi community to a further closure and to the 
strict preservation of a behavioral system based on sacred texts and 
their interpretation by illuminated sages. The overlapping of 
interpretations across the centuries gave primacy to some ideas over 
others, sometimes quite far one from the other. As reported by Stadler, 
work is an example of concept that underwent a neat change: while in 
previous times was seen as something respectful and honorable, 
modern interpretations link it to the punishment inflicted by God to 
Adam and Eve, stressing instead the necessity to live a life of total trust 
and confidence in the mercy of God, also for the provision of essential 
goods. The biblical metaphor of manna is often taken as a symbol of  
divine care to people who fully detach themselves from the mundane 
preoccupations and focus on spiritual grow and closeness to God. The 
modern predominance of this view might be also functional to the 
desire to contrast the Zionist ideal of productive work as a mean of 
social rebirth. Also civic engagement is considered by the Zionist 
ideology as part of this constructive attitude and is favorably regarded 
as a mean to legitimize one's citizenship. In Haredi ideology, 
productivity (broadly intended) turns to be a disvalue since material 
achieving does not represent success but the greediness of man and its 
egoistic impetus of setting himself apart from God97. The will of 
detaching themselves from the secular contaminated society and the 
totally focusing on prayer and the study of sacred texts result in a 
further social segregation of the Haredi community that excludes itself 
                                                 
96 Stadler N., (2002) in Is Profane Work ah Obstacle to Salvation? The Case of Ultra-
Orthodox (Haredi) Jews, in Contemporary Israel in Sociology of Religion, 63:4:455-474. 
97 Hakak Y., (2012) See above. 
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from the working environment and relies almost exclusively on 
donations, public contributions and women's working activity98 (that is 
often not well paid, given the low level of education of women in the 
Haredi world). This general setting holds true, even if a new attitude 
seems to be rising. Hakak notes how the disinterest of some Yeshiva 
students is nowadays an accepted reality also by the rabbinical 
establishment, which tries nonetheless to keep the students in a 
protected religious environment. The birth of a Haredi middle class in 
Israel has also been celebrated by Zicherman and Cahaner99. This 
would be composed by educated men and women whose religious 
strict observance and belonging to traditional Haredi communities do 
not prevent them from being integrated in the society and economically 
well positioned. Examples of Haredi progressive openness to the 
society will be given in the following pages. Nonetheless, it is 
fundamental to notice that this segment of society still remains deeply 
marginalized in terms of participation, both in dominant internal 
narrative and in the eyes of the rest of the population. 
 
 
Haredi Protest as a mean of participation 
The contra-acculturationinst attitude100 of the Haredi community is 
often expressed through public protest. The hard feelings that this 
community nurtures toward the State and the society, toward their 
symbols and rules stem in public manifestations of disdain. The 
opposition to a liberal vision of woman and corporeity for example, is 
manifested through rebellions against the advertisement world, which 
largely uses feminine images as protagonists of commercial campaigns. 
                                                 
98 Haredi women are not allowed to study in Yeshivot and even though some educational 
opportunities in the community or outside they are usually non- intensive or extended 
session of studies.  The role of learner is almost exclusively masculine in the Haredi 
society.  
99 Zicherman H. & Cahaner L. (2012), Modern Ultra-Orthodoxy: The Emerging Haredi 
Middle Class in Israel, Jerusalem: The Israeli Institute of Democracy. 
100 Freidman Hermann The Haredim who are they and what do they want 
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It is not infrequent that posters in the streets are torn101, as well as buses 
damaged for carrying advertisements showing feminine face or bodies, 
considered to be indecent and provocative. These protests trigger an 
intense public debate and groups from the non Haredi world (mainly 
secular but not only) engage social and legal duels to contrast Haredi's 
actions and demands. These actions however, have sometimes led to 
victories of the Haredi community102. Even if most of them are only 
partial and temporary victories, they show Ultraorthodox's ability to 
impose an agenda. Moments of recurrent clash between identities are 
the national holydays that the Haredi community does not recognize. 
The prevalent anti-Zionist sentiment makes commemorations like the 
Independence Day absolutely illegitimate and even heretical in the eyes 
of many Ultraorthodox103. At this regard, an interesting study104 
underlines the Haredi attitude of rejection toward the day dedicated to 
the national commemoration of the victims of the Shoah. The main 
reaction is a disparaging one. In most of the Ultraorthodox newspapers, 
the Haredi narrative of the Shoah is strengthened and the inappropriate 
forms of commemorations are stigmatized as the poisonous fruit of a 
society that is drowned in sin and blasphemy. Despite that, the 
research points out how this day is de facto recognized by the Haredi 
media (thus diffused to the Haredi public) through thematic articles 
and a specific vocabulary. This empirical result confirms once again the 
value of protest as a mean of participation as well as the progressive 
opening of the Haredi mentality toward an acceptation, even though 
partial and very critical, of the State. This reactivity to the reality is, 
from the democratic point of view, undoubtedly preferable to a status 
                                                 
101 Greenwod P. (2011, November 15), Jerusalem mayor battles ultra-orthodox groups 
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of alienation and impenetrable segregation. However, the stronger and 
the more frequent the reactions occur, the more the social fractures are 
unveiled, creating clashes among different segments of the society and 
fomenting social unrest. Another case in which the protest of the 
Haredi community can reach incredible peaks both in terms of 
participation and of intensity (with the use of a strong symbolic 
apparatus and, sometimes, the use of a moderate violence) is the case of 
protest again political deliberations. These protests become particularly 
high pitched when the decisions directly affects the life of the Haredi 
community (negatively, in their perception). One of the most contested 
issues in the last year is the protest against Haredi military 
conscription. As before mentioned, the Haredi community negotiated 
special arrangements with the secular political leadership at the origin 
of the State, that granted de facto the exemption for yeshiva students. 
Through the years, few crucial modifications have been made to the 
arrangement but the substantial exemption has been always granted to 
the growing community of Haredi young males. The recent verdict of 
the Supreme Court about the unconstitutionality of the previous norm 
in this matter, and the incapacity of the Knesset to formulate an agreed 
upon and viable alternative proposal, made the previous agreement 
decade. These developments were stimulated by a large movement of 
protest that, like many times in the past, claimed the necessity of a 
universal participation in the army to which the Israeli society attaches 
a particular identity value. On their part, the Haredi organized several 
protests, characterized by an impressive attendance and very high 
tones, occasionally degenerated in acts of violence and vandalism105. 
 
 
Why most Haredi do not serve in the army 
As previously described, compulsory army service in Israel is 
considered a crucial moment both as an individual formative 
experience and as a mean to acquire full legitimacy as a citizen. The 
                                                 
105 Ultra-Orthodox Jews in mass protest against Israel army draft (May 17, 2013) in BBC at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22565285 
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Israeli army was not conceived only as a military tool (nor only as an 
obligation to fulfill under the basic democratic paradigm duty-rights) 
but as an important ideological element. The role of the army as an 
agent of social integration and identity building, therefore, was openly 
declared by the political establishment in the beginning of the state era. 
Its success in this task is actually recognized by many scholars106.  The 
attachment to the State, the pioneristic values and the promotion of a 
new identity, based on productivity and self-empowerment were basic 
Zionist values that spread starting from the end of the Nineteenth 
century in Europe, developed exponentially with the first European 
waves of immigration and further on with the creation of the State. The 
creation of the New Jew as an ideological objective amplified the call 
for a concrete contribution to the State, exalting the material work and 
force. The collectivistic stance was further reinforced by the socialist 
ideas that were predominant among the Israeli first political class. 
These values fixated vigorously in the collective imagery and were 
completely interiorized. For this reason, still nowadays, serving in the 
army assumes a paramount significance as a civic and moral obligation 
and it is not perceived by the majority just as an imposed duty. The 
effective regional instability that many times saw the Israeli army as 
protagonist as well as the rhetoric that has been constructed around 
this public actor lends the military the meaning of homeland champion. 
Those who take part in this enterprise contribute to preserve the State, 
and the life of all citizens. Those who do not, are regarded as traitors or 
inferior citizens since they do not part in the salvific mission of the 
nation's army.  
In this frame, Haredi ideology and lifestyle stand at the margin.  
Zionist values have been largely unpopular among the Haredi society 
since the moment of their creation. The self-empowering impetus is 
                                                 
106 Ben Shalom U. & Horenczyk G (2004), Cultural identity and adaptation in an 
assimilational setting: Immigrant soldiers from the former Soviet Union in Israel in 
International Journal of Intercultural Relations 28:6: 461–479. Other scholars instead point 
out at the army as a perpetrator of social inequality and exclusion. This very stimulating 
argument, however, falls beyond the purpose of this work. An example of this interesting 
approach is in: Peled, Y. (2008), The evolution of Israeli citizenship: an overview, in 
Citizenship Studies, 12:3, 335 -345 
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regarded as an arrogant human pretense of creating one's own 
realization far from the grace of the Creator. Modernization is partially 
considered on the same level and it is looked at with suspicion. 
Spirituality and detachment from material world constituted the ideal 
of Haredi lifestyle. The main purpose in life is to get as close as possible 
to God; therefore elevation of the soul needs to be the primary goal and 
no other preoccupation should interfere. Deep understanding of the 
religious predicaments is the way to strengthen the spirit while any 
material desire represents a lethal danger. The creation of a Jewish State 
is also interpreted in this optic and even if the Haredi community 
recognizes the holiness of Eretz Ysrael (the land of Israel) and choose to 
live there, they do not identify with the human creation of the State. As 
a result, they refuse the obligations that it entails for its citizens. The 
role that Ultraorthodox Jews recognize to themselves in the Jewish 
community is of enhancement of the spiritual level107. The burden that 
they take living a life of study and prayer is not considered less 
important or less heavy than the contribution that other citizens give 
through the military service or the engagement in other public 
activities. On the contrary, the continuous study is regarded to as a 
main task, whose fulfillment cannot be posed at risk by the long 
interruption that would derive from serving the army. The army, 
moreover, represents another threat to the Haredi mission: the secular 
environment would represent a terrible temptation for the young 
students that are educated and socialized in a pure and protected 
collectivity. The exposure to the moral decline that is dominant in the 
Israeli society might irreparably harm the mission of the Haredi 
"spiritual warriors", driving them far from their purity.  From this 
reason, the Haredi community, and in particular spiritual leaders 
oppose vehemently to any kind of contact with the external world and 
in this specific case with the army.  
Stadler and Ben Ari however, discover a discrepancy between the old 
and the new generation of Haredi. While the position of the former is 
much stricter and looks at any contact as a mortal threat for the 
                                                 
107 Stadler N. & Ben Ari E. (2003) Other Worldly Soldiers? Ultra-Orthodox views of 
Military Service in Contemporary Israel in Israel Affairs 9:4 17-48 
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spirituality of the individuals and the community, the younger Haredi 
have a more moderate position at regard. They acknowledge the State 
of Israel as a reality and the practical importance of the army (also to be 
noticed that an increased wave of militarism and hawkish positions has 
been developing among the religious groups in the last twenty years. 
This might have influenced the views of young Haredi toward the 
army). The arrangements to encourage Haredi military service (the 
predisposition of a special unit exclusively for Haredi soldiers; their 
destination to  specific positions related with religious matters in the 
army, the predisposition of an articulated system of vocational courses, 
and postponed decision on the actual enlistment etc.) were not 
extremely successful in increasing the rate of enlistment but evidently 
partially eroded the wall that the Haredi society had posed between its 
youth and the military service. The strict position of Haredi rabbis is in 
fact seen as a generational trait and as the demonstration of their 
concern for the community's integrity. Youngsters define their study as 
an alternative kind of service to the community but confess that what 
stop them from accepting to serve in the army are social constraints in 
the Haredi community (in particular the social stigma and the 
repercussion on their future marriage) and the fear of being tempted by 
the secular lifestyle. 
 
 
Religious belief as promoter of participation 
Till this point religious belief and observance seems to be a strong 
obstacle to Ultraorthodox community's participation in the society and 
acquisition of a full legitimacy as citizens (partially intentionally 
rejected by the members of the community itself that would not aspire, 
in general terms to be part of a State entity that they consider 
blaspheme). A major clash originates from this situation where 
socioeconomic discourse merges with the State ideology. Haredi refuse 
and fail to incarnate the New Jew and the Israeli citizen. Therefore, 
their marginalization appears inevitable. However, from the same 
source, religion, a possible key of pacification seems to rise. In the 
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Haredi community, already from the Nineties, a well-functioning 
volunteering service has been activated that operates all over the 
country. The recipients are not exclusively members of the community; 
all group of the Israeli society can benefit from these services. An 
extensive study on the topic analyzes two of these organizations108, Yad 
Sara and Zaka. They are particularly relevant for their capillary 
diffusion in the national territory and for the high impact of their 
activity. The two organizations were both created by Haredi groups 
that keep sustaining these initiatives with voluntary work and private 
donations. Yad Sarah was founded in the late Seventies and expanded 
through the Eighties also as a consequence of the economic 
liberalization that aggravated the status of marginalization of the 
weakest groups of the population, namely Haredi and Palestinian 
citizens. Its initial mission was that of lending medical simple 
instruments (wheelchair and small medical machine for domestic use) 
and it further developed covering many other area of social interest like 
help for elderly, management of recreational and educational activities. 
Moreover, it engaged in some international benefic activities. Despite 
the Ultraorthodox paternity of the initiative, Yad Sarah's became soon 
an occasion for a much broader and variegated group of volunteers 
from all strata of Israeli society. The idea of compassion and charity is 
much present in the sacred scriptures and even more in the texts from 
the sages that the Haredi community regards with much veneration. 
Donating and helping the poor and the sick are also considered good 
deeds that a pious person should perform as a religious duty. In Yad 
Sarah these religious predicaments are sublimated and put in practice. 
To a certain extent, through Yad Sarah, the Ultraorthodox community 
has been promoting some fundamental values anchored to its credo, 
spreading a message of social caring and piety. Public recognition of 
the organization and its work has been formalized through the award 
of several national prizes. On the international level, Yad Sarah is 
known in many countries and in 2005 had been granted (for the first 
time in the history of Israeli social actors) the status of UN council 
observer. 
                                                 
108 Stadler  N., Lomsky-Feder E. & Ben-Ari E. (2008): Fundamentalism's encounters with 
citizenship: the Haredim in Israel Citizenship Studies, 12:3:215-231 
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The second very peculiar example of Haredi participation in the public 
sphere reported by the above mentioned research is ZAKA109. 
Following the terror attacks in the Nineties this group was created for a 
specific and delicate purpose: the identification of victims of disastrous 
events. This sensitive task includes the re-composition and the 
treatment of the dead victims and their "delivery" to the competent 
public authority. The quick legitimation obtained by ZAKA in the 
public opinion and in the society derives from the volunteers' expertise 
in Jewish practice of burial and treatment of bodies. Moreover, their 
legitimation is strengthened by their constant collaboration with the 
official forces of rescue and public authorities. As a contingent task the 
organization supports the operation of first aid to the injured. At first 
the ultra-Orthodox rabbis viewed the work of the organization as 
heresy and sin. The Jewish relation with death and the handling of 
dead bodies is in fact very complex. Dead bodies are considered 
impure and touching them is highly prohibited but under very special 
conditions. The engagement in this sensitive activity vests the 
volunteers of a special status and challenges their identity as believers 
and as members of a religious community.  The drive to this 
contribution to the society however is explained by the volunteers in 
religious terms. They emphasize the sacredness of life (that has been 
taken away from the victims), the piety and the respect for the dead. 
The fundamentality of these values, and the desire to affirm them in the 
society committed the volunteers to a task whose acceptability is 
contested in the religious world and, for its unpredictable nature, might 
cause the transgression of other religious commandments (like the 
transgression of the day of absolute rest).  
These activities, that still involve a minor portion of the Haredi 
community, are anyway the symbol of a possible negotiation on the 
meaning of civic participation in the State. Religious values are not per 
se an obstacle to the development of a civic conscience. On the contrary 
positive values should be enlightened and their implementation of the 
                                                 
109  A more focused description of Zaka is given by Stadler N. et al., (2005) Terror, Aid and 
Organization: The Haredi Disaster Victim Identification Teams (ZAKA) in Israel in 
Anthropological Quarterly 78:3: 619-651. 
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shared ones should be encouraged as a mean of integration. As 
mentioned in the opening of the paragraph, participation is the 
personal contribution that every individual gives to the community. 
Being it personal, it carries the peculiar traits of individuals. In a multi-
fractured democratic society the total identification with the State's 
identity is hardly achievable and sometimes unfairly requested. In 
order not to create dangerous niches of marginalization therefore the 
even partial contribution should be regarded with favor and 
emphasized in order to create a more distended social climate and 
slowly expand the collaborative space. 
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3.3 RELIGION AND COMPETITION 
If participation is the personal or collective contribution to the society 
in order to promote ones' values and views, competition is the way 
different ideas and values confront each other to prevail in the political 
or social arena. Not all the ideas and values that are introduced in the 
public sphere through an act of participation pass to the stage of 
competition. In order pass to the stage of competition, ideas and values 
needs to be disagreed upon, or at least questioned. For example, while 
there is a large movement of participation all over the Western world to 
protect children from physical violence, this issue is not matter of 
competition, since, as of our knowledge, there is no social group that 
promotes battering of children. As it was explained in the previous 
chapter, the confrontation of different ideas is influenced by various 
elements. Some of them are systemic, because they concern the "rules of 
the game". Even if, in democracy, rules aim to be the fairest possible 
and to guarantee an equal competition, different sets of rules can favor 
or disfavor some of the players. This mechanism is sometimes 
addressed as a distortive feature of the system. It is known that a 
competitive system can have different degrees of distortive effect; it is 
also recognized, however, that distortive effects are impossible to avoid 
completely. Beside institutional constraints, competition is affected (in 
it substance) by social factors. In every society, indeed, diverse issues 
are object of interest for the population and constitute the ground for 
social and political debate. According to Lipset and Rokkan110, these 
issues are definable as social cleavages when:  
a) They have a divisive power within the society;  
b) Each faction has common evident characteristics of which they are 
self-aware;  
c) There is commitment to promote the faction's interests;  
                                                 
110 Rokkan S., Lipset S. M. (1967) Party systems and voter alignments: Cross-national 
perspectives. Toronto: The Free Press. 
 
287 
d) Institutional actors are ready to give the issues a more structured 
organization and political representation.  
Some social cleavages are more widespread around the world while 
others are more peculiar of specific societies. At the time of the creation 
of the Social Cleavages Theory, religion, with its strong power of 
influencing values, views and lifestyle of large masses of people, was 
considered to be one of the main agents in the creation of social 
cleavages. Israel, with its articulated set of religious parties and 
religious political representation, its continuous public debate on the 
separation between Church and State, funding to religious institutions 
and related sub-issues, immediately appears to be one of these 
countries. The adherence to the Social Cleavage model is briefly (and 
roughly) summarized in the following table: 
 
 
Does religion produce a social cleavage in Israel? 
 
Division of society Secular VS Religious view of State and 
Society 
Common bonding traits 
within the parts 
Secular: Their lifestyle is not (or slightly) 
influenced by religious predicaments. 
Jewishness is considered an ethnic and 
cultural concept. Religion should have no 
(or minor) role in public life. 
Religious: Daily observance (in different 
degrees) of religious predicaments. 
Jewishness is vested with ethnic, cultural 
and religious meaning. Religion cannot be 
(totally) separated from the State. 
Commitment to bring 
group's values and 
interests in the society 
Secular: Creation and preservation of a 
modern State characterized by separation 
between Church and State. 
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Religious: Revival of Jewish religious roots 
and promotion of a more religious 
lifestyle. Shaping State policies and State 
features in this direction.  
Institutional actors for 
structuration and 
representation of the 
cleavage 
Secular: secular parties (rarely explicitly 
antireligious but expressing their views on 
the secular-religious issue as an important 
part of their agenda). 
Religious: Religious parties  
 
Already in pre-State period, when the Zionist idea of establishing a 
Jewish State in the area that the Jewish tradition referred to as Eretz 
Ysrael started taking form, the Jewish community showed different 
reactions. While the secular and more assimilated group generally 
looked at this possibility with favorable eyes, the religious community 
did not immediately embrace the project. Their main concern was 
about the religious admissibility of a secular State created in Eretz 
Ysrael with the claim to be the national realization of the Jewish people. 
Among the reasons for which part of the religious community adhered 
to the Zionist project, there was the desire of influencing with their 
values and practices the rest of the community, leading gradually more 
and more Jews to detach themselves from secular lifestyle or at least 
preventing the State from "blasphemous" turns111. This latter point, in a 
more intransigent version, will be also adopted by part of the Haredi 
community, which did not join the Zionist movement but, after a 
period of absolute rejection, adopted a slightly more collaborative 
attitude toward it. The division between diverse interpretations of 
Jewishness was therefore evident from the very beginning of the state 
                                                 
111 The participation of part of the religious community in the Zionist enterprise was also 
due to the messianic meaning that they gave to the mass immigration to Eretz Ysrael. 
This was considered as a religious commandment and as the first step to redemption. 
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enterprise and was strongly mirrored in the social dynamics of the 
Yshuv112 and in the post-independence political scenario. 
Jewish religion, with its pervasiveness in believers' everyday life, 
creates an immediately visible separation in the society. The simplistic 
esthetical description that was provided in the previous paragraph to 
put in evidence the difference among Secular, Orthodox and Haredi 
show somehow a neat division accompanied by strong identity 
awareness. Both in secular and in religious ideologies, group awareness 
has been strongly emphasized and enriched with the main values that 
the respective ideologies give primacy to. At times, especially when 
tones got particularly exacerbated, group bounds were negatively 
defined (with the rhetoric of "we are not… we are those who oppose 
to..."). Religious communities have maintained a certain level of 
separate socialization from the secular world, with different degrees 
according to the religious and political stream. In the case of non-
Orthodox streams, the separation from the secular group is almost 
imperceptible (unlike their religious identity). Religious Zionists 
usually have a good social integration with secular world accompanied 
by exclusive intra-group socialization, especially as regards education, 
marriage and religious practice. Frequent contacts with secular world 
might have attenuated collective bonds and ideological views in some 
cases. However, the most loyal to the Religious Zionist movement have 
been preserving conservative nationalistic views based on religious 
interpretation (especially after 1967), have endorsed the settlement 
movements and have supported an intransigent approach to the 
territorial cessions and the peace process. In the case of the Haredi 
group, the strong community bonds based on a strict observance of the 
Halacha and its recognition as the only legitimate law, have often 
resulted in self-segregation (that, in a circular process, keep 
strengthening internal community bonds). Haredi strategy is well 
explicable with the motto "social segregation and cultural 
                                                 
112 The term Yshuv defines the Jewish community settled in Eretz Ysrael during the 
Ottoman Empire and the Mandate era. I mainly refer to the New Yshuv, which was 
formed after the Zionist ideology spread and the first wave of immigration opened the 
way to a massive migratory flux. 
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fortification"113. Secular identity, well present as a group identity since 
the beginning of the Zionist era, has known moments of more 
passionate public claim in which secular lifestyle and the conception of 
the State have been harshly opposed to the religious ones.   
Already during the British Mandate, when the Jewish political 
panorama started taking a definite shape (especially as a result of the 
diffusion of nationalist aspirations), religious identities (here used in 
plural to stress the internal complexity of the phenomena) were 
translated in a more institutionalized form by religious parties. In the 
political negotiation that preceded the formation of the State and in the 
following years, religious parties were able to gain substantial victories 
in shaping the public Israeli sphere. Their political weight allowed 
them to maintain and to enlarge this influence.  
With time, the religious cleavage acquired a growing complexity, 
intertwining both with the territorial issue (described in the previous 
paragraphs as the main cleavage in Israel, massively reflected in the 
political arena) and with the intra-ethnic one. In the early years of the 
State, religious parties focused mainly in shaping the society according 
to religious predicaments and to self-promote as heralds of Jewish 
traditionalism. The main interest, in fact, was to grant autonomy to the 
religious streams in order to preserve their customs and consolidate the 
inner communities. The impellent request for the maintenance of 
separate educational streams, coming both from the Religious Zionists 
and from the Haredi, is the incarnation of the cleavage in the very 
essence of State and is the evidence of the ideological mission of the 
religious component.  
Later on, especially after 1967, the political platform of many religious 
parties was enriched (with different levels of influence) by the 
territorial issue, revisited in religious terms and incorporated into the 
religious ideology. This step, distinctive of the National Religious Party 
(main representative of Religious Zionism) represented an opening to 
certain conservative non-religious factions (mostly right wing parties) 
                                                 
113 Maimon D. & Rosner S., (2013, February 21), The Haredi Challenge, The Jewish People 
Policy Institute at http://jppi.org.il/news/127/58/The-Haredi-Challenge/ 
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but created a broader gap and a harsher political fight with the more 
liberal and "pacifist" sector, seen as betrayer of the Zionist enterprise 
and indifferent to the sacredness of the land of Eretz Ysrael. 
Paradoxically, a milder reaction was observed in Haredi sector whose 
relation with the State has always been conceived as more pragmatic. 
Their contempt for the State of Israel and the secular lifestyle of its 
citizens did not dramatically increase as a result of the territorial issue. 
On the contrary, in many Haredi leaders' declarations, the priority of 
saving human lives was preferred to territorial cessions114. A general 
trend to more nationalistic views, however, has been developing also in 
this segregated community. 
The intra-ethnic issue emerged in all its relevance in the aftermath of 
the immigration wave from Middle Eastern and Northern African 
regions. Ashkenazi and Sephardi Jews in Israel conduced since the 
beginning separate existence, due to different interpretations of 
religious rules, rituals and the recognition of different rabbinical 
authorities. Nonetheless, until the Eighties, the political participation of 
both groups converged in Agudat Ysrael, Haredi party of Ashkenazi 
origins. In 1983, the Sephardi group declared its separation from 
Agudat Ysrael, due to systematic under-representation and 
discriminations in the party. The formation of a new party, Shas, 
entailed the deep fusion of religious and ethnic discourse. The claim for 
social, cultural and spiritual redemption made by Shas on behalf of all 
Mizrahi Jews, further enlarged the basis of consensus and enriched the 
party ideology of another element, the socioeconomic one. Chetrit115 
inserts Shas in a slow and radical awakening process of the Mizrahi 
group, preceded by naïve and short-lasting political initiatives that 
nonetheless opened the way to a more structured political awareness. It 
is further stressed how the profound religious inspiration gave strength 
and stability to the party. Its rhetoric remained centered on the 
religious sphere and its action focused on building and sustaining a 
                                                 
114 The argumentation regarding the overlapping of territorial and religious issues reflects 
the position of Kopelowitz E., (2001) Religious Politics and Israel’s Ethnic Democracy in 
Israel Studies, 6:3:166-190. 
115 Chetrit S., (2000), Mizrahi Politics in Israel: Between Integration and Alternative in 
Journal of Palestine Studies, 29:4:51-65. 
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network of services and socializing bodies for the Mizrahi religious 
communities. Its social projection was functional to the strengthening 
of the religious community and to the enlargement of its electoral 
constituency. Despite the focus that Chetrit poses on the ethnic 
connotation, Shas religious ideological origin appears sharper than the 
ethnic one. The overlapping of the other two issues (the ethnic and the 
socioeconomic one) has however contributed to charm a broader 
Mizrahi target that for decades has been feeling discriminated by a 
"dominant and economically more developed ethnic group".  
As a further proof of the predominance of its religious nature, Shas, 
even more than other religious parties, integrates in its political 
discourse an insistent call for the return to religious belief and practice. 
The return to faith is a very popular concept in the Israeli discourse. 
The Hebrew expression lachzor betshuva means literally "to return to the 
answer". The expression implies two fundamental concepts: the 
original belonging to something that the individual abandoned116 and 
the sense of completeness and satisfaction deriving by finding the 
existential answers in religious life. In religious parties' propaganda 
and in particular in Shas, this element is absolutely central. Shas made 
of this concept a powerful bridge between the religious and the secular 
electorate: the internal movement dedicated to the "tshuva mission" has 
been gaining importance as party's emissary. The proposal of a more 
pious life attracts many traditionalists and drives them in the party's 
sphere of influence. While the call for the supremacy of religious 
principles and for a stronger religious influence in society is common to 
certain extent to all religious parties, Lehman and Siebzehner117 stress 
an important difference. Ashkenazi religious factions have been 
preserving a more hierarchic approach, with a strict rabbinical control 
and rigid constraints to popular participation. On the other hand, Shas 
                                                 
116 This point to which the individual is invited to return can have double interpretation: 
either to the moment of the birth in which the Jewish soul is pure and therefore close to 
God; or to the ancient status of Jewish people, chosen by God to accept his covenant and 
to live a pure life of spiritual proximity to the divine. 
117 Lehman D. & Siebzehner B., (2006) Holy Pirates: Media, Ethnicity and Religious 
Renewal in Israel in Meyer B & Moors A., Religion, Media and the Public Sphere. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.  
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focuses on capillary mobilization and proposes a spiritual and social 
renewal. Those who gravitate in Shas' sphere of influence are provided 
with social structures and services that are linked to the party (schools, 
recreational centers, synagogues, credit institutes etc.) and to which it 
ensures public funds. Using this method, Shas mobilizes and includes 
people in a "protected and controlled" social system. This approach has 
been resurrected by Shas from the ashes of the public welfare system 
that MAPAI had built in the early years of the State and that 
progressively crumbled because of the liberal economic turn. It is not 
wrong to say that nowadays Shas represents a modern version of the 
traditional mass party.  
On the other hand, Shas preserves the anti-system approach typical of 
Ultraorthodox parties, presenting the return to faith not only as a 
spiritual renewal but also as a rebellion against the hegemonic culture 
and elite. As Stoll118 underlines while describing sectarian parties 
(including Shas), these formations are born from the incapacity of the 
mainstream parties to offer representation to specific groups' instances 
and to satisfy their needs. Religious parties, that see themselves as the 
bearer of  Jewish tradition and faith against the godless Zionist regime, 
carry on a sort of Gramscian resistance to the State–oppressor119 and 
participate in the political competition and in state bodies not to 
legitimize them but to build, from inside, a social alternative to defeat 
them.120  
 
 
Religious Parties' post-electoral competition 
The religious cleavage and its strength are effective not only in shaping 
public debate, electoral competition and in structuring parties' 
ideology. In fact, through the popular consensus that they receive, they 
                                                 
118 Stoll H., (2013) Changing Societies, Changing Party Systems, New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
119 Leham D. & Siebzehner B., (2006), See above. 
120 Davis N. J & Robinson R. V (2012), Claiming Society for God: Religious Movements 
and Social Welfare, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
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have access to representative bodies. At this stage, the systemic 
elements massively show their effects. Especially in post-electoral 
competition, parties adapt their action to these institutional constrains. 
Religious parties have a minority consensus in the Israeli political 
panorama. In the 120-members Knesset, they have never overcome the 
aggregate number of 30 seats. This number might in fact seem a 
considerable one, given that, especially in the last fifteen years, many 
governments have been led by parties whose relative majority 
consisted in 26-31 seats. However, the divisions among religious 
formations (deriving from internal fights, different ethnic targets, 
different positions on "non-religious" issues and the very role to play in 
representative bodies) never have been solved completely, thus 
preventing the formation of a united religious bloc. Some partial 
agreements and fusions have been realized along the years, as well as 
separations. In this aspect, religious political parties are quite similar to 
their secular "fellows". In post-electoral competition, religious parties' 
power does not strictly derive from their numbers, rather from the 
balance of power that, starting from the Seventies, the electoral results 
have been creating. As explained in previous paragraphs, with 1977 
electoral victory of Likud, the political dominance of MAPAI ended 
and the system turned to bipolarism. The competition for the 
government of the country became a close political confrontation 
among two main parties which won one over the other often for few 
votes. Since no party has ever been able to form a government without 
the support of a coalition, religious parties have been regarded as the 
most probable allies. Beside ideological reasons that might have been 
favoring the alliance with the religious parties (among those a 
consociational mentality, developed since the establishment of the State 
and described in detail by Cohen and Susser121), it is necessary to 
consider that the most voted religious party has often been the third 
voted party, after the winner and its direct opponent. Much utilitarian 
calculations might have driven the majority party to ask the 
collaboration of the third party (that, in the referred period, held from 6 
to 12 seats). Following its acceptation, it would have been theoretically 
                                                 
121 Cohen, A. & Susser, B. (1996). From accommodation to decision: Transformations in 
Israel's religious-political life in Journal Of Church & State, 38:4, 817. 
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easier to convince other religious parties to join the coalition. Moreover, 
religious alliance would have facilitated the "public support" of specific 
sectors of the population. From the beginning of the State era to the 
Eighties, the main religious party was of Zionist inspiration. It 
generally collected more than 10 seats per election and took part in 
every Government till 1992 under various names and forms (due to 
unions and disaggregation). In the Eighties, however, another religious 
political actor took the scene in the political arena: Shas. After its first 
apparition in 1984 national competition when it gained 4 seats, Shas 
progressively raised its consensus. After 1996 it has never gained less 
than ten representatives, reaching a seventeen-peak in 1999.  
If looking at the increasing fragmentation of the system and to the 
extreme volatility of the political consensus, religious parties have been 
enjoying a relative stability, comparing to other parties (in this context, 
the drop of votes from a tournament to the other as a result of the split 
of a party cannot be considered a significant migration of votes). Shas is 
a good example of this relative stability (as well as Agudat Ysrael, even 
if with much smaller numbers). The NRP on the other hand has 
suffered from a more alternate fortune, especially since its radical 
position on the territorial issue transformed it in a right wing niche 
party and since Shas consolidated its power. However, for over 20 
years the party positioned itself steadily in the Knesset with10-12 
representatives. Starting from the bipolar era, religious parties have 
been particularly active in governments and have been livening up the 
political dynamics and the sorts of the executives. It is easy to 
understand that very close results among the two main parties gave a 
disproportionate power to the small potential allies, investing them of 
the role of kingmakers. Religious parties (especially Haredi), whose 
agenda consists mainly in enlarging the autonomy and the 
structuration of their community and in extending their reparatory 
influence on the godless State, have been welcoming this new 
opportunity, trying to benefit from it as much as possible. Tiring 
negotiations have been taking place in the attempt of forming 
coalitions. A pretty stable dynamic have been developing: in return for 
religious party support, the majority party guarantees ministerial 
appointments (particularly requested in the bargaining are religious 
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affairs, education, housing etc) and allocation of regular and special 
funds for the religious parties-related organizations (schools, 
synagogues, recreational centers and the other above mentioned). 
While the economic matter is common to all religious parties, the 
request of political offices is usually absent in the case of Ashkenazi 
Haredi parties; their aim in fact is not to take effective part in the 
Government but to negotiate with it for the preservation and the 
consolidation of the autonomous enclaves122 that they live in. A more 
articulated approach has been adopted by Shas that, as explained, is 
formed and supported by a much larger electoral and social basis. Shas' 
social basis gravitates around the network of services that the party 
offers and in which the religious and political indoctrination take place. 
The maintenance of this complex network is vital for Shas, both in 
order to maintain a high level of responsiveness toward its constituency 
and to enlarge it. This high-demanding attitude of religious parties has 
heavy consequences in terms of governance and stability of the 
executive. In the past, the dominant position of MAPAI allowed it to 
lead governmental coalitions with a certain degree of autonomy and 
the support of a small coalition member was rarely critical for the 
survival of the majority. From the Seventies, the situation changed 
completely: being coalitions much narrower than in the past, the 
weight of any vote augmented notably. The soaring power of 
bargaining led minor parties (the religious ones being an excellent 
example) to be increasingly demanding, sometimes exceeding in semi-
legal practices to guarantee the allocation of funds to their network, to 
provide public jobs as a repayment for party loyalty etc. A stricter 
attitude in opposing governmental initiatives was also registered, often 
as a sanction for non-satisfied requests. The immobilization of the 
Government and the frequent degeneration in intrigues and not 
transparent agreements has been evident to and criticized by the public 
opinion. Naturally this has been aggravating the resentment of the 
secular public against the religious parties. Religious parties' 
unconditioned commitment to preserve sectarian interest and the 
increasing request of resources and power to achieve this goal, have 
                                                 
122 On the concept of social enclave, see above Lehman D. & Siebzehner B., (2006). 
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been fostering a deep secular unrest, deepening the already neat social 
cleavage. Repeated governmental crises caused in totum or partially by 
the power dynamics between religious and secular coalition members 
and the persistent public pressure led to an electoral reform (that 
entered into force in 1996). This was adopted with the deliberate aim of 
strengthening the role of the Prime Minister through direct popular 
election. The measure proved ineffective and even more harmful: 
religious parties conducted very intense and target-focused campaigns 
and the electors, freed from strategic considerations, voted massively 
for their preferred parties, disregarding their dimensions. As a result, 
the big parties were weakened in terms of electoral consensus and 
Knesset representatives. The new numerical strength acquired by 
smaller parties was a very effective tool for influencing the 
governmental coalition. After three electoral turns, in 2001, the old law 
was reinstated.  
Religious parties have been recognized as viable partners for 
governmental coalition both from the Left and from the Right. Since the 
Seventies, a more nationalistic approach has been adopted by all 
religious parties (in particular by the Zionist religious movement). As a 
consequence, these parties have been shifting toward the nationalistic 
hawkish right wing. Instead, the Labor and the leftist parties have been 
blamed for ignoring the needs of the underprivileged population and 
to have a too amenable attitude toward the Arab population and the 
territorial issue (related to the peace process). These criticisms have not 
prevented religious parties to enter in coalition with both Right and 
Left, under favorable conditions to which the support is subordinated. 
The flexibility of religious parties in molding their enmity against 
secular parties (especially the much criticized leftist parties) has 
commonly being interpreted as a utilitarian exploitation of the 
democratic rules to ensure economic sustainment to the separatists 
communities as well as to invade the public sphere with religious 
coercive elements. This dualistic attitude can be otherwise explained on 
the light of Kopelowitz's research123. Kopelowitz states that, as any 
other party, religious factions are driven to political involvement by the 
                                                 
123 Kopelowitz E., (2001), See above. 
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desire to realize specific points of their agenda. Doing so, they 
inevitably confront with state institutions and the secular political 
establishment. The perception of the latter as harmful to their ideology 
can constitute an obstacle or even prevent their participation. 
Moreover, the decisional authority within the party, and in particular 
the strict control of the rabbinical leadership, is considered as another 
potential factor influencing the active involvement in the executive 
body. It is explainable, under this rationale, how a political decision or 
a specific position taken by the Government can determine the 
abandonment of the coalition by one or more religious parties. For 
example, the Ultraorthodox Ashkenazi party United Torah Judaism, in 
1999, left the Government led by Ehud Barak (Prime Minister for a left-
wing formation guided by the Labor) in protest against the shipment of 
a turbine to the Ashkelon power station on the sacred day of Sabbath 
that Judaism prescribes as a day of absolute rest and devotion. On the 
same level, the strict rabbinical discipline and the view of the active 
participation in the Government as a sinful legitimation of a secular 
blasphemous institution, has generally prevented the Ashkenazi 
Haredi parties from taking substantial responsibilities in the 
governments that they have been part of. On the contrary, Shas, with its 
desire of managing as much economic resources as possible in order to 
direct them to organization that match they ideological criteria and 
sustain its communities, has preferred a more active role in the 
executives that it has supported. From the just reported examples and 
from Kopelowitz's theoretical scheme it is possible to infer that not 
mere opportunistic considerations determine the entrance and the 
stable presence of religious parties in a governmental coalition. Rather 
the effective possibility to promote specific core policies of the party's 
agenda is fundamental as well as the respect, from other coalition 
members and from the Government, of the basics of the party's 
ideology. Since religious parties have quite significantly different 
programmatic priorities (as well as different approaches to politics and 
the society), their behavior vis-à-vis the Government (potential or 
existent) can vary from case to case124. The adoption of positions or 
                                                 
124 An example reported by Kopelowitz is the attitude of the National Religious Party in 
the debate over the withdrawal from the occupied territories (after the maturation of 
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concrete measures that contrast one party's core values can trigger the 
perception of the secular partners as detractors and compromise the 
alliance. The same governmental measure can instead be considered by 
another religious party as a minor one and therefore not grave enough 
to break the coalitional bound. 
. 
 
  
                                                                                                           
more a nationalistic ideology that related the post-war territorial expansion to a messianic 
vision of imminent salvation). In 1992-1996, the National Religious Party showed a very 
intransigent attitude toward its "historical partner", the Labor, over the Government’s 
peace policies. The different ideological structure and priorities left the Ultraorthodox 
Shas a broader margin to compromise over the territorial issue. Shas, whose position on 
the peace process and the territories is but dovish, showed a more supportive attitude 
toward the government, claiming the supremacy of safeguarding Jewish lives over the 
preservation of the land.  
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3.4 THE HISTORICAL REASONS OF THE INFLUENCE OF 
RELIGION 
Once analyzed Israeli democracy according to the TODEM method, it 
is undoubtedly possible to confirm that Israel is in fact a democracy. In 
the third chapter, causal relations between religion and some of the 
aspects of the Israeli democracy have been detected. It proved evident 
that religion deeply shapes key-aspects related to citizens' life and their 
civic role. Beside the effect that religion has on individuals and groups, 
influence has been observed in some institutional settings and systemic 
elements. 
A question emerges when considering that the religious population has 
always been a minority in the Jewish community in Israel and in the 
Zionist movement. How was such an influence able to impose itself? 
This question is particularly relevant to find an explanation for 
influence tracked in the institutional setting. It is necessary then to 
investigate the historical mechanisms that brought the religious views 
to predominate in the political scenario. 
 
 
Religion and Zionism 
When Zionism developed in Europe as a nationalist movement in 1897, 
the reactions among the large Jewish European community was 
multifaceted. Nationalist views that had emerged all over Europe in 
that period indicated the nation-state as the very expression of people 
sovereignty. The right to self-determination had been a much popular 
concept from the early XIX century. By the end of the century, some 
imperialistic elements started to be visible.  
In the case of Zionism, nationalism and the right to self-determination 
took the connotation of a salvific mission. According to Herzl125, 
considered the founding father of the movement, the establishment of a 
Jewish State was the only effective solution to the "Jewish problem". A 
                                                 
125 Herzl T., (1896) The Jewish State. Electronic version at 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Zionism/herzl2.html 
301 
Jewish State would have allowed the Jewish people to redeem 
themselves from centuries of oppression and discrimination 
perpetrated by States that exploited their minority status, relegated 
them at the margins of society and often used them as scapegoats. The 
passionate proposal to build a new society and to give to the Jewish 
man a new social and existential role took, at times, extreme 
conformations. Dowty126 mentions, for example, how Herzl himself 
seemed to partially have accepted the anti-Semitic European claims: he 
portrayed Jews as avid and parasitic and claimed that the condition of 
subordination imposed to the Jewish people in Christian Europe was 
responsible for this human decline.  
Zionism aimed to "normalize" the Jewish world community in a 
modern national entity. In this modernistic view carried on in the 
ideological footsteps of the Jewish Haskala, religion was considered as 
a trait of weakness and one of the causes of Jewish self-retreat. 
However, in the initial phase (and later, during its consolidation), 
Zionists tried to curb the broadest consensus possible. Since the Zionist 
message was a universal quest for Jewish consensus over the 
establishment of a national home, the need was urgent to minimize 
defections. A too critical approach toward religion was likely to 
jeopardize the legitimacy of the project in the eyes of the Jewish large 
public, which primarily lived in segregated or semi-segregated 
communities and was socialized in a Jewish traditional environment. 
Moreover, the Jewish nation was scattered all around the world; they 
had been living in non-sovereign communities for centuries, under the 
domination of foreign regimes. As a consequence, the most 
authoritative interlocutors of the much secular Zionist founding fathers 
were rabbis, the authorities of the various areas and communities. 
Therefore, massive reference was made to the Jewish tradition. Even 
the "choice" of the geographical location of the State–to-be (debated 
passionately for many years) was a greatly affected by the traditional 
Jewish narrative. The tradition-driven choice of the land, favored a 
                                                 
126  Dowty, A. (1998) The Jewish State: A Century Later, Updated With a New Preface. 
Berkeley: University of California Press 
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broader identification with the movement's ideology. Furthermore, it 
opened the way to a rhetorical, tradition-based discourse that would 
not have been possible in case of a different geographical location. Most 
of rhetorical vocabulary was derived by traditional symbols and 
incorporated spiritual values (Weissbrod127, for example, refers to the 
central concept of Zion, referring to the hill on which the Temple in 
Jerusalem was built. The word's meaning was broadened with the time 
but still retains a sacred aura).  In some cases, religious symbols were 
used according to a confrontational128 logic. Beside symbolism and 
rhetoric, therefore, Zionism proposed a clear transformation of the 
Jewish identity. Its positivistic, man-centered message left few doubts 
about the commitment to establish a non-religious national State.129. 
The religious reactions to the new nationalistic ideas are briefly but 
effectively schematized by Shafir and Peled130. The attitudes toward the 
new nationalistic ideology were of:   
a) Pragmatic Accomodationism: This attitude was peculiar of the 
Mizrachi movement, ideologically led by Rav I. J. Reines since 1902. 
The Mizrachi movement recognized the secular Zionist's  orientations 
and general aims. After an initial skeptic and quite critical reaction, Rav 
Reines did not oppose the state enterprise that represented a way to 
safeguard Jewish lives against the degeneration of the nationalistic 
European climate as well as against the new wave of violence that was 
plaguing Eastern European Jewry. Well known educator and founder 
                                                 
127 Wessbrod, L., (1983) Religion as a National Identity in a Secular Society in Review of 
Religious Research 24:3:188-205. 
128 On the confrontational use of traditional values and symbols see Liebman C. S. & Don-
Yehiya E., (1983) The Dilemma of Reconciling Traditional Culture and Political Needs: 
Civil Religion in Israel Comparative Politics 16:1: 53-66. 
129 This meager description does not aim to exhaustively describe the Zionist ideology 
that was extremely articulated and, from its very beginning, included different 
approaches and sub-ideologies. The general and short mention is functional to introduce 
to the historical context in which the state enterprise was conceived.  
130 Shafir G. & Peled Y. (2002), Being Israeli: The Dynamics of Multiple Citizenship. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. The original classification includes five types. 
One of them describes the attitude of Shas, Ultraorthodox Sephardi Party that, as 
mentioned, was formed in the Eighties. Analyzing now the early reactions to Zionist, this 
case is not relevant. 
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of progressive religious approaches, Reines showed interest in shaping 
the new State's educational system, especially after the cultural issue 
was considerably brought up by Ehad Ha'Am (father of the so called 
Cultural Zionism). Education was perceived as a mean to safeguard 
religious culture and exercise a religious influence on the secular 
population131. This approach is considered that of modern orthodoxy: 
religious people can actually live in a secular environment, adapt 
themselves and give a significant contribution.  
b) Principled accomodationism: This more positive attitude toward 
Zionism was elaborated by Rav Kook. Rav Kook, who later became a 
great source of inspiration for the Mizrachi movement too, attributed a 
religious meaning to the secular Zionist enterprise. The settlement in 
Eretz Ysrael was seen as the first step for redemption. Despite their 
distant orientation from religion, Zionists were nonetheless seen as tool 
in the hand of God. Their task was that of promoting the gathering of 
Jews in the Promised Land. Kook invited his followers to join the 
Zionist enterprise. This approach will become the leading ideology of 
Religious Zionism. It will actually remain the spine of a powerful 
political stream in the State of Israel, which will evolve with the years 
and with the historical developments. The Mizrachi movement 
integrated with the Zionist stream and in fact adopted the same 
rhetoric strategy. Secular Zionist symbol in fact were processed and 
ingurgitated in the religious symbolic apparatus that guided Mizrachi's 
ideology. Ohana132 observes how both the Zionist leadership (later 
incarnated by Ben Gurion) and Rabbi Kook translated each other core 
values according to their own paradigm and created their own political 
theologies in order to favor group identification. The former used 
religious symbols and myths to build consensus around the State idea. 
The latter, mobilized the pioneers and instilled in them Messianic 
views, attributing a salvific meaning to the physical work in Eretz 
Ysrael. Secular and Religious Zionism had opposite rhetoric aims: the 
                                                 
131 For a more extended analysis of the educational issue, central in the Israeli society 
since the pre-State period see Gross Z., (2003) State-Religious Education in Israel: 
Between Tradition and Modernity in Prospects, 33:2:149-163. 
132 Ohana D., (2012) The politics of political despair: the case of political theology in Israel. 
Jerusalem: The Israel Institute of Democracy. 
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political meaning prevailed in one case, while in the other the religious 
did. However, both greatly contributed to the legitimization of 
Zionism, developing a common narrative that had a unifying effect on 
the population.  
c) Pragmatic Rejectionism: This was the reaction of the great part of 
Ultraorthodox community, united in Agudat Ysrael133. This movement 
rejected Zionism both from the political and from the religious point of 
view. The later presence of the Haredi community in the State of Israel 
(mainly consequences of the latest European prosecution and of the 
Holocaust) was seen as an act of detached vigilance on the "sinner" 
fellows Jews (to which Haredi contraposed an example of faith and 
proper lifestyle). The only relation with the State was functional to the 
economic survival of the Haredi community.   
d) Principled Rejectionism A minority of Haredi Jews reacted with 
extreme disgust to the Zionist ideology and defined the State project as 
a demoniac act. They opted for a total closure toward it and, till today, 
they have been opposing the State and its very existence.  
When the massive immigration started, Zionist ideology became 
predominant in the Yshuv (the Jewish community in historic Palestine). 
In the Yshuv, the autonomy granted by the Ottoman Empire and then 
by the British Mandate and the national aspiration fostered the 
organization of a proto-political community, based on voluntary 
adhesion, which dealt with several matters (education, religious affairs, 
personal status etc.). As Dowty134 notes, the Yshuv resembled many 
aspect of the Diaspora Jewish communities both in the political and in 
the social organization. The European experiential background, the 
voluntary nature of the Yshuv (thus the lack of any binding power on 
the members) and the inclusive approach that the Zionist movement 
had opted for since its creation (necessary to gather as much strength as 
possible) led to the adoption of a consociational style.  The Zionist 
leadership, who aspired to be the political guidance of the Jewish 
                                                 
133 European organization of anti-Zionists constituted in 1912. In Eretz Ysrael, Agudat 
Ysrael represented an alternative community to the Zionist Yshuv. With the establishment 
of the State it became the first Israeli Ultraorthodox party. 
134 Dowty, A. (1998), See above. 
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community in Eretz Ysrael, committed to manage with this method the 
internal dynamics of the Yshuv. With its institutions, the Zionist 
movement controlled the quasi totality of the economic funds, mainly 
coming from external donations to the cause. The funds were 
generously distributed to all Jewish sub-communities, in a way to grant 
the construction and preservation of their particular social networks 
(schools, religious centers etc.). Meanwhile the immigration flux kept 
enlarging the Jewish population. The political negotiations with the 
international community for the establishment of the State proceeded 
with alternate fortune.  
Another big challenge requested the maintenance of a united Jewish 
community: the security problems deriving from frequent clashes with 
the Arab population. The case of De Haan is in a way emblematic of the 
potential threat that a lack of identification with the community and the 
state enterprise could pose to the Yshuv. De Haan, ex Zionist then 
become one of the representatives of Agudat Ysrael, established strict 
and continuous contacts with many leaders of the Arab community. 
During these contact, De Haan ensured the Haredi support for the 
creation of a Palestinian State. In exchange, he asked the permission for 
unlimited Jewish immigration in Eretz Ysrael, on which the Jewish 
community would have relinquished any nationalist aspiration. The 
episode of De Haan, even though not historically determinant, is the 
example of the consequences of social and identity divisions within the 
Jewish community. The fact that one of the Zionist armed organizations 
assassinated him in 1924 is the proof that these dissident figures were 
regarded with preoccupation by the Zionist establishment. The 
relations of some Haredi groups with the Arab world did not stop after 
this episode. Some Haredi communities (Neturei Karta135, the most 
known) have been maintaining a total rejectionist approach to the State 
of Israel and still hold relations for Iran and other countries whose 
relations with Israel are tensed. 
The absolute necessity for unity and consensus was a priority also for 
international reasons, especially before the establishment of the State. 
                                                 
135 Most of these communities originated after that Agudat Ysrael started a minimum 
pragmatic relations with Zionists. 
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While the Jewish population was growing and while the problematic 
relations with the Arab population were emerging, the Zionist political 
elite advocated for the official international community's recognition of 
the effective possibility to build an independent State. It was a very 
delicate political stage and dissident voices were perceived as harmful 
and delegitimizing. The Ultraorthodox propaganda against the Zionist 
project reached the international community through the media and 
through diplomatic work of Agudat Ysrael's representatives in foreign 
countries. The delegitimizing power of the protest can be summarized 
in one episode: Agudat Ysrael downplayed the Jewish Agency in 
Britain and intimated it not to speak on behalf of all Jews (and asking 
for their own representation, which was denied). The strong 
preoccupation of the Zionist leadership for these centrifugal forces and 
the desire to create a cohesive Jewish society the new State, led Ben 
Gurion, chairman of the Jewish Agency in Palestine to propose an 
agreement to the "separatist" Ultraorthodox party. This move 
represented a sign of respect and acceptance of the religious lifestyle, 
also vis-à-vis the Zionist Religious stream. In June 1947, during the 
UNSCOP's visit to the much troubled area, with the purpose of 
redacting a report to be used for a UN resolution to solve the Jewish-
Arab conflict on the territorial allocation, a famous letter was sent by 
Ben Gurion to the leadership of Agudat Ysrael. With this letter, 
containing the basic points for an agreement on the Jewish nature of the 
State, Ben Gurion aimed to recompose the fracture caused by the 
political debate on universal suffrage136. This issue had scandalized and 
infuriated the Haredi community that abandoned the Yshuv. In the 
letter, Ben Gurion clarified that "Neither the Jewish Agency Executive 
nor any other body in the country is authorized to determine the 
                                                 
136 The struggle of women for the right to vote and to be elected lasted years. It is, to 
certain extent, relevant to explain the internal dynamics of the Yshuv and the 
consociational approach that was adopted while pursuing an agreed upon solution. 
Interesting is for example that in 1920 Election for the National Assembly of the Yshuv 
the Haredi population in Jerusalem, was provided with kosher ballot box; Haredi women 
did not vote but Haredi men's vote was counted as double. For a more complete analysis 
see Fogiel Bijaoui S., (1992), On the way to Equality? The struggle for women-s suffrage 
in the Jewish Yshuv, 1917-1926 in Bernstein D. (ed.) Pioneers and Homemakers: Jewish 
Women in Pre-state Israel, Albany SUNY Press. 
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constitution of the Jewish State-in-the-making in advance137". He 
clarified that the State would not have been theocratic, explaining that 
the United Nations would have never accepted such an arrangement 
for the new State. Moreover, he stressed that a multiethnic population 
that was currently living in the country. On the other side, he did not 
clearly express the Zionist position at regards. The letter (known 
nowadays as Status Quo) ensured a particular attention to the basic 
requests of Agudat Ysrael concerning Shabbat observance, dietary laws 
(kashrut), personal status laws and the educational system. Even 
though the letter was just the official presentation of precedent political 
agreements (on issues that for the main part had also been granted 
during the Yshuv era), the Status Quo arrangement sanctioned the 
specific role of Orthodoxy and its establishment. Religion gained a 
formal authority in matter of personal status and in representing the 
Jewish confession within the State. This agreement therefore was the 
premise for the exclusive religious management of all matters of 
marriage and divorce. The total economic support from the State and 
the monopoly in State funded religious services was granted to the 
Orthodox stream. In the aftermath of this concessive agreement, Ultra-
Orthodox communities would be granted special conditions in order 
their lifestyle and their beliefs not to be hurt by the State's settings. 
The Declaration of Independence, crucial step in the State-building 
process, represents another example of conciliation between the secular 
and the religious group. The Declaration of Independence was 
intended to be a portentous national unifier, based on moral values 
with which the vast majority of the Jewish community could identify. 
In doing so a particular attention was to be put in the wording. For 
ideological purpose in fact, the rhetoric style was preferred to the 
legalistic one138. A very famous and significant controversy emerged 
apropos the reference of God in the text. The secularists strongly 
opposed this possibility as much as the traditionalists and the religious 
supported it. The two ideological paradigms were clashing again in the 
                                                 
137 The text of the letter is reported in Rabinovic E.& Reinharz J. (2008). Israel in the 
Middle East. Lebanon NH: Brandeis University Press 
138 Rubinstein E., (1998) The Declaration of Independence as a Basic Document of the 
State of Israel in Israel Studies 3:1:195-210.  
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most emblematic and emotional document that represented the 
realization of the much strived for project. A compromise was found in 
the use of a most subtle expression, "Rock of Israel". The religious 
community could interpret according to the biblical meaning (in which 
this expression identified God). On the other hand, it retained no 
religious meaning for the seculars.  
 
 
Religion in the new State 
When the State was created, the autonomous community of the Yshuv 
turned in a community of citizens in their national home. The old 
divisions persisted and so did the consociational approach of the 
political leadership. According to Birnbaum, during the Ottoman 
domination and later in Mandate era, Jewish religious communities 
had developed strong nationalistic feelings (fostered by Zionism). 
These feeling were poured on the newborn State in the form of 
aspirations to a greater role of religion in society. 
One of the first debates in which the "new citizens" engaged was the 
need of a constitutional text. I will not linger on this issue extensively 
since a broad description has been made in the previous chapters. The 
concurrent factors (the principled opposition of the religious sector to a 
secular law, the will of the leading class to avoid rigid constraints etc.) 
that led to the final decision not to elaborate a constitutional chart are 
all attributable to the attempt not to define in univocal terms the 
relation between Church and State. This left to the political class a 
broad margin of freedom to stipulate contingent agreements with the 
religious sector. Moreover, drafting a Constitution would have meant 
to state formally and in details the general principles expressed in the 
Declaration of Independence. The consequences of such a specification 
were regarded as potentially divisive for secular-religious relations. As 
mentioned in previous paragraphs, the caution not to contradict 
religious principles with legislation has been always very high in Israel 
and has even prevented the country to fully accept some international 
treaties. In other words, the Constitution was seen as a too strict and 
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definitive set of rule that hardly fit the consociational approach that the 
political class had adopted in that period. 
The proportional electoral system, in use in the Jewish political 
organizations before the State was formed (both in the Diaspora and in 
the Yshuv), was maintained as an electoral system. Together with a 
national district and a very low threshold, it guaranteed representation 
to all groups. General knowledge is that Ben Gurion was instead a 
fervent supporter of majority electoral systems, to which he attributed a 
stabilizing power. If comparing the whole centralized bureaucratic and 
administrative system (that has been described in the second chapter) 
to the centrifugal tendencies that the electoral system allowed, it is 
evident that a double rationale guided the institutional building 
process; namely the desire of a diffuse control of the society as well as 
the need not to strangle the composite social identity. Also with the 
adoption of a proportional method, MAPAI's political dominance was 
overwhelming (even though it never reached the absolute majority). 
The governmental coalitions were formed with an inclusive approach. 
In particular, Religious Zionist parties were systematically coopted in 
the Government. A sort of “historic covenant” was informally 
stipulated where Religious Zionists refrained from interfering in 
national policy and focused on formalizing the legal validity of the 
Status Quo and in strengthening religious influence in the institutional 
apparatus139.  
The Law and Administration Ordinance, approved immediately after 
the establishment of the State, preserved the authority of Religious 
Courts, as a concurrent judicial body (exclusive in some cases, 
extensively described in the previous chapters). This way, the 
preoccupations of the religious community were levied and the risk of 
a social fracture in this sense was avoided140. The price for this 
                                                 
139 Neuman K., (2012) New Politics, No Politics, and Antipolitics: The Dilemma of the 
Religious Right in Israel in Herman T. (ed.) By the People, For the People, Without the 
People? The Emergence of (Anti) Political Sentiment in Western Democracies and in 
Israel. Jerusalem: The Israeli Democracy Institute. 
140 One of the main practical reasons for the exclusive management of marriage and 
divorce by Religious Courts was the preservation of "pure Jewish" marriages, to be 
guaranteed by a halachically oriented body. The systematic and accurate control of the 
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delegation of power was, as Peled141 notices, a strong pro-male bias 
these legal fields as well as a traditional patriarchal idea of family.  
The public respect of Shabbat was progressively ensured with a set of 
laws (starting from the early Law of the Administration Ordinance) 
which defined the Jewish day of rest, prohibited Jewish business to 
work and to employ Jews for the Shabbat (except some exceptional 
cases). The issue of public transportation was also dealt with: public 
transportation on Shabbat was limited to few mixed cities in the 
country. The Shabbat-issue has a great symbolical valence and deeply 
marks the Jewish nature of the State. Beside the religious request that 
enlarged the deal to a public Shabbat observance (which has been 
creating divisions and protests in the secular world), the election of 
Shabbat as the day of rest underlines the deep influence that religious 
tradition has on Israeli identity, independently from the level of 
religious observance. A general acceptation of Shabbat as the day of 
rest is underlined by Mazie142 whose interviewed sample links the 
celebration of Shabbat (not necessarily implying religious observance) 
to a chain of Jewish peculiar traits, upon which the Jewish identity 
relies. 
Dietary rules were another of the main points that the State had to deal 
with in compliance with the Status Quo. Kashrut rules were (and still 
are) respected by Jewish population with variable levels of strictness.  A 
certain degree of observance of Jewish dietary laws is one of the most 
popular forms of traditionalism (practiced in most cases  also by the 
less religious population). The implemented legislation, however, has a 
very particular meaning. In 1948 therefore the respect of Kashrut laws 
                                                                                                           
origin of the spouses would have ensured to the religious faction (extremely contrary to 
intermarriage) that all couples married in Israel had the halachical approval for their 
marriage. The institution of a civil authority for marriage would not have guaranteed 
such a control and have might been cause of a deep fracture in the society.  
141 Peled, Y. (2008) The evolution of Israeli citizenship: an overview, in Citizenship Studies, 
12:3, 335 -345. 
142 Mazie S. V., (2006) Israel Higher Law: Religion and Liberal Democracy in the Jewish 
State, Lanham: Lexington Books. 
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was ordered not in all public kitchens143 but specifically in the IDF 
kitchen (Kosher Food Soldiers Ordinance). Besides providing for an 
urgent and legitimate need (that is the accommodation of soldiers' 
dietary food while they are serving their country), the law underlines 
the concern of the State for the broadest participation in the Army (that 
as we saw was conceived as a socializing agent). Further accessory laws 
in matter of kashrut will be further approved (like the forbiddance of 
pig raising and slaughtering in Israeli soil and the prohibition of non-
kosher meat importation). 
On the basis of procedure that had developed in the Yshuv period and 
following the Status Quo Agreement, the Education Law (1953) 
provided large autonomy to the different Jewish groups in matter of 
education. As said, education was seen as a precious source of 
indoctrination and preservation of group's ideology and values. The 
role of education had been originally a landmark of the Mizrachi 
movement (that aimed to revive the national soul in its land in the 
spirit of tradition and of the Torah). Short after however, the 
Ultraorthodox (who had a long scholar tradition in Europe) and the 
Secular Zionists joined the educational mission, setting up their own 
educational institutions. In the new born State, the educational asset 
was formalized through the Education Law (1953). Arab schools and 
formative activities were recognized as a separate stream; Jewish 
secular education (initially composed by two streams, then merged in 
one) was divided from the Jewish National Orthodox one. The Haredi 
remained at the margin of this legal framework: most of their schools 
were given the special status of unofficial recognized institutions (that 
in some cases meant a minimum or absent bound to the official 
educational programs). These schools, whose attendance has been in 
continuous growth, are substantially financed by public funds 
(allocated directly by various ministers for students and education or 
indirectly, through local funds and organizations)144. 
                                                 
143 This provision was not legally decreed but the norm was commonly accepted and 
respected as a consequence of the Status Quo. 
144 Apropos Haredi schools funding, it is useful to remind the previous argumentation on 
the political funding to religious network of social services. For a more detailed insight 
on Haredi educational system see Shiffer V., (1999) The Haredi Educational in Israel: 
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Related to the educational issue (even though not present in the 
original letter denominated Status Quo), exemption from the army 
service was conceded for Yeshiva students. Their commitment to 
continuous education and formation on the light of the Sacred 
Scriptures (a duty for Haredi men), earned them in the Haredi 
community the title of "spiritual warriors". Partially for the exiguous 
number of the Haredi population at the time of the agreement and 
partially in the attempt to legitimize their social function and identity 
(shaped on religious values) within the nation State, the exemption was 
granted. Similar exemption was given to Orthodox religious women in 
the aftermath of a vivid political battle that resulted with the in Civil 
Defense Law in 1949145. The reasons in this case were more related to 
the inappropriateness of the army environment to the pureness of 
religious girls. The domestic and maternal role attributed to girls in 
religious communities clashed with the military experience that was 
seen as corruptive. Again, the tradition-rooted symbolism and ideology 
were embraced in the public and legal discourse. 
For almost thirty years the political panorama was MAPAI- dominated. 
The social structures that this mass party managed to set were a 
powerful ideological vehicle used to foster State loyalty and sense of 
belonging as well as to shape citizens' identity. The continuous 
migratory flux from the Diaspora was channeled in these ideologically 
controlled structures and was guided through the integration process. 
The consociational approach endured, since MAPAI's leadership was 
aware of the possible threat coming from internal unresolved fractures. 
Government coalitions were quite large and the religious parties were 
not strictly necessary for the formation or the maintenance of the 
coalitions. Nonetheless, the young State's leaders maintained an 
inclusive approach and constantly asked for religious representatives' 
                                                                                                           
Allocation, Regulation, and Control. Jerusalem: The Floersheimer Institute for Policy 
Studies. 
145 On the exemption of religious women from the military service and more extensively 
on the political debate that originated from the different criteria of drafting applied to the 
different genders, see Berkovitch N., (1997). Motherhood as a national mission: The 
construction of womanhood in the legal discourse in Israel, in Women's Studies 
International Forum, 20:5/6: 605~519. 
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support146. State's legitimacy and security were constantly put under 
threat by the hostile neighbor countries. For this reason, the 
construction of a strong national identity rooted in biblical elements 
was seen also as a defensive measure. Specific inspirational biblical 
images and symbols were selected, reshaped and projected to the 
present reality. Adhering partially or totally to this logic, religious 
parties (and especially the National Religious Party) had the possibility 
to influence government policies and to consolidate their power in the 
emergent society. 
 
 
Religion in the era of bi-partism 
Following further waves of immigration and the development of a 
more intense social awareness of the Mizrahi Jews, the strong 
consensus machine of MAPAI progressively crumbled. Likud 
succeeded in gathering the social unrest coming from this ethnic group 
that felt discriminated against and victim of the socially and 
economically more developed Ashkenazi group. The Zionist Ashkenazi 
elite and its ideology based on human effort and self-realization was 
perceived by the Mizrahi group as distant and unfair. Shafir and 
Peled147 stress how this detachment led to the emergence of an ethno-
nationalistic interpretation of citizenship. The Zionist republican 
discourse based on duty-rights balance was accused to be the 
instrument of the Ashkenazi social domination. On the contrary, the 
common Jewish descendant was emphasized as the key for social 
advancement and legitimacy. Traditional and religious values were 
raised as the essence of Israeli identity by the Mizrahi political activists 
and by the parties that structured their claims. Among them, Shas will 
be in the Eighties the main collector of the Mizrahi unrest and ethno-
nationalist appeal. With a deep religious connotation, the party will 
invite the electorate to rebel against the false and selfish Ashkenazi 
                                                 
146 Cohen, A., & Susser, B. (1996). From accommodation to decision: Transformations in 
Israel's religious-political life in Journal Of Church & State, 38:4, 817. 
147  Shafir G. & Peled Y. (2002), See Above. 
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leadership. Moreover, it will gain the trust of many Israelis of Mizrahi 
origin providing them with the network of social services that MAPAI 
and the Alignment had not succeeded in giving them.  
 Dowty148 illustrates moreover that Mizrahi Jews, coming as refugees 
from Arab countries, had a more hostile attitude toward the Arab 
population. They warmly favored an aggressive Judaization of the 
occupied territories that Israel had conquered during the wars against 
its neighbors. At the same time, also Religious Zionists took the 
distances from their "historical allies" and get closer to the Hawkish 
positions of the right wing, attracted by their better representation of 
the religious link to the land as a sacred mission for the physical and 
the spiritual redemption. In the mid Seventies, after the Yom Kippur 
war, a blatant manifestation of this new attitude came to life: Gush 
Emunim. The very name of this extra-parliamentary group, "the block 
of the faithful", synthetizes its origin and its ideology. Gush Emunim 
engaged a massive operation of settlement in the occupied territories 
and deeply opposed the "Land for Treaties" policy, inaugurated in 
1973. Gush Emunim's ideology promoted the revival of Zionist 
initiative and encouraged the settlement in the land that was Jewish for 
divine will since Biblical time. Other more moderate parties were 
considered traitors of the Zionist ideology, weakened by their political 
and social privileged position as well as by the Western culture149. The 
historical dominance of MAPAI (renamed Alignment after the merge 
with smaller Zionist secular parties) weakened progressively and in 
1977 the Likud prevailed in the elections for the first time. This victory 
was looked at as an historical moment. It was actually a landmark for 
the historical Zionist Left that never recovered completely. It was also 
an inaugural event for the religious political influence in the country. 
From now on, the religious sector lost its role of minor ally, taken on 
board because of its symbolic relevance. Instead, it will become the 
very keystone of almost every government. This change is crucial since 
it represents the political maturation of the religious sector that, until 
                                                 
148 Dowty, A. (1998), See Above. 
149 For an interesting article on Gush Emunim and its long lasting impact in the Israeli 
society see Newman D. (1995), From Hitnachalut to Hitnatkut in Israel Studies, 10:3:192-
224. 
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that moment, had resisted and consolidated as a minority with almost 
no power of negotiation (in numerical terms). With the bipolarization 
of the party system, religious parties passed from a phase in which 
some power was given to them, to a phase in which they could actually 
claim that power, due to their political relevance. This change was as 
profitable for the religious parties as unfortunate for the big parties, 
which had loss their autonomy. The Zionist sector, furthermore, 
expanded notably its area of political interest: the ideological turn 
toward the territorial issue, made of it a more complex actor to satisfy 
in a coalition.  
In this political environment that became increasingly more 
competitive, the secular sector underwent major changes also. Most 
importantly, a greater adversity developed to the religious 
environment, now seen as greedy, inward oriented and a harmful for 
the society. The 1990s Russian wave of immigration (mostly detached 
from the religious tradition and practice) as well as a progressive 
individualization and Westernization of the secular segment 
augmented the gap between the secular and the religious world. The 
liberal discourse took the scene among the secular public. The religious 
sector responded strengthening the ethno-nationalistic appeal 
(supported by the laical right wing that adopted a much similar 
rhetoric in order to meet the favor of the religious allies). Moreover, in 
this battle royal, religious parties felt legitimated to take advantage of 
their strategic position and to abandon and destabilize the Government 
whenever they felt that their requests had remained unheard. The 
result was a recurrent political instability. In 1992 an electoral reform 
was promoted in the attempt of solving the problem curbing the power 
of sectarian parties (among which the religious ones). Even though, as 
explained previously, the attempt failed, the electoral reform is a 
unmistakable sign of impatience and of a totally changed approach 
toward the religious parties. Since the beginning of the State enterprise, 
the efforts had been put in including them; in1992 the aim was to 
neutralize them.  
The so called "Constitutional Revolution" is another example of the 
secular strives for the redefinition of the institutional setting (legal in 
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this case)150. The power acquired and used by religious parties for the 
preservation of group's interests, prevented the Basic Law: Freedom of 
Occupation and the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom to 
substantially endanger or deny the religious authority and the 
religious-rooted legislation. What the power of religious parties could 
not prevent was the new role of judicial review, acquired by the High 
Court of Justice, in virtue of the superior status of the above mentioned 
Basic Laws. The judicial body's power extension was decreed by the 
two Basic Laws that detain a higher legal status than the other laws. 
The conservative sector of the society fervidly opposed, claiming that 
the Supreme Court acted as a political body and not as a judicial 
neutral one. When Justice Aaron Barak was in office as the President of 
the Supreme Court, the body engaged in numerous cases. Its verdicts 
and more generally its increased activism provoked according to Susser 
and Cohen151, a further estrangement among the secular and the 
religious sector of the society and prevented any possibility of restoring 
a functional consociational approach.  
 
 
 
                                                 
150 Cohen, A., & Susser, B. (1996).  See above. In this article is noted how Constitutional 
Courts' activism and the further secularization attempted the consociational approach 
that was originally adopted by the Zionist leadership.  
151 Cohen, A., & Susser, B. (1996), See above. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
An analysis of the Israeli democracy following the TODEM method for 
democratic deepening enlightened that religion plays a determinant 
role in democratic procedural dimensions and deeply influences the 
quality of democracy. Of the five dimensions (rule of law, inter-
institutional accountability, electoral accountability, competition and 
participation) four are significantly influenced by religion. In this 
conclusive chapter the findings of this research will be summarized. 
Doing so, an answer to the research questions (How does religion (in 
particular Judaism) affect the quality of democracy in Israel? Why, 
historically, religion assumed this role? How the correlation between religion 
and democracy affects the life of the so called "dominant" Jewish group?) will 
be given.  A first schematic answer to the first and main question is 
given in the following table: 
 
 
Dimension How does religion affect it? 
Rule of Law - Very strict interpretation of religious precepts 
leads to gender/religious/ethnic discrimination. 
The State' ability to contrast it is reduced by: 
scarce authority in "religious-populated 
enclaves"; possible repercussions in coalitional 
politics (these positions are partially supported 
by MKs of Religious or Secular Conservative 
Parties) that limits also the possibility of 
implementing progressive legislation at regards.     
- Existence of Religious Courts with exclusive 
authority in matter of personal status. Legal 
validity to the Religious law. As a consequence: 
some citizens are negated basic rights; de facto 
implementation of a discriminatory law; different 
sets of rules (thus different verdicts) in the 
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adjudication of matters in which the authority is 
concurrent. 
Electoral 
Accountability 
The total obedience to the rabbinical authority (as 
a religious precept) allows the dynamic of 
accountability "by proxy": the spiritual 
charismatic authority has full decision on Ultra-
religious parties' internal dynamics (including 
candidate and leaders). 
Participation - Strict interpretation of religious norms leads to 
social detachment and self-segregation in 
homogeneous communities. Participation is 
associated to the risk of spiritual and cultural 
"contamination".   
- Participation in the State is seen as functional to 
the survival of the segregated community and 
implementation of its agenda but identification is 
strictly denied. 
- Religious values stimulate, in some cases, social 
engagement in specific activities in which values 
can be translated in practice (for ex. benefic 
organizations).  
Competition - Religion is a persistent social and political 
cleavage, formally structured by religious parties. 
Religious vote throughout the years: 20-30%. 
Religious influence in parties' ideology is very 
strong and assumes different forms.  
- In post-electoral competition religion keeps its 
influence due to the power that religious parties 
have in coalitions (blackmail power). 
  
 
 
319 
 
The first documents of the State: Declaration of Independence and 
constitutional debate 
At the institutional level, religion has been exerting its influence since 
the creation of the State. In the first official document of the State, the 
Declaration of Independence, the use of symbols and semantic that are 
religion-related is massive, especially in the introductory part. The 
attachment to Eretz Ysrael is explained recalling that there the Jewish 
nation was given the Torah. People's faith in God is mentioned as well 
as the desire, alive for centuries during the Diaspora, to come back to 
the land that represented their spiritual center. The possible insertion of 
the world "God" in the Declaration provoked an intense debate. As a 
result of the negotiation among the different opinions, a biblical 
metaphoric expression was chosen (the Rock of Israel) to make a 
reference to God without directly mentioning him. Similarly, the word 
democracy is not mentioned in the Declaration, even though a clear 
commitment to democracy is clearly inferable looking at the general 
content. One of the main elements that reveal the democratic aspiration 
is the emphasis on the elaboration of a Constitution by an elected 
Constituent Assembly. In the Declaration, the Constitutional Chart 
represents the trait d'union between the historic past of the Jewish 
nation in Eretz Ysrael and the reestablished modern and democratic 
State of Israel. This crucial element failed to be translated into practice. 
Religious political leadership initially proved quite collaborative. Then 
it retreated to more intransigent positions when the divisions among 
the secular political leadership emerged apropos the Constitutional 
issue. The concerns of the religious group about the Constitution were 
both practical and spiritual. On a practical level, they thought that the 
secular class would have used the Constitution to curb power to the 
religious establishment and build a secular society. On the other side, a 
supreme source of legislation, as Constitutions are by definition, would 
have undermined the authority of the only supreme law that the 
religious group recognizes: the Halacha. Therefore, even though the 
absence of a Constitutional Chart in Israel is not exclusively imputable 
to the religious hostility, it certainly played a role on the issue.  
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A weaker State against discrimination 
The absence of a written Constitution has been firmly criticized, and it 
has been looked at as a missed opportunity. In particular, a 
Constitutional Chart, with its universalistic approach to society, would 
have guaranteed a higher democratic strength and a powerful aid to 
fulfill one of the main democratic functions: the protection of 
minorities1. This argument finds at least partial confirmation in the 
research findings. The State of Israel proves a general commitment to 
fight against crime of any type, including discrimination. However, the 
effectiveness of this commitment is challenged, in some cases 
successfully, by practices of religious derivation, which flourish among 
religious citizens. It has been noticed how sacred texts as well as 
masterpieces of religious doctrine contain elements that can lead to 
discriminatory behaviors. The level of religious observance and the 
adoption of more progressive or stricter interpretations increases or 
decreases the likelihood of a discriminatory attitude. The aggregate 
dimension is also influential. The higher the level of religious 
observance, the highest the possibility is that the individual will live in 
a homogeneous community, often segregated from the external 
influence. In Ultraorthodox communities, for example, where the level 
of observance is high, the segregation increases the probability of 
values stagnation (with consequent crystallization of old practices and 
beliefs that in some cases do not even find a strong explanation in 
religion) and the adoption of a more intransigent and intolerant 
approach to those actions that are interpreted as religious violations.  
From the TODEM investigation the main areas of discrimination 
possibly related to religion are: gender discrimination, ethnic 
discrimination and religious discrimination.  
Gender discrimination is based on a deep "chauvinist"-bias traceable in 
religious sources and in a conservative approach to interpersonal 
relations, related to the exaltation of the spiritual dimension and the 
                                                 
1 Peleg, I. (1998), Israel's Constitutional Order and Kulturkampf in Israel Studies, 3:1: 230-
250. 
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downgrade of the physical one. The stigma around homosexuality is 
strong and common within the religious community. Homosexuality is 
seen as an abomination and a disease. The solution that a consistent 
part of religious authorities proposes to this obscene tendency is 
medical treatment. In alternative, a total rejection of one's own sexual 
identity is advised and the creation of a traditional family is suggested 
as a diversion. An enormous social pressure is exerted on the 
homosexual members of religious communities. The collective stigma is 
reversed on the individual and on his family. Such an inflexible 
reaction is likely to create interior dilemmas and a struggle for self-
acceptation. Furthermore it can discourage the public expression of one 
own sexuality. In cities where the religious population is numerous, 
public manifestations organized by the gay community have triggered 
ferocious protests from the religious community degenerated 
sometimes in acts of physical violence.  
The conceptual roots of discriminatory behaviors against women are 
listed above (since they are the same for both acceptations of gender 
discrimination). Discrimination against women has two manifestations: 
internal to the community and external. At the internal level, religious 
culture and education play a determinant role both on the perpetrator 
and on the victim. The virtues of a religious woman, agreed upon in the 
collective morale and instilled in youngsters through familiar and 
scholastic education, are modesty, calm, docility, obedience to the man 
as well as dedication to the domestic affairs (including the concept of 
Shalom HaBait). This vision, favors the silent acceptation of familial 
abuse and foster dynamics of self-accusation and justification of the 
violent behavior2. In some cases the justification or the minimization of 
violence comes also from the leaders of the community, whose opinion 
is trusted and hardly contested by the community members. 
Detachment from the rest of the society as well as the sense of shame 
represents a further obstacle for the victims. It can be hard for a woman 
that lived all her life in a segregated community to leave her world and 
build a new life in a different context. In the case of spousal violence, 
                                                 
2 Graetz N., (1998) Judaism Confronts Wife-Beating in Woman in Judaism in A 
Multidisciplinary Journal, 1:2. 
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the legal constrains represent a further problem, that is actually 
common to secular and religious women. Religious courts have 
authority on matter of divorce. These courts act according to religious 
principles that, as seen, tend to perpetuate gender inequality. Religious 
women, that hardly would refer to a civil court also for ancillary 
matters to divorce (it is seen as a sin in the religious world) risk to be 
significantly penalized in the divorce proceeding, also in economic 
matters and in the custody of children. Moreover, the Jewish law, 
enforced by religious courts, gives the husband the last word on the 
divorce proceeding. If the permission to divorce is negated by the 
husband, the woman will find herself in a limbo as she will remain 
married for the civil and the religious law. This mean that in case the 
woman decided to break a violent spousal, she is likely to lose her 
husband, her name, the support of the family and of the community, 
her children and not to be able to start a new life. With these premises, 
actually, the perspective of a new life will not seem so attractive and the 
risk is significant that women will not take stance against their abuser. 
The gender-biased approach due to religious beliefs is not only adopted 
within the community. In fact, it is extended to all women, 
independently from their will and it intensifies in case of women that 
find themselves in a religious-dominated spatial area (like a religious 
neighborhood). The community's morale is enforced in public and also 
"outsiders" are subject to it (this entails restrictions in behavior, clothing 
etc.). The contravention of or the perceived threat to these niche norms 
can provoke the violent reactions of religious individuals (verbal or 
physical). 
Despite State's general commitment to protect sexual minorities and to 
promote full gender equality, the political debate is influenced by 
diverse positions, some of them extreme. Members of religious parties 
opposes regularly to demonstrations promoted by organizations that 
defend homosexual's rights accusing them public disturbance and 
offense to the public morale. Unequivocally discriminatory positions 
have been taken by many Members of Knesset (declaring that women 
should not sit in Parliament; that homosexuals are a plague for the 
society etc.). A quite intense legislative activity has been dedicated to 
the proposal of discriminatory bills (proposing mandatory 
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"normalization" treatments and even, ban of gay sexual relations, 
opposing women's appointment to selection etc.). These positions are 
not exclusive of religious parties (as well as not totally agreed upon 
within the religious parties). The denigrating discourse, especially 
regards homosexuality, is supported and fomented by some 
representatives of secular conservative parties. More progressive 
factions counteract this approach, and dedicate part of their legislative 
activity to the promotion of equality and integration. Progressive 
factions as well as the secular public opinion often blame the 
Government for trading social progress for coalition interests. The 
Government is portrayed as a hostage of the extremist religious logic 
that betrays the aspiration of the secular and moderate majority. 
Coalitional interests can be particularly harmed by these issues: 
religious parties are extremely intransigent on these matters and could 
easily break the governmental alliance if their point of view was not 
taken into account (with possible repercussion in future alliances). The 
direct and the transversal impact of religious positions cause 
Governments (independently from their political connotation) to barely 
progress on matter of integration and equality.  
Similar religious constraints to the institutional promotion of equality 
and the fight against discrimination have been found also in the case of 
ethnic and religious minorities. An exclusivist conception of Jewish 
ethnicity and the desire of creating a pure Jewish social and territorial 
entity had driven some religious leaders to promote discriminatory 
estate transactions. In the attempt to create homogeneous ethnic 
neighborhoods and in compliance with a much controversial biblical 
norm that warns Jews not to let other population dwell among them, 
some rabbis forbade the cession of property to non-Jews in Israel. Other 
initiatives have been taken in this direction, where the ethnic criterion 
was used as discriminant for the acceptation of new members in a 
residential area. 
The same exclusivist logic, leads to discrimination against religious 
minorities in the country. This is particularly true in the case of 
proselytizer groups. They are perceived as a threat for the Jewish 
identity, since they might be driving some Jews to embrace other cults. 
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This possibility is regarded with terror by religious groups. As a 
consequence, even though proselytism is not a crime in Israel, some of 
them engage a "holy war" against these groups. The main target is the 
Messianic cult, whose members are observant Jews who recognize 
Jesus as the Messiah. Some religious Jewish organizations, committed 
to the defeat of these dangerous cults, oftentimes harass verbally and 
physically the members of these proselytizer communities. The fight 
against these groups is flanked by religious parties' parliamentary 
activity that tried several times to ban (or severely restrict) the 
possibility to proselytize in Israel. Several bills have been presented to 
the Knesset, especially by MKs from religious parties, which tried to 
ban the proselyting activity in the country. Some of these proposals 
have been approved and became law. Also at local level, episodes of 
discrimination perpetrated by institutional actors have been taking 
place under the pressure of religious parties' protestors. The ambiguity 
of the Government on this matter is sometimes astounding: a restrictive 
interpretation of the norms have been informally decreeing the 
illegality of proselytism, spreading among the public the perception 
that this activity is illegal. A certain degree of collaboration between the 
Ministry of Interior and anti-missionaries organizations to prevent 
"suspect" proselytizers to enter or to stay in the country had been 
denounced and rebuked by the Supreme Court. A strong power against 
the implementation of equality is registered also in the case of non-
Orthodox streams of Judaism. The different approach to religious 
observance and to prayer creates scandal among the Orthodox 
believers. Contempt is showed toward these minority groups by the 
Orthodox establishment that often questioned their real Jewishness. In 
cases in which the two realities meet in sacred places, violent reactions 
are likely. At the political level there is much awareness on this matter 
since it is deeply intertwined with other legal matters. The position of 
the State is ambiguous: it condemns extreme acts of discrimination but 
it enforces discriminatory provisions. Orthodox and Ultraorthodox 
parties fiercely advocate against the improvement of the status of non-
Orthodox communities, looking at them as undignified competitors 
both on the religious and on the political level. Under the pressure of 
public opinion, especially the international one (non-Orthodox Judaism 
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is a majority stream in the United States) some timid steps toward 
equality that have been made among the indignation and violent 
opposition of the religious parties3. As of now, even though the reforms 
might strengthen the non-Orthodox communities and contribute to 
their legitimation in the eyes of the population, their status in front of 
the law remains a lower one.   
 
 
A State within the State 
As remarked above a high level of observance influences not only the 
views and the behavior of the individual but has consequences also at 
aggregate level. Religious communities and especially the 
Ultraorthodox tend to spatially detach themselves from the rest of the 
society and socialize in homogeneous communities where values and 
customs are agreed upon and based on strict observance of the 
Halacha. These customs and traditions have been preserved since the 
time of the Diaspora, when Jews lived in foreign countries and 
struggled against persecutions and assimilation processes to maintain 
their identity. One of the original requests of the Ultraorthodox faction 
to the Zionist leadership at the time of the Yshuv was to be able to 
preserve their autonomy in matter of lifestyle, education and religious 
practice. This was a sine qua non to obtain the Ultraorthodox minimal 
collaboration in the establishment of the State. The request was 
consented, probably imagining that the exiguous community would 
have surrendered after a while to the secular society, integrating itself 
and embracing modern life independently from their religious belief. 
Up to this time, this transformation has not occurred. Instead, the 
Ultraorthodox community grew and dwelled in new Haredi 
neighborhoods and new Haredi towns. The lasting desire to 
distinguish themselves from the rest of the population and to preserve 
a strong identity has been an incentive them to open educational 
institutions, shops, banks and social services that fit their values and 
                                                 
3 At the time of the writing a process of reform seems to be started. It is way too early to 
state the effects of the very recent measures and to analyze them more in detail. 
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their social norms. In the creation of these microcosms, they have been 
granted the autonomy that had been originally conceded. The influence 
of Ultraorthodox parties has ensured the public disbursement of 
conspicuous funding necessary to set up the services and maintaining 
them. If this autonomy has allowed a centenarian tradition to survive 
and a group of citizens to safeguard their identity, on the other hand it 
has caused the State to renounce to part of the control over its citizens. 
Educational separation that was decreed in 1953 (but was in force from 
the time of the Yshuv) enabled the Haredi community to set up 
educational projects focused on the religious traditions and doctrine. 
The special status conferred to the Haredi educational stream limits the 
control authority of the State on the learning material and teaching 
quality. Even if these schools receive public funding and substitute the 
mandatory schooling, as a matter of fact, they are practically not bound 
to guarantee an appropriate educational path for the students. In 
Haredi neighborhoods, as extensively described, a different set of 
informal rule is in force. Roads are closed to the traffic every Shabbat 
and during the religious holidays. Specific norms of behavior are in 
effect: interpersonal contacts among women and men are not 
welcomed and sometimes spatial segregation is enforced. There are 
separate entrances to many shops, which are required to sell goods that 
are not offensive for the public morale (not colorful clothes, not books 
or movies that have not been approved by Haredi religious authority 
etc.). The official authority does not usually interfere with this social 
asset that, nonetheless, contributes to the consolidation of 
antidemocratic values and represents an obstacle for the free circulation 
of non Haredi citizens in that area. To ensure the respect of these 
norms, an informal "police service" is acting semi-clandestinely. These 
squads generally known as "modesty police" are responsible for 
safeguarding the decency in the Haredi areas, patrolling public 
behavior, business and residents' private life. Their method of action, 
not always remains in the limits of legality. The State intervenes in 
resounding cases (when physical violence or grave vandalistic acts are 
denounced) but, many times, it finds itself powerless up against the 
code of silence of a population that scarcely relies on State authority. 
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Dual Judicial System  
The most evident way in which religious influence impairs the rule of 
law in Israel and directly affects the institutional system is through the 
existence of religious courts and their incorporation into the national 
judicial authority. The acceptation of religious exclusive authority in 
matters of personal status entails the attribution of the exclusive 
legitimacy to the sets of religious norms that govern these matters. The 
religious norms acquire legal status and are extended to all citizens, 
disregarding their level of religiosity. This has an automatic restrictive 
effect on the legislation of liberal values bot at national and at 
international level. At national level, the inclusion of special articles and 
margin notes in legal texts is a much used stratagem in order to create 
legal exceptions and not to harm religious-legal norms. At international 
level, Israel is often unable to accept the whole text (of Conventions, 
Agreements, Declarations, Pacts etc.) and is forced to put its reserve on 
articles that enucleate basic rights. Going back to the authority of 
religious courts, and its power in matter of personal status, religious 
views and rules on this issue are implemented as an adjudication 
criterion. This causes two main problems: a) some citizens are left 
without an option for the enjoyment of rights connected to the personal 
status (for example all citizens that are not able to marry in a religious 
court, couples whose union is not accepted according to the religious 
law, couples whose religion is not recognized in Israel therefore does 
not have authority in matter of personal status) b) the religious law 
enhances inequality as a legal principle (see the above mentioned 
example of divorce in which the husband has decisional power on the 
end of the marriage). Moreover, also the functioning of the religious 
courts (not only its judicature) relies on inequality: women are not 
allowed to sit as religious judges and the procedure for the obtainment 
of the rabbinical license favors men and observant people. As explained 
in the previous chapters, religious courts and civil courts share 
authority in complementary matters of the divorce procedure. The 
authority is actually competitive. This means that the citizen can appeal 
alternatively to one or the other court. A serious dysfunction in terms of 
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rule of law stems from this duality. The two courts adopt different 
criteria, almost contrasting among them. The situation could verify in 
which two identical cases were adjudicated in very different terms. The 
verdicts would be both legally valid. The fact that two cases can be 
totally identical is extremely improbable but a more convincing 
example is that at times, when a religious verdict has been contested in 
the Supreme Court, it has been overturned since not in line with the 
civil norms. It is difficult to say what is more harmful for a democracy: 
the fact that two judges of the State can give a total different verdict or 
the fact that the Supreme Court overturns a verdict because elaborated 
according to a discriminatory rationale but the underlying principle 
maintains its validity for future adjudications. In this context, the 
legitimacy of the judicial power is also weakened. Judicial power 
should be seen as an impartial arbiter. With the provision of different 
verdicts, religious and civil courts risk to be seen as partisan, in contrast 
one with each other. 
 
 
Religious Parties 
Just having a quick look to the general topic of the present and the 
previous paragraph, it is possible to realize how substantial the role of 
religion is in the institutional apparatus. In these two small passages in 
fact, Judiciary, Legislative and Executive are nominated as the fields in 
which religion exerts its influence. In the last chapter has been 
confirmed according to the model of Rokkan and Lipset4 that religion 
in Israel produces a social cleavage. This social cleavage is structured 
and organized by religious parties. Some of these parties' commitment 
to religious values is very strong. Religion is not only an inspiration but 
is actually the protagonist of the model of State and society that they 
aim to realize. The minority consensus that these parties gain does not 
allow them to implement their ideology completely; however it is 
sufficient for the parties to exert influence in the elective bodies to 
                                                 
4 Rokkan S., Lipset S. M. (1967) Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-national 
Perspectives. Toronto: The Free Press. 
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realize part of their agenda. In the fragmented political system of the 
last decades, religious parties' power has been increasing. Their 
blackmail power allows them to be more and more demanding since 
their vote is often determinant for the life of the Government. Religious 
parties have been taking part in almost every coalition since the State 
was created.  In exchange for their support, they have been assigned 
ministries (Ministry of Interior and ministry of religious Affairs has 
been two traditional offices assigned to religious parties but also 
different ministries has been assigned during the years) and monetary 
budget to direct to the religious communities and institutions. The hard 
strategy of these parties about the support to the Government results 
sometimes in stalemates. In order to recompose the fractures, informal 
and non-transparent arrangements are stipulated in favors of the 
blackmailer party. These episodes are often denounced by the media 
and the public reactions are ferocious. Parliament and Government 
progressively lose popularity in the eyes of the citizens (especially 
secular): on one side they resent religious parties for they ruthless 
approach to politics; on the other side they resent the main parties for 
satisfying the utilitarian demands of the religious parties and 
submitting to their blackmail in order to stay in power. 
 
 
Orthodemocracy 
In the introduction a detailed argumentation has been made apropos 
the concept of Ethnic Democracy created by Smooha5. The studies of 
Smooha have been actually very inspiring for this research and have 
stimulated the first questions about the relation between religion and 
quality of democracy in Israel. Smooha elaborates his theory focusing 
on the ethnic issue, which is the most powerful cleavage in Israeli 
society6. In ethno-democratic regimes, the State is considered a 
                                                 
5 Smooha S., (2001) Ethnic Democracy a model. Working paper n. 13, European Centre for 
Minority Issues. 
6 Arian A. & Shamir M. (2008) Israel 1996 - 2006 A Decade Later, the World Had Changed, 
the Cleavage Structure Remained in Party Politics, 14: 685-705. 
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prerogative of the dominant ethnic group. The model defines the State 
as a tool in the hands of the ethnic majority who shapes policies and 
institutions in order to achieve its goals. The same ethnic path was 
followed in an analysis of the Jewish population. Mizrahi Jews were 
considered highly discriminated on the basis of their provenience by 
the dominant Ashkenazi class. However, the ethnic approach in its 
entirety leaves a number of phenomena unexplained, which instead 
have found an answer analyzing the religious dimension.  
This research was originated by the desire to explain paths of 
discrimination that were not perpetrated through ethnic lines. A 
significant portion of basic individual and collective rights, indeed, are 
not accessible to some Jewish Israeli citizens. Other rights are negated 
to all Israeli citizens because of the survival of religious dominance on 
some legal spheres. Moreover, dissatisfaction and social unrest has 
been growing in the segment that the ethnic approach portraits as the 
dominant class: the Ashkenazi population, or more generally the 
secular one. The results lead to the introduction of a new term: 
Orthodemocracy, which portraits the relation between democracy and 
religion in the country. This term does not define a model but simply 
summarize the role of Orthodox Judaism (and for some respect 
religious orthodoxy in general) in the institutional apparatus and in the 
life of the citizens. I do not deny the belonging of Israel in the category 
of democratic countries. What the term Orthodemocracy implicates is 
that orthodoxy influence the democratic quality and, in some cases, 
poses itself before democracy. All the above mentioned institutional 
cases in which religion affects the State are proof of this concept: in 
particular, the 1953 formalization of a double judicial apparatus and the 
attribution to the religious courts of exclusive authority in certain 
matters. Recognizing religious norms as civilly valid forces all citizens 
to submit to them. Rubinstein7 looks at this reform as an historical 
event since from this moment on religious affiliation (and the 
submission to a certain religious authority and sets of rules) became a 
condition and not a choice.  
                                                 
7 Rubinstein A., (1967). Law and Religion in Israel in Israel Legal Review, 380:384-88. 
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Incorporating the religious courts in the State system means that a body 
that refers to religion as a normative source becomes a legitimate 
instrument of the rule of law. As it concern Judaism, the Rabbinical 
Courts are exclusive expression of the Orthodox stream and do not 
keep in any consideration Non-Orthodox streams of Judaism. The State 
therefore not only imposed the adhesion to religious norms on all Jews 
but specifically chose one of the streams of Judaism, further narrowing 
the horizon of freedom. The privileged position in the institutional 
ordainment of the Orthodox interpretation of Judaism and the 
consequent disadvantaged position of those who do not identify with it 
betray the main existential purpose of the State of Israel: to be the 
homeland of all Jews and the place where they can live their Jewish 
identity freely and without being discriminated against. What happens 
instead is that the organization of public services and the public sphere 
in general aim to be congenial to the Orthodox observance. All other 
streams of Judaism and those who do not recognize themselves as 
believers, encounter some kind of obstacle Orthodemocracy is 
preserved through the active participation of religious parties in the 
political life of the country. Following this rationale, it is possible to 
understand their extreme closure to reforms that could improve the 
conditions of non-Orthodox streams or the bitter tones against the 
Supreme Court's intervention in religious courts' verdicts.   
From this brief summary an from the research at large,  it is possible to 
confirm the hypothesis that the Israeli State considers its citizens first as 
members of religious groups, then as members of ethnic groups and 
only at the end, as citizens of the State. This has two repercussions, one 
regarding the society at large and one regarding the Jewish group. 
Conferring civil authority to religious orthodoxy, the State misses an 
occasion to be regarded as point of reference (in matters that have a 
great impact on the life of the citizens). Those who are satisfied with the 
religious provisions of the above mentioned services will strengthen 
their bonds of loyalty to the religious authority. All those citizens that 
cannot enjoy their rights in the country will certainly feel discriminated 
against and their level of identification with the State will decrease 
sensibly. In terms of legitimation for the State, both cases are a failure. 
Moreover, the delegation of this area of authority to different actors 
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increases the separation among the population. Even if they are all 
citizens of the same country, nonetheless they are not under the same 
equal law.  
The second repercussion, internal to the Jewish group, is that the 
"secular Ashkenazi"8, modeled as the dominator of the Israeli society, 
accused to having shaped the Israeli democracy according to his 
standards and interests find himself trapped in a situation of 
discrimination. The "secular Ashkenazi" identification with religious 
values is usually scarce as well as the will to submit to religious rules. 
The rules and the political dynamics of the Orthodemocracy constitute 
a hard burden to carry for him. This condition actually favors the 
detachment from the social and political sphere and the self-retreat in a 
individualistic position, full of resentment for those who are seen as 
usurpers of his freedom.    
 
 
Historical reasons 
Orthodemocracy is the result of a deliberate process of institution-
building driven by political considerations. While non-institutional 
settings can be the result sociological transformations in which the 
political power plays a minor role, the case in analysis presupposes 
political guidance and awareness. It this research, a brief paragraph has 
been dedicated to the historical reasons of why religion exerts such an 
influence in Israel. The analysis confirms the hypothesis that the very 
origin of this influence is the power that the religious group had as a 
legitimizing agent. The affirmation of Zionist nationalism was 
engrossing as much as complicated. In the Jewish world, especially the 
religious one, not everybody held favorable views on the Zionist 
project. Zionism however could not afford a religious mass-defection 
both for numerical considerations and for ideological ones. The 
                                                 
8 In this paragraph the expression "Secular Ashkenazi" is used as a term of reference to 
the ethnic studies that depicted it as a stereotype of economic success and social 
domination.  In reality, non all Ashkenazi are secular and not all secular are 
Ashkenazim). 
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meaning of a Jewish national enterprise would have been gravely 
harmed by the non-adherence of a significant part of the population. 
For this reason, a strategy for gathering consensus was engaged. The 
favorable religious faction was immediately coopted (this will 
constitute the Religious Zionist group and will be kept within the 
leading coalition for thirty years by the Zionist secular leadership). To 
mild the position of the most reticent groups (especially those united 
under the non-Zionist Agudat Ysrael movement) the adopted strategy 
was a profusion of religious symbolism and rhetoric and, most 
effectively, the reassurance that the religious identity and tradition will 
not be obstructed or downplayed in the new State. The consociational 
approach was a traditional custom in the Diaspora. Jews used to live in 
semi-autonomy and organize their social life in a way not to endanger 
the unity and the safety of their community. The same model was 
exported in Palestine, when the wave of Zionist migration took control 
of the New Yshuv.  After all, the initial characteristics of the Yshuv were 
actually similar to the Diaspora communities. The importance of 
fostering identification with the Zionist project and involving all social 
groups in the community was remarked after few "attempts of 
sabotage". Leaders of the Ultraorthodox party Agudat Ysrael, for 
example, tried to founder the State plan establishing secret contacts 
with the Arabs and delegitimizing Zionism at international level, with 
negative propaganda. International legitimation was an indispensable 
requirement in the delicate process in which the actual possibility of 
forming a State was still under the examination of the international 
organs. As symbolic evidence, exactly during the UNSCOP visit in 
Palestine, the Status Quo was stipulated as an agreement between the 
Zionist elite and Agudat Ysrael.  This document sealed the agreement 
between Religious and Secular leaders on their reciprocal concessions: 
the support for the creation of the State of Israel was to be traded with 
the implementation of some religious traits of the new State. The Status 
Quo is the symbol of the organization of the society along the religious 
fracture. It proves the political power that the religious component of 
the Jewish community derived from symbolic and political elements, 
all linked to the legitimation of the State of Israel as the Jewish 
Homeland.  
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Looking at the post- Independence period, it is possible to trace a 
consociational rationale in all the main political choices: the influence 
that religious parties exerted in setting the basic legislation 
(Orthodemocracy), the choice of the proportional as an inclusive 
electoral system, the involvement of the religious parties in the 
governmental coalitions, the social autonomy that was given them and 
funded with public money, etc. For almost thirty years MAPAI 
dominated the political scene and preserved this asset. In the late 
Seventies, with the institution of a bipolar political system the 
consociational approach left the place to a more competitive pattern. 
Religious parties shifted progressively from a condition of symbolic 
power (that is the power of legitimation) to a condition of numeric 
power (because their votes became necessary for the survival of the 
Government). The new political power has been allowing them to 
maintain basically intact (or to enhance) the Orthodemocratic 
apparatus that was created during the early years of the State. This 
"new" competitive position however, together with an ongoing 
individualization and secularization in the society has further 
deepened the secular- religious rift.  
 
 
The dynamics of Participation 
It has been found that the Haredi group is the most reticent to social 
participation. Its self-exclusion from social interactions and activities is 
justified with the will of preserving spiritual purity, religious identity 
and not being contaminated by a corrupted society and by a blaspheme 
ideology. From one hand, the incorporation of religious values and the 
religious parties' agenda implementation proved to be a sine qua non for 
the identification with, the recognition of and the participation to the 
State of specific group of citizens. 
A minimum degree of pragmatic collaboration with the Government 
has been kept through religious parties that advocate the Haredi cause 
in order to gain further autonomy and resources to maintain it. The 
political mobilization is very effective: the detached and segregated 
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Haredim can turn to the most loyal activists and voters during the 
electoral period. Their politicization follows the same religious path. 
Haredi parties for example, attribute centrality to the spiritual leader 
that de facto controls the party (choosing its leadership, the candidates 
etc.) This accountability "by proxy" is built on the trust and the absolute 
authority conferred to the religious authority. After all, the sacred 
scriptures confer to rabbis a superior and uncontestable authority. 
On the social level, the rejection to participate is justified on religious 
basis but acquires often political and social meanings.  The almost total 
rejection of work as a positive element in human life is proved to be a 
rather "recent" interpretation, elaborated by the rabbinical tradition but 
actually not totally respondent to the Biblical source that praises work 
as a noble activity9. The affirmation of this interpretation among the 
Israeli Haredi world might actually assume a political connotation of 
refusal of the man-centered Zionist ideology that defines productivity 
and creativity as paramount. The troubled relation of the Haredi 
communities with participative forms enlightens the absolute concern 
about the preservation of their values and their lifestyle and depicts the 
non Haredi society as hostile and marauding. 
 Some openness has been shown in the last decades especially in the 
new generations. Another element has absolute relevance for the next 
and final paragraph: the creation of some benefic Haredi organization 
that grew in the territory and provided the entire population with 
precious services.  
 
 
Religious values as a key for reconciliation 
Religious belief and observance have a prevalent deterrent effect on the 
Haredi participation in society. This rejection prevents them from 
increasing their identification with the State and to acquire full 
legitimacy as citizens. These are partially effects and partially declared 
                                                 
9 Stadler N., (2002) in Is Profane Work ah Obstacle to Salvation? The Case of Ultra-
Orthodox (Haredi) Jews, in Contemporary Israel in Sociology of Religion, 63:4:455-474. 
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ideological purposes of the Haredi leadership. Civic partnership in the 
sinful State of Israel is not an enticing possibility for the Haredi 
community, focused on the preservation of religious tradition and 
values. However, from the same source, religion, a possible key of 
pacification seems to rise. The religious values that the Haredi 
volunteers puts in practice through the benefic organizations they are 
involved in and that they created, give them gratification both as 
believers and as citizens. Their role harmonized the two identities and 
pacifies the dilemma State-Faith. These activities, which involve a 
minor portion of the Haredi community, are anyway emblematic of a 
possible negotiation on the meaning of civic participation in the State. 
Religiosity does not necessarily contrast with the civic dimension; on 
the contrary there is margin for religion to help building a new social 
identity that will not create an internal dilemma.  
The path that this research would like to propose is a path of 
reconciliation and education. Participation should be favored in the 
acceptation of individual contribution. As Bick10 argues, participation 
should be valorized by the State as a moment of bridging social 
capitals, putting aside the particularistic interests that aim to affirm 
groups' ideology as dominant. The particularistic approach rapes 
others' identities and favors detachment and closure. Indeed, it fosters 
the reciprocal perception as threat and a defensive self-retreat. Giving a 
sort of "federal autonomy" to the Haredi community, the State has 
fostered a particularistic view of participation and citizenship. As a 
consequence, the rift between religious and secular citizens has 
deepened. The Haredi community (but also the secular one to a certain 
extent) created a "super-individual" dimension, maintained jealously its 
particularistic views and used the society to impose them. The aim to 
building a more inclusive society, as a result of compromise and 
integration of the different views was not taken into consideration. On 
the contrary, a consuming negotiation has taken place on the meaning 
of Israel as a political and social entity. An unsolvable diatribe about 
the Jewish identity has been occupying the scene for decades. The 
                                                 
10 Bick E., (2010), The Tal Law: A Missed Opportunity for “Bridging Social Capital” in 
Israel in Journal of Church and State  52:2:298-322. 
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political class has never been able to set an agenda that would diminish 
the internal conflict or implement long term measure to shape the 
political culture of its citizens. 
Till the moment in which particularistic considerations will be the main 
motor of political and social actions, improvements will not be seen. A 
good point of starting should be the retrieval of those basic values that 
are shared by the groups (this should not be impossible given the 
common cultural roots). The Declaration of Independence, being the 
result of long negotiations over matters of principle, includes many of 
these values. They should be taken out of the rhetorical context and 
implemented in shared paths. 
Absolute protagonists of this cohesive project should be the progressive 
voices within the religious communities. Those rabbis who express 
milder opinions on homosexuality, those who engaged in continuous 
collaboration with shelters for beaten women, the volunteers of benefic 
organization should be seen as gatekeepers (and not as Troy horses). 
Only the honest recognition of the other as equally entitled to 
contribute to the society with his own resources and only the will of 
rebuilding a common society can lead to an improvement in the 
relations among secular and religious citizens and to the preservation 
of everyone's own identity. 
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